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Cablegate: Missile Technology Control Regime (Mtcr): North

VZCZCXYZ1406
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #3755 2791335
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061314Z OCT 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0000
MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T STATE 103755

SIPDIS
PARIS FOR POL: NOAH HARDIE
BRASILIA FOR POL: JOHN ERATH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2034
TAGS: MTCRE ETTC KSCA MNUC PARM TSPA FR BR
SUBJECT: MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME (MTCR): NORTH
KOREA,S MISSILE PROGRAM

Classified By: ISN/MTR Director Pam Durham.
Reasons: 1.4 (B), (D), (H).

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see paragraph
2.

2. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Department requests Embassy
Paris provide the interagency cleared paper "North
Korea,s Missile Program" in paragraph 3 below to the
French Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) Point of
Contact (POC) for distribution to all Partners. Info
addressees also may provide to host government officials
as appropriate. In delivering paper, posts should
indicate that the U.S. is sharing this paper as part of
our preparation for the Information Exchange that will be
held in conjunction with the MTCR Plenary in Rio,
November 9-13, 2009. NOTE: Additional IE papers will be
provided via septels. END NOTE.

3. BEGIN TEXT OF PAPER:

(SECRET REL MTCR)

North Korea's Missile Program

Introduction

North Korea continues to make progress in its ballistic
missile development efforts. We expect both the new
Musudan intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and
the solid-propellant Toksa short-range ballistic missile
(SRBM) to be fielded in the coming years, and as
demonstrated by North Korea,s April 5th launch of the
Taepo Dong 2 (TD-2) space launch vehicle
(SLV)/intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) in a
failed attempt to place a satellite into orbit, the
pursuit of longer-range systems remains a DRPK priority.
North Korea's deployed forces include hundreds of Scud
and No Dong short and medium-range ballistic missiles
(SRBM/MRBM), seven of which it launched in 2009.

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North Korea remains one of the world's leading suppliers
of ballistic missiles and technology, and continues to
provide assistance to both Iran's and Syria's ballistic
missile programs. North Korea, since the 1980s, has
supplied a variety of customers with ballistic missiles,
missile components, and missile-related technology.
These sales have included complete Category I missile
systems, as well as production technology and expertise.
North Korea has maintained its right to sell ballistic
missiles and continues to market its systems to countries
in the Middle East while seeking to expand its missile
marketing activities worldwide. North Korea this year
probably resumed ballistic missile-related cooperation
with Yemen, and may have recently reached an agreement
with Burma to provide Rangoon with ballistic missile
technology.

North Korea has developed most of the necessary
capability and infrastructure to produce and assemble its
ballistic missiles. However, while North Korea continues
to make progress in its missile development efforts, it
remains reliant on outside suppliers for a range of
missile-related raw materials and components. While most
of these materials are for direct application to its
missile program, North Korea may procure some items in
support of its missile customers.

Program History

North Korea's ballistic missile program started in the
early-1980s, when it reverse-engineered Soviet-made
300km-range Scud B SRBMs acquired from Egypt. This Scud
B technology went on to form the basis for the DPRK,s
Scud B, Scud C, No Dong, Taepo Dong-l (TD-1), and TD-2
systems. In return for the Scud Bs, North Korea assisted
Egypt's efforts to domestically produce Scuds. Building
on this success, the DPRK began designing the 500 km-
range Scud C in the mid-1980s. These Scuds have been
exported to customers in the Middle East and are deployed
in North Korea. Given its 20 years experience working
with Scud technology, North Korea is able to design and
produce extended-range variants of the Scud, capable of
delivering payloads of over 500 kg to ranges up to 1,000
km. North Korea also used Scud technology to develop the
No Dong medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) that is
deployed as part of North Korea's missile forces. The No
Dong has a range of 1,300 km with a 500 kg payload, which
could strike all of South Korea and Japan.

Scud and No Dong technology also form the basis of North
Korea's TD-1 and TD-2 systems. In 1998, North Korea
tested the Taepo Dong-1, which probably utilized a No
Dong first stage and Scud second stage. Although
launched as an SLV, the TD-1 launch showed that North
Korea had successfully developed many of the essential
technologies for staged missile systems vital for ICBM
development. The DPRK has also developed the follow-on
system for the TD-1, the TD-2. Although a more advanced
design than the TD-l, the TD-2 still relies on Scud and
No Dong technology, with probably clustered No Dong
engines powering the first stage, and either a Scud or No
Dong-based second stage. In a two stage configuration,
the TD-2 would have a range of over 9,000 km with a
substantial weapons payload of approximately 500 kg. In a
three stage configuration, such as that launched in April
2009, the TD-2 could deliver the same sized payload up to
15,000 km, which could reach all of the United States and
Europe, although likely with very poor accuracy. The
first stage of the April 2009 launch fell into the Sea of
Japan, and the upper stages landed in the Pacific. This
demonstrates progress since the 2006 test, which flew
only about 40 seconds.

Recently, North Korea has developed a new land-mobile
IRBM --called the Musudan by the United States. The
Musudan is a single-stage missile and may have a range of
up to 4,000 km with a 500 kg payload. The Musudan is
derived from the SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) and represents a substantial advance in
North Korea's liquid propellant technology, as the SS-N-6
had a much more advanced engine and used more energetic
propellants -- unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and
nitrogen tetroxide (N204) -- than those used in Scud-type
missiles. Development of the Musudan with this more
advanced propulsion technology allows North Korea to
build even longer-range missiles -- or shorter range
missiles with greater payload capacity -- than would be
possible using Scud-type technology.

As the Scud market nears saturation, North Korea also has
started to develop its own solid-propellant missile
systems, as evidenced by its development of a new solid
propellant SRBM based on the SS-21 SRBM. This new missile
-- called the Toksa by the United States -- has a range
of 120 km with a payload as large as 500 kg. This is a
disturbing development since North Korea can apply its
experience in producing this missile to other, longer-
range, solid propellant missile designs. Solid
propellant ballistic missiles are preferred by many
countries due to their lesser logistics requirements and
shorter launch times, making them more survivable than
liquid propellant missiles.

North Korea,s advances -- in both its liquid and solid
propellant programs -- have come despite a self-imposed
missile launch moratorium, that limited North Korea's
ability to verify new designs or modifications to its
missile systems during the 1999-2006 timeframe. North
Korea ended the moratorium with its July 5, 2006 Scud, No
Dong, and Taepo Dong-2 launches.

Program Activities

On April 5, 2009, North Korea -- despite UN Security
Council Resolution 1718, which requires the suspension of
all activities related to its ballistic missile program --
conducted the second launch of the TD-2. Although the
April 5th TD-2 launch failed to place a satellite in
orbit, the launch was much more successful than the first
TD-2 launch in 2006, demonstrating that North Korea is
making progress in developing technology that can
directly contribute to the production of ICBMs.
Subsequently, and despite the adoption on June 12, 2009
of UNSCR 1874, which reaffirmed the provisions of UNSCR
1718 related to North Korea,s ballistic missile
activities, North Korea tested seven Scud SRBMs and No
Dong MRBMs on July 4th.

The April 5th TD-2 launch also demonstrated that North
Korea continues to pursue the development of longer-range
missile systems and that long range missile development
probably remains a priority. North Korea's next goal may
be to develop a mobile ICBM that would be capable of
threatening targets around the world, without requiring
the lengthy -- and potentially vulnerable -- launch
preparation time required by the TD-2.

Technology Supplier

The DPRK continues to sell ballistic missile-related
technology to countries in the Middle East, while seeking
to re-engage with former customers in the region. North
Korea is probably also pursuing new markets for its
missiles, including in regions such as Southeast Asia and
Africa. North Korea offers a wide-range of ballistic
missile services, almost certainly is willing to offer
any missile design in its inventory for sale to customers
interested in complete systems, and can design missiles
to meet specific customer needs. For customers with
established missile programs or otherwise lacking
interest in complete systems, North Korea provides
missile refurbishment and technical expertise, ground
support equipment and launchers, and production
technology. North Korea can also broker precision
machine tools and other missile-related raw materials
from third-parties for customers through its extensive
procurement network.

Iran

Iran is one of North Korea's key missile customers.
Since the late 1980s, the DPRK has exported complete Scud B
and Scud C missiles to Iran, as well as their production
technology. The Scud and other missile technology acquired
from North Korea form the basis for the Iranian Shahab-3,
which is based on North Korea's No Dong.

North Korea has probably provided Iran an MRBM variant,
called the BM-25, of its Musudan IRBM. This technology
would provide Iran with more advanced missile technology
than currently used in its Shahab-series of ballistic
missiles and could form the basis for future Iranian
missile and SLV designs.

North Korea also provided assistance to Iran's SLV
program. On February 2nd, Iran successfully orbited the
Omid satellite, using its Safir SLV, the first stage of
which was based on the Shahab-3 (No Dong). Pyongyang's
assistance to Iran's SLV program suggests that North
Korea and Iran may also be cooperating on the development
of long-range ballistic missiles.

Syria

Syria is another of North Korea's key missile customers.
North Korea has provided Syria with 500 km-range Scud C
missiles and technology as well as technology for a 700
km-range Scud variant, referred to in Syria as the "Scud
D." The missiles came initially in either partially or
completely knocked-down kit form, but were produced in
North Korea. Syria has since achieved a domestic
production capability, probably with extensive assistance
from Pyongyang. North Korea has also provided a range of
other missile-related services to Syria, including
production technology, ground support equipment, raw
material, components, technical assistance, and know-how.

North Korea probably provided assistance to Syria's
development of a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) for
its Scud ballistic missiles.

Yemen

In December 2002, Yemen received a shipment of Scud
missiles, which Sanaa claimed to have bought from North
Korea for defensive purposes and pledged would not be
retransferred to any third party. North Korea probably
resumed ballistic missile cooperation with Yemen in 2009.

Burma

The mid-2009 voyage of the North Korean ship, Kang Nam 1,
probably was associated with North Korea's primary arms
export entity -- suggesting that the cargo was most
likely weapons-related. The ship returned to North Korea
prior to reaching its destination, which was most likely
Burma. The Kang Nam 1 probably was carrying ballistic
missiles or conventional weapons. A November 2008 visit
by a senior Burmese official to a North Korean ballistic
missile production facility suggests that the two sides
probably have been discussing a ballistic missile deal,
and that the cargo may have been related to these
discussions.

Foreign Assistance

North Korea operates a vast network of embassy personnel,
front companies, and commercial entities run by ethnic
Koreans in other countries to obtain key technologies and
materials needed to support both its own and its
customers' missile programs. Members of this network
often do not reveal their affiliation with North Korea,
or North Korea as the end-user of critical goods; they
utilize entities in Europe, China, East Asia, and South
Asia to establish reliable routes for the transfer of
controlled items.

Most foreign procurement by the North Korean missile
program includes material North Korea finds too costly or
too advanced to manufacture domestically, such as missile
component testing equipment, heat-resistant materials for
re-entry vehicles, heavy-duty vehicle chassis, missile
tracking technologies, precision machine tools, specialty
steels and aluminums, ball bearings, precision
gyroscopes, solid-propellant precursor chemicals, and
liquid-propellant precursors.

Although important for its own program, North Korea also
uses this network to broker missile-related raw materials
for its missile export customers.

Conclusion

North Korea will continue to develop missiles with
increasing range, payload capacity, and sophistication.
In support of these efforts, North Korea will continue to
seek critically-needed components from foreign suppliers
-- most commonly China-based, given their proximity and
access to technology that would be beneficial to North
Korea,s missile program. In light of its past missile
technology acquisition practices, we remain vigilant for
any attempts by North Korea to acquire material or
technology associated with missile systems other
countries -- including MTCR Partners -- have retired.

International pressure against North Korea and its
customers have had a significant impact on North Korea,s
missile sales. However, despite such pressure, North
Korea continues missile cooperation with its core clients
and continues to offer MTCR Category I missile systems,
their production technology, and missile maintenance and
support services to all interested customers.


END TEXT OF PAPER.

4. (U) Please slug any reporting on this or other MTCR
issues for ISN/MTR. A word version of this document
will be posted at www.state.sgov.gov/demarche.
CLINTON

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