Ukraine War Exacerbating Russia’s Demographic Crisis

The invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated Russia’s demographic crisis: military recruitment and a wave of emigration have aggravated the reality of the low birthrate and life expectancy. The population is shrinking and its composition has changed. Young educated men are leaving, and Ukrainian refugees, most of whom are elderly, women, or children, have arrived. Under Vladimir Putin, Russia has invested much effort to address the demographic crisis, but with little success. Now that the country is embroiled in the war in Ukraine, it seems highly unlikely that it will be able to reverse the negative trend and overcome the crisis.

In July 2023, the Kremlin ordered state-owned media outlets in Russia to limit their coverage of the country’s demographic crisis. Throughout his tenure, President Vladimir Putin has tried to advance various solutions to the demographic problems that beset Russia, but thus far attention to this issue and the ensuing efforts have not been successful, and the current situation is testimony to that failure. In May 2023, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov admitted that Russia’s demographic situation was complex and that the measures taken to address it have not yielded the desired results. Demographic crises are not new to Russia, which experienced such problems already during the Soviet era, stemming, inter alia, from the civil war at the start of the 20th century, the massive purges undertaken by Stalin, periods of drought and famine, World War II, and a low birthrate. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia once again experienced negative trends in terms of its demographic growth, apart from a few years in the late 1990s.

One of the main factors leading to Russia’s demographic crisis is the country’s short life expectancy. There is generally a positive correlation between the education level of a country and its life expectancy, but Russia is an exception in this regard. Russia’s education statistics are similar to those of most other developed countries, with the rate of young Russians with higher education the second highest in the OECD, after South Korea, but life expectancy is similar to that of Third World countries. Specifically, the life expectancy of Russian men and women is lower than in other developed countries, in part because of the Russian healthcare system, which is currently struggling. Moreover, there is a major gap between the life expectancy of Russian men and Russian women, which is also characteristic of Third World countries. In 2021, the life expectancy of Russian men was 64 years – similar to that of men in Eritrea, Rwanda, and Pakistan; in contrast, Russian women enjoyed a longer life expectancy – 75 years. The fact that Russian men have a significantly lower life expectancy than Russian women is explained in part by excessive alcohol consumption, which is a major contributing factor to an unhealthy lifestyle, and the accompanying morbidity factors. Higher alcohol consumption has also been linked to increased incidents of violence, crime, traffic accidents, and suicide.

Another factor is Russia’s low birthrate, which has declined steadily since the invasion of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014. In 2021, the birthrate stood at just 1.5 children for each woman, but in order to maintain the current size of the population, Russia needs a birthrate of at least 2.1 children per woman – and this is without the effect of wars and pandemics. Russia’s birthrate is not particularly low compared to other developed countries, but when combined with the short life expectancy, Russia’s population is shrinking more rapidly. In addition, the COVID-19 pandemic hit Russia particularly severely. According to Western estimates, Russia suffered between 600,000 and one million fatalities during the pandemic – one of the highest figures in absolute numbers suffered by any country.

During the more than two decades he has been in power, Putin has taken various measures to address the crisis and increase both the birthrate and life expectancy. To this end, the government adopted various programs and initiatives over the years, such as state handouts. In 2008, the Kremlin unveiled a plan to give Russians financial incentives to have a second child; the plan was expanded in 2018. As part of the plan, any family that had a second child was given a one-time handout of 300,000 rubles, which at the time was worth around $5,200. Poorer families were given financial assistance to pay for their mortgages. Another initiative was the “Mother Heroine” award, which was first introduced in the Soviet era and renewed by Putin, and is awarded to women who bear 10 or more children. Among those to have received the award are Medni Kadyrova, the wife of Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov.

However, these initiatives to increase the birthrate in fact served to exacerbate poverty and inequality, especially among children. The birth grants were not sufficient to raise these children. In 2019, before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, every fifth child in Russia lived below the poverty line. For the most part, these were children living in outlying areas in families with three or more children, and children in single-parent families. According to official figures published for that year, 1 percent of the Russian population was unable to afford basic foodstuffs, 15 percent were unable to pay their monthly expenses, and 49 percent of the population were hard pressed to afford a one-time major purchase, such as a refrigerator or washing machine. According to European criteria, 65 percent of the Russian population lived in poverty, most of them in the geographic peripheries.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated the existing demographic crisis. Extensive army mobilization and Ukrainian military operations have taken a heavy toll on the Russian military. According to an analysis by independent Russian media outlets, at least 47,000 Russian soldiers have been killed in Ukraine. According to Western military estimates, the number is somewhere between 40,000 and 60,000 – or perhaps even more – compared to the official Russian death toll, which is less than 6,000 fatalities. Having said that, most of the harm that the invasion of Ukraine has done to Russia’s demography has not been because of the number of fatalities, but because of the waves of migration and the birthrate, which is lower than expected.

In 2022, Russia experienced two large waves of migration. The first occurred in the immediate aftermath of the invasion on February 24, and the second on September 21, when the Russian army announced a partial mobilization of troops. According to most estimates, between 600,000 and 800,000 people left Russia in 2022. Tens of thousands of those who left because of the war returned, in part because they were not given visas for their destination countries. Others opted to return because the standard of living in Russia was better than in the countries they moved to, while still others returned because of the hostile reception that Russian nationals were given in those countries.

Around 5 percent of all men between ages 20 and 40 were either drafted into the Russian military or emigrated – and this has a major impact on the birthrate. As a result of the mobilization and the massive wave of emigration, the birthrate for April 2023 came close to being the lowest since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In addition, uncertainty among Russian nationals about what the future will bring also has a negative impact on the birthrate, evidenced by the fact that in 2022, after the start of the war, there was record demand for pills to induce abortion. Moreover, the war in Ukraine, the sanctions imposed on Russia, and the recession all exacerbate the economic situation significantly – which in turn is likewise expected to negatively influence the birthrate. Russian demographers believe that the downward trend will continue, and the birthrate will drop to its lowest level since the 19th century.

Russia has made efforts to address the severe demographic crisis. Early in 2023, Putin unveiled a national project designed to encourage births and extend life expectancy, and he demanded a detailed plan of action for each district to increase the birthrate and provide assistance for large families. In Sverdlovsk Oblast, for example, various potential services are deliberated, including consultations, social support, and psychological help for women considering an abortion, as well as an increased number of medical organizations that treat women with fertility issues and the establishment of more fertility clinics. As part of the effort to deal with the crisis, in early July 2023, billboards across Moscow, Saint Petersburg, and dozens of other cities publicized the grants that the government would give to new parents and other plans to support them.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the diversion of state resources toward the fighting has entailed a cut in welfare, education, and health budgets – and this will have a significant impact on Russian society. The population of Russia is shrinking, and its composition is changing: young educated men are leaving, and the refugees arriving from Ukraine are for the most part elderly, women, or children. Moreover, Putin wants to shape the face of Russian society and strengthen his regime by promoting the conservative values of the traditional family as an alternative to Western ideas of liberalism and democracy. However, these approaches have not permeated fully into Russian society. It is highly doubtful that Russia will be also to reverse this negative trend and increase its life expectancy and birthrate, significantly narrow the gaps between the periphery and the urban centers, or deal with ever-growing poverty. Now, with Russia deeply embroiled in the war on Ukraine, it appears that these negative trends have intensified and in the short and medium terms, this will have far-reaching negative ramifications for the Russian economy, society, and military.

ENDS

The opinions expressed in INSS publications are the authors’ alone.

Bat Chen Druyan Feldman

Bat Chen Druyan Feldman is a Research Assistant at the Russia Program. Bat Chen is PhD student at Tel Aviv University and her research focuses on Soviet and Iranian intellectual history. She has a B.A in Philosophy and Middle Eastern Studies and an M.A in Middle Eastern Studies from Ben-Gurion University.
 

Arkady Mil-Man

Arkady Mil-Man is a senior researcher and the Head of the Russia Program at the Institute for National Security Studies. He was the Israeli Ambassador to Russia (2003-2006) and Israeli Ambassador to Azerbaijan (1997-2000). He began his career at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a Senior researcher of the Soviet Union at the Center for Political Research. He later headed the department in the Center responsible for the research of Russia and the Far East. Mil-Man also served as Deputy Head of the Group of Israeli diplomats in Moscow (1989-1990) before the renewal of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. He founded the Israeli Embassy in Kazakhstan (1992) and became the first Israeli Chargee d'Affairs in that country.

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