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Cablegate: Iran/Iraq: The View From Najaf

VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #3195/01 3480957
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140957Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5706
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003195

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/IR, NEA/I, AND NEA/FO LIMBERT, CORBIN.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2019
TAGS: PGOV PECON PREL IR IZ
SUBJECT: IRAN/IRAQ: THE VIEW FROM NAJAF

Classified By: Political M/C Gary A. Grappo for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Local interlocutors from Najaf's social,
economic, political and military circles discussed with
Post's Senior Iran Watcher (IW) and PRToffs the scope of
Iranian influence in the province, the role of the Shia
clerical establishment (Marja'iyyah), notably Grand Ayatollah
Ali Sistani, and the challenges confronting the province's
farmers who are unable to compete with Iranian-subsidized
produce. Interlocutors generally cautioned against a
premature U.S. departure and agreed that Iran remains an
influential force in Najaf, leveraging its ties with Iraqi
political groups to extend its influence. Iran remains wary
of Sistani's social and political clout among Shias, notably
in Iran, given the Grand Ayatollah's rejection of the Iranian
regime's adherence to clerical rule (vilayat-e-faqih). END
SUMMARY

2. (C) During a recent visit to Najaf, local interlocutors,
including the province's head of military intelligence; the
chairman of the Provincial Council; a well-connected Shia
businessman; the president of the farmer's union; the chief
judge of the province; and a representative of the local
Chamber of Commerce shared their views on the state of
political and economic development in the province and Iran's
role.

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Provincial Council Chairman
---------------------------

3. (C) Sheikh Fayedh al-Shimerri, the Chairman of Najaf's
Provincial Council, a religious cleric turned politician and
member of Maliki's State of Law coalition asserted that
Iraqis throughout the country were growing increasingly
frustrated with foreign interference, notably from Iraq's
neighbors. He singled out Saudi Arabia and Iran as the
biggest culprits, but noted that a "mental revolution" was
underway among Iraqi youth against foreign agendas seeking to
undermine the country's stability, pointing to such trends in
Anbar against the Saudis, Najaf against the Iranians, and
Mosul against the Turks.

4. (C) Al-Shimerri echoed other interlocutors' concerns
about a premature U.S. departure from Iraq and risks of a
political and security vacuum. He noted that Iran had formed
the Iraqi National Alliance (INA) political coalition
comprised of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI) and
the Sadrists, among others, in an effort to bolster ISCI's
image as the pan-Shia party of choice in the elections.

5. (C) Al-Shimerri expressed concerns about rumors
circulating in Najaf that the USG was sponsoring a Baathist
conference in the U.S. IW dismissed the news as baseless
rumors intended to undermine the USG-GOI relationship.
(NOTE: A recent press report in an ISCI-owned media also
mentioned a proposed Baathist conference scheduled to be held
in Washington in February. END NOTE).

Keeping the U.S. Bogged Down
----------------------------

6. (C) Major Uday, a provincial military intelligence
officer and Maliki supporter, described Iran as a threat to
Iraqi stability, commenting that the Iranian government's
(IRIG) goal is to keep the U.S. bogged down in Iraq in order
to discourage U.S. military reprisals against the IRIG for
its nuclear program. He commented that Iran fears Iraq's
potential influence in the region, and will continue to
support local proxies to exert its influence and undermine
Iraq. "Iran does not offer its support for free," Uday
noted, there will be a price to pay for each proxy in
exchange for Iranian support.

7. (C) Uday is supportive of Maliki's decision to forego (at
Q7. (C) Uday is supportive of Maliki's decision to forego (at
least for now) a political alliance with the INA that is
dominated by the pro-Iranian Sadrist Trend and ISCI. Joining
the INA will only undermine the integrity of Iraqi security
institutions as ISCI/Badr and the Sadrists will try to fill
key security positions with their own supporters, many of
whom are unprofessional and sectarian, Uday cautioned. The
Badr Organization, heavily influenced by Iran, continued to
maintain a very effective intelligence arm, according to
Uday. Many former Iraqi fighter pilots who flew sorties
against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war were now on Iran's hit
list (NOTE: According to Uday, Iran had already assassinated
180 Iraqi pilots. END NOTE).

8. (C) Uday also noted that Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) elements
often resort to bribes (USD 10-20K) to secure the release of
supporters in GOI detention and that the Najaf anti-terrorism
unit regularly receives cash offers to release detainees. He
asserted that Najaf's police chief, Abd Al-Karim (aka Abu
Ahmad Al-Miyahi), is a "former" member of Badr with dubious
loyalties. Najaf's chief justice, Kareem Faroon, a
well-respected judge also alleged that the Iraqi police were
responsible for placing an IED close to the PRT base in
November. "He (police chief) is a bad guy. After all, he is
still part of the militia (Badr)," Judge Faroon asserted.

Sistani: "What Do the Americans Want?"
----QDI>RpQd%'MkQQto pulse the cleric on
his views about matters of political consequence. Kelanter
explained that Sistani's son, Muhammad Ridha, serves as the
main conduit of information between his father whenever a
religious/political message needs to be conveyed to Shia
imams in the country.

12. (C) Sistani does not allow Iranian students to enroll
in the howzeh (religious seminary) in order to prevent IRIG
infiltration, Kelanter asserted. Kelanter himself is
suspicious of Iranian intentions and asserted that the imams
of the holy Abbas and Husayn shrines in Karbala, Shaykhs
Karbal'aie and Safi, were "in the pocket of the Iranians",
despite their proclaimed loyalties to Sistani.

The Sadrists
------------

13. (C) Regarding the Sadrists, Kelanter recalled fondly his
time as a student of the late Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr (Moqtada
Al-Sadr's father), commenting that, unlike his radical son,
the late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He
Qthe late cleric was admired and respected by many Iraqis. He
criticized Moqtada for failing to capitalize and build on his
father's legacy. Al-Shimmeri also praised the efforts of
Sadr's father and sought to distinguish between "good" and
"bad" Sadrists; the former being adherents of Sadr's father.
Major Uday believes the Sadrists are politically weak and
continue to splinter as former JAM elements form their own
groups. (NOTE: Major Uday believes Al-Shimmari is a closet
Sadrist despite his public alliance with Maliki's coalition.
Al-Shimmari commented that the Iranians had told the wayward
Moqtada to stay-put in Iran for the time being. END NOTE).


Farmers: Iran and Syria Waging Economic Warfare
--------------------------------------------- --

14. (C) Jabar Al-Garawi, the head of Najaf's Farmers' Union
commented that most farmers support PM Maliki for his
increasingly non-sectarian political message and success in
improving security. However, he complained that Iran and
Syria were waging economic warfare on Iraqi farmers by
flooding provincial markets with low cost/quality produce
that are heavily subsidized by their respective governments.

15. (C) Iraq's neighbors were pursuing such measures in
order to prevent economic development, thereby forestalling
the continued success of Iraq's new democracy, Al-Garawi
alleged. These problems were further aggravated by water
shortages due to the ongoing drought, the high cost of fuels,
outdated farming techniques, and power shortages, he noted.
Al-Garawi confirmed that the Najaf Provincial Council had
recently voted to ban the import of foreign tomatoes into
Najaf in an effort to bolster local producers. (NOTE: 60
percent of Najaf's labor force works in agriculture. The
sector is the province's most important revenue generating
industry, followed by religious tourism. END NOTE).

16. (C) Samira Al-Halawi, an outspoken female member of the
Najaf Chamber of Commerce, having recently returned from a
USG-sponsored visitors program in the U.S., railed against
Iran's pervasive commercial influence in Najaf, noting that
many Iranian-owned companies secure favorable contracts in
the province by capitalizing on ties with local politicians.
She also criticized Iraqi politicians "for being ignorant
and overly-reliant on clerics" for their political welfare.

COMMENT
-------

17. (C) Najaf, as the epicenter of Shia Islam, carries
significant importance for Iran and its overall campaign to
expand its sphere of influence in Iraq and the region. The
city is home to many Iranian pilgrims and traders eager to
profit spiritually and financially from the city's religious
and commercial offerings. There is general awareness and
acknowledgment among many Iraqis that Iran's influence,
albeit a historic reality, does not always translate into
mutual benefit for Najafis. Many also acknowledge that Iran
will continue to capitalize on its ties to the city in order
to foster greater socio-economic dependencies. The extent of
its ability to influence the ways of the Marja'iyyah are more
limited, particularly during Sistani's tenure, given the
clerical establishment's unrivaled theocratic and geographic
prominence when compared to its "sister city" Qom.
HILL

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