Cablegate: The Supremacy of "State Powers"

R 260444Z FEB 97
FM AMCONSUL YEKATERINBURG
TO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
SECSTATE WASHDC 0049
INFO AMEMBASSY VILNIUS
AMEMBASSY TALLINN
AMEMBASSY RIGA
CIS COLLECTIVE
MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
AMCONSUL ST PETERSBURG
AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 YEKATERINBURG 0043

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: PGOV RS
SUBJECT: THE SUPREMACY OF "STATE POWERS"

REF: A) 95 YEKATERINBURG 74 B) 96 YEKATERINBURG 72

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SUMMARY
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1. THE LOCAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE GOVERNOR OF SVERDLOVSK
AND THE MAYOR OF YEKATERINBURG IS MORE THAN A PERSONAL
DISPUTE, REVEALING AS IT DOES A FUNDAMENTAL RUSSIAN
DISTINCTION BETWEEN "STATE POWERS" AND "LOCAL SELF-
ADMINISTRATION" THAT IS OFTEN LOST IN TRANSLATION. FROM
THIS PERSPECTIVE, DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS AT THE MUNICIPAL
LEVEL DO NOT CONFER A LEGITIMACY TO EXECUTE MANY OF THE
GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS WE TAKE FOR GRANTED. THE LATTER
ARE CONSIDERED "STATE POWERS," INHERENT TO THE FEDERAL AND
OBLAST LEVELS, BUT ONLY DELEGATED TO MUNICIPALITIES AT THE
PLEASURE OF THE "STATE." MANY REPUBLICS AND OBLASTS IN
EFFECT VIEW THE DEVOLUTION OF THE FORMERLY CENTRALIZED
"STATE POWERS" FROM MOSCOW TO THEM AS SIMPLY MULTIPLYING
THE NUMBER OF "KREMLINS" IN EXISTENCE, NOT CHANGING THE
NATURE OF THIS POWER OR GIVING IT TO THE PEOPLE. THE
MUNICIPALITIES ARE CONTESTING THIS CONCEPT, BUT ARE
USUALLY PLAYING FROM A WEAKER HAND. THE OUTCOME OF THIS
STRUGGLE WILL TO A LARGE PART DETERMINE THE FATE OF TRUE
DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA. END SUMMARY.

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A MISLEADING PREMISE
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2. THE ONGOING DECENTRALIZATION OF POWER FROM MOSCOW IS
OFTEN SEEN AS A CONTINUING RIPPLE THAT IS FINALLY REACHING
TO THE LOWEST LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT. THE PROCESS OF
ELECTING OFFICIALS AT EVERY LEVEL IS OFTEN ASSUMED TO BE
SOMEWHAT IN ACCORD WITH THE AMERICAN VIEW THAT GOVERNMENT
AUTHORITY SHOULD REST AT THE LOWEST LEVEL POSSIBLE, WHERE
THE ELECTED OFFICIALS ARE MOST RESPONSIBLE TO THE PEOPLE.
THE RUSSIAN FEDERAL AND OBLAST LAWS PROVIDING FOR THIS
LOCAL DEMOCRACY USE THE TERM "MESTNO-SAMOUPRAVLENIYE,"
WHICH IS PRECISELY TRANSLATED AS "LOCAL SELF-
ADMINISTRATION" BUT OFTEN MISTAKENLY ASSUMED TO MEAN
"LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT," A VERY DIFFERENT THING INDEED.

3. MANY OF THE BASIC PREMISES OF THE ABOVE RUSSIAN
CONCEPT OF GOVERNMENT ARE REFLECTED IN AMERICAN PRACTICE.
THE IDEA OF "STATE POWERS" WHICH DO NOT, INDEED CANNOT,
EXIST AT ALL THREE LEVELS OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT--FEDERAL,
STATE, AND LOCAL--IS SEEN IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER TO
RAISE ARMIES AND ORGANIZE THE MILITIA. THE CONCEPT THAT
ALL MUNICIPALITIES ARE CONSTRUCTS OF STATE LEGISLATURES
IS ANOTHER SHARED PREMISE. THE MAJOR DIFFERENCE IN ALMOST
EVERY CASE, HOWEVER, EVEN WHERE THE BASIC AMERICAN AND
RUSSIAN CONCEPTS ARE SIMILAR, IS THE FAR MORE SWEEPING
AUTHORITY ACCORDED TO THE UPPER LEVELS OF RUSSIAN
GOVERNMENT, NOT BECAUSE THE EXERCISE OF THIS AUTHORITY MAY
BE MORE EFFECTIVE THERE BUT BECAUSE THAT IS WHERE THE
AUTHORITY IS HELD TO COME FROM. POLITICAL POWER IN RUSSIA
DOES NOT, AND NEVER HAS, ORIGINATED FROM THE BOTTOM, AS IN
THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WHERE CITIES MAY PREDATE STATES
AND STATES PREDATE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. IN THE RUSSIAN
SENSE, ELECTIONS THUS DO NOT DELEGATE THE POWER INHERENT
IN THE PEOPLE TO THE VARIOUS LAYERS OF GOVERNMENT, BUT
MERELY CONFER A LEGITIMACY TO THE ELECTEES TO EXERCISE
CERTAIN "STATE POWERS" THAT ALREADY EXIST, INDEPENDENT OF
THE PEOPLE AND DERIVED FROM THE EXISTENCE OF STATE ITSELF.
IN THIS SENSE, THESE "STATE POWERS" DO NOT, AND CANNOT,
EXIST AT THE MUNICIPAL LEVEL.

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THE SUPREMACY OF THE STATE
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4. HISTORICALLY, MOSCOVY HAD DEVELOPED AS THE EXTREME
EXAMPLE OF THE CENTRALLY-ORGANIZED STATE. THE CZAR WAS
NOT ONLY THE RULER OF HIS EMPIRE BUT ITS "GOSUDAR'," OR
LITERAL "SOVEREIGN" OWNER, EXERCISING "GOSUDARSTVENNIYE
VLASTI" ("GOSVLASTI" FOR SHORT) OR "STATE POWERS." THESE
POWERS REFLECTED THE AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY INHERENT IN
A SOLE PROPRIETOR, WHICH COULD NEITHER BE FURTHER DIVIDED
NOR ALIENATED AND WHICH DID NOT REPRESENT ANY AUTHORITY OR
LEGITIMACY CONFERRED UPON THE PROPRIETOR BY ANYONE ELSE.
THESE "STATE POWERS" HAD ONE ORIGIN, AND WERE LITERALLY
SOVEREIGN. THE COMMUNIST STRUCTURE THAT FOLLOWED
EXHIBITED IN MANY RESPECTS THE SAME THEORETICAL AND
PRACTICAL SUPREMACY OF THE CENTER.

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THE TREND TOWARDS REGIONALIZATION OF "STATE POWERS"
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5. RECENT YEARS HAVE SEEN SOMETHING NOT EXISTENT IN
RUSSIA SINCE THE TIME OF INDIVIDUAL PRINCIPALITIES OR THE
ANOMALOUS CITY-STATE OF NOVGOROD, I.E., AN INDEPENDENT
SOURCE OF "STATE POWERS" OUTSIDE OF THE CAPITAL, BE IT
MOSCOW OR ST. PETERSBURG. THIS INITIALLY OCCURRED DE
FACTO, BUT HAS SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, IN MANY
CASES, DE JURE. SVERDLOVSK OBLAST, FOR EXAMPLE, CLAIMS
"STATE POWERS" IN ITS CHARTER, AND POINTS TO THE
AGREEMENTS SIGNED BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND
SVERDLOVSK OBLAST IN JANUARY 1996 AS A RECOGNITION OF ITS
SOVEREIGNTY BY MOSCOW. IT CAN THUS LEGITIMATELY CLAIM
THAT IT ITSELF NOW HAS THE ATTRIBUTE OF "STATE POWERS"
FORMALLY ONLY HELD BY CZAR OR COMMUNIST CENTRAL COMMITTEE.
CURRENT RUSSIAN FEDERALISM, IN THIS SENSE, IS THE
REPRODUCTION OF THE FORMER CENTRALIZED "STATE POWERS" OF
THE KREMLIN IN THE EIGHTY-NINE "SUBJECTS OF THE RUSSIAN
FEDERATION," BE THEY OBLASTS, REPUBLICS, OR AUTONOMOUS
OKRUGS.

6. WHILE MOSCOW AND THE REPUBLICS OR OBLASTS, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE MANY AND VARIED TREATIES NOW SIGNED
BETWEEN THEM, MAY HAVE DIVIDED THESE "STATE POWERS"
BETWEEN THEM, THE REPUBLICS AND OBLASTS ARE NOT ABOUT TO
FURTHER DIVIDE IT WITH THE MUNICIPALITIES. THEY WILL
DELEGATE CERTAIN "GOSUDARSTVENNIYE POLNOMOCHIYE" OR "STATE
PLENETARY POWERS" TO THE MUNICIPALITIES BY DECREE OF THE
GOVERNOR OR BY LAW OF THE OBLAST LEGISLATURE, BUT CAN
QUITE AS EASILY TAKE THEM AWAY. "LOCAL SELF-
ADMINISTRATION," FROM THEIR POINT OF VIEW, THUS DOES NOT
MEAN THAT THE SUBORDINATE MUNICIPALITIES HAVE ANY INHERENT
"STATE POWERS" OF THEIR OWN. THE LATTER CAN MERELY USE
THEIR DISCRETION IN THE EXECUTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
OBLAST'S "STATE POWERS."

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SVERDLOVSK'S "KREMLIN" ON THE RIVER ISET
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7. THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN GOVERNOR EDUARD ROSSEL OF
SVERDLOVSK AND MAYOR ARKADIY CHERNETSKIY OF YEKATERINBURG
HAS BEEN THE SUBJECT OF PREVIOUS CABLES (REFTELS). THIS
PREVIOUSLY HAD SEEMED TO US MORE OF A CONFLICT OF
PERSONALITIES THAN OF IDEOLOGIES, AS THEIR TWO PARTY
PROGRAMS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY SIMILAR. IF ONE INCLUDES THE
CONCEPTUAL DISTINCTION NOTED ABOVE, HOWEVER, THE CONFLICT
TAKES ON A DIFFERENT, MUCH DEEPER NATURE. THAT THIS
CONCEPT OF "STATE POWERS" IS INDEED DRIVING THE OBLAST IS
APPARENT IN A WHOLE SERIES OF RECENT ACTIONS.

8. ONE ASPECT OF THIS DIVISION OF SOVEREIGNTY IS THE
APPOINTMENT OF MANY SENIOR FEDERAL OFFICIALS, WHO ARE
SUPPOSED TO BE NOMINATED BY THE FEDERAL AUTHORITIES IN
AGREEMENT WITH THE GOVERNOR AND CONFIRMED BY THE OBLAST
LEGISLATURE. (COMMENT: SHADES OF THE LONG STRUGGLE
BETWEEN SECULAR MONARCHS AND THE PAPACY OVER THE
APPOINTMENT OF BISHOPS. END COMMENT) THIS LIST INCLUDES
THE MVD CHIEF, AND LOTS OF GRUMBLING WAS RECENTLY HEARD IN
THE LEGISLATURE WHEN A DEPUTY MINISTER FROM MOSCOW CAME
OUT AND PRESENTED THE NEW OBLAST UVD HEAD BEFORE ANY VOTE
ON HIM WAS UNDERTAKEN IN THE OBLAST LEGISLATURE. EVEN THE
FEDERAL OFFICIALS WHO CAN BE APPOINTED BY MOSCOW WITHOUT
REFERENCE TO THE OBLAST, SUCH AS THE MILITARY DISTRICT
COMMANDER OR THE FSB CHIEF, HAVE BEEN COOPTED BY BEING
INCORPORATED IN THE GOVERNOR'S OWN "SECURITY COUNCIL."

9. THE OBLAST'S CLAIM TO SOVEREIGNTY WAS CLEAR WHEN THE
DUMA PASSED A LAW, SIGNED BY THE GOVERNOR ON 24 DECEMBER
1996, "ON THE CONFERRING OF DELEGATED STATE PLENETARY
POWERS TO THE ORGANS OF SELF-ADMINISTRATION OF MUNICIPAL
STRUCTURES IN SVERDLOVSK OBLAST," IN WHICH IT LAID OUT
EIGHT SPECIFIC AREAS IN WHICH THE MUNICIPALITIES CAN
PARTICIPATE WITH THE OBLAST IN PROGRAMS ON THE USE OF
LAND; THE USE OF MINERAL RIGHTS; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION;
EDUCATION; CULTURE; PUBLIC HEAL; THTHE : THE OBLAST
PROGRAM ON THE USE OF LAND; .

10. PERTINENT EXAMPLES OF THIS LINE OF THINKING WERE
REVEALED IN THE OBLAST DUMA'S DEBATE ON 17-18 FEBRUARY ON
THE LAW CREATING THE EASTERN "OKRUG," ONE OF THE SIX NEW
PREFECTURAL DISTRICTS LONG DESIRED BY THE GOVERNOR AS A
STATED MEANS OF BRINGING THE OBLAST ADMINISTRATION CLOSER
TO THE PEOPLE AND OF MAKING IT MORE EFFICIENT. THE DRAFT
WAS SURPRISINGLY DEFEATED, WITH SOME LOCAL DEPUTIES SAYING
THAT THE PEOPLE IN THE AREA NEITHER UNDERSTOOD NOR FELT
THE NEED FOR SUCH A NEW BUREAUCRATIC ENTITY AND SUGGESTING
THAT A REFERENDUM SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. THE SPEAKER OF
THE DUMA, VLACHESLAV SURGANOV, IN TURN STATED THAT THE
NEED FOR THIS NEW LEVEL OF OBLAST GOVERNMENT STEMMED FROM
THE FACT THAT THE "ORGANS OF LOCAL SELF-ADMINISTRATION DO
NOT CORRELATE THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH THE OBLAST
ADMINISTRATION AND SHOW TOO MUCH INITIATIVE."

11. THE REACH OF THE OBLAST POWERS WAS EVIDENCED IN THE
OPINIONS OF "REVIVAL OF THE URALS" DEPUTY VENIAMIN
GOLUBITSKIY, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DUMA COMMITTEE ON
ECONOMIC POLICY, BUDGET, FINANCES, AND TAXES, WHO SAID
THAT THE LAW WAS ABOUT "IMPROVING THE STRUCTURE OF THE
"UPRAVLENIYE" (DIRECTION OR ADMINISTRATION) OF THE OBLAST.
JUST AS WE (THE DUMA) DO NOT DISCUSS CONCRETE TASKS GIVEN
BY THE HEAD OF THE OBLAST TO HIS DEPUTIES BECAUSE THEY ARE
AN INTERNAL MATTER OF THE OBLAST, BY THE SAME TOKEN WE
SHOULD NOT DISCUSS THIS. AND WHAT ARE WE DOING HERE? WE
ARE DISCUSSING THE 'POLNOMOCHIYE' (AUTHORITY) WHICH THE
OBLAST ANYWAY POSSESS. IT IS ONLY A QUESTION OF HOW THIS
'POLNOMOCHIYE' MATERIALIZES." (COMMENT: THE HEAD OF THE
DUMA BUDGET COMMITTEE CANNOT BE TALKING ABOUT THE CREATION
OF GOVERNMENT POSITIONS, SINCE HE HAS TO PAY FOR THEM, AND
LOGICALLY CAN ONLY MEAN THE AUTHORITY INHERENT IN THE
GOVERNOR'S POSSESSION OF "STATE POWERS." END COMMENT.)
GOLUBITSKIY THOUGHT THE PROPOSED IDEA OF A REFERENDUM ON
THE NEW PREFECTURAL DISTRICT RIDICULOUS, SINCE THE PEOPLE
WERE UNINFORMED ON SUCH ISSUES.

12. THE NORTHERN PREFECTURE HAS ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED,
AND A GUBERNATORIAL DECREE WAS ISSUED STATING THAT ITS
STAFF WOULD CONSIST OF 49 PERSONNEL, TO BE TRANSFERRED
FROM THE STAFFS OF THE MUNICIPALITIES CONTAINED THEREIN.
WHEN THE CG ASKED YEKATERINBURG MAYOR CHERNETSKIY HOW THE
GOVERNOR COULD SO TRANSFER MUNICIPAL PERSONNEL, THE MAYOR
REPLIED "HE CAN'T.." ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF THE OBLAST
EXECUTIVE'S EXERCISE OF "STATE POWERS" IN THE PERSONNEL
AREA WAS A GUBERNATORIAL DECREE DECLARING THAT THE HEADS
OF AGRICULTURAL DEPARTMENTS OF MUNICIPALITIES AND RAIONS,
CLEARLY ORGANS OF LOCAL SELF-ADMINISTRATION, WERE NO
LONGER TO BE APPOINTED BY THE ELECTED MAYORS OR RAION
HEADS OF ADMINISTRATION, BUT BY THE GOVERNOR.

13. THE LATEST EXAMPLE OF THIS THINKING IS THE OBLAST
GOVERNMENT'S DRAFT OF A LAW ON THE STATUS OF YEKATERINBURG
AS THE OBLAST CAPITAL. MAYOR CHERNETSKIY, AS A MEMBER OF
THE LEGISLATURE, SUBMITTED HIS OWN VERSION. THE DUMA
COMMITTEE CONSIDERING THESE TWO VERSIONS HAS PRODUCED A
COMPROMISE, NOTING THAT IT USED CHERNETSKIY'S DRAFT AS THE
MORE WORKABLE BASIS. THE GOVERNOR'S REPRESENTATIVE TO THE
DUMA HAS HOWEVER DECLARED THAT THE GOVERNOR WILL NOT
ACCEPT ANY COMPROMISE.

14. THE KEY ITEM IN THE GOVERNOR'S PROPOSAL IS THAT,
BECAUSE OF YEKATERINBURG'S STATUS AS THE "ADMINISTRATIVE
CENTER OF THE OBLAST," ITS MAYOR SHOULD BE PROPOSED BY THE
GOVERNOR AND ELECTED BY THE CITY DUMA. IN ADDITION, THIS
STATUS MEANS THAT MANY OF THE FUNCTIONS NORMALLY ASCRIBED
TO LOCAL SELF-ADMINISTRATION MUST NOW BE CONSIDERED AS
"STATE POWERS," TO BE EXECUTED BY THE EXECUTIVE ORGAN OF
THE "CENTRAL ADMINISTRATIVE DISTRICT."

15. CHERNETSKIY HAS ALSO BEEN UNDER ATTACK OF LATE BY A
NUMBER OF THE OFFICIALS AND DUMA MEMBERS OF THE GOVERNOR'S
PARTY FOR BEING TOO CONCERNED ABOUT POLITICS AND NOT
PAYING ENOUGH ATTENTION TO THE GOOD HUSBANDRY OF THE CITY.
(COMMENT: THIS IDEA THAT THE MAYOR SHOULD BE A NON-
POLITICAL FIGURE IS A CLEAR CONFIRMATION OF THE
SUBORDINATE ROLE FORESEEN FOR THE ORGANS OF LOCAL SELF-
ADMINISTRATION, HOLDING AS IT DOES THAT POLITICS IS
SOMETHING APPROPRIATE ONLY AT THE OBLAST LEVEL, THE TRUE
REPOSITORY OF POLITICAL POWER. THE DE FACTO REALITY OF
THIS, FELT BY VOTERS IN THEIR BONES, MAY WELL ACCOUNT FOR
THE LATTER'S RELATIVE INDIFFERENCE TO MANY ELECTIONS AT
THE LOCAL LEVEL. END COMMENT.)

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UDMURTIA'S "KREMLIN" ON THE RIVER IZH
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16. THE UDMURT REPUBLIC IS GOVERNED BY A "GOSSOVIET," OR
STATE SOVIET, THE CHAIRMAN OF WHICH, ALEXANDR A. VOLKOV
SERVES AS THE HEAD OF THE REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT. THE STATE
SOVIET ATTEMPTED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE OF "STATE POWERS"
AND "LOCAL SELF-ADMINISTRATION" IN APRIL 1996 BY SIMPLY
PASSING A LAW ABOLISHING THE POSITIONS OF THE ELECTED
MAYORS. ALL OF THESE MAYORS, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF
ANATOLIY I. SALTYKOV, THE MAYOR OF THE CAPITAL, ISHEVSK,
ACCEPTED THE LAW AND BECAME GOVERNMENT-APPOINTED
OFFICIALS. DURING THE CG'S VISIT TO UDMURTIA LAST
NOVEMBER, THERE WERE THUS TWO MAYORS OF ISHEVSK, THE OLD
POPULARLY-ELECTED ONE, SALTYKOV, AND THE NEW GOVERNMENT-
APPOINTED ONE, YURIY S. PITKEVICH, WITH THE CITY
GOVERNMENT AT A STANDSTILL. VOLKOV AND PITKEVICH, OVER
THE USUAL SUMPTUOUS LUNCH, ATTEMPTED TO CONVINCE THE CG
THAT DEMOCRACY HAD TO BE ESTABLISHED ONLY SLOWLY IN THE
REPUBLIC, AND THAT THE UDMURT POPULATION WAS ONLY READY TO
ELECT OFFICIALS AT THE SUB-MUNICIPAL LEVEL. THE SMALL
SIZE OF THE REPUBLIC, AND THE DOMINANT POSITION OF
ISHEVSK, MEANT THAT A UNIFIED GOVERNMENT APPROACH TO THE
NECESSARY DEVELOPMENT OF THE ECONOMY WAS IMPOSSIBLE WITH
AN ELECTED MAYOR IN THE CAPITAL WHO PURSUED HIS OWN
POLICIES.

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THE CITIES FIGHT BACK
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17. THIS VIEW OF THE SUPREMACY OF THE REPUBLICS AND
OBLASTS IS NOT SURPRISINGLY REJECTED BY MUNICIPAL LEADERS,
WHO ARE SEEKING REAL GOVERNMENTAL POWER. SALTYKOV TOOK
THE UDMURT REPUBLIC TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT IN
NOVEMBER, AND EFFECTIVELY WON THE CASE AT THE END OF
JANUARY. WHILE THE COURT AGREED THAT THE REPUBLIC HAD THE
RIGHT TO STRUCTURE THE LOCAL ORGANS OF SELF-ADMINISTRATION
ANY WAY IT WISHED, INCLUDING HAVING APPOINTED HEADS OF
ADMINISTRATION AT THE LOCAL LEVEL, IT STIPULATED THAT ONCE
THE PEOPLE OF THESE LOCAL ENTITIES HAD EXPRESSED THE
POPULAR WILL THROUGH ELECTIONS FOR THE THEIR MAYORS OR
HEADS OF ADMINISTRATION, FUTURE CHANGES COULD ONLY BE
EFFECTED THROUGH POPULAR WILL. THE EXISTING POSITIONS
COULD THUS ONLY BE ABOLISHED BY A REFERENDUM, NOT BY ANY
ACTION OF THE STATE COUNCIL. (COMMENT: THIS CAVEAT WAS SO
HARD TO DISCERN FROM THE REPUBLIC-CONTROLLED MEDIA THAT
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT LATER HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE TO
"CLARIFY" THE OFFICIAL REPUBLIC INTERPRETATION. END
COMMENT) THE STATE COUNCIL IN UDMURTIA IS NOW LOOKING AT
HOLDING REFERENDUMS ON ABOLISHING THE OFFICES OF ELECTED
MAYORS, AND APPEARS TO BE CONFIDENT THAT IT COULD WIN IN
MOST CASES.

18. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT'S DECISION WAS SEEN AS A
GREAT VICTORY BY THE CITY OF YEKATERINBURG. ONE OF ITS
DEPUTY MAYORS, ALEXANDR G. KOBERNICHENKO, COMMENTED TO THE
CG THAT THE DECISION HAD BEEN ANNOUNCED JUST BEFORE A
MEETING OF THE "UNION OF CITIES OF RUSSIA" ATTENDED BY
CHERNOMRYDIN AND CHUBAIS. KOBERNICHENKO NOTED THAT THE
UNION, WHICH IS AN ORGANIZATION OF THE LARGER CITIES OF
RUSSIA, IS APPARENTLY NOW BEING SEEN BY THE CENTER AS A
USEFUL ALLY. ITS MEMBERS CONTAIN SOME 48 PERCENT OF THE
COUNTRY'S VOTERS AND, UNLIKE MANY OF THE OBLAST GOVERNORS
AND REPUBLIC HEADS, THE CITY HEADS ARE NOT INTERESTED IN
BRINGING ABOUT ANY GREAT DIMINUTION OF THE AUTHORITY OF
THE FEDERATION. IN ANY GIVEN INSTANCE, HOWEVER, THE
CITIES ARE GENERALLY PLAYING THE WEAKER HAND. IN
YEKATERINBURG, THE MAYOR HAS TO CONTINUALLY FEND OFF
ATTACKS INITIATED BY THE OBLAST, INCLUDING SUCH EXTREMES
AS THE GOVERNOR'S SECURITY COUNCIL INVESTIGATION OF THE
CITY TELEPHONE RATES IN THE NAME OF "ECONOMIC SECURITY."

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COMMENT
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19. THE OUTCOME OF THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER BETWEEN THE
OBLASTS AND REPUBLICS AND THE MUNICIPALITIES AND THEIR
EQUIVALENT RAIONS, MOST CLEARLY REPRESENTED IN SVERDLOVSK
AND UDMURTIA BUT ONGOING IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER IN MOST OF
THE SUBJECTS OF THE FEDERATION IN OUR CONSULAR DISTRICT,
WILL HAVE A DECISIVE EFFECT ON THE EVOLUTION OF A REAL
DEMOCRACY IN THE REGION. IF THE CONCEPT OF THE SUPREMACY
OF "STATE POWERS" PREVAILS, THE LOCUS OF POWER MAY HAVE
CHANGED BUT ITS NATURE WILL BASICALLY REFLECT THE
CENTURIES-OLD CONCEPT OF A SOCIETY RUN FROM THE TOP DOWN.
THE VIEW FROM THE URALS IS THAT, IN THIS RESPECT, ONE
OUGHT TO BE ROOTING FOR THE MUNICIPALITIES.

STEERS

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