Cablegate: Brazilian Views On the Latest Iaea Reports On Iran and Syria
DE RUEHBR #1186/01 2661639
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 231639Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5133
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0183
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5134
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 6357
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0333
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRASILIA 001186
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2019
TAGS: KNNP PARM IAEA MNUC IR SY TRGY PREL BR
SUBJECT: BRAZILIAN VIEWS ON THE LATEST IAEA REPORTS ON IRAN AND SYRIA
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lisa Kubiske, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). REF: A) STATE 91633, B) BRASILIA 1170
1. (C) SUMMARY. The Government of Brazil (GOB) is concerned about Iran's and Syria's nuclear activities and wants all parties to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to answer the outstanding questions. The GOB does not see the latest IAEA reports on these countries as closing those cases. Still, the GOB is not supportive of the Iran case being with the UN Security Council or the idea of the UNSC imposing additional sanctions. The GOB strongly objects to the use of unilateral military action in the case of Syria and is very concerned about the possibility of force being used against Iran. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) On September 11 Science Counselor and Science Officer met with Brazil's Ministry of External Relations' (MRE) Acting Director of the Division for Disarmament and Sensitive Technologies (DDS) Fabio Simao Alves to discuss the USG's views - per REFTEL A - on the latest International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reports on Iran and Syria. Alves was well informed about both matters, and he reiterated the Government of Brazil's (GOB) cautious approach to both cases. IRAN
3. (C) Alves stressed that only through discussion can the dispute with Iran be resolved. The GOB is interested in learning the nature of the Iranian nuclear program and it does not rule out the possibility that the program has military aims. Thus, the GOB is supportive of the IAEA investigating the matter and getting answers. Alves stressed that the GOB sees the IAEA as the appropriate forum for dealing with Iran and not the UN Security Council (UNSC). The GOB wants the IAEA to become more active. Now that Brazil is going back on the UNSC it is particularly interested in the thinking of the P-5 plus Germany about Iran. He said that Brazil would not be supportive of the UNSC imposing additional sanctions, but it will fully comply with measures adopted by the UNSC.
4. (C) Brazil would like Iran to be more cooperative, he said. Then, he added that the GOB would like unnamed "other member states" to share more information about Iran with the IAEA. Alves appeared to be suggesting that there was a lack of sharing of information on Iran and that this was somehow impeding the IAEA's efforts to understand the Iranian nuclear program.
5. (C) The GOB is "very concerned" about a possible military strike against Iran by another state, emphasized Alves. Brazil wants a peaceful solution to the Iran question.
6. (C) Alves said that the GOB could not publicly support a call for Iran to comply with an Additional Protocol. Since Brazil has not signed up to an Additional Protocol, it will not support calls that other countries comply with them.
7. (C) The GOB had heard reports, Alves noted, that Iranians were saying in Vienna that Iran should not be pressured so hard, but rather should be treated like Brazil. Brazil has an enrichment program and it is not being put under a microscope or being compelled to sign/comply with an Additional Protocol. Alves seemed unhappy about these reports and emphasized that the Iranian and Brazilian situations are quite different.
8. (C) The GOB at the IAEA would have a balanced statement about Iran, according to Alves. SYRIA
9. (C) The GOB was not planning to make a statement about Syria at the IAEA, Alves said. He declared that the GOB strongly condemned the use of force by a country against Syria; Brazil viewed this as impairing the work of the IAEA. Nonetheless, he acknowledged that there were outstanding questions about Syria's activities and these should be cleared up. He added that the GOB has serious concerns about the Syrian program and did not consider it a case closed.
10. (C) As with the Iran case, Alves wanted unnamed "other member states" to share their imagery and other intelligence about Syria with the IAEA. He indicated that this unwillingness to share hindered the IAEA's efforts to understand the Syrian activities.
1. (C) Brazil recognizes that there are serious questions outstanding about Iran's and Syria's nuclear activities and does not see these latest IAEA reports as closing those cases. The GOB, however, doesn't seem willing to go much further than calling for everyone to cooperate more with the IAEA. It strongly opposes unilateral military action and doesn't like the Iran case being with the UNSC. The GOB's interest in the proposals and activities of the P-5 and Germany is more that they want to be well-informed than an interest in trying to contribute to crafting new measures to pressure Iran. We do see that the GOB's objection to an Additional Protocol for Brazil is having an impact in the international arena, as the GOB is unwilling to call Iran on not complying with an Additional Protocol. END COMMENT.