Cablegate: Joint Fsc-Pc 14 October: Isaf Deputy Commander
PP RUEHAST RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL
DE RUEHVEN #0224/01 2891347
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 161347Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6636
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0129
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000224
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER,
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG
SUBJECT: JOINT FSC-PC 14 OCTOBER: ISAF DEPUTY COMMANDER
URGES "EXPEDITIONARY POLICE" CAPABILITIES
1. (SBU) Summary: Deputy ISAF Commander LTG Dutton appealed
to the joint meeting of the Forum for Security Cooperation
and the Permanent Council (FSC-PC) for developing
"expeditionary police" capabilities that would parallel those
of the military for building capacity in Afghanistan. Dutton
also emphasized sustained "political will" as the primary
factor for mission success. There appeared to be unanimity
in the FSC-PC for further OSCE engagement in Afghanistan,
especially for border security, rule of law and other
2. (SBU) Meanwhile, the plenary adopted the Best Practice
Guide for Implementation of VD99 Chapter IV, Contacts
(FSC.DD/6/09/Rev.2). In Working Group "B," Russia suggested
the group move forward with its proposal for Naval CSBMs
under the pretense that "no comments" from delegations
implied consent. The U.S. made clear its concerns. We
expect Russia will continue to press on this issue as well as
their proposal to amend VD99. No draft documents were moved
to plenary from Working Group "A." End Summary.
Deputy ISAF Commander
3. (SBU) The 41st Joint FSC-PC, held on October 14, )
unusual in that it was the second Joint session in a month )
featured Deputy ISAF Commander LTG Jim Dutton's frank
appraisal of the shortfalls to achieving a success in
Afghanistan. He introduced his brief with the blunt
assessment, "The single likely cause for strategic failure in
Afghanistan would be the loss of political will to see this
through." Following his rapid review of achievements (e.g.,
successful Pakistani engagement and cooperation on the
border, Afghan National Army budgeting, credible plan for
developing the Aghan National Police, evolution of the
political and democratic process), he warned that the
positive masked the reenergized insurgency, public
perceptions of decline, press skepticism, lowered
expectations, and calls among some for an early "exit." He
noted insurgents also read the press and use it to
rationalize a strategy of "waiting out."
4. (SBU) Dutton underscored ISAF's military achievements were
not the best measure for success in Afghanistan, but were
only one component of a strategy to gain the initiative,
consolidate gains, and make the gains sustainable as the best
path towards an exit strategy. He explained the goal was not
about defeating the insurgency, but neutralizing its ability
to threaten the stability of the Government of Afghanistan or
the security of its people. He underscored the need for
sufficient resources to develop the Afghan National Police
(ANP), which he characterized as wasteful, deficient in
leadership, and corrupt with a high proportion of drug
addicts. He argued for creating an expeditionary capability
for national police forces that could be deployed to
Afghanistan to train and mentor the ANP in the same way that
the NATO Training Mission in Afghanistan is designed to do.
5. (SBU) Dutton also advocated for a different strategic
approach to strengthen the counter-insurgency operational
culture, the security partnership away from its preoccupation
with force-protection, responsive and accountable governance
(key to comprehensive security), and organizational changes
focused on "unity of effort." He noted Afghanistan needed to
connect subnational to national governing institutions, to
improve PRT coordination, to focus on rule of law issues, and
to improve the resources-to-task ratios. Dutton argued the
Taliban was weak and defeatable by the Afghanis with our
help, but he advised no insurgency is defeated without some
level of political reconciliation.
6. (SBU) Sweden (Nesser), speaking for the EU and the
several candidate, Stabilization and Association countries
among others, inventoried EU member states' commitments to
Afghanistan including in the areas of civilian
reconstruction, governance and rule of law, policing, as well
as border management and customs administration. Sweden
further suggested OSCE consider cooperating with Afghanistan
to enhance border security, counter-terrorism, to combat
radicalization, trafficking in drugs and persons and promote
respect for human rights and regional cooperation. Sweden
noted these would contribute to not only Central Asia but the
whole OSCE area and beyond.
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7. (SBU) The U.S. (Fuller), Canada (Gregory), Russia (Azimov)
each made statements supporting OSCE's niche, value-added
capabilities. Russia called for a greater role for it in
NATO discussions with ISAF Troop Contributing Nations, and
more discussion in the NATO-Russia Council especially on
addressing counter-narcotics strategies, including
coordination between NATO and the CSTO. Turkey (Buluc)
supported OSCE engagement to assist Afghanistan in border and
police and counter-narcotics training.
8. (SBU) Dutton responded to various points, thanking Russia
for its contribution to opening up the air corridor for
supplies, noting that the counter-narcotics component in
Afghanistan was important but not as serious as focusing on
Pakistan and Iran components, encouraging OSCE members states
to consider developing an expeditionary police capability to
help build ANP capacity, and underscoring that the
minimization of civilian casualties was ISAF's top priority,
though statistically the collateral damage was extremely low.
Vienna Doc 99 "Contacts" BPG Adopted
9. (SBU) Following the Security Dialogue (Agenda Item 2), the
plenary agreed to the Draft Decision on the Best Practice
Guide for Implementation of VD99 Chapter IV, Contacts
(FSC.DD/6/09/Rev.2). Under AOB, the Greek Chair (Bakoyannis)
announced that it requested Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini to
present to a special session of the Permanent Council the
report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mision
on the Conflict in Georgia at a mutually agreeable date.
Also under AOB, the CPC Director (Salber) reported on the
OSCE presentation to the 1540 Review Meeting in New York.
Sweden marked the tenth anniversary of ESDP.
10. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) recommended moving its Proposal
for a Draft Decision on CSBMs in the Naval Area
(FSC.DEL/120/08/Rev.2) to Working Group "A" for discussion
since it had received no comments from delegations on it.
"This implied consent," Ulyanov said (Note: knowing full
well that over half of FSC pS had expressed concern about
Russia's proposal in the past year. End note.). Russia also
requested that its AIAM proposal to amend VD99
(FSC.AIAM/2/09) be placed on the agenda of Working Group "A."
11. (SBU) The U.S. (Ellis) drew upon standing generic
guidance refuting the need for naval CSBMs (98 STATE 156529).
Russia attempted to underscore the U.S. was missing the
point in that Russia was seeking to address only the issue of
Chapter 1 of its proposal, "Exchange of Military
Information." The U.S. noted in addition to the problematic
language in Chapter 1 (i.e., "zone of application"), the
information Russia was requesting was readily available
through open sources, and thus added no value. The U.S.
reiterated that absent a highly unusual situation in which a
clear national interest would be served, it remained U.S.
policy not to enter into discussions regarding naval CSBMs
that would impinge on operations in international waters.
Russia retorted that such arguments would apply equally to
land forces and perhaps we did not need the Vienna Document
(Comment: at this point several delegations rolled their
eyes! End comment.) Russia said the U.S. position was not
an acceptable reason to not discuss the issue of Naval CSBMs
in that the Russian proposal if for a specific area and would
not impinge on U.S. moving ships through the Mediterranean.
12. (SBU) The Chair (UK) moved off the agenda item when no
delegation requested the floor following the last Russian
intervention. The Chair did announce that it would move the
Russian AIAM proposal to the following week's agenda for
Working Group "A."
Working Group "A"
13. (SBU) There were no current implementation issues raised.
Under Item 2, VD99, the Chair kept the draft decision on the
Agenda and Modalities of the 20th AIAM (FSC.DD/9/09) on the
agenda for the following session "to give all delegations an
opportunity to obtain guidance from capitals." Turkey's
revised proposal for a draft decision on possible FSC action
towards improving the application of VD 99 compliance and
verification measures (now digital cameras only) was
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acknowledged with Belarus and Sweden expressing support for
the draft. It remains on the agenda for the next WGA.
14. (SBU) Under Agenda Item 3, Sweden, a co-sponsor along
with Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany and the UK, introduced
the revised Food For Thought paper on an update of FSC
Decision 15/02 on expert advice on implementation of Section
V of the OSCE Document on SA/LW (FSC.DEL/151/09/Rev.1). The
U.S. (Ellis) said with the revisions it could now support the
draft. The chair will keep the document on the agenda for
the next WGA.
15. (SBU) There were no interventions under Agenda Item 4
(SCA). Under Item 5 (Code of Conduct), the CPC reported it
was organizing with Austria a November 5 regional workshop in
Sarajevo on Security Sector Reform and civilian oversight of
the Armed Services for South East Europe. Under Item 6
(other CSBMs), the Czech Republic reported below threshold
and demonstration of major equipment airbase visit under the
16. (U) The next WGA is scheduled for October 21, following
WGB and the FSC plenary.