Cablegate: Guinea: Ambassador Moller's Consultations In

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DE RUEHFR #1465/01 3031721
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301721Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY PARIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7449
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L PARIS 001465

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019
TAGS: PREL PINS PINR KDEM GV FR
SUBJECT: GUINEA: AMBASSADOR MOLLER'S CONSULTATIONS IN
PARIS (OCTOBER 29-30)

Classified By: Andrew Young, Political Counselor, 1.4 (b/d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: French officials generally agreed with U.S.
Ambassador to Guinea Patricia Moller on the need for the
international community to develop a visible process or
framework on Guinea that could lead to a transition to a
democratic government, with Burkina Faso President Campaore's
intervention a possible vehicle for forming such a process.
Presidential Africa Advisor Andre Parant plans to travel to
Ouagadougou for meetings with Campaore on November 2, where
Parant will offer France's support. While agreeing that
junta leader Dadis Camara had to be removed from power, they
believed that Dadis could be part of the solution to the
problem if handled properly through the right combination of
"carrots and sticks." The French were encouraged by the
African Union's October 29 decision to take a firm stance on
Guinea, and they believed that the AU, following ECOWAS's
lead, could play a useful role in resolving the crisis in
Guinea. Once the transition process gains traction, France
is prepared to commit resources and expertise, especially for
reforming Guinea's military. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) U.S. Ambassador to Guinea Patricia Moller, met,
separately, with MFA AF A/S-equivalent Stephane Gompertz and
Presidential Africa Advisor Remi Marechaux on October 30,
following her meeting on October 29 with MOD Africa Analyst
Jerome Spinoza. AF-watcher attended the meeting with
Marechaux; AF-assistant attended the meetings with Gompertz
and Spinoza. MFA Guinea desk officer Ann'laure Hare attended
the meeting with Gompertz.

Meeting with Gompertz (MFA)
---------------------------
3. (C) Gompertz began by asking what Ambassador Moller
planned to do concerning her credentials. She replied that
she would not present her credentials to the Dadis government
and, if pressed, would say that she would do so only when a
democratically-elected government was in place in Conakry.
Gompertz explained that France's recently arrived Ambassador
(Jean Graebling) had similarly refused to present his
credentials. The CNDD Foreign Minister informed Graebling
that, as a result, Graelbing would have no access to regime
officials. Gompertz observed that Ambassadors Graebling and
Moller would be in similar situations. He and Ambassador
Moller looked forward to close working relations between the
Ambassadors Graebling and Moller in Conakry.

4. (C) Gompertz noted the AU's October 29 communique on
Guinea, which he deemed very helpful. He commented on EU
efforts to develop travel bans and asset freezes. Ambassador
Moller said the USG was taking similar steps.

5. (C) On the broader issue of next steps, Ambassador Moller
stressed ultimate priority of avoiding a melt-down in Guinea,
with which Gompertz agreed. To accomplish that, Ambassador
Moller said that it was imperative for the international
community to establish a process or framework -- the more
visible the better -- to show that there was a serious
commitment on moving Guinea away from the abyss and towards
an acceptable democratic transition, which could be centered
on African institutions such as the AU or ECOWAS, with the
support and participation of other members of the
international community.

6. (C) Gompertz agreed, and he said that Burkina Faso
President Campaore, who had already taken up a mediator's
role, could be the focus of such an effort. Gompertz said
that Presidential AF-advisor Andre Parant was going to
Burkina Faso and would meet with Campaore on November 2, to
discuss Guinea as a first priority, and also Niger. Gompertz
indicated that Parant would try to encourage movement on
Campaore's part, although Gompertz noted Campaore's
preference to move deliberately. He also mentioned that
Campaore had personal economic interests in Guinea (as he had
in many other African countries) that would be a factor in
his decision-making. Gompertz encouraged the U.S. to talk to
Campaore.

7. (C) Gompertz, while harboring no illusions about Dadis
(describing his as "dangerous" and "insane") nonetheless
believed that Dadis should be part of the solution and not
simply isolated and scorned. He needed to be offered an exit
or a way out. Gompertz mused on the possibility that Morocco
(where the junta has cached much of its wealth) or Libya
could serve as points of exile, although Ambassador Moller
indicated that Morocco had signaled that it was not
interested in hosting an exiled Dadis. Gompertz said that
other factors to be considered were the danger of civil war
(the Forestiers had to be reassured that Dadis's departure

did not signal a return to Peul or Malinke dominance over the
Forestiers) and the need to accommodate Guinea's military.
Gompertz observed that a transition to a democratic
government was essential, in order to avoid a "melt down" or
else a drift into a Zimbabwe-like state, which would be
hardly any better.

8. (C) Asked about the departure of French citizens from
Guinea, Gompertz said that about 500 of 1,800 had left
following the GOF's public suggestion that citizens leave
voluntarily rather than wait for a possible evacuation under
emergency conditions. He noted that of the remainder, many
were dual nationals or long-term residents not inclined to
leave in any case. Gompertz said that the suggestion to
leave was more anticipatory in nature and to prepare for the
worst, not an indication that conditions were at an extreme.
(Marechaux claimed that about 800 French, out of 2,300, had
departed, and that there were an estimated 600 known dual
nationals who would likely never leave. He also verified
that the GOF-supported school in Conakry would remain closed
until an acceptable transition government was in place.)

Meeting with Marechaux (Presidency)
-----------------------------------
9. (C) Presidential Africa Advisor, Remi Marechaux, who will
travel with Parant to Ouagadougou, echoed many of the points
made by Gompertz. In particular, he noted that it was
important to support Campaore and allow him to lead, even
though there would be frustrations that Campaore wanted to
"maintain leeway" and that the mediation would happen "on
African time." Part of the problem was that Campaore relies
on only 5-6 advisors to assist with all his mediations,
including for Togo and Cote d'Ivoire, and that even FM Yoda
could not speak authoritatively on Campaore's thinking.

10. (C) In Marechaux's opinion, Campaore was "scared by the
strength of the international community's strength of
reaction" to the September 28 violence. Therefore, Marechaux
said that in Ouagadougou, Parant would make clear that France
would support Campaore, if requested, on delivering
demarches, providing ideas on the way forward, and even
helping with travel or other logistic requirements.
Marechaux agreed with Ambassador Moller that it is important
to get some visibility on a specific transition plan soon,
but described the situation as still in the "threat stage,"
and that "we still have 2-3 weeks before we need to be
greatly concerned about a lack of progress."

11. (C) Marechaux described the sanctions and UN Commission
of Inquiry as "tools" that should not be confused with the
international community's "goals." In creating the sanctions
list, there was a vibrant debate within the GOF, with some
wanting the sanctions to be more targeted to "destabilize"
the junta. Now that the list is, in the end, quite
inclusive, it needs to remain dynamic so that those listed
understanding there is the option of being removed from the
list if they depart the junta and help the transition process
-- a process that leads to the removal of Dadis.

12. (C) Parant will also discuss with Campaore the question
of what to do with Dadis, reminding Campaore that he needs to
reach out to countries who might accept the junta leader
should he step down. France also wants Campaore to consider
how to avoid the possibility of an International Criminal
Court (ICC) case against Dadis, which, Marechaux added, would
be a disincentive for the junta to agree to give up power.
Marachaux speculated that perhaps some kind of in-country
court could be established which, in the end, would allow
Dadis and others a way to be relocated.

13. (C) Another critical step raised by Marechaux is to plan
for some kind of international observer force, noting the
effectiveness of 50 or so ECOWAS troops who helped during
Togo's 2007 elections by assuring that military forces stayed
in their barracks and by conducting joint patrols with Togo's
police and gendarmes. In Marechaux's opinion, it would be
difficult for Guinean authorities to refuse a similar ECOWAS
plan. However, a large intervention force was not realistic.

14. (C) Marechaux stated that reforming the military needed
to be included in the transition plan, and that the U.S. and
France needed to work together on this. He asserted that the
majority of Guinea's military was not implicated in the
September 28 attacks, and that Guinea's gendarme force had
performed well. Dadis may have recruited up to 2,500
fighters from Liberia, but the Guinean forces loyal to the
junta numbered only about 2,000. This left a significant
military to work with. Marechaux raised the idea of possibly
training Guinean troops for UN peacekeeping duty, effectively

reducing the influence of the military in Guinea. Ambassador
Moller remarked that peacekeeping training and deployment had
been a successful strategy in Burundi.

Meeting with Spinoza (MOD)
--------------------------
15. (C) Jerome Spinoza at the MOD's Strategic Affairs
Delegation, befitting his position as an analyst, offered a
broader, less operational view of Guinea during his October
29 meeting with Ambassador Moller. Of the three
interlocutors, he was the one who most directly counseled
against demonizing and isolating Dadis. He too shared no
illusions about Dadis but he thought that Dadis was more
reasonable and susceptible to persuasion than others might
think, even if only at the level of self-interest. He
believed that Dadis should be part of any process to end the
junta's control of Guinea and to move to a more acceptable
government. Spinoza agreed with Ambassador Moller's views on
the need to establish a process for channeling Guinea in the
right direction and the need to avoid a complete collapse in
Guinea, which would be bad for Guinea and disastrous for the
region, which was grappling with recoveries in in Sierra
Leone, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire. Spinoza acknowledged that
some of his colleagues considered him "pro-junta," but he
said that this was only because he believed one had to work
with the junta rather than isolate it or back it into a
corner where its only choice might be aggression.

COMMENT
-------
16. (C) The French clearly welcomed the opportunity to
consult with Ambassador Moller and we expect she will a close
and collaborative relationship with the French in Conakry.
More importantly, in each of her discussions, French
agreement on the need for a visible international process
strengthened, with a focus on Campaore's initiative. END
COMMENT.

17. (U) Ambassador Moller has cleared this message.

18. (U) Conakry minimize considered.
RIVKIN

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