Cablegate: Chadian Political Theater: Southern Rebel Chief

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DE RUEHNJ #0031/01 0181118
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181118Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7588
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 NDJAMENA 000031

SENSITIVE
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STATE FOR AF/C
STATE FOR S/USSES
OSD FOR DASD HUDDLESTON
NSC FOR GAVIN
LONDON FOR POL - LORD
PARIS FOR POL - BAIN AND KANEDA
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR AU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF MARR CA SU CD
SUBJECT: CHADIAN POLITICAL THEATER: SOUTHERN REBEL CHIEF
CAPTURED AS DEBY IS FETED IN SOUTHERN CAPITAL

REF: A. NDJAMENA 004
B. 09 NDJAMENA 602
C. 09 NDJAMENA 503

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SUMMARY AND
COMMENT
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1. (SBU) The GOC's capture of rebel commander Djibrine
Dassert and his top staff in Southern Chad January 4 was a
big plus for President Deby's government, and provided an
occasion for a bit of Chadian-style political theater. The
Chad military's successful ambush of Dassert, who took part
in Deby's military triumph over Habre's regime in 1990 and
was later Deby's Defense Minister before attempting a
military of overthrow Deby in 2005, serves many of Deby's
purposes in this election year. Dassert's capture:

-- burnishes the Chadian armed forces' (and Deby's own)
credentials as protector of national security;
-- decapitates the only major non-Sudan-based armed
opposition group;
-- eliminates the only politically-motivated armed rebellion
based on Chadian soil;
-- demonstrates the unwisdom of rejecting the GOC's efforts
toward peaceful "national reconciliation";
-- shows Southern Chadians that the GOC is actively involved
in their security; and,
-- improves prospects for stability along the Chad-CAR border
by eliminating a rogue armed group.

2. (SBU) Dassert was part of a web of southern
oppositionists, some armed, some not, some in Chad, some in
exile. An unarmed associate of Dassert, Dr. Nahor Mahamout
Ngawara, long in exile in Paris, was wooed by Deby last fall
and returned to Chad in December. The political symbolism of
Dassert's capture was unmistakable: on January 2, Nahor sat
on the dais with the President in the southern city of Sarh
when Deby celebrated the 20th anniversary of his rule; two
days later, Dassert was ambushed and captured by ANT troops
near Sahr. Coincidence? Hardly.

3. (SBU) The GOC's decision to go very public regarding the
status of Dassert and his cronies is smart politically and
also provides some protection for Dassert and his men,
because there is transparency on their physical and political
conditions. How the GOC handles this case from now on will
test the government's commitment to human rights and the rule
of law, as well as give us an idea of just how politically
sophisticated the GOC will be in managing a "national
reconciliation" problem of a different sort from the
negotiated and peaceful reentry to Chad of, say, Soubiane and
Goukouni -- or Nahor himself. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

4. (SBU) Following the failure of his coup attempt in 2005,
Dassert retreated to his power base in the Guera, Moyen Chari
and Chari Baguirmi regions of southwestern and southern Chad,
where Deby's support has traditionally been weak. He was
captured in Korbol, located very near Sahr, immediately
following Deby's January 2 visit to Sahr. Deby chose that
southern city to deliver his New Year's address as part of an
effort to cultivate southern voters long suspicious of him
and of the ability of his northern Zaghawa ethnic group to
govern all of Chad impartially.

5. (SBU) Deby was accompanied on his early-January visit to
Sahr by returned-exile Nahor, who decided to come back to
Chad after having met with Deby in Paris in October. Some
here have asserted that Nahor provided information that led
to Dassert's capture -- Nahor has said that soldiers directly
loyal to his movement are still being encouraged to surrender
from inaccessible locations along the CAR border, where
Dassert's troops have also been operating.

6. (SBU) Nahor has been quite visible since his return from
France, engaging in interviews in which he describes his

NDJAMENA 00000031 002 OF 002

rational for abandoning an opposition stance. Nahor has said
that he does not see President Deby, with whom he continues
to have political differences, as the root of Chad's many
problems. He has made clear that he believes Deby's
overtures to rebels and opposition figures, and willingness
to have opposition party members play prominent roles in his
government, are sincere. He has said that he appreciates the
efforts of the National Mediator to guarantee the rights of
returning rebels. Like former rebel leader Ahmat Soubiane,
Nahor insists that he does not intend to take an active part
in political life in the near term, other than to serve as a
link between the GoC and disaffected groups in Chad, France
and elsewhere.

7. (SBU) As for Dassert, the GoC is treating his capture as
a major victory, having paraded both him and a stockpile of
weapons captured with him before foreign military observers
in recent days. Dassert's removal will lead to increased
stability along the CAR border, as his troops stand accused
of having staged raiding parties into CAR this past fall.
Dassert's treatment in custody will be a test for the GoC's
ability to adhere to human rights standards and rule of law,
and also for Deby's skill at finessing relations with the
Chadian South.

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COMMENT
-------

8. (SBU) The Chad military's capture of Dassert was a big
plus for the government, serving many useful political
purposes for Deby and company in this election year,
including: burnishing the armed forces' (and Deby's own)
credentials as protector of the national security;
decapitating the only major non-Sudan-based armed opposition
group; practically eliminated the only politically-motivated
armed rebellion from Chad soil; demonstrating the unwisdom of
rejecting the GOC's efforts toward peaceful "national
reconciliation; showing Southern Chadians that the GOC is
actively involved in their security; and improving the
chances for stability along the Chad-CAR border by
eliminating one more rogue armed group.

9. (SBU) Dassert's fall also provided the occasion for a
bit of political theater, Chadian-style. Dassert was part of
a loose web of southern oppositionists, some armed, some not,
some in Chad, some abroad. Unarmed associate Nahor Mahamout
Ngawara, long in exile in Paris, was wooed by Deby last fall
and returned to Chad in December. The symbolism in this was
unmistakable: Nahor was on the dais in Sarh when Deby
celebrated the 20th anniversary of his rule on January 2; two
days later Dassert was ambushed and captured by ANT troops
near Sahr.

10. (SBU) The GOC's decision to go very public regarding
the status of Dassert and his cronies was politically astute
and also provides some protection for Dassert and his men,
because there is transparency on their physical and political
conditions. How the GOC handles this case from now on will
test the government's commitment to human rights and rule of
law, as well as give us an idea of just how politically
sophisticated and supple the GOC will be in managing a
"national reconciliation" problem of a different sort from
the negotiated and peaceful reentry to Chad of, say, Soubiane
or Goukouni -- or Nahor END COMMENT.

X. (SBU) Minimize considered.
NIGRO

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