U.S. State Dept Daily Press Briefing: 25 July 2007
12:30 p.m. EDT
Daily Press Briefing: Sean McCormack, Spokesman, Washington, DC, July 25, 2007
INDEX:
AFGHANISTAN
OEF (Operation Enduring
Freedom) and NATO Missions
Civilian Casualties a
Concern of All Allied Forces in Afghanistan
Engaging
Militarily with Al Qaida and the Taliban
Reports on
Status of South Korean Hostages
KOSOVO
Contact Group
Meetings in Vienna
Independence for Kosovo Based on
the Ahtisaari Plan
Russian and Serbian Positions /
Full Agreement Unlikely
U.S. Remains Hopeful to Bring
Others On Board
PAKISTAN
U.S. Position on Waziristan
Agreement
Pakistan Working with Tribal Elders
Essential That President Musharraf Fully Integrate Area into
Pakistan
Congressional Testimony by Under Secretary
Nicholas Burns
President Musharraf’s Possible Use of
Military-Security Intervention
INDIA
Civil Nuclear
Agreement will be Consistent with U.S. Interests
Discussions Continue on Agreement
TURKEY
Query on
Election Results
TRANSCRIPT:
12:30 p.m. EDT
MR. MCCORMACK: Good afternoon, everybody. I don't have anything to open up with. We'll get right to your questions, whoever wants to start off.
Sylvie.
QUESTION: I have a question about Italy. Mr. D'Alema said today that U.S. should wind down the Operation Enduring Freedom --
MR. MCCORMACK: Right.
QUESTION: -- in favor of the NATO-led operation.
MR. MCCORMACK: Right.
QUESTION: Do you think it's a good idea? He says it's because Enduring Freedom makes too many civilian casualties.
MR. MCCORMACK: Right. Well, I haven't seen the full text of his remarks, but a couple of points here. One, OEF, Operation Enduring Freedom, and the NATO mission are separate missions, yet complimentary missions. They're both doing important work there and the idea is that the work they're doing is mutually reinforcing. The OEF mission is focused largely on mentoring and training Afghan security forces, whether that's the Afghan army or the Afghan national police.
And that's important, because eventually we all want to get to the point where it's Afghans doing all of these jobs and providing security for all of Afghanistan, they can't do that right now. So we're in the process of training them. The NATO mission is heavily concentrated down in the south and they are working on reconstruction and development. And they are also engaged in some -- from time to time, military operations against the Taliban, who are attempting to undermine the work that they're doing there.
We also separately have U.S. forces that go after high-value targets in Afghanistan, whether it's al-Qaida or the Taliban, so all of these missions are complimentary. In doing all of this, all of these forces, whether they're NATO forces or ISAF or OEF forces, take the greatest possible care to avoid civilian casualties. Unfortunately, because of the -- largely due to the tactics that the Taliban and al-Qaida use, there are, on occasion, civilian casualties. Nobody wants to see that. We don't want to see that. NATO forces don't want to see that. The Afghans obviously don't want to see that.
But let's focus for a second on the reason why, in many cases, you have those civilian casualties. The reason why is because Taliban forces, al-Qaida forces will very often use innocent civilians, including children, as human shields, with the thought that that can -- that will prevent an attack. And we take the greatest care to avoid any civilian casualties. But let's, for a second, focus back on the enemy here and the kind of disgusting tactics that they use and there is -- the forces -- the forces of NATO and the OEF forces are sometimes engaged in very tough, very tough fighting with some of the Taliban and the al-Qaida who are seeking to reverse all of the gains that Afghanistan has made.
So both of these components are critically important. We are grateful. The Afghans are grateful for all the contributions that the -- our NATO allies have made to the NATO force, and they're going to continue to be needed in the future.
QUESTION: But this seems to imply that the civilian casualties are due to the Enduring Freedom operation more than to NATO operation.
MR. MCCORMACK: I can't --
QUESTION: How do you explain that?
MR. MCCORMACK: You know, I can't vouch for that as a fact, Sylvie. I don't know that that is a fact. Again, they're engaged in two different kinds of missions here, and I can't tell you whether or not that is because, for example, OEF forces might be engaged in more combats -- combat missions than NATO forces who are focused primarily on reconstruction and development. I don't know. I don't know what the case is. But, you know, I can tell you that certainly some of those European forces, the NATO European allies are engaged in some combat operations. The Canadians have taken heavy casualties as well as other countries. So they too are engaged in combat efforts.
I can't tell you (a) if there is some qualitative difference in terms of numbers of civilian casualties from OEF operations versus NATO-ISAF operations or -- and (b) if there is, why is that. I think that folks in the field would be better placed to answer those kinds of questions rather than me.
QUESTION: And do you -- how do you see the risk of these casualties, the civilian casualty, affecting the effectiveness of the operation itself? I mean, if the population turns against the forces of the Enduring Freedom operation, what is it really doing?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, Sylvie, again, I underline that everybody takes the greatest care. I've talked to these -- talked with the folks that have been engaged in combat operations in these kinds of environments. These people are parents or brothers and sisters. They have families of their own. They don't want to see any civilian casualties.
But it is also the case that you are not going to ultimately succeed in Afghanistan without engaging, militarily, forces from al-Qaida and the Taliban who mean to kill the members of the Afghan National Government. They mean to kill innocent civilians and they mean to kill the military forces whether they're from NATO or from the United -- from OEF, who engage in trying to help the Afghans.
So let's be clear. Let's be clear on that -- the kind of enemy that we're facing. Everybody is fully cognizant of the losses that innocent families have endured. But without the Taliban, without al-Qaida and the threat that they pose in Afghanistan, we wouldn't have the need for NATO or OEF forces.
Matt.
QUESTION: Kind of related -- do you have anything you can tell us about what your understanding is of (inaudible) Korean -- the South Koreans?
MR. MCCORMACK: At this point, Matt, I don't. I've seen the press reports, I've made inquiries on it, but I don't have any further information at this point.
QUESTION: What -- okay.
QUESTION: What does the U.S. see as the goal now of the contact group meeting on Kosovo that's getting underway?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I guess they're meeting in Vienna today. We're -- it's sort of at the working level. We have Rosemary DiCarlo, who is one of our Deputy Assistant Secretaries, who's there for us today.
This is part of the ongoing diplomacy surrounding Kosovo. As I said the other day, you're going to see over the coming weeks and months this diplomacy play out up in New York at the UN, you're going to see it play out in capitals in Europe and Russia and here in the United States.
It is to talk about simply how we get from where we are today in terms of the diplomacy to the agreed upon endpoint, at least inasmuch as it is agreed upon by the United States and many of our European friends and allies; that is, independence for Kosovo based on the Ahtisaari plan. President Bush laid that out as the policy objective that we, the United States, have. And that policy objective is shared by many of our European friends and allies. So the question is how do you get from where we are right now to that point.
Now, there are disagreements in terms of the Russians, and the Serbian Government has expressed opposition to this policy endpoint. We want to try to engage them as much as we can to try to bring as many people onboard as possible to that endpoint solution. It would be optimal if we could get full agreement on it. I'm not sure we're going to get to that point. I think given where we are in the diplomacy, it's unlikely that we will get full agreement.
But it is our belief, and is the shared belief of many, that in the absence of that endpoint, independence for Kosovo, that you are actually going to see an outbreak of further violence in the region, which isn't good for anybody. It's not good for the people of the region. It's not good for Europe and not good for us.
We have an interest in seeing that region be more stable and having the people of that region have a horizon and a orientation towards the EU. Now there are possibilities there that exist, but there are going to be certain requirements and the EU has laid those out. Of course, we don't have a vote in that.
So that's basically where we are. And that's why -- that's what you're seeing unfold in terms of diplomacy both at that working level and Dan Fried and Frank Wisner and Nick Burns and the Secretary, as well as the President.
QUESTION: Sean, is the 120-day period going to start from now, or is it coming into sight where that 120-day period will start?
MR. MCCORMACK: Right. I think that will become more apparent in the coming days and weeks.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Sean, if it's unlikey -- if you resign yourself to the fact to what you say is it's unlikely that we'll be able to get a full agreement, you know, why bother with the diplomatic track now?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, it's -- because it is --
QUESTION: What are you hoping to achieve from this if you're not -- if you accept the fact that the Russians and the Serbs are never going to agree?
MR. MCCORMACK: Right. Well, I didn't say "never", but, you know, diplomats are nothing if not hopeful and --
QUESTION: But you didn't sound hopeful.
MR. MCCORMACK: And -- well, I said it was likely, while also realistic. So while at this point, it does -- I wouldn't it was likely that you would get full agreement, we remain hopeful that we can try to bring as many people on board as possible to this endpoint and we're going to keep trying. We're going to --
QUESTION: Well, does that mean that you think that there is a way to make this less objectionable to those who are opposed?
MR. MCCORMACK: We'll see as we continue to -- we --
QUESTION: You think that there is?
MR. MCCORMACK: We shall see, Matt. We have been very forward-leaning in terms of laying out various proposals with the Russians as well as others. We'll see. We'll see.
QUESTION: Is there something short of independence that would be acceptable to --
MR. MCCORMACK: We believe -- we continue to believe that the implementation of independence based on the Ahtisaari plan is the proper course to follow.
QUESTION: But what are you negotiating, then, if you -- if the end result is already clear?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, we're -- like I said, we're talking about how to go from Point A to Point B.
QUESTION: Are you talking about Kosovo or the Middle East? (Laughter.)
MR. MCCORMACK: And there -- within that space, there are many different things that need to be accomplished; many different possible diplomatic steps that you can take, some of which may not be -- may not move the needle in terms of news headlines or news stories, but nonetheless are important. And so it's all of those very, sort of, inside baseball kinds of moves --
QUESTION: Examples, such as?
MR. MCCORMACK: Nothing that I, at this point -- at liberty to share with you.
QUESTION: But -- so that means that there is some kind of -- I don't know what the right word is -- penumbra of something that could be let -- there could be a variation on the theme of independence to make it (inaudible) --
MR. MCCORMACK: No, I certainly --
QUESTION: -- 50 percent bad for the --
MR. MCCORMACK: No, that is -- look -- you know, take a look at what President Bush said. That is our line. It is unchanged. We still want to see who else we can bring on board with that vision that's shared by many.
Yes, anything else on this?
Nina.
QUESTION: Can we move on to Pakistan?
MR. MCCORMACK: Sure.
QUESTION: And can you clarify what the U.S. position is on this Waziristan agreement? It kind of collapsed last week. It seems like Pakistan is trying to reinvigorate this again. What's your opinion on whether it could possibly work?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I think our view as -- the agreement, as it was configured, didn't work. And President Musharraf said as much. We have commented as much. I know that the Pakistani Government is still engaged in some attempts to work with tribal elders to find some way to modify the agreement so that it works and so that it is effective.
He has the same objective that many share, and that is to see that North Waziristan, the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas, are not a safe haven for violent extremists, including al-Qaida. We certainly don't want to see that.
And so the question is how do you go about doing that? Well, he tried this pathway with this agreement. That didn't work. And so we'll see whether or not there is some -- any sort of accommodation that they can make in the framework of an agreement that would get us to the endpoint of these areas not serving as safe haven for violent extremists, because they're as much a threat to President Musharraf as they are to us or other people who have an interest in promoting greater freedoms and liberties throughout the world.
So we'll see exactly what course President Musharraf decides to follow, how far he is willing to take the discussions with tribal leaders, and at what point does he decide that he needs to use more forceful means to see that these areas aren't used for the purposes of planning and launching terrorist attacks.
QUESTION: Yet how optimistic are you that he'll be able to get a grip on this area?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, it's a hard problem. It's not an area that has ever been governed by the Government of Pakistan. These have -- are within the borders of Pakistan, but these are areas that have been, for lack of a better word, autonomous or semi-autonomous in terms of central government control over the regions.
So it's a very difficult problem. We understand that. But at the same time, it is essential that he, as well as the rest of the world, start to move to a place where this, this region, this area, is more fully integrated into a Pakistan that is on the pathway to democratic development, greater prosperity for its people and rule of law throughout the entire country.
QUESTION: Sean, it's my understanding is that Nick Burns is going to be on the Hill in about an hour or so saying that you guys do support the revised Waziristan agreement now that -- based on the three -- three specific criteria that the political dialogue that he had that failed before would now be backed up with a military and security initiative as well as an economic and --
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, there is already -- well, there is already an economic component to --
QUESTION: Am I wrong? Is he not going to --
MR. MCCORMACK: I can't tell you. I can't tell you, Matt. I haven't talked to Nick this morning about his testimony. You know, I don't know what he's going to say up there.
There's an economic component to this which we continue to contribute to, which we believe actually has borne some fruit and is -- and can work. The question is the political/security component of what President Musharraf previously negotiated. That didn't work. I know that he has efforts underway right now and I can't tell you that I have a perfect read right now where he stands in terms of his decision making and when to cut those off and --
QUESTION: Musharraf?
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah, Musharraf. Yeah. I mean, we're not negotiating. And when he is going to make -- when and if he makes a decision to use more forceful means, use military/security intervention in those areas to get them under control.
QUESTION: But you have the commander of the U.S. troops in Afghanistan today in a conference call with the Pentagon quoted as saying that he is, that -- and they've seen -- they've seen a result from that from -- and obviously, we've seen the attacks that have happened, so you know that he's redeploying people or sending people back into the -- into these forward positions.
MR. MCCORMACK: Well --
QUESTION: So am I not correct that you guys are supporting the -- this revised --
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I'm not sure --
QUESTION: -- with more military oomph?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, I think there are two separate -- there are two separate questions there, Matt. There's the question of President Musharraf using military force going into the FATA areas, as they have done previously, but they gave -- gave this agreement some space to work. It didn't work. So I'll let the Pakistanis talk about their military operations. I'm not going to talk about it. There are certainly a lot of news reports about the fact they're going in in a heavier way, in a more forceful way with their military forces into the FATA area. You can talk to the Pakistanis about that. It's not my place to talk about those things.
In terms of political agreement, you know, standing here I'm not aware of any new political agreement that they have with the tribal leaders based on what they had previously negotiated. You know, perhaps there is some update and the Pakistanis can tell you that they have some new agreement based on what they had previously negotiated. I can't tell you that's the case right now.
But everybody shares the need for the Pakistanis to get that area under control. And what you heard from the military commander, I don't know if he's speaking about within the past few days he's seen the number of attacks going down. I don't know. I don't know if that's the case. But there very well could be a correlation between a reduction in the numbers of attacks emanating from the tribal areas and news reports of the Pakistanis going in there in a more forceful way.
Yeah.
QUESTION: Richard raised the prospect of military aid to the frontline troops, the Pakistani troops going into these tribal areas, FATA areas. But has there been any request by the U.S. to the Pakistanis about any joint operations in these areas?
MR. MCCORMACK: Joint U.S. --
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. MCCORMACK: You can talk -- you can talk to the folk that conduct military operations about that.
Yeah, Nicholas.
QUESTION: Can we move to India?
MR. MCCORMACK: Sure.
QUESTION: There are new reports today about revised language in the the nuclear agreement, which apparently would -- the text on a nuclear test, whether India can actually do it and what permission and what negotiations. I mean, first of all, can you -- I don't know if you've seen those reports this morning -- they've been on the wires -- but can you confirm them? Because most people out there think that you're caving in because finally you need an agreement and it's not working out. So anything you have to say will be helpful. Thanks.
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, first of all, we're not going to -- we're not going to agree to anything that is not in the United States national interest. And in terms of "needing agreements," we're certainly not going to do anything that we believe is harmful to either our national security or foreign policy interests.
As for the agreement with the Indians on the 12 -- the so-called 123 agreement, we had a statement out last Friday. There are some continuing discussions regarding that agreement. I would expect within the next couple of days we'll have more to say about it.
But at the end of the day, what we produce and what we may agree to is going to be something that is in the interest of this country from a variety of different perspectives, from helping to prevent the further spread of nuclear technologies and nuclear materials, and also in realizing a different kind of relationship with India that President Bush has really made an important priority for the Administration going all the way back to the first term.
QUESTION: Because India is not obligated under the IAEA not to perform nuclear tests, I thought that was one of your underlying objectives, to prevent a future test.
MR. MCCORMACK: In the fullness of time, Nicholas, we will have more to say about the details of what we've been talking to the Indians about. At this point, I am not at liberty to get into any more of the details.
Yes.
QUESTION: Sean, just a question on whether allowing India to reprocess spent nuclear fuel in its -- in India under IAEA guidelines is in accordance with U.S. national interest.
MR. MCCORMACK: Again, same answer applies.
Yeah, Lambros.
QUESTION: On Turkey. Mr. McCormack, any congratulatory statement on the election of the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Recep Erdogan with a huge majority?
MR. MCCORMACK: Lambros, I have to admit I haven't checked to see if the results are final. You know, when the results are final, you can expect that we will, of course, make some phone calls and issue some statements. I'll be happy to give you something.
QUESTION: One more question? According to Washington Post, "The military basically cannot do anything with that nearly 50 percent support. Turkey is not a banana republic. They cannot tell them how to behave." How do you assess democracy in Turkey on the results of the new elections?
MR. MCCORMACK: Well, you know, again, Lambros, I told you I don't know if the results are final. They may well be. I just haven't informed myself on that particular matter. I can tell you, based on the way the election unfolded, that the state of democracy in Turkey is strong.
QUESTION: You still have faith in Turkey's secular democracy? (Laughter.)
MR. MCCORMACK: Yeah.
Yeah, go ahead.
QUESTION: Yeah, what kind of role does -- has the United States played in -- to solve the hostage crisis in Afghanistan? You said that you don't have further information, but --
MR. MCCORMACK: Right.
QUESTION: -- the United States has been extremely – has maintained an extremely low-key position on this mater and -- but today, we hear that the U.S. military operation against the kidnappers is imminent. If you have any comment on that --
MR. MCCORMACK: Look, we support the South Korean Government in their desire to have their people returned unharmed. That's what the case should be. These people should be released immediately unharmed so they can return to their families. I certainly am not going to say anything that, in any way, could affect the situation and could possibly affect the safety of these individuals. So I'm just not going to say anything about it.
Yes, ma'am.
QUESTION: The House Appropriations Committee passed a bill that bans exportation of F-22s to any foreign government using the funds included in the bill.
MR. MCCORMACK: Right.
QUESTION: Does this make the Japanese -- more difficult for the Japanese Government to obtain these fighter jets? And how is the State Department involved in this?
MR. MCCORMACK: You got me stumped. I'll have to get you an answer on that.
QUESTION: Thank you.
MR. MCCORMACK: Thanks.
(The briefing was concluded at 1:00 p.m.)
ENDS