Cablegate: Formin Says Chad Pushing to Normalize with Sudan,

VZCZCXRO1283
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHKUK RUEHMA
RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNJ #0485/01 3001414
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 271414Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7367
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 NDJAMENA 000485

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
NSC FOR GAVIN
SECDEF FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
ABUJA FOR POL
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL -- BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF MARR SU NI CD
SUBJECT: FORMIN SAYS CHAD PUSHING TO NORMALIZE WITH SUDAN,
USG SUDAN STRATEGY SOUND, DEBY TO MEET GRATION IN ABUJA

REF: A. STATE 109669
B. NDJAMENA 483
C. NDJAMENA 479
D. NDJAMENA 466
E. NDJAMENA 462
F. NDJAMENA 457
G. NDJAMENA 446

-------
SUMMARY
-------

1. (SBU) FM Moussa Faki Mahamat told Ambassador and DCM
October 27 that Chad was "perfectly serious" about pursuing
normalization with Sudan; still talking to Sudan about
confidence-building measures and normalizing relations along
lines agreed during Dr.Ghazi Salahuddin's visit last month;
and awaiting the GOS's cantonment of Chadian rebels and
promised invitation for Faki to visit Khartoum to move the
process to conclusion. Faki said that Deby's decision to
move the Oure Cassoni refugee camp away from the border was
meant as a clear signal to the GOS that Chad was serious
about normalization, and to the JEM that their welcome in
Chad was wearing out. Faki reiterated that he was hoping for
an equally "strong signal" from Sudan. Faki said that he
would accompany President Deby to the AU Peace and Security
Council meeting in Abuja. The GOC was preparing for a
Deby-Gration meeting there and would take the Abuja
opportunity to consult with Sudanese counterparts, including
Ghazi Salahuddin, in the hope of speeding up the bilateral
process.

2. (SBU) Ambassador briefed Faki on the USG's new Sudan
Strategy, underlining the novel elements -- prioritized full
CPA implementation, a shorter timeline, and new benchmarks,
incentives and disincentives. Ambassador briefed Faki on his
own visit to Eastern Chad last week, emphasizing the very
good collaboration between GOC local officials, MINURCAT,
Humanitarian IOs and NGOs. Faki approved Ambassador's goal
of talking soon to rebel and opponent returnees like Soubiane
and Goukouni, but noted that Soubiane was busy re-integrating
his fighters into Chadian life and that Goukouni was not in
Chad at the moment.

3. (SBU) The GOC has proved as good as its (very carefully
chosen) word regarding the current bilateral Chad-Sudan
normalization process and its outreach to former rebels and
regime opponents, as reftels make clear. Deby's engagement
on courses of action recommended to him by senior USG
officials since February of 2008, and now with SE Gration,
has resulted in progress toward restoring regional stability,
both in terms of Chad-Sudan detente and JEM as a Chadian
proxy. We're not there yet, and we prefer to make
predictions after the fact, but Chad-Sudan normalization, and
a JEM-less Chad, are more possible now than a few months ago.
END SUMMARY.

-------------------
CHAD-SUDAN DYNAMICS
-------------------

4. (SBU) Faki reviewed the results of the October 10
meetings in N'Djamena between President Deby and Sudanese
Presidential Envoy Ghazi (Ref B), describing the
confidence-building measures agreed by the two sides (the
"scenario" having been hand-written by Ghazi as he and Faki
spoke): Khartoum to canton and restrain remaining Chadian
rebels well inside the Sudan border; N'Djamena to "open its
eyes" to JEM doings on its territories and "encourage" JEM to
return to Darfur, after which Chad was to open its territory,
including "former JEM areas of operation" in Eastern Chad to
inspection by the Sudanese; and a visit by Faki himself to
Khartoum to discuss further mutual steps, which might include
mixed patrols on the border and the opening of consulates in
Abeche and El Geneina, as envisaged in the bilateral 2006
Protocol. Faki reiterated that Ghazi had said Sudan sought
peace, and recalled that the two sides needed proof of

NDJAMENA 00000485 002 OF 003

sincerity -- "just as your Sudan Strategy calls for 'verify,
then trust'."

5. (SBU) Faki indicated that he had spoken with Ghazi by
phone October 25 for an update on the status of Sudan's
efforts with regard to the initial confidence-building
measure, cantonment of Chadian rebels still in Sudan. Ghazi
had told him that all elements of the GOS were supportive in
principle of the measure. Chad was "now awaiting a concrete
plan, and hoping for progress." Faki said that Deby's
decision to move the Oure Cassoni refugee camp away from the
border was meant as a clear signal to the GOS that Chad was
serious about normalization, and to the JEM that their
welcome in Chad was wearing out. Faki said that Chad hoped
for an equally "strong signal" from Sudan. Ambassador noted
that he had spoken with JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim the
previous week and found him more on the defensive than
formerly. Faki rejoined that the GOC had this impression as
well.

6. (SBU) Faki confirmed that he would accompany President
Deby to the AU's Peace and Security Council meeting in Abuja
October 29, and that President Deby was looking forward to a
meeting there with S/E Gration. Faki said that he himself
intended to meet with Ghazi and others from the Sudan side in
Abuja in the hope of spurring progress on the
confidence-building measures laid out October 10 in N'Djamena.

--------------
CHADIAN REBELS
--------------

7. (SBU) Faki said that the Ambassador should feel free to
meet with returning Chadian rebel leaders Soubiane and
Goukouni but noted that Soubiane was busy re-integrating his
fighters into Chadian life and that Goukouni was not in Chad
at the moment. Faki said he had been in routine contact with
Soubiane October 25, as they worked together on national
reconciliation issues. Faki indicated that he was not able
to shed light on the supposed "congress" of Chadian rebels
organized by Khartoum, which National Mediator Abderahman had
previously discussed with us.

-----------------------
SUDAN STRATEGY ROLL-OUT
-----------------------

8. (SBU) Ambassador briefed Faki on the elements of the
USG's new Sudan Strategy (Ref A), stressing that we felt a
sense of urgency to resolve the Darfur conflict and
simultaneously to move forward with the CPA process. Faki
indicated that that the GoC appreciated the "strong ideas" in
the document, supported the notion of simultaneous steps on
the Darfur and CPA fronts, and was pleased that Sudanese
Presidential Envoy Ghazi had had favorable things to say
about the U.S. strategy. Faki noted that Chad believed the
U.S. had correctly identified the root causes of the Darfur
conflict, which included injustice and marginalization of the
population, coupled by "usurpation of power" by those not
popularly selected. He thanked the U.S. for stating clearly
that the time had come for Sudan to "take care of its
internal problems" and "find means of getting along with its
neighbors," including Chad.

9. (SBU) Following the release of the new U.S. Sudan
Strategy, "the world was waiting" for Sudan to respond,
continued Faki. The U.S. had made its views known. If other
UNSC members -- "including Sudan's friends" -- did the same,
Sudan might produce concrete proof of its bona fides.
President Bashir remained concerned about his indictment by
the International War Crimes Tribunal, Faki pointed out, and
was perhaps looking for international support for the notion
of placing some judges at the Tribunal who were from Sudan.
The question of whether justice would have to precede
reconciliation or vice versa was an open one, but "Bashir
needs to be judged based on the allegations against him,"
Faki offered.

NDJAMENA 00000485 003 OF 003

-------
COMMENT
-------

10. (SBU) The GOC has proved as good as its (very carefully
chosen) word regarding the current bilateral Chad-Sudan
normalization process and its outreach to former rebels and
regime opponents. Deby's engagement on courses of action
recommended to him by senior USG officials since February of
2008, and now with SE Gration, has resulted in progress
toward restoring regional stability, both in terms of
Chad-Sudan detente and JEM as a Chadian proxy. We're not
there yet, and we prefer to make predictions after the fact,
but Chad-Sudan normalization, and a JEM-less Chad, are more
possible now than a few months ago.
NIGRO

© Scoop Media