Cablegate: Embassy Tokyo

VZCZCXYZ0005
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKO #0011 0040952
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 040952Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TOKYO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8512
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA IMMEDIATE 0061
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2517
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 3133
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 6601
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 8588
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0554

S E C R E T TOKYO 000011

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/RA, ISN/CPI, EAP/J, SCA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2035 TAGS: PGOV PREL PARM MNUC KNNP IR KZ JA

REF: A. ASTANA 02273 B. ASTANA 02257 C. STATE 131723

Classified By: DCM James P. Zumwalt, reasons 1.4(b) and (d).

1. (S) Acting EMIN delivered the demarche and non-paper contained in ref C to Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) Deputy Director General for Disarmament, Nonproliferation, and Science Akihito Nakajima January 4. (Note: The Government of Japan had been officially closed since December 29 for New Years holidays, delaying our delivery of this demarche. End note.) Without getting into details of Astanas discussions with the government of Kazakhstan, A/EMIN also made him aware of Kazakhstans strong denials on this issue by sharing a copy of the December 30 public statement from the GOK.

2. (S) Nakajima expressed appreciation for the information and said MOFA would look into the transaction, including by consulting with Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industrys (METI) colleagues. He requested any additional information the USG could provide, especially that which relates to the status of the transaction and the dates of the shipment. Nakajima said the GOJ understands that Iran will soon run out of yellowcake, and has expected Iran to search for another source. He suggested there will be a continued need to keep a look out for this type of transfer in the future.

3. (S) Econoff also delivered separately the demarche and nonpaper to METIs Security Export Control and Trade Control Policy Divisions. These offices are typically responsible for investigations into Japanese companies on security and export control issues, and likely will coordinate the GOJ investigation with MOFA. Since press articles about the uranium transfer have not included any details on East Asia Limited or Baiken-Us involvement, METI officials were unfamiliar with the issue and initially confused by our request to discuss a uranium transfer involving Iran. However, once made aware of the potential role of a Japan-owned firm, Security Export Control Division Director of International Affairs Masaaki Takabatake said that his office would begin an immediate investigation. He noted his office was unfamiliar with the companies involved, but would work with METIs nuclear energy division, which should already have the required corporate contacts.

4. (SBU) Post will provide updates on the results of GOJ investigations as soon they are received. We would welcome any additional information that can be shared with the GOJ on this issue.
ROOS

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