Hon Phil Goff
Minister of Defence

29 August 2007

New Zealand’s defence policy

Opening address of the Chief of Army’s Contemporary War Fighting Seminar

Thank you for the invitation to contribute to the seminar today.

I want to focus on New Zealand’s defence policy and the strategic considerations underlying it.

In particular, I want to make the point that the security needs of the Twenty-First Century are qualitatively different from those of a generation ago.

Traditional inter-state conflict has increasingly taken second place to conflict within states.

And unlike the Cold War, where conflicting parties were often proxies for ideological battles between super powers, today by-and-large, outsiders cannot be blamed for the violence.

New Zealand’s defence policy is set out in the Government’s Defence Policy Framework published in June 2000, and in an accompanying Foreign Affairs paper, which as Foreign Affairs Minister I released at the same time.

The Framework acknowledges that ensuring the security and safety of the nation is a fundamental objective of any sovereign state.

“New Zealand’s primary defence interests are protecting New Zealand’s territorial sovereignty, meeting shared alliance commitments to Australia, and fulfilling obligations and responsibilities in the South Pacific.

The wider Asian-Pacific strategic environment, of which we are a part, is also relevant.

New Zealand is not directly threatened by any other country and is not likely to be involved in widespread armed conflict.”

The Framework also makes the point that security is about more than defence simply by military means versus conventional threats.

“The Government believes that New Zealand can best contribute to regional stability and global peace by promoting comprehensive security through a range of initiatives, including diplomacy, the pursuit of arms control and disarmament, addressing global environmental concerns, providing development assistance , and building trade and cultural links.

New Zealand will continue to meet UN Charter commitments to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Underpinning this approach is the Government’s strong commitment to maintaining New Zealand’s nuclear free status, and promoting a nuclear free South Pacific.”

There are a number of strategic considerations underlying this statement.

It acknowledges that security relies, in part, in dealing with the causes of instability and conflict.

It noted the exacerbating effect on local conflicts of the uncontrolled supply of weapons.

It reflects the deep-seated belief by New Zealand, in the post Second World War era, that nuclear weapons pose a threat to human survival.

And it also reflects New Zealand’s commitment to multilateralism through the United Nations as a means to prevent and resolve conflict.

After two world wars in the twentieth century, in which New Zealand suffered amongst the highest per capita casualty rates of any nations, New Zealand was one of the strongest advocates of the United Nations.

While the achievements of the UN have fallen short of its vision, we continue to believe that multilateralism, when effectively implemented, is the best means for preventing and resolving conflict.

A UN mandate is normally the prerequisite for the deployment of New Zealand’s Defence Force on security or peace-keeping operations.

The Defence Policy Framework predated the events of 9/11. While identifying no country as being of direct threat to New Zealand, it did not however assume that we lived in a benign security environment.

It explicitly warns that circumstances can change and noted terrorism as one of the threats that the NZDF would have to counter.

The foreign policy paper I released at the same time reinforces the approach set out in the Defence Policy Framework.

- Security requires a comprehensive approach.

- Within a violent world, New Zealand is committed to building and keeping the peace.

- We have fundamental commitments under the United Nations Charter regarding the rule of law, human rights and maintaining international peace and security.

- However there are times when we may have to use force and the NZDF needs to retain combat capabilities.

- As part of the comprehensive approach to security, we need to strengthen UN peacekeeping efforts, address the causes of conflict, working to reduce poverty, ensure good governance and human rights and supporting preventative diplomacy and confidence building measures.

- In terms of defence force capabilities, as well as protection of sovereignty, we needed to consider other roles such as maritime surveillance and resource protection, support for civil authorities in search and rescue, civil defence, crime and illegal migration and a counter-terrorist capability.

- Attention was drawn to our focus on the South Pacific, our wider security interests in Asia – Pacific, important relationships with Australia and the United States and the challenge of disarmament and non-proliferation.

Taking into account the strategic considerations and needs outlined, the Defence Policy Framework set out the requirements for a Defence Force for the twenty-first century.

Acknowledging the run-down of capabilities over the 1990s, it set out seven principles for shaping and rebuilding New Zealand’s Defence Force.

These are that the Defence Force should be:

- equipped and trained for combat and peacekeeping;
- able and ready to be deployed;
- able to operate alongside other forces;
- equipped and trained at appropriate levels of readiness;
- able to sustain commitments;
- up to date in technology and doctrine; and
- needs to be fiscally sustainable.

In May 2001, the Government produced a Defence Statement entitled “A Modern Sustainable Defence Force Matched to New Zealand’s Needs.”

This set out the path forward for reconfiguring a Defence Force which is modern, professional and well equipped, able to meet defence and security needs and sustainable and affordable over the longer term.

Its key components are:

- joint approach to structure and operational orientation by the three services;
- a modernised and reequipped army;
- an enhanced Navy fleet matched to New Zealand's wider security needs;
- a refocused and updated Air Force; and
- a funding commitment to provide financial certainty.

In 2002, the Government approved the Defence Long-Term Development Plan (LTDP) and committed NZ$3.3 billion over ten years to update and replace a range of equipment.

The LTDP links the Government’s defence policy objectives, as set out in the Defence Policy Framework, with the capability requirements announced in the May 2001 Defence Statement.

This has seen a sustained re-equipment of the Army, Navy and Air Force with new or upgraded equipment.

Acknowledging the need for sustainability, the approach has been to focus on achieving excellence in priority areas rather than trying to provide capacity across the board.

Hence the decision was taken to disband the air combat wing, while huge capital-resourcing was put into new helicopters and upgrading transport and surveillance capacity.

Considerable investment has been put into new navy ships, with a focus on sea-lift capacity and enhancing maritime surveillance, resource protection and border protection capabilities.

Investment in equipment is being matched by investment in people and infrastructure.

In 2005, under the Defence Sustainability Initiative, the Government committed itself to a further $4.6 billion spending programme over ten years in these areas.

These programmes reflect the Government’s commitment to an enhanced, rather than diminished, role for the New Zealand Defence Force.

However, in the twenty-first century this role will be qualitatively different given the current needs I mentioned in my opening comments.

The New Zealand Defence Force will continue to be trained and equipped for combat and, from time-to-time as it has been with the Special Forces in Afghanistan, deployed for this purpose.

But in recent years the predominant deployment of the Defence Force has been in security and peacekeeping tasks related to intra-state conflict.

They have been in response to the need to re-establish stability to prevent human suffering and to prevent the development of an environment where criminality and terrorism can develop and flourish.

Our deployments in Bougainville, Bosnia, East Timor, the Solomons, Afghanistan and Tonga reflect these objectives, while other missions to Mozambique, Laos, Cambodia and the Lebanon have focused on removing mines and other explosive remnants of war.

Given the increasing focus on the need to intervene in failing states, further strategic thinking needs to be applied to the issue of how best to re-establish security and stability in these circumstances.

Military intervention will generally be an essential component in controlling and stabilising a situation to prevent widespread death and destruction.

Our respective interventions in Bougainville, East Timor and the Solomons were all required for this purpose.

But for the resolution of conflict to be sustainable, we need more wide-ranging interventions to deal with the causes of state failure including actions to build institutions of state, and social services, and deal with issues of ethnic or religious conflict.

Stability and development are mutually dependant. Stability requires addressing poverty, under-development, economic crisis and weak or corrupt central government.

In Afghanistan, for example, the Taliban and Al Qaeda will not be defeated simply by military means. Success there will depend on local populations concluding that the international intervention should be supported because it offers them not only security, but also improves the quality of their lives.

Development programmes taking place in our PRT area, Bamyan, that do improve peoples’ lives as well as an effective peacekeeping operation, where our troops work with and are respected by local people, are important components in the success of our operation there.

In other deployments, such as East Timor and the Solomons, what is needed for longer-term stability, and an exit strategy for our deployments, is to build local capacity in governance, policing/defence forces and the provision of services.

The problems to be resolved are complex. They often involve communal tensions, political instability, weak governance, fragile economies, rapid population growth that places pressure on limited resources, land tenue problems and trans-national crime.

What lessons can we draw from our experience?

Firstly there is the need for a holistic approach.

In each of these missions, peacekeeping and security forces are essential. They help stabilise a volatile situation as an necessary first step.

But while insecurity and violence are the most obvious and pressing problems, they are the manifestation of more deep-seated weaknesses, in particular ethnic tension, weak or corrupt central authorities, and lack of economic opportunity, which also need to be addressed.

RAMSI is an example of such an integrated intervention. While restoring law and order was RAMSI’s first priority when it was established in 2003, work began immediately on the mission’s other two pillars: machinery of government and economic development.

Each of the three pillars is essential to improve the lives of Solomon Islanders. Economic opportunity, good governance, and security go hand in hand.

Secondly, interventions must be balanced.

We must, as Kofi Annan put it, strike the right balance between hard and soft responses. Military forces will often be required to end instability and lawlessness where insurgents are a threat. In recognition of that we deployed three rotations of Special Forces personnel to Afghanistan.

But the use of force can also undermine the consent environment, especially when it causes harm to local people. So-called collateral damage in dealing with insurgents or a heavy-handed approach to the local population will quickly turn them against intervention forces. Skill and sensitivity on the part of military forces is required to avoid that.

Use of force must be proportionate and highly discriminating. It needs to be balanced with the ability to get alongside the local people. Earning their respect and trust is critically important.

Thirdly, interventions must be inclusive.

The relationship between the intervening partners and the host needs to be a partnership in pursuit of shared goals. Being invited by the host government, and maintaining a consent environment, are important elements in the success of a mission. This is not always straightforward.

Likewise the local government needs to maintain ownership of its country's problems and the solutions to them. Otherwise the intervening force comes to be held responsible and to blame for what happens or does not happen.

Fourthly, the regional and international context is important.

Regional participation or cooperation is important. Interventions are much more likely to succeed when neighbouring states lend their support.

The successful truce and peace missions that brought Bougainville out of conflict comprised neighbouring Pacific Island states that understood the environment and the people. The same dynamic is currently operating in the RAMSI mission in the Solomon Islands.

A stronger regional commitment in Timor-Leste, in parallel with the United Nations and bilateral commitments, is likewise essential to ensure Timor-Leste gets back on track to stability.

Collective interventions also build legitimacy, especially with the host government, and reduce the risk of the intervention being seen as a form of neo-colonialism.

Finally, we regard authorisation from the UN Security Council as vital for regional peace operations. This may be by the establishment of a UN mandated peacekeeping operation or as in the case of Timor Leste, by the approval of a force invited by the government in question.

To conclude, I have sought to outline today New Zealand’s contemporary defence policy framework, and the considerations that contributed to it.

I have also set out the situations involving intra-state conflicts and state failure, which are currently the predominant cause of deployment of our defence force overseas.

I have suggested ways in which we, and others, can best achieve the security and stability objectives in such circumstances.

An effective and efficient Defence Force, trained and equipped for combat, but also with the skills for peacekeeping is essential. So too are the complementary whole-of-government actions necessary for the peace to be sustainable.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge that the New Zealand Defence Force has, in my experience, carried out its responsibilities in this area effectively, and in an exemplary manner that as Defence Minister I, and New Zealanders more generally are extremely.

ENDS

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