Cablegate: Afghan Elections: Preliminary Observer Group

VZCZCXRO9133
PP RUEHDBU RUEHPW RUEHSL
DE RUEHBUL #2478/01 2351416
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231416Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1026
INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 002478

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PREL AF
SUBJECT: AFGHAN ELECTIONS: PRELIMINARY OBSERVER GROUP
READOUTS

1. (SBU) Summary: Numerous observer groups released
preliminary reports on the transparency and fairness of the
Afghan elections. There were universal concerns among the
groups about the accuracy of the voter registry; the
intimidation of voters, candidates, campaign workers, and
election officials, especially females; the lack of security
which severely affected the voter turn out in the south and
southeast of the country; the quality of the candidate
vetting process; the late establishment of the Electoral
Complaints Commission (ECC); the misuse of government
resources; and the bias of media coverage which favored a
powerful handful of candidates.

2. (SBU) However, on the positive end, all observer groups
praised the fact that these elections were carried off at all
given the current security environment; that there was
excellent coordination among Afghan Security Forces that
prevented some attacks and curtailed others; the emergence of
widely-covered national presidential debates on issues; that
voting operations and the distribution of election materials
were so highly successful; and that the legal framework for
elections in Afghanistan and the protection of women's rights
is already in place. End Summary.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
FEFA - Domestic Observers
- - - - - - - - - - - - -

3. (SBU) The Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan
(FEFA), the country's home-grown observer coalition, sent
7,368 observers to all provinces in Afghanistan, but not to
all districts. The number of observers it was able to send
to insecure areas was significantly lower than the numbers in
relatively secure areas. Security also impacted the number
of female observers sent out. For example, there were no
female observers in Paktia, arguably the most conservative
province and the most prone to female voter registration card
fraud. In Zabul, there were only five female observers.

4. (SBU) FEFA held a press conference on August 22 to report
that security was a problem, echoing the message of other
observer organizations. FEFA noted that some of its female
observers were attacked in Kunduz, Logar, and Kabul. FEFA
calculated that 650 female polling stations throughout the
country could not open, although they did not elaborate on
the reasons for this situation; it was likely either lack of
female staff or lack of security in the area or both. FEFA
also reported that 1500 polling centers opened late, although
they did not expand on the reasons for the delays, whether
there were any geographic or security distribution patterns,
or what the impact was on voting. There was at least one
report of a FEFA observer in Kandahar actually witnessing the
Taliban cutting off voters' fingers.

5. (SBU) FEFA claimed that it had witnessed incidences of
fraud including: support of candidates by IEC staff, closure
of polling stations before 1600, illegal campaigning of some
candidates on election day, stuffing of ballot boxes by the
representatives of some powerful candidates, underage voting,
and multiple voting. In some cases, FEFA reported, its
representatives saw people with boxes of voter registration
cards; they claimed that this was seen nationwide, not just
in the South, where it had been expected. In a meeting with
Ambassador Holbrooke, the Chair of FEFA specified that his
organization,s allegations of ballot stuffing were specific
to parts of Balkh, Kandahar, Laghman, and Takhar. On a more
hopeful note for future elections, FEFA's Chair told
Ambassador Holbrooke that he believed the lower voter
turn-out in the South was due to voter intimidation, not
apathy. The full text of FEFA,s report is available at
http://fefa.org.af.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Asian Network for Free Elections
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

6. (SBU) The Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)
deployed 55 observers to 13 provinces. On August 23 it
released a list of recommended changes to be made for future
Afghan elections, an analysis of the existing legal framework
for elections and women's enfranchisement in Afghanistan, and
a press statement with statements at both ends of the
spectrum. While stating that "there is no denying the fact
that the elections were by and large acceptable", they also
said that "in some areas, peoples' participation was
restricted to a great extent by the prevailing security
situation." It also describe in much stronger language than
any other team the problems with ink that we have heard
anecdotal reports about. ANFREL said that "in many polling
stations, the quality of indelible ink that was used was of
extremely poor quality....Many voters demonstrated how the

KABUL 00002478 002 OF 004

ink could be wiped off within a few minutes after the polling
process." Embassy Kabul will wait for further reports to
come in before we assess whether or not we agree with this
characterization. The full text of ANFREL,s report is
available at www.anfrel.org.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
European Union Election Observation Mission
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

7. (SBU) The European Union Election Observation Mission
(EUEOM) put a generally positive spin on the elections at its
press conference on August 22. General Phillipe Morillon
called the election "mostly good and fair" based on their
observations in 17 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, and 342
polling centers out of 6,192. (Comment: Morillon stipulated
that this would allow for a statistically strong sample of
Afghanistan's polling centers, but given the diversity of
polling day experiences being reported by others it seems
impossible to get an accurate aggregate picture without a
complete view of the whole. End Comment.) The EUEOM did not
present any data on turn-out and nor any analytical reports
of fraud or fraud patterns.

8. (SBU) Despite the relative optimism of the EUEOM press
conference, its written report reflects the same concerns and
trends noted by other international observers. Highlights of
the EUEOM report that were not noted in other observer
reports were alleged incidents of the IEC Commission exerting
pressure on its staff "in a manner which raised questions
about its impartiality." The EUEOM also directly cited the
Electoral Media Commission for failing to ensure fair and
balanced coverage of the election campaign by not preventing
the skew of the media toward only four presidential
candidates and most especially the incumbent. The full text
of EUEOM,s report is available at www.eueom-afghanistan.org.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

9. (SBU) The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) fielded an experts mission rather
than an observation mission. Their plan has been to release
an after-action report with a set of recommendations for
future elections several weeks after these elections are
concluded. On August 22 they reported in Washington to a
small group on their initial observations. They drew their
conclusions from official statements of the government,
specific information from GIRoA officials, and their own
small observation team's visits to 40 polling sites in Kabul
City on election day. Their current conclusions track with
all of the general conclusions of the observer groups
discussed here. The text of OSCE/ODIHR,s report is not yet
available online.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
International Republican Institute
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

10. (SBU) The International Republican Institute (IRI)
released a preliminary report on August 22, calling the day
of the elections "credible" but clarifying that this was not
a comment on the on-going counting and complaint adjudication
process. With regard to Election Day itself, IRI said that
it saw generally well-run, well-organized polling sites,
based on 69 observers who visited 250 polling stations. It
is unclear how representative their observations are, and
their report does not describe the locations of the polling
stations they observed. IRI noted that the main issues were
low turnout, abuse of state resources, and fraud but their
report was among the least detailed. The full text of IRI,s
report is available at www.iri.org.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
Democracy International
- - - - - - - - - - - -

11. (SBU) Democracy International (DI) chose to release a
written statement on August 23 rather than hold a press
conference. They visited 13 of the 34 provinces in
Afghanistan. The title of the statement is: "Too early to
judge if Afghanistan election is credible." DI took a middle
of the road approach giving positive and negative elements of
election day equal time. Their comments tracked with the
general comments of all other observers but they differed by
making the most unequivocal statement yet released about how
the fairness of the elections cannot yet be assessed.

12. (SBU) DI made a very pointed statement on the inability
of any group to assess the percentage of Afghans who voted

KABUL 00002478 003 OF 004

since there is no accurate list of registered voters and no
census of Afghans in general. DI made clear that all groups
will only be able to report on the total number of people who
voted and called this "the only meaningful measure of
turnout."

13. (SBU) DI was also the only observer group to comment on
the IEC's decision to withhold the vote count until August
25, calling it "unfortunate" on the grounds that it
destabilizes the already uncertain political atmosphere. DI
would have preferred that the IEC release partial results
with a clear explanation that they were partial. (Comment:
This could actually destabilize a tenuous security
environment since most Afghans will take any IEC declaration
as definitive, regardless of how it is caveated. End
Comment.) The full text of DI,s report is available at
http://democracyinternational.com/afghanistan .

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
National Democratic Institute
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

14. (SBU) The report by the National Democratic Institute
(NDI) is measured and detailed. NDI highlighted the fact
that their observers saw different elections based on the
region of the country from where they were reporting. The
elections proceeded relatively normally in the north, west,
and central regions but there were reports of violence and
disenfranchisement in the south and southeast. NDI was
straightforward in admitting that they could not assess the
truth of the majority of these allegations as they did not
have a strong presence in the south or southeast due to
security concerns.

15. (SBU) NDI reported definitively on the fact that there
was violence and threats of violence against voters and
election workers by the Taliban and other armed groups.
According to NDI this did not appear to be systemic, but it
was heaviest in the south and southeast. NDI reported also
that in many provinces polling centers were closed early, or
did not open at all due to threats of violence and, that
while local election officials seemed generally knowledgeable
about counting procedures, female staffers seemed slightly
less well-trained in some provinces than in others. Many
female polling centers postponed the counting procedure until
the following day to prevent their staffs from being out late
at night. This was a culturally acceptable alternative to
having female poll workers turn over counting
responsibilities to their male counterparts.

16. (SBU) Turnout was lower than expected in Kabul Province
and nationwide, according to NDI's report. NDI acknowledged
that this was the case despite the IEC's afternoon issuance
of an order to keep polls open an extra hour in some areas to
encourage additional turn-out. NDI's report admitted that
they did not know whether this was due to the message not
getting out or due to apathy or fear of violence.

17. (SBU) Regardless of why that message did not affect its
intended recipients, the IEC messages to poll workers seemed,
to NDI, to be absorbed efficiently. When hole-punches didn't
work, the IEC told its local structures that workers could
cut the corners off cards instead. U.S. Embassy observers
witnessed this adjustment first-hand as far away as Herat.
NDI also reported positively on ink usage and the fact that
there were fewer incidences of proxy voting and multiple
voting cards than expected, calling the latter "isolated
cases."

18. (SBU) The NDI report concentrated more on women's
obstacles to candidacy, voter turnout, and poll station work
than any other we have seen. NDI's report noted that female
voter turnout was noticeably low, except in Bamyan and the
north. Especially in the south and southeast, where it was
very hard to recruit female poll workers, the presence of men
in female centers may have posed a big deterrent for the
participation of women voters. (Comment: Poloff observing in
Herat Province noted that all women wearing burkas pushed
them up and were completely uncovered in front once they
entered the polling stations. They would not be able to do
this in male-staffed polling stations and trying to deal with
the hard-to-decipher ballots through a burka would make
voting significantly more difficult, especially if a female
voter is illiterate. Female polling station workers are an
extremely important issue for all future elections. End
comment.) NDI presented an assessment of the pluses and
minuses of the election along with a long list of lessons
learned and recommendations in today's report. At their
press conference, NDI was again the most measured, saying
that they are reserving judgment for now on whether or not
the elections were free and fair until the entire electoral

KABUL 00002478 004 OF 004

process is over. The full text of NDI,s report is available
at www.ndi.org.
EIKENBERRY

© Scoop Media