Scoop has an Ethical Paywall
Sharon cleared of charges Bulldozers work overtime
Sharon cleared of charges - bulldozers work overtime
International release, June 18 ÷éùåøéí ìòáøéú / links to Hebrew
[] The latest news about the route of the Wall [] The buddies - Gush comment on the whitewashing of Sharon
[] So is there someone to talk to - or is there not? # Yediot photo of June 4 commented by Rami Elhanan # Haaretz June 11 - beginning of security establishment revelations A week of increasing debate Haaretz June 18 - Arafat interview
[] The latest news about
the route of the Wall
We just heard through activist David Nir that he got a phonecall from Sawiya (not Azawiya about which we have been writing before). This morning bulldozers arrived, without any prior warning, and started destroying the villagers' olive groves, those most near to the settlement of Rehelim to its north. Soldiers told them that it is for "the fence." Sawiya is some ten kilometers east of the Ariel settlement, located in the very middle of the West Bank... The work is still going on though the Sabbat has started - a highly unusual behavior, giving the impression that Sharon is in a very big hurry to create even more facts.
[] The buddies - Gush comment on the whitewashing of Sharon
The buddies get back together
òáøéú áàúø / Hebrew on the website www.gush-shalom.org
[ad in this weekend's Ha'aretz Hebrew edition]
Attorney General Meni Mazuz has published the decision that everyone had been waiting for since he was appointed to his job by the Sharon government: he acquitted Sharon from all wrongdoing.
This decision clears the way for the Labor Party to join the government.
Shimon Peres' dream is coming true. He will again be able to travel around the world as Sharon's chief spokesman.
This way Sharon can go on undisturbed promoting his "Disengagement" deception, destroying the basis of existence of the Palestinian people, killing Palestinians, building the monstrous wall and wrecking all our chances to achieve peace.
But what are generations of war compared to one day of Shimon Peres in the government?
----------- Gush Shalom, Help us maintain our weekly ad - with donations to: P.O.Box 3322, Tel-Aviv 61033, Israel ------------------------------------
***
[] So is there someone to talk to - or is there not? # Yediot photo of June 4 commented by Rami Elhanan # Haaretz June 11 - beginning of security establishment revelations a week of increasing debate: Haaretz June 18 - Arafat interview
# Yediot photo of June 4 commented by Rami Elhanan [Hebrew attached - òáøéú îö"á ]
English
#
Haaretz June 11 - beginning of security establishment
revelations A week of increasing debate: Haaretz June
18 - Arafat interview [We didn't immediately pass on Akiva
Eldar's article "Popular misconceptions" with the scoop of
the by now internationally-publicized accusations from
within the security establishment against the orchestrated
anti-Arafat campaign started after Camp David, 2000. At
last it is admitted that the demonization of Arafat wasn't
based on any facts. Why we didn't pass it on? At first we
felt bitter that only now this comes out, and we also
didn't want to seem saying "I told you so". But since its
publication a week ago, the article is not going away
anymore. It opened an ongoing discussion in which more and
more people of the security establishment as well as the
long hermetic media begin to open their mouths. It is
clear that the mistakes of the past - involving a very wide
spectrum of Israeli society(!) - have been disastrous and
cannot be simply reversed. But even though the thousands
killed won't get back to life, it opens the perspective of
"rehabilitation" of the Palestinian leader, and it will make
it more difficult for Sharon to continue avoiding
negotiatimg with the Palestinians. Meanwhile, Akiva Eldar
went to Ramallah, together with the new Ha'aretz editor in
chief David Landau, and today they publish an interview
with the Palestinian president in which he is shown to be
still the Palestinian leader willing - and probably the
only one able - to do painful concessions in order to
achieve peace with his not so easy partner.] Popular
misconceptions Akiva Eldar, Haaretz June 11
òáøéú / Hebrew
Distinctions like those presented by Gilad on
Sunday, at his office in the Defense Ministry in Tel Aviv,
were welcomed by the Prime Minister's Bureau. "Arafat is
aiming to have Oslo lead to the fulfillment of his strategy
that Israel has no right to exist," said the man who headed
the research division at Military Intelligence during the
period when the Oslo agreement was gasping for breath and
dying. "Arafat is a terrible danger. Nothing will shake him
as long as he lives. If he isn't dealt with in the right
way, he will also bequeath us a heritage that no one will
dare to change." Thanks to the position in which he served
and his powers of persuasion, Gilad's konseptzia penetrated
every home in Israel. But behind the doors of a few homes,
among them those of senior people in the intelligence
branches, different and even opposite assessments have been
whispered throughout. Amos Malka, who was head of MI from
mid-1998 to the end of 2001, and was Gilad's direct
superior, is one of them, and his version is the opposite
of Gilad's. He is joined in this by Major General (res.) Ami
Ayalon, who headed the Shin Bet security service up until a
few months before the intifada; in the approach taken by
Arab affairs specialist Mati Steinberg, who until a year
ago was a special advisor on Palestinian affairs to the head
of the Shin Bet; and by Colonel (res.) Ephraim Lavie, the
research division official responsible for the Palestinian
arena at that time and Gilad's immediate
subordinate. Violence - catalyst or weapon? Malka
details the assessment of the situation he presented during
his days as "national assessor" to the General Staff and to
the government. >From time to time he peers at his papers
and stresses that every word he utters is anchored in
situation assessments by the research division and
discussions with its professional echelons. Malka: "The
assumption was that Arafat prefers a diplomatic process,
that he will do all he can to see it through, and that only
when he comes to a dead end in the process will he turn to
a path of violence. But this violence is aimed at getting
him out of a dead end, to set international pressure in
motion and to get the extra mile. This was the assumption I
found when I took up the position. Along the way, I was
able to confirm it myself and bring it to the [attention of
the] leaders. The classical example is the tunnel incidents
- an initiated move of violence that was aimed, from
Arafat's perspective, at instilling a sense of urgency. If
you look into what happened after each of his violent moves,
you will find that in nearly every instance, he to some
extent achieved something. "We received the best proof
that Arafat supports a diplomatic move," says Malka, "in
May 1999. Prior to this date [the original target date for
a permanent status agreement - A.E.], the whole country was
caught up in the huge crisis event that was about to occur
- the unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state. We at
MI assessed that nothing would happen in May 1999, and that
Arafat would wait for the elections in Israel, for the
formation of a new government and for the formulation of a
policy." Malka read from his notes from March 2000:
"Should Arafat believe that the channel of diplomatic talks
is unable to advance him toward that goal (a Palestinian
state) in 2000, Arafat might well take unilateral measures.
If he realizes that progress is not in the realm of the
possible, the crisis could develop into following the path
of armed struggle. Conclusion: Without movement in the
diplomatic process, which would give Arafat a sense of real
progress, there is a high likelihood of
hostilities." What "real progress" would have prevented
hostilities? Gilad insists that Arafat has never let go of
the vision of the right of return, in order to shorten the
way to demographic victory over Israel. The current head of
MI, Ze'evi, and former Mossad head Ephraim Halevy, share
this assessment: Arafat has not come to terms with the
existence of a Jewish state and has not given up the
struggle to eliminate it. Malka insists that their version
has no backing in any research document. "We assumed that
it is possible to reach an agreement with Arafat under the
following conditions: a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as
its capital and sovereignty on the Temple Mount; 97 percent
of the West Bank plus exchanges of territory in the ratio of
1:1 with respect to the remaining territory; some kind of
formula that includes the acknowledgement of Israel's
responsibility for the refugee problem and a willingness to
accept 20,000-30,000 refugees. All along the way ... it was
MI's assessment that he had to get some kind of statement
that would not depict him as having relinquished this, but
would be prepared for a very limited
implementation." Right of return crisis The possibility
of a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state in
September 2000, and the danger of a decline into violent
conflict were at the center of a discussion held in May
2000, in Barak's "Peace Administration." The discussion was
held in the shadow of Barak's public threat that Israel's
response would be severe, to the extent of occupying
territories. Participating in the discussion were the head
of the Administration, Dr. Oded Eran; the coordinator of
activities in the territories, Major General Yaakov (Mendy)
Orr; Colonel Shaul Arieli, Mati Steinberg and
representatives of MI research. Orr and Steinberg expected
that the crisis would degenerate into a violent reaction on
the part of the Palestinian street. Steinberg added that an
Israeli incursion into the territories could also sweep
along the Arabs of Israel. It was in fact the MI people,
Gilad's representatives, who expressed reservations about
this chilling thesis and suggested that the reaction would
be restricted to the level of propaganda, law and
diplomacy. According to the testimony of three of the
participants in the discussion, none of the MI people
argued that Arafat was planning to blow up the diplomatic
process and return to the military option. Several weeks
later, on June 15, prior to his departure for Camp David,
Barak summoned a conference with a group of military people
and advisors. "This was one of the most exciting and most
important discussions in which I have ever had occasion to
participate," recalls Gilad, adding: "I warned Barak that
Arafat will not give up on the realization of his vision
through the right of return." According to some of the
participants in the discussion, all the speakers agreed that
if Arafat did not get what he expected to achieve, he would
turn to limited violence. No one remembers that Arafat was
said to be aiming for the destruction of Israel through
demography. There was also no mention of the possibility
that the Palestinians would abandon the peace process in
favor of a comprehensive armed struggle. No one, including
Gilad himself, argued that Arafat's expectations included
Israeli agreement to take in 300,000 to 400,000 refugees in
the framework of the right of return. Confirmation that
MI research did not believe that Arafat expected a massive
return of refugees can be found in a document of the
information team of the research division, which was headed
by Gilad. The document analyzes a position paper that was
written in June, 1999, by Dr. Assad Abed al-Rahman, a
member of the Palestine Liberation Organization steering
committee and the one in charge of the portfolio on refugees
and the uprooted. "In his discussion of the possible
solutions to the refugee problem, Abed al-Rahman presents a
comprehensive and rigid position, which even the
Palestinian leadership has already understood is no longer
realistic," the document says. "Even those who hold an
`extreme' position on the issue, among them Arafat, have
adopted the position that if Israel recognizes the right of
return in principle, its implementation can be partial and
limited." In a lecture at Princeton University in March,
2002, the contents of which have not been published until
now, Steinberg argued that the Camp David summit failed
because of the dispute over the Temple Mount - not over the
issue of the right of return, which was barely discussed at
that summit and was born retrospectively in Israel in order
to create the internal consensus. His remarks are
congruent with the claim of Yossi Ginnosar, who
participated in the summit: In an interview with the
mass-circulation daily Yedioth Ahronoth before his death,
he said that the idea that the summit had failed because of
the right of return was aimed at justifying the failure and
was "a duplicitous campaign that contributed to sowing
despair in Israeli society and caused damage to the process
that was conducted afterward." At a conference under the
auspices of the Peres Center for Peace that was held in the
spring of last year, Ephraim Lavie, who closely accompanied
the negotiations for a permanent status agreement, analyzed
the reasons for the summit's failure. He said that there is
not and there never was any basis for assuming that Arafat
or any other Palestinian leader would deviate from the
resolution passed by the Palestinian National Council in
Algiers in 1988: the establishment of a Palestinian state
in the June, 1967 borders, with its capital in Jerusalem,
and a solution to the refugee problem. However, Lavie
stressed that since Oslo, the Palestinian leadership has
been aware that there is no chance that Israel will accept
the element of the right of return and implement it. The
leadership is thus making do with a recognition in
principle of the right of return and of the historical
injustice, and is willing to accept a limited
implementation, to which Israel will agree. Lavie, who was
the intelligence officer in Barak's peace administration ,
argues that "at Camp David, there was some sort of a
solution in sight to the refugee problem by means of
compensation and a small number of refugees who would
return to Israel, under one definition or another ... Israel
saw Camp David as a crucial summit, and urged Arafat to
concede explicitly the right of return - something that the
PLO institutions have never approved. Arafat rejected this
and dug in to his position that every refugee must be given
the right to decide whether to return to the territories of
1949 or to accept a substitute and compensation, and that
the conflict will end only with the implementation of the
agreement. Israel interpreted this position as stemming from
his unwillingness to make the historic decision to concede
the right of return, and depicted this as evidence of his
intention to demolish Israel's existence." A few weeks
before Camp David, Malka reviewed Arafat's positions for the
cabinet. "I said there was no chance that he would
compromise on 90 percent of the territories or even on 93
percent. He is not a real- estate trader, and he is not
going to stop midway. Barak said to me: `You are telling me
that if I offer him 90 percent, he isn't going to take it?
I don't accept your assessment.' I said to him that indeed,
there is no chance that he would accept it. "Haim Ramon
said: `Are you trying to tell me that if we offer him 77
percent and make a 20-year commitment to him for another 10
percent, and another 20 percent, and in the end we stop at
90 percent - he won't agree to this?' I told them that the
difference between me and them is that they are speaking
from hope and I am trying to neutralize my hope and give a
professional assessment. But Barak saw himself as able to
make his assessments without assessments from MI, because he
is his own intelligence, and he thought he was smarter.
Afterward, it was convenient for him to explain his failure
by a distorted description of the reality." Why the
terror began In his new book, "Hazit lelo oref" ("A Front
Without a Rearguard: Voyage to the Boundaries of the Peace
Process"), Shlomo Ben Ami - who was foreign minister and
headed the team that negotiated with the Palestinians in
Barak's government - wrote that immediately after the
summit, "intelligence sources" picked up sounds from
Ramallah that encouraged "renewing the process for the
complete fulfillment of the chances for an agreement."
According to his testimony, Barak himself was partner then
to the efforts to achieve a breakthrough. How does this
concord with the version that at Camp David "Arafat's true
face was revealed?" Why did the prime minister and the
foreign minister continue to waste their time on
negotiations? Malka insists that even after the peace
talks gave way to hostilities, MI did not revise its
assessments. Neither did the research units at the Shin Bet,
the Mossad, the Foreign Ministry and the office of the
coordinator of activities in the territories adopt the
thesis that the Camp David summit had revealed "the Oslo
plot." The official working assumption at MI then stuck to
the approach that Arafat was continuing to see terror as a
strategic weapon that could reduce the gap between the
Palestinians and Israel. But present MI head Ze'evi,
Defense Minister Mofaz and Chief of Staff Ya'alon adopted
the approach that there is no connection between the state
of the peace process and terror. According to Gilad,
"Arafat is faithful to his [perception] that terror can
break us and will not allow the security mechanism to deal
with terror as long as his policy view (greater Palestine)
does not prevail." Ami Ayalon, however, believes that when
there is progress in sight in the diplomatic field, the
Palestinian Authority silences Hamas. Steinberg, who was
his advisor, backs this up. "The Palestinian leadership's
willingness to confront its internal opposition was
dependent on a single factor: progress in the implementation
of interim agreements or, at the very least, a political
expectation of progress," he said at Princeton. Steinberg
explained that although the intifada was not preceded by
Palestinian planning and preparation, neither at the highest
level nor at the local level, "From the moment it erupted,
Arafat and the majority of Palestinians had an interest in
exacerbating the crisis, on the assumption that it would
bear political fruit." Malka adds that with the outbreak of
hostilities, Arafat thought he was "going for something far
more limited, that would cause a shock ... After two or
three days Arafat was not able to go against the
street." Both of them share the argument that the top
Israeli security echelon contributed to fanning the flames.
Malka relates that about a month after the intifada began,
was he was on his way to the Gilo neighborhood in Jerusalem,
he asked Yossi Kuperwasser, at the time the intelligence
officer of the Central Command (and today head of the
research division), how many 5.56 bullets the command had
fired that month. "Kuperwasser got back to me with number
850,000 bullets. My figure was 1.3 million bullets in the
West Bank and Gaza. This is a strategic figure that says
that our soldiers are shooting and shooting and shooting. I
asked: `Is this what you intended in your preparations?' and
he replied in the negative. I said: `Then the significance
is that we are determining the height of the flames.' I
brought the issue up at Central Command discussions, but
Mofaz went with the militant bit from the very first day
and all along the way." Malka is convinced that today too,
if Israel offers Arafat a state in 97 percent of the
territories, with Jerusalem as the capital, exchanges of
territory and the return of 20,000-30,000 refugees - he will
sign the agreement and an order to lay down
arms. Malka: Gilad rewrote the analyses While the
issue of intelligence analyses submitted on the eve of the
war in Iraq was the subject of a comprehensive parliamentary
investigation - which found they were not based on reliable
information, but rather on assessments and assumptions -
the gaps in analysis of the Palestinian arena have never
been examined. The former head of Military Intelligence
(MI), Amos Malka, has a disturbing answer when asked where
he was when his subordinate, Amos Gilad, spread his
triumphant version of events: "I did everything I could. I
went several times to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and
Defense Committee and submitted reports to the chief of
staff. Nowhere did I say that I accepted the conspiracy
theory that Oslo was a plot to eliminate Israel. To my
regret, [current Defense Minister and then chief of staff
Shaul] Mofaz and Bogey [Moshe Ya'alon, now Chief of Staff]
as his deputy ignored what I said. What Gilad said suited
them better, and therefore they adopted it." Malka notes
that Gilad was "a very significant factor who influenced
many people. Thanks to his rhetoric - and in a situation in
which no one in the cabinet reads intelligence material,
apart from the defense minister and the foreign minister, a
little - the ministers are carried away by professional
lecturers, who put the word `I' into 50 percent of their
text." Malka challenges Gilad's professional integrity: "I
say, with full responsibility, that during my entire period
as head of Military Intelligence, there was not a single
research department document that expressed the assessment
that Gilad claims to have presented to the prime minister.
As obligatory under the work regulations, no document can
leave the research department without getting the approval
of the head of the division. Therefore it is not possible
that Gilad's written opinion was the opposite of those
dealing with the Palestinian arena. If there was a
difference between the assessments, there is no other
definition of this but conspiracy. But because Gilad is
endowed with a great awareness of history, it cannot also
be assumed that the conception he transmitted orally was
different from the one that the division formulated in
writing. Therefore I argue that only after the Taba talks
were broken off, on the eve of the 2001 elections, Gilad
began retroactively rewriting MI's assessments." Lavie
refuses to relate to the disagreement between the two
schools of thought and confines himself to a brief
response: "My detailed position on the Palestinian issue is
well known to the past and present heads of MI. I believe
that it is impossible to ignore Malka's claims, and it is
essential to examine the validity of the existing conception
in their light." Gilad - whose good relations with Malka
cooled following the professional disagreement - is not
impressed by the versions put forth by Malka and Lavie. "I
would have no problem if 1,000 people thought differently
than I. That still doesn't mean that they're right. It's a
lie that I didn't voice different assessments. I made sure
to bring the head of the department [dealing with the
Palestinians] and the head of the branch to discussions
with the head of MI. I insist that I have always said what
I'm saying now and have been saying all along." In the
background, there is also a disagreement between Gilad and
Arab affairs specialist Mati Steinberg, whose view concurs
with that of Malka and Lavie. In the past, Gilad spread a
crude letter against Steinberg following a disagreement
over Palestinian textbooks, and even complained that Barak
had ignored it and preferred to meet alone with Steinberg
numerous times. Steinberg, for his part, asserts that he has
never met with Barak one-on-one. Gilad was also prepared
to comment on the doubts that have surfaced recently with
respect to the influence of the state of his health on the
quality of his assessments, after he sued the Defense
Ministry to obtain a high disability rating because of
phenomena resulting from psychological pressure. Gilad
relates that during the Lebanon War, as a major in MI, he
warned GOC Northern Command Amir Drori not to let the
Phalangist forces enter the Sabra and Chatila refugee
camps. After he heard about the slaughter over the
operational radio, he hastened to report the incident to the
MI control center. Several days later, he was reprimanded
for having used the intelligence network for operational
reporting that was not within his area of authority.
According to Gilad, the heavy pressure he was under
affected him badly and a short time thereafter he came down
with diabetes. The doctors told him that psychological
pressure can cause diabetes, and upon his demobilization
from the Israel Defense Forces they advised him to see to
medical coverage from the Defense Ministry - and he did so,
as has been reported recently. Even after his
demobilization, Gilad continues to sit close to the
junctures of security and diplomatic decision-making and to
influence the leadership with the same decisiveness and
conviction, although today too his views are not supported
by the professional echelon of MI. *** A week of
increasing debate [To get an impression of what kind of
things come up in the discussion started by the Eldar
article (in what continues to be only a beginning of
opening up) here follow excerpts of what Ben Caspit wrote
for Maariv June 6 and June 13 (with thanks to the UK
friends) and the article of Danny Rubinstein in today's
weekend supplement]
http://www.jfjfp.org/maariv_caspit.htm
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/439571.html Haaretz
June 18 - Arafat interview by David Landau & Akiva Eldar A
Jewish state? `Definitely' By David Landau and Akiva
Eldar Arafat is ready to sign an agreement that would
give Palestinians 97 per cent of the West Bank and Gaza -
with the rest in a land swap, and the right of return of
not all, but at least some refugees. In a free- ranging
interview with Haaretz, conducted in the carefully preserved
ruins of the Muqata, the PA Chairman also spoke of the
historical family bonds between the two peoples. Full
text: English
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/440479.html
òáøéú/Hebrew
http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=440679
# Photos + report of June 16 A-Ram protest against
the Wall The press conference + start of women's demo
http://www.gush-shalom.org
http://www.gush-shalom.org/english/index.html Photos
of the following women's protest march
http://share.shutterfly.com/os.jsp?i=EeANWjlw2csWzqg&open=1 #
The "Breaking the Silence" soldiers' exhibition continues in
Tel Aviv (until June 25th) link for details [in Hebrew
only] :
http://www.shovrimshtika.org/hebrew/ and in English:
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/440348.html #
Arna's Children June schedule at:
http://www.arna.info/Arna/movie.php?lang=heb # Truth
against Truth - opposite views on the history of the
conflict in 101 steps # Video footage of mass uprooting
of olive trees and the women's resistance in Az Zawiya,
June 7 (all of it for the construction of the monster
Wall) available at:
http://www.womenspeacepalestine.org/news8junazzawiya.htm
(International Womens' Peace Service - IWPS) #
Palestinians draw the map for understanding the
Disengagement Plan
http://www.nad-plo.org/images/maps/pdf/gaza.pdf
Hebrew / òáøéú
http://www.gush-shalom.org/Docs/Truth_Heb.pdf English
http://www.gush-shalom.org/Docs/Truth_Eng.pdf #
Boycott List of Settlement Products (newly updated)
Hebrew / òáøéú
http://gush-shalom.org/Boycott/boycheb.htm English
http://gush-shalom.org/Boycott/boyceng.htm #
Refusniks Constantly-updated refusniks lists: English -
http://www.yesh-gvul.org/english/prison/ Hebrew / òáøéú
-
http://www.yesh-gvul.org/prison/ English -
http://www.newprofile.org/default.asp?language=en Hebrew
/ òáøéú -
http://www.newprofile.org/ Help us free our children
from the military prison! (parents of The Five)
For ENGLISH details please click
http://www.refuz.org.il/help.html For HEBREW
please click
http://www.refuz.org.il/hebrew/help.html
Homepage with lots of information: http://www.refuz.org.il/ #
Eye-witness reports from the Occupied Territories:
http://www.machsomwatch.org (Israeli women
monitoring the checkpoints)
http://www.palsolidarity.org/pressreleases/pressreleases.php
(internationals throughout OT) -- http://www.gush-shalom.org/
(òáøéú/Hebrew)
http://www.gush-shalom.org/english/index.html (English)
http://www.gush-shalom.org/arabic/index.html (selected
articles in Arabic) with \\photos of recent actions \\the
weekly Gush Shalom ad \\the columns of Uri Avnery \\Gush
Shalom's history & action chronicle \\position papers &
analysis (in "documents") \\and a lot more N.B.: On the
Gush Shalom website links for Articles and documents in
German, French and Spanish In order to receive Gush
Shalom's Hebrew-language press releases mail to:
gush-shalom-heb-request@mailman.gush-shalom.org + NB: write
the word "subscribe" in the subject line. Archive of email
reports:
https://mailman.gush-shalom.org/pipermail/gush-shalom/2004/thread.html#start
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