State Dept. Daily Press Briefing April 11, 2007

Daily Press Briefing
Sean McCormack, Spokesman
Washington, DC
April 11, 2007

INDEX:

NORTH AFRICA
Statement Condemning Terrorist Attacks in Algeria and Morocco
Status of Consulates in Region

NORTH KOREA
Status of Banco Delta Asia Fund Transfer
Status of Yongbyon Reactor Closure / U.S. Expects North Korea to
Fulfill February 13 Obligations
Implementation of Treasury Rule on Banco Delta Asia up to Macanese
Authority
February 13 Agreement Just One Step in Larger Six-Party Talk
Process
UNSC Resolution 1718 Still In Effect
Process in Which Good Faith Actions Will Be Met by Good Faith

SUDAN
Internationally Recognized Definition of Genocide
Level of Violence Still Occurring in Darfur
Deputy Secretary Negroponte's Schedule of Meetings on His Upcoming
Travel
Special Envoy Natsios Testifying to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee
Sanctions against Sudan

IRAN
Possibility of a Trip by Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi to Iran
Selling of Weapons to Iraqi Insurgents
Attendance at the Neighbor's Conference

MACEDONIA
U.S. Name Recognition

TRANSCRIPT:

12:08 p.m. EST

MR. MCCORMACK: Good afternoon, everybody. I have one opening statement concerning the recent terrorist attacks in North Africa, Morocco and Algeria.

The United States condemns the terrorist attacks that occurred yesterday, April 10, in Casablanca involving suicide bombers and today's bomb attacks in Algiers. These horrific acts indiscriminately killed members of the security services and civilians alike. We extend our deepest sympathies to the victims of these atrocities, their families, and the people of Algeria and Morocco. We stand with the Moroccan and Algerian people and their governments in the struggle against extremism and violence, and support their efforts to secure a future peace. There is no political justification for the murder of innocent life.

And with that, happy to take your questions.

QUESTION: You're not seeing a link between these two?

MR. MCCORMACK: No. I -- just before I came out here, I saw a wire report in which al-Qaida claimed responsibility for both attacks. I can't confirm that at this point, so I'm not in the position right now to confirm any linkage between the two attacks. We do know that al-Qaida and al-Qaida affiliates have been active in the past in North Africa. I expect that the investigation is going to continue to determine who exactly is responsible for the acts. We'll support the Moroccan and Algerian authorities in whatever appropriate way in order to identify those individuals and, of course, we want to see them brought to justice. But I think we're going to have to wait on the results of some further investigations before we're able to determine any possible linkage and verify the claim.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) made more urgent to install this African Command you are planning for the Department of Defense and the Department of State to fight terrorism?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I think -- well, it's important in its own -- in our own right. There are a number of different issues in which DOD is engaged on the continent of Africa and I think it's a farsighted initiative on the part of the Department of Defense and we're happy to participate with them in setting up the Africa Command. I confess, I don't know the current status of readiness. I know that they were laying some -- laying the groundwork to actually establish the headquarters component and get in place all the resources for the command, but I can't tell you where it stands right now.

QUESTION: Sean, yesterday the consulate in Casablanca was closed down after the police raid. Has that reopened yet? And has there been any kind of similar step taken in Algiers?

MR. MCCORMACK: Let me check for you whether or not the consulate has opened up. I know that they were closed -- I think they were closed today. Is that correct? I think -- we'll check for you on that, Matt. In terms of the Embassy in Algiers, they are taking all the appropriate security precautions that they might normally do in a case like this that you would expect they might do. This is a post already that has a heightened security profile. They are as far as I'm able to determine still open as such. But we'll -- I'll check for you to see if there's anything about closures, either in Casablanca or Algiers.

QUESTION: And you don't have anything on injured Americans.

MR. MCCORMACK: No reports of any injured Americans.

QUESTION: Do you see al-Qaida as a growing threat in North Africa? Do you have any intelligence that they are regrouping or anything on their links with al-Qaida leadership?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I can't assess for you whether or not it's a growing threat. It is a current and persistent threat. There have been some successes on the part of Algeria and Moroccan authorities in the past in breaking up terrorist cells, but we know that there is a continuing threat from the presence of -- at the very least, al-Qaida related affiliates both in Morocco and Algeria. I can't offer an assessment for you whether or not it is a growing threat, but it's a very real threat as evidenced by the actions today.

Yes -- okay, yes, here we go.

QUESTION: On North Korea, have you heard -- is the U.S. taking what the North Koreans said to Bill Richardson as their official response to this or have you heard any more from them?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, there's been no -- I understand that there's been no formal request from the North Korean Government to extend the 60-day deadline and we, as do the other members of the six-party talks, expect all the -- all members to work and make every effort to fulfill their obligations according to the February 13th agreement. We'll see where we are on Saturday in that regard.

With respect to the BDA issue, it is our view that is shared by others, that the matter has been resolved, that the Macanese authorities have taken certain steps in which the accounts are now open to authorize account holders, and that the ball is in the court of the North Koreans. And we shall see what actions they decide to take, but let's be clear that the other members of the six-party talks believe that that matter has been resolved.

Yeah, Sylvie.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) question. According to the February 13th agreement, do the North Koreans have to completely shut down Yongbyon or do they have to start shutting down?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, the commitment is that they would shut down the enrichment-related activities, the reprocessor, the fuel fabrication, the reactor. So that's the commitment and it's our -- it is our expectation that the North Koreans will fulfill their commitments under the February 13th agreement.

Now because the BDA issue has been more complicated than anybody could have rationally expected back on February 13th, that has taken a lot more time to resolve. It has been resolved now and we would expect to see the North Koreans take actions to fulfill their commitments under the February 13th agreement. As I have said before, Chris Hill has said before, you're bumping up against the technical capability to do that safely, to shut down all those facilities safely. We will make an assessment of where we are on Saturday, you know, all the individual members of the talks as well as collectively, so we will wait to see where we are on Saturday.

Yeah.

QUESTION: In the end, the fact that the United States kind of agreed to allow the money to be returned back to the North Koreans, what do you say to critics that respond that this is kind of giving in to the kind of same nuclear blackmail that North Korea always engaged in; it doesn't take any steps until it gets what it wants first?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, in terms of the Treasury action on BDA, it was an effective action. It effectively put out of business a banking institution that was engaged in money laundering and other kinds of illicit activities. That's no longer happening. And also as a result, you have a strengthening of Macanese banking laws, and that's good and that's important for the continuing integrity of the international financial system, and that is a job with which Treasury is charged: to enforce United States banking regulations and also to ensure the -- help ensure the integrity of that international financial system.

Now, there were a lot of discussions about how to implement the Treasury rule -- it's a technical term -- regarding BDA and it was never the idea from the very beginning of this process that these funds would be held in perpetuity. There would need to be some disposition of them. Now, that -- the decision about that particular disposition is up to the Macanese authorities. We didn't -- we don't hold the funds. We have never controlled the funds. It has been the Macanese banking authority who has controlled those funds and it is -- it was and is up to them how to decide about the disposition of the funds and what to do with them.

Now, the solution was arrived at between the Macanese authorities as well as the North Koreans that the accounts would be open to authorized accountholders. The Treasury Department has put out a statement saying that this meets the parameters that we have laid out, that it is consistent with the international financial regulations that the Treasury Department is charged with upholding, and also it fulfills the commitment that the North Koreans have given that these funds are going to be used for the betterment of the Korean people.

Now, we are going to -- we intend to hold the North Koreans to that obligation and we intend to hold them to those assurances. We talked a little bit yesterday about some of the difficulties of doing so, but nonetheless we are going to be persistent in examining exactly how these funds are used. With this issue resolved, the focus can now get back to what we are doing about the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. That's the main focus of the six-party talks. And I think everybody will agree that if we are able to achieve that through this six-party process, then that will have meant a considerable positive change in the regional security situation and also a positive change vis-à-vis the threat from nuclear proliferation emanating from North Korea. So we'll, again, we'll see how this process plays out.

It's going to proceed in a step-by-step fashion. Everybody goes into this process with their eyes wide open. There's a long history of North Korea reneging on deals, breaking obligations, going back on promises. But the fundamental difference that you have now is that North Korea has made pledges not just to the United States but to the other members of the six-party talks and that is critically important. Also overlaying that, you still have UN Security Council Resolution 1718. You also have the ability of U.S. regulators as well as other regulators to enforce international and financial regulations. So there are considerable possible upsides at the -- in this process for all parties, including the North Koreans. But if the parties do not meet their obligations, they are not going to realize those potential gains.

QUESTION: Okay. It doesn't really answer the question, though. I mean, originally a while ago before this nuclear agreement, you made a point of saying that those two issues were -- you had no linkage to them whatsoever. North Korea linked it to the nuclear deal, so why is this not giving into kind of North Korea dictating the terms of the negotiations and nuclear blackmail? Or are you saying that you think in the end it's worth it if you get the bigger, more important issue of getting North Korea to dismantle its nuclear program?

MR. MCCORMACK: What I'm saying is that the February 13th agreement is one step in implementing an earlier agreement, the September agreement, which deals with a wide range of issues and that this is one part of that process. We are going to see if all the parties meet their obligations. We're going to see if the North Koreans meet their obligations in a way that is judged by all the members of the six-party talks as in good faith fulfilling their obligations.

All along the way there are tests here. So the idea that somehow the United States or the Chinese or the Japanese or the Russians don't fully appreciate the history of North Korea's behavior is wrong. That's a big reason why the process has been structured the way that it is and that you have 30-day, 60-day increments here as opposed to looking at behavior over the course of one year, two years or five years as you had with the agreed framework.

That approach didn't work. People who negotiated the agreement did so in good faith, thought it was the best solution at the time, proved that it didn't work largely because North Korea didn't fulfill its obligations. You have a completely different approach now and we'll see how this approach works. We'll see if it yields results. Our hope is that it will result in a denuclearized Korean Peninsula and a fundamentally different relationship between North Korea and the rest of the world, including its neighbors.

QUESTION: But in the end, do you think that if indeed North Korea implements its end of the bargain and dismantles its nuclear program it was worth it in your eyes to relax your position on the financial issue?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I think the Treasury Department and we would dispute the idea that somehow we have relaxed our position. The Treasury Department put out a statement about the solution that the Macanese authorities arrived at with regard to these bank accounts and they said that it conformed to the strictures of international financial regulations and that they were comfortable with the arrangement.

Matt.

QUESTION: Sean, forgive my ignorance about this. I have not read the entire February agreement. Is there any provision in it built in for an extension or is there any provision in it for what happens if the --

MR. MCCORMACK: Not that I'm --

QUESTION: -- if the timeline isn't met?

MR. MCCORMACK: I have to admit I don't have the whole thing committed to memory. I don't believe there is. I was just making the point that the North Koreans have not formally come to the other members of the talks to ask for an extension of the 60-day deadline.

QUESTION: Right--

QUESTION: But is an actual extension necessary? I mean, if you see that they're -- while the reactor itself, just to follow up on what Sylvie was saying, isn't exactly turned off, if they're making steps to implement the agreement, is a formal extension necessary or do you --

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, these are all things that can't be -- decisions that can't be taken in isolation by the United States or any single party. Again, this is a group exercise and you will have consultation among the other members of the six-party talks. Obviously, we'll take a look at the facts as they stand at 60 days, make our assessment and do consultations about what the potential next steps might be.

QUESTION: Well, what is the U.S. position on what should happen?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I think, Matt --

QUESTION: Do you go back to the -- does -- do you have to go back to the September agreement or do you -- where do you -- is there a place to start again from?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, before I start leaping ahead of the facts, let's take a look at where we are on Saturday. And policy makers are going to have to take a look at the facts as they are before them, how that matches up against the February 13th agreement as well as what our expectations are about future North Korean behavior based on what they have done to that point. We don't know what they will have done to that point. We're not there yet.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Professional -- it would be hard to believe that professional negotiators would not have a Plan B, that based on North Korea's long history of not keeping their word. Wouldn't one want to think that if we were going forward with this there has to be some sort of provision that if this doesn't work out, where do we go next?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I never said that there wasn't.

QUESTION: Oh. Is there one?

MR. MCCORMACK: Certainly if there were such ideas, I wouldn't be sharing them from the podium at this moment.

Anything else on North Korea?

QUESTION: (Inaudible) the whole process with North Korea has been a carrot and stick process and we see that the carrot is obviously the resolution of the BDA and -- BDA issue, but we're not seeing any sticks. What are the consequences if they don't --

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I talked about those a little bit. You have within -- if you look at the six-party process and the September agreement, there's a lot in there for all the members of the six-party talks and there's a lot in there for North Korea. And quite clearly, if they do not fulfill their obligations at these early stages, they're not going to realize the benefits as they're outlined in that September 2005 statement.

Also, you have the UN Security Council Resolution 1718. That is still in effect. It is still being implemented. The Japanese Government took some steps just the other day to implement Resolution 1718. There are also in place international efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. You still have the Proliferation Security Initiative. You still have the Department of Treasury working to ensure the integrity of the international financial system and work to prevent the use of that system for illicit behavior. So those things are all still out there.

So there are plenty of incentives for North Korea built into that September 2005 agreement, but in order to realize those benefits and to realize the benefits of a different kind of relationship with the rest of the world, they have to perform, as do the other members of the talks.

Nicholas.

QUESTION: Sean, just going back to your comment yesterday about the good faith effort that all parties are putting into this and you expect the North Koreans to show that too in the way they use the money when they get it back, I wonder -- it's -- it took you about six years to realize that the good faith would be necessary in any dealings with North Korea and I wonder if this is an acknowledgment that your policy of isolation didn't work?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well --

QUESTION: My point is -- you know, Colin Powell was pretty much on this page you're on now six years ago and he was repudiated by the White House and a policy ensued with no (inaudible) so it just may seem to some people that a lot of time was wasted in trying to find out what the best way of dealing with North Korea is, to go back to what actually would have been six years ago.

MR. MCCORMACK: Right. Well, I think that ignores six years of history and that ignores six years of very carefully laying the diplomatic groundwork that allowed us to get to the point where we were able to negotiate the February 13th agreement, never mind the September 2005 agreement.

There was a -- the situation as it stood in the summer of 2001 was completely different than it is right now. Think about it; you had, in the summer of 2001, a situation in which North Korea was insisting upon only dealing bilaterally with the United States. There wasn't even the prospect or the thought of a six-party framework in which you have all of North Korea's neighbors at the table there as guarantors of any pledges or any agreements that are made and not insignificantly, probably the countries with the greatest leverage on North Korea and their behavior.

So you didn't even have that. You didn't even have that prospect. As a matter of fact, in the summer of 2001, we had just emerged from a crisis with China over the EP-3. And so now, you are in a position -- let's go to the current day -- now you are in a position where China voted for, in the wake of a missile test by North Korea, a Chapter 6 resolution, in the wake of a nuclear test by North Korea, a Chapter 7 resolution. And the Chinese Government fully engaged in a diplomatic negotiation to get North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons and using all the considerable leverage that they have with the North Korean Government, never mind the fact that you also have the Russians there and the Japanese and the South Koreans, the South Koreans by many reports being very tough negotiators during that February 13th agreement and the negotiation of the benchmarks that North Korea had to meet in order to realize some of the benefits, some of the fuel oil or in-kind assistance. So you have a completely different situation.

And it wasn't -- that didn't happen by accident. That happened through careful, painstaking diplomacy. And I would argue that you couldn't have gotten to the point that we have right now where there is a prospect of a six-party agreement that results in denuclearization of the Peninsula, a completely different security framework in Northeast Asia guaranteed by all the members of the six-party talks. But that just was not a possibility back in the summer of 2001 because you had not laid that diplomatic groundwork.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) are you saying that although nothing in North Korea has changed, including the government or its attitudes or the way it does business, but because the environment around it has changed now you can trust the North Koreans to do what you expect them to do just because they have to answer to more countries than just one, which was the United States before?

MR. MCCORMACK: What you're saying is that all along, whether it was 2001, 2000, 1994 or 2007, what you are looking for is a change in North Korean behavior. They tried with the (inaudible) framework. It didn't work, primarily because North Korea didn't meet its obligations. We think the current process and the current diplomatic effort has as good an opportunity, if not better, than any other effort to realize a change in North Korea's behavior. What does that mean? A denuclearized Korean Peninsula as well as addressing other issues important to others, for example, the abduction issue with the Japanese. It's a matter of leverage and certainly the international system and the other members of the six-party talks are in a position of greater leverage to realize those goals at the moment. It's not a guarantee of success. What it is is a -- it gives you the best prospect, we believe, of achieving the goals that have been out there for quite some time.

QUESTION: Is it paying off?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, see, Nicholas. We'll see. We have a number of different points along the way at which we will be able to determine progress or whether absence of progress. And ultimately it is going to be up to the individual judgments of those member-states of the six-party talks as well as the collective judgment of those parties as to whether or not progress has been made and what the future course of action will be.

QUESTION: But could you just remind us once again of the entire history of U.S.-North Korean relations -- (laughter) -- since 1994 in detail? (Laughter.)

MR. MCCORMACK: Sorry, I was boring you, Matt. (Laughter.)

Kirit.

QUESTION: New topic if I could.

MR. MCCORMACK: I don't know. Have we exhausted the North Korea nuclear -- Finally, I've beaten you into submission. (Laughter.) It was -- mark this time down -- mark this date. (Laughter.)

All right, sure.

QUESTION: Just shy of a half hour there. If I could ask you to clarify something for me, just wondering if there's an accepted definition or standard for the U.S. Government for what is genocide?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, there's a legal definition and that is an internationally accepted legal definition. I believe it's written into U.S. law. I can't vouch for that 100 percent but there is an internationally recognized definition. We went -- before Secretary Powell made the pronouncement about genocide taking place in Darfur, policymakers and lawyers went through very carefully the facts and looking at those facts through the prism of the law and made the judgment that, yes, in fact, genocide was occurring.

QUESTION: So (inaudible) sign onto that international standard of what a genocide is then, just to be clear?

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.

QUESTION: All right. I'm just wondering if currently, the U.S. still believes that there is genocide occurring in Darfur.

MR. MCCORMACK: What we have said in the past about this question is that there's no reason to act as if one is not taking place, no -- throughout the past several years, you have had dips in the level of violence as well as spikes in the level of violence, but we are pursuing our policies with the idea in mind that that -- the condition of a genocide taking place still does hold.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.

QUESTION: Well, somewhat related to that, can you say or do you know if Deputy Secretary Negroponte expects to meet with President Bashir while he's in --

MR. MCCORMACK: While he's in Sudan?

QUESTION: While he's in Sudan or --

MR. MCCORMACK: We're going to --

QUESTION: -- or travel actually to Darfur itself and then any details you could give on the Libya stuff?

MR. MCCORMACK: We're going to -- right, we're going to try to, as his trip progresses, keep you up to date on what meetings are actually taking place or have taken place. So right now, I don't have that information for you, but we'll try to keep you updated along the way.

QUESTION: Do you know if he plans to meet with --

MR. MCCORMACK: He does plan to meet with senior Sudanese leadership. Again, we will try to keep you informed on exactly with whom he's meeting along the way.

QUESTION: At each stop?

MR. MCCORMACK: Yes.

QUESTION: And Qadhafi? Does he plan to meet with Qadhafi?

MR. MCCORMACK: Same -- the same applies.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) in Darfur?

MR. MCCORMACK: As to all of the questions related to the Deputy Secretary's travel and specific meetings and where he's going to be going at a specific point in time, we'll keep you updated along the way.

QUESTION: Well, but he had a plan when he left here. I mean, he either planned to go to Darfur or not plan to go to Darfur.

MR. MCCORMACK: And we will -- as his trip proceeds, Charlie, we will keep you updated on it.

QUESTION: Sean --

QUESTION: Can I just -- sorry, if I could just follow up on what I was asking earlier. So just -- you said that the lawyers and so on had gone through the definition --

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: -- back in 2004. I just want to be very clear that that's exactly the same standards that are being applied when you say now that there's a genocide --

MR. MCCORMACK: To my knowledge, yeah. That is, I don't believe that there was a shifting legal standard.

QUESTION: Okay. I'm just wondering why Andrew Natsios had such a hard time this morning on the Hill saying that there was a genocide going on the Hill. He was asked repeatedly, pressed by Senator Menendez for about five minutes and he would not say.

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: And even when -- you know, Senator Biden finally did ask him, he only would say yes. He would not even use the word genocide. I'm wondering why there was such a --

MR. MCCORMACK: You can ask him. I don't know.

QUESTION: Sean, can you revisit to what Negroponte hopes to achieve in Sudan? I mean, is this -- can this be seen as sort of a last chance for the Sudanese Government to be receptive to this hybrid business or we move on?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I think the international community has gotten to the point where we cannot allow this catastrophe in Darfur to continue without a qualitatively different reaction from the international system, from individual states as well as collectively. And the Deputy Secretary is going to travel there to see where the Sudanese Government is in removing the obstacles it has put in the place of the deployment of all three phases of the AU/UN force. Now, I've -- I had heard that there was -- there were some possible positive signals coming out of a meeting in Riyadh which Secretary General Ban Ki-moon attended as well as King Abdullah and President Bashir.

Now, we still have to see those positive signals manifest themselves in actions on the part of the Sudanese Government. And we have to be clear that the positive actions need to include the assent of the Sudanese Government to all three phases of the AU/UN force. They have tried to put in place certain caveats with respect to the command and control relationship between the AU and the UN. And this force has to operate effectively and you can't have those sort of caveats in place. The international system and individual member-states have tried to reassure the Sudanese Government that the mission of this AU/UN force is limited to trying to provide greater security and greater stability in Darfur.

Now, if we don't see movement, tangible actions from the Sudanese Government to address the concerns of the international system, then I think you are going to see a reaction from individual member-states as well as a discussion of what collective diplomatic action might be taken. Now, I don't want to detail what those might be, but certainly we have ourselves considered what steps we might take. And the Deputy Secretary's trip in what he hears not only from the Sudanese, but all the other member-states is going to be an important factor in the decision-making process as to what we as well as others do next.

QUESTION: How about -- can you give us something about Libya? What's he going to be doing in Libya?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, Libya -- Libya shares a border with Sudan and also it's contiguous with Darfur, so they can play an important role potentially in trying to influence the Sudanese Government to agree to the deployment of this force and also as a neighbor of Sudan in an area in which this force might be deployed. It's worthwhile. Also we're underlining for the Libyan Government exactly what it is going to be doing. And Libya is also potentially a place that could help provide some logistical support for forces that may be deploying into Darfur. That's certainly an option. Thus far, I don't think we've seen agreement from the Libyan Government on that, but certainly it would be a welcome step.

QUESTION: What about non-Darfur issues there?

MR. MCCORMACK: Non-Darfur? I haven't talked to the Deputy Secretary whether or not he's going to talk about --

QUESTION: He's going to become the highest-ranking diplomat to go there since 1953 and you don't know if he's going to talk about anything other than Darfur?

MR. MCCORMACK: Matt, I haven't talked to him about it.

QUESTION: Okay. Perhaps you can also ask him if he's aware that -- we don't have the exact itinerary obviously, but the dates are the 11th to the 19th for the whole trip encompass the April 15th which I don't know if you're aware of the significance of that date, but it is the anniversary of the U.S. air strikes on Tripoli and Benghazi. Do you know if the Deputy Secretary was aware that his visit there would roughly coincide with the time at which Qadhafi and other Libyan leaders have in the past -- they've used this to stir up anti-American sentiment?

MR. MCCORMACK: Matt, I don't know. I haven't talked to him about it. I can't tell you whether or not he has. I can tell you that that's an era that U.S. and Libya had hoped to move beyond in their developing relationship. So I'm -- you know, I know that you have noted it and you find it important. But I'm not sure that it's --

QUESTION: No, I'm asking if you find it important or significant. But to get away from that, since I guess you don't know, but has the Deputy Secretary received the letter from the Hill, sent by Senators Lautenberg and the other six asking him to specifically raise the compensation issues for Lockerbie and the La Belle disco bombing?

MR. MCCORMACK: You know, Matt, I haven't asked him about it, but I know that that is something that the lawyers for the families involved are working closely with the Libyan Government. Ultimately it is an issue that they need to resolve themselves. You know, we have encouraged a settlement, certainly, but the United States is not a party to those discussions.

QUESTION: I don't understand why it is that you are being so coy about what he might be doing in Libya. Just -- you haven't asked him, so you haven't asked him about Mauritania either? Do you know what he's doing there, other than --

MR. MCCORMACK: Matt -- I said, you know, (inaudible) I know it's very important to you, Matt. And what we -- we have said all along the way that we are going to keep you informed, as he makes progress on his trips.

QUESTION: But you had a lengthy spiel about what he was going to do in Sudan and what he was looking for there.

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, that's the focus of his trip, Matt.

QUESTION: Oh, I understand that. But well, people aren't saying that there might be other places that he should focus on as well and you're saying you don't know if he will take those concerns to heart.

MR. MCCORMACK: Matt, as we said, we're going to keep you updated on his trip. The focus of this trip is on Darfur. As to any other discussions he has on topics outside of Darfur on any of the various stops, then we'll let you know. We'll keep you updated on it.

QUESTION: Sean.

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.

QUESTION: Can you just -- a general question on the Deputy Secretary's travels. His predecessor Bob Zoellick liked taking press with him and we used the government plane. Apparently this is not the preference of Mr. Negroponte at least judging by this trip. I mean, do you envision in the future him sort of having these high profile trips or are we going to rely on PAOs at embassies to tell us what he did in those countries?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, you know, obviously every Deputy Secretary is going to be different. You know, Deputy Secretary Zoellick, I think was in -- taking a lot of press with him was -- operated in a very different manner from the previous Deputy Secretary. So the fact that Mr. Negroponte is choosing to travel without his friends in the press corps isn't really much of a divergence from past practices. Actually, Deputy Secretary Zoellick --

QUESTION: (Inaudible)?

MR. MCCORMACK: Right.

QUESTION: Sean, there's going to be a series of activists-type rallies and further protests (inaudible) Omar al-Bashir from April 23rd to May 1st.

MR. MCCORMACK: Mm-hmm.

QUESTION: And now since the AU hybrid UN force is not in place, are you in any way talking to either the Russians and Chinese to see if their particular commercial contracts to the Sudan can be tempered down? In other words, it would be not necessarily our sanctions but theirs?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, the Chinese can be a potentially very important player in convincing the Sudanese that they need to change their behavior. We all know about the extensive investments that they have made in Sudanese infrastructure as well in their oil sector. I have -- I noticed recently that there was a comment from the Chinese Government critical of the Sudanese Government. That's a departure from their past practice.

I can't tell you whether or not that foretells a difference in their stance vis-à-vis the Sudanese Government. Certainly, we have encouraged the Chinese to be as active as they possibly can in convincing the Sudanese that they need to change their behavior.

Yeah.

QUESTION: A couple things on Iran. First of all, Pelosi says she's thinking of going there now with Tom Lantos in tow. Can you give me any reaction on that?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I'm not sure that that has happened in 27 years that you've had the Speaker of the House travel to Iran. You know, I don't know how serious she is about those plans and I don't think that we have heard from her that she plans to do it. I know that there's a mention of this in a press conference. So at this point, I'm not going to try to react to something that was just mentioned in perhaps an off-hand way in a press conference. But it would certainly be a departure from 27 years of past practice.

QUESTION: Do you think if she does go that this is, you know, a dangerous trend that's happening and the Democrats kind of trying to circumvent what you're trying to do?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, whatever members of Congress ultimately decide to do with respect to their travel schedule, I don't think that there's any confusion on the part of the American people or the international system as to who is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy as well as its execution. That is the Executive Branch led by President Bush, so I don't think there's any confusion about that.

QUESTION: Okay. Can I ask one more, please?

MR. MCCORMACK: Sure.

QUESTION: About Iran and Iraq. Caldwell this morning held a press conference in Baghdad showing more weapons, saying that training was taking place (inaudible). Can you elaborate on this a bit?

MR. MCCORMACK: I don't have much more that I can elaborate beyond what he has said, other than to say that in my consultations with colleagues here in the building that this information is, in fact, solid; that there is training of these people that has taken place outside of Iraq, including in Iran. That's clearly disturbing and inconsistent with Iranian public pledges about wanting to support a more stable, secure, peaceful Iraq, so that is, in fact, a direct contradiction. For our part, we have made it clear that we are going to go after these networks. We are not going to allow them to operate freely in Iraq to threaten our troops. And I think the Iranians as well as others inside Iraq understand that clearly now.

QUESTION: So if the Iranians do show up at this neighbors conference, will you take them to task over this during the conference?

MR. MCCORMACK: If the -- we will see if we have the appropriate opportunity to raise the issue. Certainly, if it's an issue related to protection of our troops, I'm sure that we will find some way to raise the issue.

QUESTION: Did you ever hear more from the Swiss?

MR. MCCORMACK: No, no.

QUESTION: If the Iranians will not attend the Sharm el-Sheikh conference, anything will be -- anything will be changed regarding this conference?

MR. MCCORMACK: I can't tell you whether or not that's their final answer. They have to inform the Iraqi Government. I know there was some attempt to make a connection between the five individuals that are being held by our multinational forces and attendance at the conference. We clearly don't recognize any such linkage. These are individuals that were swept up in operations to break up these EFD networks.

Now, if Iraq is -- if Iran is truly interested in playing a supporting -- a supportive role for the Iraqi Government as it deals with its numerous, numerous issues, then certainly something like this would not get in the way of their attendance at the conference. They attended an envoys-level conference.

So whether or not they attend is going to be up to them. I think the -- I'll let the Iraqis speak for themselves about how they would feel about it. But the absence -- their absence at a conference designed to send a positive, supportive message to the Iraqi people and to the Iraqi Government would certainly be notable.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Did you hear the Syrians are going to attend or not?

MR. MCCORMACK: I don't know. We're not collecting RSVPs. It's the Iraqis who are --

QUESTION: The Iraqis.

MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, I don't know. I don't know. Check with them.

Yes, sir.

QUESTION: I have a NATO question. The day before yesterday, the President signed the NATO Consolidation Act of 2007. In this text there is a reference to the Republic of Macedonia. There is a parenthesis close to the name with the indication FYROM. Since you recognized this country with its constitutional name in 2004, can we take from this that there is some kind of change of policy, second thoughts? What we can read in this? You still recognize the country with its constitutional name? What's the name of the parenthesis there and the signing by the President of this text?

MR. MCCORMACK: Right. Well, no, I have something here for you. It says that the U.S. policy on Macedonia's name has not changed. Since 2004 we have recognized Macedonia by its constitutional name, Republic of Macedonia, in our bilateral relations, as you noted, and we continue to strongly support ongoing UN-led talks between Greece and Macedonia in finding a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue.

QUESTION: Your answer I can't understand that the remaining of the parenthesis there with the FYROM mentioned. Is there any pressure exercised towards the Macedonians to accept any solution or to get more serious in the process of an agreement with Greece on that issue?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, we would encourage them to come to some agreement with the Greek Government on the issue. You know, clearly it's a sensitive, emotional issue on both sides of the border. When the Secretary last met with Foreign Minister Bakoyannis, she encouraged efforts that were underway by the Greek Government to resolve the issue.

QUESTION: So it's --

QUESTION: FYROM is the name that NATO uses? While it may not be the name the United States uses, Macedonia is still referred to as FYROM within NATO, and particularly because of the sensitivity of the issue involving the Greeks?

MR. MCCORMACK: I don't understand your point, Matt.

QUESTION: Well, I'm saying I think that's a quicker answer.

MR. MCCORMACK: Thanks. Next time I'll let you come up here.

QUESTION: So, it's meaningless, the parenthesis there, as far as policy concerns?

MR. MCCORMACK: There's no change in policy.

QUESTION: Okay.

(The briefing was concluded at 12:50 p.m.)

DPB # 63

Released on April 11, 2007

ENDS

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