Cablegate: Daily Summary of Japanese Press 10/22/09

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DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA;
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA

SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 10/22/09

INDEX:

(1) Tension spikes in Japan-U.S. alliance with Obama administration
shifting to tough stance on Futenma, Afghan aid, secret nuclear
agreement (Yomiuri)

(2) Editorial: Governor's response on Futenma relocation: Steep
price to pay for ambiguity (Okinawa Times)

(3) Editorial: "Friction over security issues" could put Japan-U.S.
alliance at risk (Nikkei)

(4) Prime Minister Ohira considered unveiling secret nuclear pact in
1980 (Asahi)

(5) American academic urges Hatoyama administration to have courage
to revise campaign pledges (Asahi)

(6) Sankei-FNN poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties (Sankei)

(7) Prime Minister's schedule, October 21 (Nikkei)

ARTICLES:

(1) Tension spikes in Japan-U.S. alliance with Obama administration
shifting to tough stance on Futenma, Afghan aid, secret nuclear
agreement

YOMIURI (Page 2) (Full)
October 22, 2009

Tokyo -- Washington Bureau reporter Satoshi Ogawa

The visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to Japan, where
the main issue was how to handle the relocation of the U.S. Marines'
Futenma Air Station in Okinawa, ended in discord, with Gates
strongly pressing Japan to reach a decision before President Barack
Obama's visit to Japan on Nov. 12-13, and Prime Minister Yukio
Hatoyama and other Japanese officials not offering a definite
response. At a news conference held after his meetings, Gates made
repeated demands of the Hatoyama administration in an unusually
strong tone, which is rare in diplomacy. Tension in the Japan-U.S.
alliance has heightened ahead of the U.S. President's visit to
Japan.

A senior Japanese government official was visibly shocked after
watching Gates's news conference on Oct. 21. He said: "I'm surprised
he made such blunt statements. It appears that without any
consideration for diplomacy he simply explained the heated exchanges
that took place during the meetings."

Gates said: "Without (the construction of) the replacement facility
(in Nago City), there can be no relocation (of U.S. Marines in
Okinawa) to Guam. There will also be no troop reductions or return
of land in Okinawa." This amounted to "open intimidation" (in the
words of a government source): if the Hatoyama administration does
not make any progress on Futenma relocation, the transfer of 8,000
Marines from Okinawa to Guam, a main feature of the U.S. Forces
Japan (USFJ) realignment plans, and other measures to reduce the
burden imposed by military bases will not be implemented. Gates's
tough stance reflects the fact that the Obama administration has

TOKYO 00002442 002 OF 012

judged its soft approach to the Hatoyama administration a "failure."
One participant on the U.S. side in the meetings observed, "We have
been too soft so far," admitting the shift to a hard-line approach
toward Japan.

The tough stance is not limited to the Futenma issue. At his
meetings and during the news conference, Gates demanded an increase
in financial contributions to expand the Afghan armed forces and
police as part of Afghan aid measures. He also made it a point to
mention the secret agreement on bringing nuclear arms into Japan and
cautioned that "this should not have a negative impact on the
bilateral relationship."

According to a senior Ministry of Defense official, this time Gates
declined a salute from a guard of honor, something normally
performed by the Self-Defense Forces for welcoming state guests and
other VIPs. Observers interpreted this as sign tough negotiations
lay ahead in Tokyo.

The lack of consensus on the Japanese side was also pronounced. In
response to Gates's demand to implement the USFJ realignment plans
at an early date, Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa said, "We don't
plan to spend too much time." Meanwhile, Hatoyama said, "We need a
bit more time to give the issues careful consideration and to come
up with an answer." The Prime Minister reiterated to reporters on
the evening of Oct. 21 his policy to consider the government's
response after the Nago mayoral election next January.

In a speech delivered to the Yomiuri International Economic Society
meeting on Oct. 21, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada revealed that
Gates had said in the meeting with him on Oct. 20 that "discussions
have been going on for 13 years (since the Japan-US. agreement on
the return of Futenma) and the arguments have been exhausted," and
that he had responded, "As an opposition party we argued against the
Japan-U.S. agreement during that period."

The fact that a coordination process had taken place among Chief
Cabinet Secretary Hirofumi Hirano, Okada, and Kitazawa ahead of
Gates's visit also gave the impression that the government was not
prepared with a diplomatic position before the Okada-Gates talks on
Oct. 20.

(2) Editorial: Governor's response on Futenma relocation: Steep
price to pay for ambiguity

OKINAWA TIMES (Page 5) (Full)
October 22, 2009

The U.S. government is taking advantage of the Okinawa Prefectural
Government's acceptance of the relocation of the U.S. forces'
Futenma Air Station to corner the Hatoyama administration.

Governor Hirokazu Nakaima should admit that he has been co-opted
into such a scheme.

The governor's oft-repeated phrase that "relocation out of the
prefecture is the best option" sounds like a meaningless cliche. If
he maintains an ambiguous attitude at this critical stage in the
fate of the base issue, his words might be used in an unintended
way. Recent developments concerning the Futenma issue have
substantiated this contention.

TOKYO 00002442 003 OF 012

Shortly before U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates's visit to
Japan, a senior Department of Defense official stated that moving
the planned Futenma replacement facility in Henoko, Nago City,
farther offshore by 50 meters would be acceptable. The official
said: "If the governor wants to move the facility, that is an issue
between the Japanese government and the governor. If a proposal is
made, we will consider it."

The timing of this shift in the policy of the U.S. government, which
had insisted the replacement facility could not be moved even 1
millimeter, can be interpreted as a mere maneuver for the purpose of
finding a meeting point.

Secretary Gates also conveyed to the Japanese government the U.S.'s
readiness to accept moving the replacement facility farther
offshore. This is a major concession on the part of the U.S.
government, which had pushed for construction of the facility in the
coastal area of Camp Schwab.

Because the governor said this would be a "good thing," he has
finally come out with a clear stance. It would appear that the
governor and the U.S. government are working hand-in-hand to check
the Hatoyama administration's moves toward reexamining the agreement
on returning Futenma, including the possibility of relocating it out
of Okinawa or out of Japan.

We wonder if the governor is aware of the popular will. An opinion
poll conducted by Okinawa Times and Asahi Shimbun in May disclosed
that 68 percent of Okinawans oppose and only 18 percent favor
Futenma's relocation within the prefecture. There is a chasm between
the Nakaima administration and the popular will.

This debate is distorted.

Allowing foreign troops to use Japan's national territory is an
issue that touches on sovereignty. Normally, the host country
provides the facilities and training grounds to meet the
requirements of the troops whose deployment it recognizes as
necessary. Why is the U.S. defense secretary making the
determination that relocation to the coastal area of Camp Schwab is
the only option and telling Japan that plans to relocate the Marines
to Guam will be scrapped without Futenma relocation, as if he were
serving an ultimatum?

This also sounds like intimidation.

His statement resembles a warning to a new administration aiming at
an "equal relationship."

The Futenma base is a U.S. Marine facility. The government needs to
explain to the people whether the Marines are indispensable for
Japan's defense and security. Furthermore, unless it clarifies why
the Marines cannot function if they are not based in Okinawa, debate
is untenable.

The present situation where senior U.S. officials' statements appear
to decide Japan's policy is too unprincipled. Okinawa has been
tossed into just such a situation.

The governor should express Okinawa's indignation in a
straightforward manner.

TOKYO 00002442 004 OF 012

The option of relocation out of Okinawa is often nixed because
nowhere else will accept a new military base. This is an utterly
unreasonable notion. Are other prefectures saying that it is all
right for Okinawa to host the base when they themselves refuse to do
so?

If the Japan-U.S. security alliance is indeed important, the
concomitant burden should be borne in mind. Japan is often
criticized for enjoying a "free ride" in security, but the reality
is that the free ride is made on the back of Okinawa.

Now is the time for Governor Nakaima to question with vehemence the
postwar security policy of concentrating military bases in Okinawa.

(3) Editorial: "Friction over security issues" could put Japan-U.S.
alliance at risk

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
October 22, 2009

U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates might be wondering why he
flew across the Pacific. While in Japan, he met with Prime Minister
Yukio Hatoyama, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, and Defense Minister
Toshimi Kitazawa. But none of them talked about what he wanted to
hear - specific support measures to replace the Maritime
Self-Defense Force's ongoing refueling mission and words of
commitment to the Japan-U.S. agreement on the relocation of the U.S.
Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa.

Imagine if the U.S. remained noncommittal even though the Japanese
defense minister visited the U.S. immediately after a new government
had been launched there and wanted to reconfirm an accord concluded
between Japan and the previous U.S. administration. The defense
minister must be wondering why he visited the U.S.

A new administration will naturally bring about changes in policy,
but international promises and policies are different matters. For
instance, the previous Bush administration took over the accord its
predecessor Clinton administration concluded with Japan in 1996 on
the return of U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station. If the U.S.
had overturned the accord, Tokyo would have become distrustful of
Washington's foreign policy.

In countries in which regimes changes occur frequently, it is
customary to place emphasis on the continuity of foreign policy.
Japan is now in the stage of trial and error.

It was revealed through Defense Secretary Gates's visit to Japan
that there is friction between Japan and the U.S. over security
issues. The friction must be quickly resolved so that it is only a
temporary phenomenon. If the two countries remain unable to take
care of their pending issues, President Barack Obama's planned visit
to Japan in November might end in failure even if the two countries
try to gloss over the failure with words, as they did in the case of
Gates's Japan visit.

If the discord over security issues lasts for a long time,
Japan-U.S. ties will inevitably weaken.

The Obama administration might begin to regard China as a more
trustworthy partner than its ally, Japan. In negotiations on issues
related to North Korea, as well, China might become more influential

TOKYO 00002442 005 OF 012

and Japan might eventually feel even more frustrated. Also in
negotiations on pending issues between Japan and China, including
the development of gas fields, if Japan loses the support of the
U.S., its position will become weaker.

If the Hatoyama administration feels that it was able to display "an
equal Japan-U.S. relationship," this should be considered dangerous
self-contentment.

In discussing the Futenma issue with Gates, Okada pointed out the
current difficult political situation in Japan and sought his
understanding about the government's stance. This remark, made by a
senior ruling party official after its recent landslide victory in
the general election, could be interpreted as an excuse for a lack
of coordination and leadership capability.

The Hatoyama administration has reiterated that the Japan-U.S.
alliance is the cornerstone of Japan's foreign and security
policies. If this is not simply diplomatic language, the
administration should make the decision to continue the refueling
mission and take action to implement the relocation plan for the
Futenma facility as soon as possible; otherwise, the Japan-U.S.
alliance may turn into a mere name and may not properly function in
an emergency situation.

The prime minister, the foreign minister and the defense minister
are lacking in a sense of crisis. This could result in exposing the
Japan-U.S. alliance to risk.

(4) Prime Minister Ohira considered unveiling secret nuclear pact in
1980

ASAHI (Page 3) (Abridged slightly)
October 22, 2009

Masahiro Tsuruoka

In the spring of 1980, shortly before his sudden death, Prime
Minister Masayoshi Ohira considered disclosing to the public port
calls in Japan by U.S. vessels carrying nuclear weapons and
dissolving a secret nuclear pact between Japan and the United
States. This was revealed in Asahi Shimbun interviews with Hajime
Morita, a former House of Representatives member, and Lower House
lawmaker Koichi Kato. Morita was serving as secretary to Prime
Minister Ohira and Kato as deputy chief cabinet secret at the time.

In 1963, Foreign Minister Ohira held talks with U.S. Ambassador to
Japan Edwin Reischauer and confirmed the pact's interpretation that
Tokyo was to allow port calls in Japan by U.S. vessels carrying
nuclear weapons. This was revealed through testimonies and documents
in the United States. The Asahi Shimbun interviews have made clear
that Ohira was concerned about the fact that the pact was still kept
under cover (in 1980) when he was serving as prime minister and that
he considered dissolving the agreement.

According to Morita, about two months before his death, Prime
Minister Ohira called into his office Chief Cabinet Secretary
Masayoshi Ito, Kato, and himself. There, Ohira asked for their
opinions, saying, "Don't you think it's about time to let the people
know about port calls by vessels carrying nuclear weapons?" Kato
also remembers this scene. "I don't think that would be appropriate
at this point," Ito replied. Morita followed suit, saying, "That's

TOKYO 00002442 006 OF 012

not possible." Kato echoed Morita's opinion.

According to Morita, Ohira then said, "I know it's difficult. That's
why I am asking for your opinions," and he did not bring up the
issue again before he died. Ohira did not seem surprised at the U.S.
view immediately after his meeting with Ambassador Reischauer. But
he gradually began to think seriously about the gap between the
government's official position and reality, and developed a desire
to unveil the secret pact. On several occasions Morita heard Ohira
mumbling "introduction, introduction" (referring to the introduction
of nuclear weapons) in the car on the road.

Many years after retiring as ambassador to Japan, Reischauer
testified in 1981 that Ohira in their meeting in 1963 had confirmed
the U.S. view that port calls were not equivalent to the
introduction (of nuclear weapons). But the Japanese government has
consistently denied this fact.

Shortly after assuming office, Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada
ordered the ministry to investigate four secret agreements,
including one on the introduction of nuclear weapons, and to produce
a report by the end of November. A third-party panel to be set up
will also interview persons familiar with the matter.

After entering the Finance Ministry, Morita married the eldest
daughter of Ohira, a former Finance Ministry official. In 1962,
Morita became a secretary to Foreign Minister Ohira. In 1972, Morita
again served as secretary to Ohira, who became foreign minister for
a second time.

Seinan Jogakuin University Professor Hideki Kan, who found copies of
official U.S. telegrams on the Ohira-Reischauer talks about 10 years
ago, said: "It is significant that there was a politician who
agonized over deceiving the people about the existence of a secret
(nuclear) pact and considered disclosing the pact to the public."

(5) American academic urges Hatoyama administration to have courage
to revise campaign pledges

ASAHI (Page 15) (Full)
October 22, 2009

Gerald Curtis, professor at Columbia University

The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took over the administration
just over a month ago, but its achievements during this short period
are impressive. First of all, the government has changed its
policymaking systems drastically, and not just in the sense that the
methods of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) era have been changed.
The system of an administration comprising the senior bureaucrats
appointed by the Emperor and the majority party in the Diet was
established during the Taisho period, and this has remained
basically unchanged even under the new postwar constitution. The
historical significance of the Hatoyama administration's
revolutionary change of this system of governance is tremendous.

The new system under which the cabinet makes policies and the party
passes these policies in the Diet prevents the zoku giin (Diet
members lobbying for special interests) from coming into play and
clarifies accountability for policymaking. The phenomenon of cabinet
ministers talking to the people in their own words, and not reading
from scripts prepared by the bureaucrats, is a symbol of the major

TOKYO 00002442 007 OF 012

changes brought about by the Hatoyama administration.

I have long had doubts about the myth that the bureaucrats are to
blame (for Japan's problems). There is nothing wrong with the
bureaucracy itself. The issue is whether the politicians controlling
the administration are able to fully utilize their governing
abilities, and not leave things in the hands of the bureaucrats, and
are able to make the capable bureaucrats or bureaucrats who have a
sense of mission to make contributions to the country to work
closely with the cabinet.

In any case, the people have high hopes for and give strong support
to the Hatoyama administration's efforts so far. The United States
and other countries are closely watching developments from now on.

However, the Hatoyama administration also faces serious problems.
The first problem is how to maintain the unity of the cabinet, since
the DPJ has formed a coalition with small parties because it does
not control a majority in the House of Councillors.

The notion during the LDP era that each minister is the boss in his
ministry is incompatible with the DPJ administration's thinking. If
Mr. Hatoyama allows the leader of junior coalition partner People's
New Party to openly declare that the prime minister cannot possibly
fire him and behave like he is an equal of the prime minister, this
will undermine not only the prime minister's authority, but also the
unity of the cabinet.

Another issue is whether the administration is able to display
courage in revising the policies included in the DPJ's campaign
manifesto if warranted. Campaign pledges are just campaign pledges.
A responsible political leader should not be obsessed with policies
just because they are campaign pledges, regardless of whether
funding is available.

With tax revenues plunging, the issuance of more deficit-funding
bonds will be required if all the policies in the manifesto are to
be implemented. Child allowances, toll-free expressways, and so
forth are not one-time policies. Since they will probably continue
for many years, spending for these policies will increase every
year. If government debts increase any further, the credibility of
the Hatoyama administration will be jeopardized.

Flexibility to make revisions if warranted is necessary, even for
campaign pledges. Like U.S. President Barack Obama, Prime Minister
Yukio Hatoyama won the election under the slogan of "change." After
taking office, President Obama has made pragmatic revisions to
specific policies while standing firm on his basic ideals. If the
Hatoyama administration can convince the people on this point and
demonstrate its courage and resolve, it will probably become the
administration that will realize the historical changes Japan
needs.

(6) Sankei-FNN poll on Hatoyama cabinet, political parties

SANKEI (Page 5) (Full)
October 20, 2009

Questions & Answers

(Note) Figures are percentages. Figures in parentheses are
percentages in the previous Sankei-FNN survey, conducted Sept.

TOKYO 00002442 008 OF 012

16-17.

Q: Do you support the Hatoyama cabinet?

Yes 60.9 (68.7)
No 20.7 (15.3)
Don't know (D/K), etc. 18.4 (16.0)

Q: Which political party do you support?

Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 40.6 (44.4)
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP or Jiminto) 18.9 (18.8)
New Komeito (NK or Komeito) 3.6 (4.0)
Japanese Communist Party (JCP or Kyosanto) 2.7 (2.7)
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 1.3 (2.4)
Your Party (YP or Minna no To) 2.3 (4.1)
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0.5 (0.3)
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0.0 (0.3)
Other political parties 0.5 (0.8)
None 28.5 (21.6)
D/K, etc. 1.1 (0.6)

Q: Do you have high expectations for the Hatoyama government on the
following points?

The prime minister's personal character
Yes 71.0
No 15.6
D/K, etc. 13.4

The prime minister's leadership
Yes 41.5
No 28.5
D/K, etc. 30.0

Foreign, security policies
Yes 42.1
No 24.9
D/K, etc. 33.0

Economic policy
Yes 36.2
No 34.6
D/K, etc. 29.2

Cutting government waste
Yes 72.2
No 15.6
D/K, etc. 12.2

Relations with bureaucrats
Yes 76.1
No 10.4
D/K, etc. 13.5

Budget
Yes 47.0
No 29.9
D/K, etc. 23.1

Teamwork
Yes 46.8

TOKYO 00002442 009 OF 012

No 29.7
D/K, etc. 23.5

Performance at 1 month
Yes 52.7
No 21.4
D/K, etc. 25.9

Q: What do you think about the Hatoyama government on the following
points?

Mr. Ichiro Ozawa is the right person as DPJ secretary general
Yes 49.0 (56.7)
No 39.0 (33.3)
D/K, etc. 12.0 (10.0)

Mr. Katsuya Okada is the right person as foreign minister
Yes 70.1 (63.7)
No 15.2 (18.0)
D/K, etc. 14.7 (18.3)

Mr. Akira Nagatsuma is the right person as health, labor and welfare
minister
Yes 66.3 (70.0)
No 17.2 (9.3)
D/K, etc. 16.5 (20.7)

Mr. Seiji Maehara is the right person as land, infrastructure and
transport minister
Yes 62.5 (------)
No 23.4 (------)
D/K, etc. 14.1 (------)

Mr. Shizuka Kamei is the right person as state minister for postal
reform
Yes 24.9 (41.8)
No 53.9 (40.2)
D/K, etc. 21.2 (18.0)

Ms. Mizuho Fukushima is the right person as state minister for
consumer affairs and declining birthrate
Yes 46.8 (61.5)
No 29.7 (24.3)
D/K, etc. 23.5 (14.2)

The DPJ's coalition with the SDP and the PNP is good
Yes 52.7 (49.8)
No 21.4 (37.1)
D/K, etc. 25.9 (13.1)

You feel Mr. Ozawa's influence in the cabinet lineup
Yes 49.0 (61.3)
No 39.0 (26.8)
D/K, etc. 12.0 (11.9)

Do you think the Diet should discuss such issues as the "child
allowance handout" plan during its extraordinary session?
Yes 70.1 (------)
No 15.2 (------)
D/K, etc. 14.7 (------)

TOKYO 00002442 010 OF 012

You have high expectations for the DPJ's newly elected lawmakers?
Yes 66.3 (39.2)
No 17.2 (43.8)
D/K, etc. 16.5 (17.0)

Q: Do you have high expectations for LDP President Sadakazu
Tanigaki?

Yes 34.1
No 54.7
D/K, etc. 11.2

Q: Do you think the DPJ should keep its manifesto without fail?

The DPJ should do so 9.0
The DPJ should do its best to do so, but it can't be helped if it
fails to keep some pledges in its manifesto 38.8
The DPJ should flexibly translate its policies into action without
being bound to its pledges 50.6
D/K, etc. 1.6

Q: Do you think the DPJ should translate the following policies into
action?

No fees for high school
Yes 46.9
No 44.1
D/K, etc. 9.0

Abolition of provisional gasoline tax rates
Yes 57.1
No 29.3
D/K, etc. 13.6

Compensation for farming households
Yes 59.2
No 21.7
D/K, etc. 19.1

Loan moratorium for small businesses
Yes 54.9
No 28.4
D/K, etc. 16.7

Relocation of the U.S. military's Futenma airfield outside Okinawa
Prefecture
Yes 45.1
No 29.1
D/K, etc. 25.8

Ban on bureaucrats' replies before the Diet
Yes 39.9
No 35.7
D/K, etc. 24.4

25 PERCENT cuts in Japan's greenhouse gas emissions from 1990
levels as a midterm goal
Yes 72.7
No 17.5
D/K, etc. 9.8

Q: Who do you think is appropriate as prime minister among the

TOKYO 00002442 011 OF 012

following politicians?

Yukio Hatoyama 28.7
Katsuya Okada 8.2
Naoto Kan 5.5
Ichiro Ozawa 4.4
Seiji Maehara 3.9
Akira Nagatsuma 1.6
Other ruling party lawmakers 1.7
Yoichi Masuzoe 9.7
Shigeru Ishiba 4.2
Nobuteru Ishihara 2.5
Sadakazu Tanigaki 2.2
Taro Kono 0.8
Yasutoshi Nishimura 0.1
Other opposition lawmakers 3.4
None 16.5
D/K, etc. 6.6

Q: Would you like the ruling or opposition parties to win next
year's election for the House of Councillors?

The DPJ and other new ruling parties 59.0 (58.6)
The LDP and other new opposition parties 32.9 (32.3)
D/K, etc. 8.1 (9.1)

Q: How long do you think the Hatoyama government will continue?

About several months 4.0 (1.3)
Until around next summer's election for the House of Councillors
16.8 (18.2)
Until next fall 26.5 (24.1)
Until after next fall 47.7 (51.9)
D/K, etc. 5.0 (4.5)

Polling methodology: The survey was conducted Oct. 17-18 by the
Sankei Shimbun and Fuji News Network (FNN) over the telephone on a
computer-aided random digit dialing (RDD) basis. For the survey, a
total of 1,000 persons were sampled from among men and women, aged
20 and over, across the nation.

(7) Prime Minister's schedule, October 21

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
October 22, 2009

08:42 Met Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirano at the Prime Minister's
Official Residence.
09:10 Met U.S. Defense Secretary Gates, followed by former Prime
Minister Mori, with Hirano present.
10:11 Met Environment Minister Ozawa. Later attended a meeting of
the Ministerial Committee on Basic Policies.
12:17 Met Katsura Sanshi, a professional comic storyteller, with
Transport Minister Maehara and others present.
14:17 Met Cabinet Intelligence Director Mitani.
15:10 Responded to an interview with the Thai newspaper Bangkok
Post. Later, met State Minister for Administrative Reform Council
Sengoku, Cabinet Office Vice Minister Furukawa, and Government
Revitalization Unit Executive Secretary Kato.
16:22 Met Deputy Foreign Minister Sasae, Deputy Education Minister
Shimizu, Director General for International Affairs Saneshige of the
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Ministry, and others.

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17:32 Met Chinese National Peoples Representatives Congress Foreign
Affairs Committee chief Li, former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone
and others.
18:45 Met at the prime minister's official residential quarters with
Diet Affairs Committee Deputy Chairman Mitsui, the head directors of
Lower House standing committees, and others.
20:29 Met Health, Labor and Welfare Minister Nagatsuma and
parliamentary secretary Yamanoi.
21:39 Returned to his home.

ROOS

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