Cablegate: Osce: 2/3 Fsc Holds Robust Discussion On Vienna

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 USOSCE 000033

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC,
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER,
NILSSON, FRIEDT
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL)
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OSCE PARM PREL KCFE RS XG
SUBJECT: OSCE: 2/3 FSC HOLDS ROBUST DISCUSSION ON VIENNA
DOCUMENT AND ON RUSSIA'S CONFLICT PREVENTION PROPOSAL

REF: ELLIS-WRIGHT 1/27 EMAIL

1. (SBU) Summary: The Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC)
received a presentation on one potential way ahead for the
Vienna Document from alumnus Col Wolfgang Richter, currently
with the German Institute for International and Security
Affairs. Richter's presentation supported the currently
tabled Danish and UK proposals for strengthening the CSBM
regime, which will be discussed on 10 February. There were
lengthy, but positive reactions from FSC delegates to
Richter's presentation. The Russian proposal for a new
Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management Decision in Working
Group "B" also generated many but less generous
interventions. We noted our concerns about the procedural
issues raised by the Russian proposal (see paras 9-11). End
Summary.

But first, the UK's Food for Thought
------------------------------------

2. (SBU) The 602nd Meeting of the Forum for Security
Cooperation (FSC) on February 3 featured under Agenda Item 2,
Security Dialogue a presentation on the role of the Vienna
Document in an evolving Security Environment by Germany's Col
Wolfgang Richter. Prior to Richter's address, the UK (Gare)
introduced under Agenda Item I, General Statements its
Food-for-Thought paper (FSC.DEL.13/10)on "A Way Forward" on
negotiation procedures for strengthening Vienna Document 1999
(VD99). The UK proposed a negotiation package of Chapters
Five (Prior Notifications) and Nine (Compliance and
Verification) for strengthening the CSBM regime. The UK
emphasized its "good faith commitment" to address the
directive from the Athens Ministerial Council Decision 16/09
and requested inclusion of its paper on the February 10
agenda for Working Group "A". Gare explained her "unorthodox
approach" for introducing the UK paper under this agenda item
was to inform the pS during the presentation and discussion
of Richter's address to the FSC. France (Alabrune) expressed
strong support for the UK proposal, especially for opening
the door to other "packages."

"Enhancing Vienna Document"
---------------------------

3. (SBU) Richter, an FSC alum currently with the German
Institute for International and Security Affairs (circulated
as FSC.DEL/16/10), gave a tour d' horizon on the added value
of the Vienna Document and set forth some concrete
suggestions on how to keep it relevant (circulated as
FSC.DEL/16/10). Some highlights:

-- Arms Control and confidence building built the framework
for stability and strategic reassurances for not only ending
the cold war, but for the ensuing political transformation of
Europe.

-- Originally the West insisted on hard arms control to
offset the ethereal character of political intentions by
focusing on the facts of military capabilities.

-- Modifications to the Vienna Document in the 1990s
reflected political will and conceptual imagination to
address changes in the strategic environment; and these
elements are still needed in order to fulfill the pledges
made at the 1999 Istanbul Summit.

-- VD99 information requirements are insufficient for
transparency on evolving force structures based on smaller
military unit levels with increased capabilities and
short-term, rapid developments.

USOSCE 00000033 002 OF 005

-- Inspection quotas and evaluation visits need adaptation to
current unit structures and military activities to retain
their integrity in assuring transparency and confidence.

-- The acquisition of military capabilities by internal
security Forces are excluded though they play an important
role in intra-state conflict,

-- The small unit levels, including manpower and hardware,
also change the effective value for prior notification and
observation of certain military activities.

-- CSBM verification mechanisms cannot contribute to conflict
prevention and crisis management if inspection quotas are
depleted when they are most needed. Also ambiguities
regarding Force Majeure can have a similar negative impact on
conflict prevention and crisis management.

--The negotiation process to achieve the goal of improving
VD99 should not be held hostage to solving the CFE crisis but
undertaken on its own merits.

Twenty-two Interventions!
-------------------------

4. (SBU) Most of the 22 interventions made by pS with few
exceptions following Richter's remarks were expansive
expressions of appreciation and pledges to work
constructively to strengthen VD99. France (Alabrune)
proposed the FSC focus on addressing observation and
verification mechanisms and all but gave a complete
endorsement of the UK paper. Germany (Genrich) warmly
welcomed the Food-for-thought papers presented by the UK and
Denmark, and aligned itself with the French proposal.

5. (SBU) Drawing on the Secretary,s 29 January remarks in
Paris, the U.S. (Neighbour) underlined the importance of
transparency. Inter alia, he said the U.S. supports a more
open exchange of military data, including visits to military
sites and observation of military activities and exercises.
Thanking Richter for his remarks and the UK for its paper, he
said both would be studied carefully in Washington.

6. (SBU) Russia's representative Ulyanov said he personally
thought the UK and Danish proposals contained "some
attractive and intriguing elements that merit further
attention.", but that he had no instructions yet from Moscow
on how to respond. He further opined that they would likely
need some &modifications.8
Turkey (Begec) underscored closing loopholes that allowed
circumvention of VD99 provisions, and proselytized about
being attentive to Russian proposals even on issues that may
lead to "discomfort." He also focused on including internal
security forces so that they could not be used to circumvent
VD.

7. (SBU) Latvia (Nilsons) emphasized the importance of
reciprocity and suggested a possible Food-for-thought that
would change the inspection quota procedures to provide the
right to inspection/evaluation based on receiving an
inspection or evaluation visit. Sweden (Byren) noted it no
longer uses regiments or brigades as units, especially within
the framework of EU "battle groups." Georgia (Giorgazde)
elicited a brief Russian response after it described the
failure of VD99 mechanisms to prevent conflict in the events
leading up to the August 2008 clash. Georgia asked how to
improve the VD99 mechanisms which in 2008 had yielded
¬hing positive for either Russia or Georgia. Ukraine
(Yelchenko) was especially supportive of the proposal to
improve information exchange which was in line with its own
proposal last year. He also said that they agreed with

USOSCE 00000033 003 OF 005

Richter,s statement that VD99 not be held hostage to CFE,
but dealt with on its own merits.

8. (SBU) In response to delegations, Richter cautioned pS not
to lose sight of the requirement to improve transparency in
the changing European security environment. He described
VD99 Chapters five and nine as the most urgent for improving,
and cautioned that VD99 is only one piece of the useful
political military toolbox of the OSCE. Richter was
"encouraged" there was a way forward to improve VD99 based on
the discussions and active participation in the FSC. In
answer to Georgia,s question about improving VD conflict
prevention mechanisms, Richter opined that challenge
inspections over and above the quota in such conflict
situations would by &their mere presence8 have a
de-escalating effect.

Russia's Conflict Prevention Proposal in Working Group "B"
--------------------------------------------- -------------

9. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) referred to his introductory
remarks at the Opening Session of the FSC (see FSC.JOU/606).
He stated the aim of the Russian proposed "joint" Draft
Decision on Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management
(FSC-PC.DEL/1/10/Corr.1) was to strengthen the OSCE's
potential and avoid the double standards of applying OSCE
rules to conflict situations. Several delegates remarked on
the need for discussion on this issue within the Corfu
Process framework before engaging on substantive elements
within the Russian draft. France (Simonet) observed the
Russian proposal did not address the use of OSCE mechanisms
to prevent conflict and asked for clarification of the phrase
"parties to the conflict." Italy (Negro) said the proposal
was still being studied, and while agreeing with France that
there was room for further clarifications on some phrases in
the draft decision, it was not opposed to considering new
mechanisms. Germany (Risse) questioned the applicability of
the Russian proposal on the sub-regional level. Hungary
(Toth) noted the topic required a comprehensive review to
understand the relationship of the Russian proposal to other
applicable tools. Switzerland (Halter) noted the Russian
draft was not the only proposal on the table, argued for
better implementation of the documents that have already been
approved, including the Code of Conduct.

10. (SBU) The UK, Latvia, Romania, Moldova and Azerbaijan
made interventions varying on the themes previously noted.
Georgia (Giorgazde) was very blunt criticizing the Russian
draft as an attempt to "legalize violations of international
law." Giorgazde said Russia's draft ignores principles of
territorial integrity, sovereignty, internationally
recognized borders and other elements of the Helsinki Final
Act. He accused Russia of attempting "to deconstruct the
Corfu Process instead of consolidating a dialogue to put into
effect flexible functional mechanisms." That said, Giorgazde
noted, Georgia stood ready to engage in "constructive
dialogue."

11. (SBU) In reaction, Ulyanov explained that its proposal
was a clear link between the Corfu Process and the FSC, and
its proposal, which he admitted was "unorthodox" procedurally
since it called for a joint FSC and PC decision, was
complementary to the Corfu formula and in response to the
West's call for comprehensive approaches. He expressed a
willingness to delay the next round of discussion of the
Russian draft decision until after OSCE ambassadors have had
a chance to discuss conflict prevention. Ulyanov added that
Russia was not attempting to make its proposal complete,
since its draft reflected "only one element" of the crisis
management problem. Referring to Georgia's intervention,
Ulyanov noted that if the principles as contained within the

USOSCE 00000033 004 OF 005

Russian draft were respected, then there would have been no
August 2008 "tragedy." Russia is trying to put order in
place of chaos.

Procedural Issues Raised
------------------------

12. (SBU) The U.S. (Ellis) raised the point of whether it was
appropriate for Working Group "B" to discuss a proposed draft
decision in view of the fact that Russia previously submitted
the exact same proposal at the January 21 Permanent Council.
In addition to the point that as a cross-dimensional issue
that should be discussed first in the broader context in
order to inform the way ahead in Working Group "B", the U.S.
noted it was unclear how Russia expected to proceed with its
proposal for a decision in the FSC while simultaneously
seeking a decision in the PC, which is a separate autonomous
OSCE decision-making body. Furthermore, the U.S. noted the
political-military tools and instruments that are within the
competency of the FSC were not explicit in the Russian
proposal. It was not inconceivable that in the process of
working on the Russian draft, the Prepcom and the Working
Group could arrive at two distinct texts without a procedure
in place for reconciling differences. The U.S. underscored
that the introduction of any new decision-making process must
first be agreed through consensus.

13. (SBU) Note: The Greek Chair (Sourani) appealed to the
Secretariat to explain the principle behind a "joint FSC-PC
decision." The Secretariat's senior coordination officer
Yerzhan Birtanov confirmed that because the procedure was not
addressed within OSCE rules of procedure, it could be created
by delegates "if they collectively decide to do so," adding
"it could be a useful tool to develop a joint decision-making
process." The Greek Chair acknowledged that what was being
advanced would require some mechanism for joint FSC-PC
decisions, such as through a combined Prepcom-Working Group
"B" format, but the FSC will not have to cross that bridge
until perhaps the June time frame! Ulyanov acknowledged
Russia was taking an "unorthodox approach," ensuring that no
decision would be taken without consensus, and that if/when
progress was made on the Russian text, perhaps there would be
a requirement to engage in the PC's Prepcom.

14. (SBU) Comment: Russia's motives for a joint decision are
not clear, other than we suspect they do not want to engage
in cross-dimensional discussions in the PC alone, preferring
to keep the focus on "hard security." Greece, on the other
hand, would like to have a new decision-making format in
support of cross-dimensional conclusions that come out of the
Corfu Process. The irony of this discussion following Col
Richter's presentation that noted differences between the
weighted value of military capabilities and the risk of
inconstant political intentions was lost on the FSC. A new
proposed tandem decision making process, if not carefully
managed, could blur the lines between PC (intentions) and FSC
(capabilities) mandates, risking forum shopping for any issue
deemed multi-dimensional, with unpredictable implications for
the Corfu Process. End Comment.

Working Group "A" ) SALW
------------------------

15. (SBU) There were no issues for discussion under Agenda
Item 2, Vienna Document. Sweden (Byren) made a general
presentation on the meeting of the Friends of the Small
Arms/Light Weapons Informal Working Group held on January 29
(ref a). Sweden and the UK (Hartnell) and FSC Troika member
Hungary (Toth) urged delegates to provide specific, concrete
proposals in order to facilitate the FSC efforts on
developing a Plan of Action by May 2010 as directed by

USOSCE 00000033 005 OF 005

Ministers. The U.S. reminded delegations of its points raised
at the January 27 discussion and again at the Informal
Working Group.

16. (SBU) The Austrian Food for Thought paper on a reference
guide on the questionnaire on the OSCE Politico-Military Code
of Conduct (FSC.DEL/14/10) was discussed cursorily.
(Comment: this was a particularly long FSC plenary and
Working Group "B" discussion that delayed convening Working
Group "A" until late afternoon; Austria's representative left
for another obligation. End comment.) The issue will remain
on the agenda for the next Working Group "A" on February 10.
Nonetheless, Canada (Linteau) announced it was prepared to
co-sponsor the Austrian draft. Hungary (Toth) also expressed
strong support.

17. (SBU) Under "Any other business," the CPC (Salber)
reported distribution of its monthly report (FSC.GAL.13/10),
its briefing of the FSC Information Exchange procedures
(FSC.GAL.12/10), and the availability of a new set of
"melange" guides in the Russian language.

18. (U) The 603rd Meeting of the FSC and its Working Groups
are scheduled for February 10. USDel notes that in Working
Group "A" that day, currently tabled Danish and UK proposals
for strengthening the VD99 regime will be discussed in more
detail.
FULLER

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