Cablegate: Scenesetter for Codel Marshall Visit to Mali

VZCZCXRO7811
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHBP #0566/01 2381352
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 261352Z AUG 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0676
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0670

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BAMAKO 000566

SENSITIVE SIPDIS

DEPT PASS TO LTC FRANK SOBCHAK, USSOCOM

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OREP PREL PGOV MASS ML

SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL MARSHALL VISIT TO MALI

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1. (SBU) Summary: We warmly welcome CODEL Marshall's
upcoming visit to Mali. The CODEL?s visit will provide
an important opportunity to highlight U.S. support for a
moderate, majority Muslim democracy that stands as an
example for West Africa and beyond. Mali is a strong
opponent of terrorism and a key member of the Trans-
Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). Mali has
made considerable progress since its 1991-1992 transition
to democracy. Nonetheless, Mali faces serious
socioeconomic and security challenges. Mali's health,
education and economic indicators remain among the lowest
in the world. U.S. assistance plays a crucial role in
helping Mali to address these challenges by ensuring that
Mali's political successes translate into tangible
improvements for Mali's estimated 13 million people.

2. (SBU) Mali?s security challenges are multi-faceted
and involve a dormant Tuareg rebellion and a growing
terrorist threat from Al Qaeda in the Lands of the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Although currently at low ebb,
periodic fighting earlier this year between one Tuareg
rebel/criminal group and the Malian military in the
northern region of Kidal endangered the implementation of
a peace agreement, known as the Algiers Accords, signed
by the Malian government and Tuareg rebels in July 2006.
Northern Mali also serves as an unwilling safe-haven for
the Islamic extremist group AQIM which has held multiple
Western and Malian military hostages ? although none at
present ? and has assassinated one hostage and a Malian
military officer.

3. (SBU) In late-June and early-July, Malian military
forces engaged in battle members of AQIM with some
success. U.S. military assistance, including training and
provision of non-lethal material through the TSCTP and
other programs, significantly assists the Malian Armed
Forces to become more professional and to improve their
capacity to defend themselves and to begin to take the
fight to AQIM in the harsh desert environment of Northern
Mali. U.S. security cooperation is a key component to
helping Mali meet its security needs and provide the
stability it requires to prosper both politically and
economically. End Summary.

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Malian Democracy and International Engagement
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4. (U) As a moderate majority Muslim multi-ethnic
democracy with over 17 years of democratic experience,
Mali serves as an example for west Africa and beyond.
President Amadou Toumani Toure, who is known to Malians
as "ATT," was re-elected to a second and final five year
term as President in a free and fair election in 2007
with more than 70 percent of the vote.

5. (U) Mali is a responsible and engaged international
partner. It has a strong human rights record and is one
of the few members of the Organization of the Islamic
Conference to be rated as "free" by Freedom House. Mali
is also a leader in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of press
freedoms. In addition to serving as the 2007 Chair of
the Community of Democracies, Mali is active in the
United Nations and other international organizations and
has participated in several international peacekeeping
operations. Mali is also a solid partner in the fight
against terrorism and an active participant in TSCTP.

6. (SBU) Unfortunately, Mali's political progress has not
been matched by improved social and economic indicators.
Mali ranked 173 out of 177 countries on the United
Nation's 2007 Human Development Index. Mali's poor
ranking is due in large part to literacy rates, health
indicators and a per capita GNP that ranks among the
lowest in the world. These factors, along with periodic
Tuareg unrest and the continued presence of al Qaeda-
aligned terrorist elements in the country's sparsely
populated northern regions, constitute serious threats to
Malian democracy and regional stability. The United
States plays a significant role in helping Mali to meet
these challenges and reinforce almost two decades of
democratic progress.

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U.S. Assistance to Mali
-----------------------

7. (U) The November 2006 signing of a Millennium
Challenge Account compact with Mali made the United

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States the largest bilateral donor to Mali. It also
cemented strong U.S.-Mali relations and better positioned
Mali as a force for stability in a politically fragile
region. The USD 461 million compact entered into force
in September 2007 and includes a USD 234 million
irrigation project north of Segou and a USD 183 million
airport renovation project. USAID/Mali has an annual
budget of approximately USD 97 million, which is focused
on the health, agriculture, education sectors. Mali is
host to one of the largest Peace Corps programs in
Africa, with currently 115 peace corps volunteers and a
further 65 trainees awaiting swearing-in. The PCVs work
on health, sanitation, water conservation and economic
development.

8. (SBU) Mali is an important ally in the fight against
terrorism and a key member of the Trans-Sahara Counter-
Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP). TSCTP programming in Mali
can be divided into programs focused on counter-terrorism
and counter-extremism. Important counter-
terrorism programs include bilateral training exercises
like Joint Combined Exercise Training (JCET) events.
Counter-extremism activities include a broad range of
Department of Defense supported humanitarian assistance,
USAID development programs and public diplomacy
outreach. The Department of Defense's Humanitarian
Assistance Program has contributed over USD 3 million to
Mali since 1999 to build wells, construct schools and
renovate health clinics. Mali is an active participant
in our small DOD International Military Education and
Training (IMET) program.

9. (SBU) Malians practice a predominately open and
tolerant form of Islam and are therefore unreceptive to
extremist messages. Our TSCTP counter-extremism programs
and our public diplomacy outreach are designed to promote
moderate messages and ensure that Malians remain
unreceptive to extremist ideologies. TSCTP programs are
administered jointly by the State Department, USAID and
the Department of Defense. USAID/Mali considers the
northern region of Mali an important area and has
undertaken activities there in a concerted effort since
1999; as budgets have increased in the past two years
USAID/Mali has ensured that a portion of the funding for
each program has been dedicated to activities in Northern
Mali. In the past ten years, USAID/Mali activities in
the north have included: support to 35 rural health
centers, the construction and reinforcement of 17
community radio stations, the establishment of six
community telecenters offering internet access, the
conduct of conflict-mitigation activities, support to
rice and horticultural commodities, the expansion of
access to financial services. The provision of
scholarships and mentoring to 6,500 girls under the
Ambassador's Girls Scholarship Fund was very successful,
but funding is no longer available. USAID/Mali
continues with the creation of teacher training and
radio-based instruction for children of nomadic
populations. USAID/Mali also receives additional funds
from TSCTP and the majority of these resources have been
earmarked for activities in the north that aim to expand
economic opportunities for youth, the Trickle-Up program
for emerging entrepreneurs, construct additional
community radio stations, build capacity for local
government, and support the secular education component
of madersas (religious schools) throughout the country.

10. (U) On the Public Affairs side, we have used
cultural preservation grants to help Mali honor its
Islamic heritage by protecting ancient Islamic
manuscripts in Djenne and Timbuktu and helping to
preserve an ancient mosque in Gao. We are also
approaching the two year anniversary of the only American
Corner in Mali. Located in Gao, it has allowed us to
quadruple our outreach to key contacts in the region and
to further promote mutual understanding between Malians
and Americans.

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Security Challenges
-------------------

11. (SBU) Security concerns in northern Mali constitute a
significant challenge for the Malian government. Mali has

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weathered two Tuareg rebellions (one in 1963 and a second
during the 1990s) since independence. In May 2006 Tuareg
rebels attacked two Malian military outposts in northern
Mali and rekindled fears of another prolonged rebellion.
President Toure resisted calls from some Malian political
leaders to force a military confrontation with the rebels
and instead opted for dialogue mediated by Mali's
northern neighbor, Algeria. In July 2006 Mali and the
Tuareg rebels signed a peace agreement, known as the
Algiers Accords, which pledged to provide increased
development and infrastructure support to Mali's three
northern regions. In 2007 a dissident group of Tuareg
rebels/criminals led by Ibrahim Bahanga resumed attacks
against Malian military posts and convoys. Bahanga held
several dozen Malian soldiers hostage for nearly six
months until Libya helped negotiate their release in
March 2008. In January 2009, Bahanga lost the support of
the other main rebel group ? the Alliance for Development
and Change (ADC). Subsequently, Malian military units,
supported by militia elements, chased Bahanga out of
Northern Mali into exile in Libya. Unfortunately, this
was only achieved after the Malian Army lost more than 20
soldiers who had insufficient means to defend themselves
against Bahanga's attack.

12. (SBU) Although Tuareg unrest is generally confined to
the region of Kidal, rebels in the past have orchestrated
early morning attacks against military outposts in the
regions of Gao and Segou. Algerian-brokered discussions
aimed at uniting disparate Tuareg rebel factions and
facilitating a return to the Algiers Accords framework
continues presently. President Toure remains committed
to a negotiated settlement with Tuareg rebel leaders.
Key aspects of the Algiers Accords not yet implemented
include the creation of special military units composed
of Northern and Southern Malians, the reintegration into
the army of former Tuareg deserters, and a boost to
economic development in the north.

13. (SBU) In addition to the periodic Tuareg friction,
Mali's sparsely populated and vast northern regions also
serve as a haven for smugglers, bandits and terrorist
elements. The Malian government is unable to fully
secure these zones due to their size and remote nature,
and due to the Malian military?s lack of both materiel
and desert training. Algerian Islamic extremists,
formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat (GSPC) but now called al Qaeda in the Lands of the
Islamic Mahgreb (AQIM), continue, to Mali's embarrassment
and anger, to use northern Mali as a safe haven. AQIM
held, at one point, up to six Western hostages. After
protracted negotiations and a ransom payment, all but one
British hostage were freed. The British hostage was
murdered after a deadline for ransom payment was broken.
Shortly thereafter, an AQIM supporter assassinated Malian
Army Colonel Lamana ould Bou in his home in Timbuktu.
Subsequently, the Malian government decided to take the
fight to AQIM in Northern Mali despite its evident
disadvantage. Special Malian military units,
supplemented by some irregular elements, engaged AQIM in
battle in late-June and early-July 2009. Initial success
later turned to a set-back when Malian troops were
ambushed several kilometers outside of Timbuktu. A
recent AFRICOM assessment identified critical shortfalls
with Malian logistics capabilities, including transport,
communications, and intelligence. Improving these
capabilities is a current interagency focus.

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Comment: U.S. Support for Mali
------------------------------

14. (SBU) Your visit to Mali will give you firsthand
knowledge of the importance of U.S. security cooperation
to Mali?s stability and prosperity. Mali's status as a
leader in democracy, human rights and tolerance make U.S.
engagement with Mali, and support for Mali's security and
development even more critical. We remain convinced the
U.S. policy, and the Embassy?s, is correct: listen to a
broad range of people, support implementation of the
Algiers Accords, foster increased professionalism and
capacity of the Malian Armed Forces, and stress the need
to strengthen and preserve Mali?s unitary multiethnic
democracy as the fight against AQIM is pursued. End
comment.

MILOVANOVIC

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