Report On Corruption In International Cricket
Report on Corruption in
Sir Paul Condon
Anti Corruption Unit
International Cricket Council
1. This report is submitted in compliance with the terms of reference for the Anti Corruption Unit (ACU), which require me to conduct a general review of relevant matters and to submit a written report to Rt Hon Lord Griffiths of Govilon MC PC, the Chairman of the Code of Conduct Commission of the International Cricket Council (ICC) by 30 April 2001. In this report I review the work of the ACU, the history and causes of corruption in cricket and I make recommendations to minimise malpractice in the future. My unit has approached its task with humility and respect for religious and cultural differences, particularly given the trust placed in us by those who have taken us into their confidence, often at personal or professional risk.
2. With the agreement and support of the Chairman of the Code of Conduct Commission and Malcolm Gray, the President of the International Cricket Council, I have written this report in the knowledge it will be made public. There is a clear and legitimate public interest in the subject matter of this report. Confidence in world cricket will only be restored if there is open and frank analysis of past problems and a resolve to confront the challenge which continues to threaten the integrity and reputation of the game.
3. As a public document this report must not prejudge or prejudice the outcome of specific enquiries into named individuals. Therefore, it does not give full details of these investigations. The outcome of these individual investigations will be determined entirely on the merits of each case. Some of the findings and punishments in relation to players named in this report are subject to appeal and further legal proceedings.
4. This report will make disturbing reading for all those who love and follow the game of cricket. It describes at least twenty years of corruption linked to betting on international cricket matches. Corrupt practices and deliberate under-performance have permeated all aspects of the game.
5. I am confident that recent measures, including the creation and work of the ACU, have stopped much of this corrupt activity. I also believe, however, that corruption continues to happen and the potential for a resurgence of corruption in cricket remains a real threat.
6. International cricket is at a critical point of development. If the ICC continues as a loose and fragile alliance it is unlikely to succeed as a governing body. It must become a modern, regulatory body with the power to lead and direct international cricket. All the constituent cricket boards, in the member countries, must show equal determination to deal with the ongoing challenge of corruption.
7. In this report, I have set out a package of measures to enable the ICC to draw a line under past problems and move on. If implemented, with resolve, these recommendations will keep corruption to an irreducible minimum. They provide a credible deterrent to would be corruptors and a framework to help secure the detection and punishment of those who threaten the future of the game.
THE ROLE AND WORK OF THE ANTI CORRUPTION UNIT
8. On the 26 June 2000 I was appointed Director of the Anti Corruption Unit (ACU) of the International Cricket Council. This is a new post and I had to establish terms of reference, recruit staff and establish an office. By September 2000 the staff had been recruited and the unit was working from an office at 1 Queen Anne's Gate, London SW1H 9BT.
9. My Chief Investigator is a former Detective Chief Superintendent from New Scotland Yard and he is supported by two other former detectives who are now Senior Investigators with the unit. I recruited a Security Adviser, with a background in security and protection issues and a Systems Manager to establish an intelligence database and to look after the information technology of the unit. The unit has a full time secretary who is the Office Manager.
10. In this chapter of my report I describe the work of the unit during the first seven months of its existence and the next tranche of work already underway. First, however, I will describe the climate of silence, apathy, ignorance and sometimes fear we inherited, as the backdrop to our work.
A Climate of Silence, Apathy, Ignorance and Fear
11. Within days of taking up this new appointment, it became clear to me that many people within cricket had significant information about corruption within the game. However, the prevailing culture was not helpful. As a result of the interviews carried out by my unit I realised the allegations in the public domain were only the tip of the iceberg. Many people had not reported attempts to corrupt them or suspicions about other people they believed to be corrupt.
12. Various explanations were given for what amounts to a conspiracy of silence. Players did not want to be branded an informant and risk being ostracised by team mates. There was no obvious or credible person or place to report matters. There was the justified fear that 'whistleblowers' would be penalised rather than supported. Players and others feared their international careers would have come to an abrupt halt if they had voiced their anxieties about corruption.
13. Some people were apathetic and thought corruption would always be present, in some form or another, in international cricket.
14. Ignorance has also been the enemy of a more robust approach from within cricket. I have spoken to worldly wise and mature individuals whom I genuinely believe had no idea what was going on, in terms of corruption, even though it took place close to them. Players, former players, umpires and others have been shocked, angry and embarrassed as their role as innocent participants in matches, where the result was corruptly fixed, has been explained to them.
15. The most disturbing aspect of the tolerance of corruption is the fear that some people have expressed to me about their own personal safety or the safety of their families. I have spoken to people who have been threatened and others who have alleged a murder and a kidnapping linked to cricket corruption. In order to respond to these anxieties I have interviewed some people away from their normal lifestyles.
16. It is reassuring that as people have begun to understand my role and the work of the unit they have been prepared to come forward and talk. In most cases we have no reason to doubt the veracity of their allegations and have been able to cross check and validate aspects of what they are saying. In some cases we have encountered people whose motives were dubious and whose allegations were suspect and exaggerated. Sadly and perhaps inevitably, at this stage, the most serious allegations have been made in circumstances which, for the time being, cannot be converted into evidence before disciplinary or criminal hearings. Some people will talk in secure and confidential surroundings but are not prepared to give evidence in formal and public fora. Confidence in the work of my unit is growing and I believe the atmosphere is gradually changing to one of trust and a critical mass of support for cricket to be cleaned up. It will take time and the International Cricket Council will need to convince a sceptical and critical audience that things have changed for the better.
Anti Corruption Unit Investigations
17. Prior to the formation of the ACU, the ICC had received allegations about corruption from a number of sources and these were passed to my unit for assessment and the potential for investigation. Some of these allegations had been discussed at Executive Board level and others had merely been recorded by the staff of the ICC based at Lords.
18. The staleness of some of these allegations reinforced the need for the establishment of the ACU. We assessed these allegations and they provided important background information and the starting point for interviews of witnesses.
19. The ACU computer based intelligence database uses sophisticated analytical systems, comparable to those used by police services around the world. Our analysis quickly generated important strands for investigation.
20. Detailed interviews have taken place involving people from most of the member countries of the ICC. As a result we now have reasonable grounds to investigate a number of people. These allegations against players, former players, umpires and others within cricket are not yet public knowledge and will be investigated during the next phase of work of the ACU.
Support for Judicial, Criminal and Disciplinary Proceedings
21. In helping to draft the ACU terms of reference, I felt it was important to emphasise the support my unit should give to judicial, criminal and disciplinary enquiries into cricket corruption. The Anti Corruption Unit provides the vital coordination, the lack of which previously inhibited the work of these investigations. The work of the unit has added value to enquiries that could have missed important opportunities as a result of parochialism. We have established a secure computer database and liaison point and I am confident we are seen as an independent force who can assist and help coordinate these enquiries. Although the Anti Corruption Unit has a vital role to play, its members do not have the powers given to judicial inquiries and police forces. It is important we assist these bodies to make good use of their powers in dealing with cricket corruption. Whilst some of our support for these inquiries is already public knowledge, I have summarised below our involvement.
The King Commission - South Africa
22. This investigation focused on allegations made public by the New Delhi Police, that Hansie Cronjè and other South African cricketers had accepted substantial sums of money from an Indian bookmaker for under-performing or ensuring that certain matches had a pre-determined result.
23. Judge King's inquiry team included lawyers, police officers, forensic auditors and others. As a result of this inquiry the United Cricket Board of South Africa banned Hansie Cronjè from playing or other involvement in cricket for life. Two other players were suspended from international cricket for six months.
24. I met Judge King in London and members of my unit went to South Africa to liaise with his team. With Judge King's approval we interviewed Hansie Cronjè on 6 November 2000 to learn from his experience and to help formulate some of the recommendations which appear later in this report.
25. Judge King issued interim reports and will issue a final report in due course. As the King Commission draws to a close we remain in contact to ensure that any residual matters are taken forward by the Anti Corruption Unit and the United Cricket Board of South Africa.
Metropolitan Police - England
26. The Metropolitan Police Service at New Scotland Yard is investigating allegations made by the test players, Chris Lewis of England and Stephen Fleming of New Zealand, that attempts were made by a bookmaker to involve them in cricket corruption. We have been in regular contact with the police enquiry team and have assisted them in a number of material ways. The result of the investigation has been passed to the prosecuting authorities for consideration.
Central Bureau of Investigation - India
27. In the first half of 2000 the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in India undertook an investigation into match fixing and related issues. On the 2 August 2000 I held a critical meeting in London with the Head of the CBI investigation into match fixing and we established a very productive working relationship. In September and October my unit played an important liaison role for the South African, British and Indian investigations.
28. On 2 November 2000 the CBI published their report. They implicated a number of Indian cricketers, criticised the Board of Control for Cricket in India and implicated a number of non Indian players. Two members of my unit worked in India immediately after the publication of the CBI report. We were made aware that although the CBI had carried out a thorough and professional investigation into the allegations against the Indian players, it was not within their jurisdiction to follow up the allegations against the non Indian players. In my discussions with them, the CBI justified the reasons for naming and implicating the overseas players on two grounds. First, as they were in possession of the allegations they could have been vulnerable to accusations of negligence or cover up if they had not made them public. Secondly and more controversially the CBI felt that their principal witness M K Gupta, a bookmaker, had not been disproved in respect of any allegations he had made and they did not think he was lying.
29. The Anti Corruption Unit took on a coordinating role, in relation to the allegations about non Indian players in the CBI report. Australia, New Zealand, England and Sri Lanka quickly announced investigations into the allegations made against their players.
30. In the second week of December 2000, I led a delegation of Special Investigators from Australia, New Zealand and Sri Lanka to India. We held meetings with the Minister for Sport and the Law Minister, the CBI, Delhi Police, the Board of Control for Cricket in India and their Special Investigator.
31. As a result of the CBI report and the report of their Special Investigator, Mr Madhaven, the Board of Control for Cricket in India took robust action against a number of people.
32. The investigations into the allegations against the non Indian players named in the CBI report are ongoing and the Anti Corruption Unit will continue to support these investigations.
33. These allegations against the non Indian players named in the CBI report emanate principally from M K Gupta. He was seen by members of my unit in Delhi in November 2000 and again in March 2001. Negotiations continue to establish whether Gupta is prepared to give evidence in person to support the investigations underway in a number of countries. I have set out below a brief summary of the response to the CBI allegations in each of the relevant countries outside of India and the support my unit has given or is scheduled to give.
34. The CBI report named Mark Waugh and Dean Jones. The Australian Cricket Board appointed Greg Melick, a Barrister to investigate. He has worked very closely with my unit, in London, India and Australia and two members of my unit were present when he interviewed Mark Waugh in Melbourne in February 2001. Greg Melick has submitted an interim report to the Australian Cricket Board.
35. The England and Wales Cricket Board asked my unit to investigate the allegations relating to Alec Stewart. I met Alec Stewart and his legal advisor in January 2001 in London and he will be formally interviewed in the near future by my unit.
36. The New Zealand Cricket Board appointed a Commission of Inquiry headed by Sir Ian Barker, a former High Court Judge, to examine allegations against Martin Crowe. The New Zealand Barrister assisting the inquiry worked with my unit in London and India and I briefed Sir Ian in Auckland. Sir Ian has formally requested that my unit interview a key witness, the Sri Lankan player, Aravinda De Silva who allegedly introduced M K Gupta to Martin Crowe, and we will do so in early May 2001, in Sri Lanka. Martin Crowe will be interviewed in New Zealand and members of my unit will assist the process.
37. The Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka appointed Desmond Fernando, Presidents Counsel, as their Special Investigator and he worked with my unit in London and India. I had arranged to be in Sri Lanka with other members of my unit at the end of March 2001. However, at short notice we were informed that the Sri Lankan players due to be interviewed had been given more time to respond in writing to Desmond Fernando. In addition the Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka was suspended. An interim board has been appointed and I plan to be in Sri Lanka at the end of April 2001 and members of my unit will assist Desmond Fernando to interview the two Sri Lankan players, Ranatunga and De Silva who were named in the CBI report. In Sri Lanka, as we have done elsewhere, we will help formulate the interview structure and questions and will provide the vital co-ordinating role to ensure all of the international investigations have access to relevant information.
38. The Pakistan Cricket Board had already taken robust action against a number of players, as a result of the Commission of Inquiry by Mr Justice Qayyum and felt that no residual action arose from the CBI report for them.
39. However, the persistent allegations that the Pakistan v Bangladesh match in the 1999 World Cup was fixed in favour of Bangladesh for betting purposes, led to the Pakistan Cricket Board confirming that a further judicial inquiry will take place.
40. I will be in Pakistan with other members of my unit in late May 2001 and I will discuss my support for the investigations in Pakistan. I will also brief Mr Israr Ahmad, the newly appointed Special Investigator for the Pakistan Cricket Board.
The West Indies
41. Brian Lara was implicated in the CBI report and Elliott Mottley QC has recently been appointed by the West Indian Cricket Board to investigate the allegations. We will support his investigation and have begun to share information with him.
United Arab Emirates
42. As a result of allegations in the CBI report and elsewhere relating to matches in Sharjah, the United Arab Emirates Cricket Board has commissioned an inquiry. This inquiry is headed by George Staple QC, from England assisted by Clive Lloyd, the former Captain of the West Indies and Brigadier Mohammed K Al Mualla from Sharjah. I am liaising with the Sharjah inquiry and two members of my unit were in Sharjah in mid April 2001 to follow up a number of issues. They returned to Sharjah later in the month to carry out further work.
Security and Control
43. It soon became apparent to my unit that it had been very easy for corruptors to mix freely with players and others at cricket grounds, training grounds, hotels and other locations. My Security Advisor has taken every opportunity during our visits to member countries to establish the security regimes for players, umpires, officials and venues. He has noted best practice and members of the ACU have visited stadia including Lords in London, the Wanderers in Johannesburg, the Melbourne Cricket Ground, the Bellerive Oval in Hobart, the Wankhede stadium in Mumbai, the MAC stadium in Chennai, the SSC in Colombo, the Nairobi sports ground and the Sharjah cricket stadium. These reviews provide the background to my recommendations for security and control set out at page 42.
44. In establishing the unit and setting the operating protocols for the members of the unit I sought to adhere to the highest standards of integrity and professional standards. I have taken legal advice on all relevant matters and will continue to involve our legal advisors in all stages of our operations. Our computer-based database is registered with the British Data Protection Registrar. Formal interviews are audio taped and/or video recorded in certain circumstances, always with the consent of the interviewee. Written statements are taken to a standard compatible with use in criminal proceedings and cricket disciplinary proceedings.
45. The unit is sensitive to the diversity of religious, cultural and political backgrounds within the member countries of the International Cricket Council and is strengthened and encouraged by the trust and support we have won in the first few months of our operation.
46. It is important not only that we operate but we are seen to operate within the principles of natural justice. In essence, we must not allow pressures for 'convictions' and 'punishment' of alleged wrongdoers to subvert ethical standards and due process. Longer term, the foundations we are now laying will prove more enduring and effective in cleaning up the game than dramatic gestures to grab headlines.
Confidence Building Measures
47. In the first few weeks of the unit we encountered cynicism and suspicion about our role and purpose. History was against us in the sense that the International Cricket Council was perceived as having been dragged reluctantly into public discussion of corruption and action to prevent further malpractice. In each of the member countries I have visited I have held one or more press briefings, I have also had the opportunity to brief senior members of Government in India and Australia and hope to do the same in Sri Lanka and Pakistan in the next two months. The cynicism expressed by players and former players will take time to assuage. They have expressed support for my role and the work of my unit but are still reluctant to accept the International Cricket Council can take decisive and coordinated action to deal with corruption. Also the fact that the ICC funds my unit is used by some to challenge the independence of our endeavours. I have sought to reassure doubters by pointing out that on all our operational matters and investigations I report to the Chairman of the Code of Conduct Commission and not to the ICC President or Executive Board. Malcolm Gray, the President of the ICC strongly supported this independent reporting line. Actions will speak louder than words and if my unit is seen to operate without fear or favour we will reassure those who doubt us. I am encouraged by the information and support we are now receiving.
Self Declaration Forms
48. Prior to my appointment and the formation of the Anti Corruption Unit, the International Cricket Council decided to place international players and others under an obligation to complete a confidential form setting out a series of questions about knowledge and involvement in corrupt practices.
49. The decision to introduce this process was taken at an ICC Executive Board meeting in May 2000, prompted by the Hansie Cronjè allegations in South Africa. A first draft was considered by the Board in June 2000 and the final version was approved in October 2000. All the test playing nations, plus Kenya and Scotland (both countries are represented at Executive Board Meetings and were therefore included) were instructed to prepare the forms and return them by November 2000. A sample form for completion by a player is included at appendix A.
50. The motivation which led to this process was sound but it rapidly became overtaken by events such as the operations of the Anti Corruption Unit.
51. Individual cricket boards were requested to print the declaration forms on their own letterheads and to give a copy to relevant people for completion. Relevant people were designated as follows:
1. Players, including former international
players still playing first class cricket
2. Team Officials
52. Each country was asked to produce a list of relevant persons and to send the list to the Anti Corruption Unit ahead of the completed declaration forms. Each completed form was to be sealed in an envelope by the person completing it and forwarded to the board in question. The National Board would then send all the sealed envelopes unopened to the Anti Corruption Unit, via a secure courier.
53. These instructions were designed to give people the opportunity and requirement to be frank and open, whilst maintaining a reasonable degree of confidentiality.
54. This was the first time the ICC had completed such an exercise and not surprisingly the logistics involved were complex and the timescales for return of the forms unrealistic. Players and umpires were distributed throughout the world and each of the boards interpreted the instructions differently. The idea was well motivated but the implementation and response poor. The responses to date have varied from full compliance with every aspect of the instructions through to non compliance. As of 31 March 2001 two countries had completed the exercise completely satisfactorily and negotiations continue with the others to ensure full compliance.
55. Some 911 completed declarations have been received by the Anti Corruption Unit and of these 21 indicated a yes or positive answer about involvement or knowledge of corruption. 10 of these positive responses were already known to the unit as a result of previous contact, reports and investigations. The remaining 11 positive responses were scrutinized and 6 do not require follow up action. The remaining 5 positive responses are being investigated.
56. The declaration process was well motivated and to some extent it served a purpose in that it raised awareness. However, it was intrinsically flawed because corrupt people were unlikely to respond honestly. Also from the work of my unit, I know that players and others, with justification, were cynical about the confidentiality of completed forms prior to their arrival at the Anti Corruption Unit.
57. In my recommendations I conclude that the self declaration process was not worth the logistical effort and outcome and there are better ways to test and ensure compliance with ethical standards in cricket.
Liaison with Organisations Outside Cricket
58. Corruption is not confined to cricket and I felt it was important to understand the challenge to and response from other sporting organisations. As a result my unit has established links with a number of organisations.
The United Kingdom Jockey Club has, in recent times, faced challenges to the integrity of horse racing and we have established strong working links with those tasked with security in all its aspects.
Corruption in cricket is motivated predominantly by the desire to win money through betting and the Anti Corruption Unit needs to understand all aspects of the betting industry. Even though most betting on fixed matches, or occurrences within matches, takes place in the unlawful betting environment, it was also important for my unit to liaise with lawful industries. We have been briefed on line betting, fixed odds betting, spread betting and the growth of internet betting. We will continue to work closely with relevant organisations to identify risks and threats to cricket and to them.
In the United Kingdom the Gambling Review Body is carrying out a major review and I gave evidence to them on behalf of the International Cricket Council.
In the United States of America, baseball, basketball, american football and ice hockey responded to a history and threat of corruption by forming extensive and well resourced security operations. They also collaborate on joint training and educational programmes. Members of my unit visited these organisations and researched their operating methods. We continue to share best practice with these sporting bodies.
The Next Steps for the Anti Corruption Unit
59. The work to date of the unit can be summarised as follows:
1. We have scoped the size of the problem faced by world cricket and analysed the causes.
2. We have assisted investigators around the world to carry out their criminal, judicial and cricket discipline investigations. The investigation emanating from the CBI report dominated this aspect of our work.
3. We have reasonable grounds for new investigations against a number of individuals. These allegations are not yet in the public domain.
4. We have established productive liaison points in all the member countries and generated trust in our ability to respect the diversity of religious, cultural and political backgrounds.
5. We have put forward an integrated package of recommendations for reform to the ICC in this report.
60. We will build on these foundations. The World Cup in South Africa in 2003 is a significant date for cricket and it is my ambition and intention that corruption in cricket will be under control and reduced to an absolute minimum before then. To fulfil this ambition the programme of work for my unit over the next 12 months will include:
1. Supporting the enquiries arising from the CBI report to a conclusion. The availability of M K Gupta and his willingness to cooperate will be critical to these investigations.
2. Supporting the CBI in two further investigations
a) The links between organised crime and
cricket match fixing.
b) Allegations of criminal offences linked to the contract for the television rights and associated matters for the ICC knockout competition in Bangladesh in 1998.
3. Supporting the Judicial Inquiry in Pakistan into allegations about the 1999 World Cup, in particular the match between Pakistan and Bangladesh.
4. Supporting the new Chief Executive and the individual cricket boards to implement the recommendations contained in this report, if approved.
5. Carrying out a series of new investigations into allegations of corruption we have uncovered in recent months, as a result of detailed interviews with players, former players, umpires, referees, groundsmen, administrators and the media. These new investigations are not in the public domain and relate to players, former international players, umpires and other people linked to cricket.
6. If my recommendations are implemented, the ACU will have the ability to prevent corruption by monitoring and frustrating the attempts by corruptors in real time and not just responding to past events. We will be in a stronger position to catch people in the act of corruption and this will lead to criminal and disciplinary proceedings.
ANALYSIS OF CORRUPTION IN CRICKET
61. Corruption in any aspect of life is caused by human weakness, greed and opportunity. In this section of the report I set out my analysis of when and how corruption developed in cricket. I describe the extent and causes of the problem and finally my concern that, although progress has been made, corruption still occurs.
62. At appendix B, I summarise some of the key formal inquiries into match fixing. They provide a valuable understanding of some of the chronology of corruption in cricket but none was able to provide an overview of the problem because of the understandable restrictions of the terms of reference to specific events, individuals or countries.
63. My unit is not similarly restricted and although we are relatively new we have been able to piece together a reasonably comprehensive picture of corruption in cricket. The picture that emerges is a depressing one for all genuine cricket supporters. However, this analysis also provides the opportunity to put in place a comprehensive package of reforms to meet the challenge.
The Seeds of Corruption
64. It has been suggested to me that the seeds of corruption in cricket were sown in the 1970s when county and club games in domestic tournaments, in England and other countries were allegedly fixed by teams to secure points and league positions. Players were not bribed with money but relied on mutual interest. If a match was of vital importance to one team and not to the other then an accommodation would be reached between the teams as to who would win. Similar arrangements would be made to secure bowling and batting points, if applicable. The movement of players around the world gave players from a number of countries experience of these 'friendly' fixed matches. As a result, in a number of matches the ethic of winning or losing on merit was replaced by a pragmatic arrangement to divide the points and/or agree in advance who would win.
65. There is some evidence to suggest these 'friendly' fixes took place but it is harder to prove they were the genesis of corruption for financial reasons linked to betting. My unit has received reports of episodic instances of match fixing in the early 1970's for betting purposes but so far these allegations are unsubstantiated.
The Emergence of Match Fixing and other Cricket Corruption for Betting Purposes
66. From the late 1970s onwards a more insidious and corrosive form of fixing took hold in the game. This involved a player or players under-performing so that the result of a match or occurrences and events within a match were determined and fixed in advance. This allowed bets to be placed with a certainty or high probability of winning. If a team won or lost a match in a dramatic reversal of form and expectation, as a result of corrupt under- performance, then the winnings from betting on such a fixed event were greatly enhanced. It was also possible for a player or players to under-perform at pre-determined points in a match for betting purposes and yet still go on to win the match.
67. Betting on cricket grew in volume dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of the interaction of a number of issues.
68. In my discussions with colleagues in the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in India and with Indian Ministers they acknowledged the growth of unlawful betting on cricket in India and see resumption of international matches against Pakistan in 1978 as being a key stimulant for raising interest in betting on cricket.
69. Live television coverage of matches and the growth in the number of One Day Internationals (ODI's) created an environment in which it was possible to watch and bet on cricket almost every day of the year. The chart below gives an idea of the growth of One Day Internationals. Betting on cricket grew even more with the widespread availability of mobile phones.
70. Most of the betting was and remains outside the lawful and regulated betting industry. It is of course unlawful to bet in many countries and will remain so for religious and cultural reasons. The lawful betting industry around the world, whilst vulnerable to the bet on a fixed match, has a much stronger chance to monitor and detect these betting 'scams'. The lawful betting industry is regulated and often subject to money laundering regulations. This industry is also better placed through record keeping and analysis to detect individuals and events linked to cricket corruption.
71. It is the nature of unlawful betting that it is fragmented, secretive and long- term record keeping is anathema to those who are involved. Betting on corrupted matches flourished in this environment and the huge volume of betting hid the smaller number of bets on fixed events.
The Many Aspects of Corruption in Cricket
72. In some respects 'match fixing' is a misnomer to describe corruption in cricket. The inquiries summarised at appendix B have placed some aspects of cricket corruption in the public domain but the full range of cricket corruption transcends the limited revelations of those investigations.
73. As far as corruption on the part of players is concerned, the uninformed observer might assume this is straight-forward and involves players under- performing so that the opposing team wins and a betting coup takes place and the corrupt players are paid for their involvement. Whilst indeed this is 'match fixing' in its most serious and lucrative form, corruption in cricket has many manifestations because every single aspect of a match can be and is bet upon. As a result every aspect of a match is vulnerable to manipulation and fixing, normally through under-performance. Often these fixed and corrupt incidents within a match have little or no effect on the final outcome of the game and consequently are harder to detect. Nevertheless, the betting coup takes place and the corrupt participants receive payment for the part they have played. For ease of reference I tend to call this phenomenon 'occurrence fixing'.
74. My unit has received allegations from a number of different sources of the following being pre arranged or fixed in order to allow a betting coup to take place.
The outcome of the toss at
the beginning of a match
The end from which the fielding captain will elect to bowl
A set number of wides, or no balls occurring in a designated over
Players being placed in unfamiliar fielding positions
Individual batsmen scoring fewer runs than their opposite numbers who batted first
Batsmen being out at a specific point in their innings
The total runs at which a batting captain will declare
The timing of a declaration
The total runs scored in a particular innings and particularly the total in the first innings of a One Day International
75. Several umpires interviewed by my unit have received approaches in dubious circumstances. With the benefit of hindsight, some umpires have realised that what they thought at the time to be an innocuous approach was actually the start of an attempt to corrupt them. Whilst allegations in respect of umpires focus largely on their favouring one team over another in their decisions, other aspects of their behaviour are sought to be fixed for betting purposes. Bizarre though it may seem, it is not uncommon for bets to be placed on the end at which a particular umpire will stand at the start of play. In a way betting on 'either/or' situations in cricket is equivalent to a red or black, odds or evens bet at roulette.
76. Allegations of groundsmen preparing pitches to suit home teams have been made for many years. Indeed players and others regard this as a legitimate hazard when touring. More contentious, however, is the practice of groundsmen, on payment from bookmakers, preparing pitches that will ensure a result. This is alleged to have happened after a succession of draws in a test series. Equally serious are the allegations that groundsmen have been bribed to interfere with a pitch overnight to assist a team for betting purposes.
77. Whilst corruption at the playing level is now well documented, equally serious allegations are emerging about individuals involved past and present in the administration of cricket. It is too early to form judgments about these allegations and the picture is confused by internecine struggles within individual countries for control of cricket. Also personal rivalries have undoubtedly led to smear campaigns. Nevertheless, the sums of money now coming into cricket centrally through the International Cricket Council and those generated by individual boards are large by any standards. The current corporate governance arrangements within cricket are inadequate for the task. Investigations will continue into alleged corruption in television rights contracts and related issues.
78. My unit has received a number of allegations from different sources and locations in the world about the unlawful use of performance enhancing drugs or recreational use of unlawful drugs by players past and present. We have also received allegations about baggage and equipment on tours being used to facilitate the movement of unlawful drugs. Most of these allegations have been dismissed or they cannot be substantiated. This leaves a small number of allegations from people who have been shown to be knowledgeable and reliable in respect of other aspects of malpractice in cricket. This should provide a further wake up call to the ICC to ensure it monitors the potential for drug abuse in cricket.
Why Has Corruption Developed in Cricket?
79. I have taken every opportunity to allow people involved in cricket to explain to me why they think corruption established such a strong foothold. Whilst the explanations and excuses have varied in emphasis they embrace some or all of the following:
International cricketers are paid less than top soccer players, golfers, tennis players or formula one drivers and are therefore more vulnerable to corrupt approaches.
During the last World Cup and other major events the cricketers received a low single figure percentage of the proceeds from the event and resent the distribution of profits elsewhere.
Cricketers have little say or stake in the running of the sport and limited recognition of their representative bodies, where they exist.
Cricketers have relatively short and uncertain playing careers, often without contracts and some seek to supplement their official earnings with money from corrupt practices.
Some administrators either turn a blind eye or are themselves involved in malpractice.
Cricketers play a high number of One Day Internationals and nothing is really at stake in terms of national pride or selection in some of these matches.
Cricketers can take money from potential corruptors in return for innocuous information and yet refuse to fix matches.
Whistleblowing and informing on malpractice was ignored or penalised rather than encouraged.
There was no structure in place to receive allegations about corruption.
Cricketers were coerced into malpractice because of threats to them and their families.
It was just too easy.
80. None of these explanations and excuses, even if true, can ever begin to justify the betrayal of the game of cricket or the damage caused by the impact of corruption. However, these explanations need to be tested and examined to provide a more effective regime of prevention and detection of malpractice in the future.
81. Variations in pay and conditions may have played a part in tempting players and others into corruption. But relatively well paid players have been drawn into corruption and relatively poor ones have resisted. Greed and opportunity are the main factors which are common in all the cases of corruption.
82. The classic seduction of a player into corrupt behaviour followed a familiar route. The target for corruption was introduced to the corruptor by an innocent or conspiratorial third party. The corruptor sought a betting advantage through contact with the targeted player or umpire. The spectrum of outcomes from these relationships ranged from information about players, pitches, team selection and morale through to the securing of under- performance and the fixing of match results.
83. The corrupt approach was often subtle, ambiguous and patient. The relationship would sometimes start innocently with admiration of players being used as the reason for invitations to mix socially. Corruptors have masqueraded as journalists or other professionals to gain access to players. Gifts without obligation would follow and eventually the true motivation for the relationship would emerge. The corrupt approaches would be made and either embraced or rejected.
84. The environment in which these corrupt relationships developed is also worthy of analysis as common sense measures to prevent further malpractice flow from this exercise.
85. I have already described the prevailing climate of silence, apathy, ignorance and fear and this culture was not conducive to dealing with the problem. Players did not want to inform on each other and there was no system to receive or process reports of improper approaches or behaviour. This environment was aggravated in many cases by an absence of security or control.
86. Until recently, security in the broadest sense was not on the agenda. Consequently, access to players for corrupt purposes at hotels, training grounds, stadia and even team dressing rooms was effortless. The unrestricted mixing of teams, supporters, journalists and others at many of these venues, whilst understandable, provided an ideal opportunity for corrupt approaches and meetings.
87. This relaxed regime was particularly relevant at neutral venues where none of the participating teams was on home territory or under the intense scrutiny of home fans. Corrupt practices took place under the cover of the carnival atmosphere of some of these events.
88. The nature of the match or tournament has been an important determinant of the willingness or reluctance of people to be corrupted for betting purposes. If national pride was not really at stake then players were more susceptible to corrupt approaches.
89. At some of these tournaments the payment regime to players and others has been vague and the total remuneration for a player could involve cash in an envelope from the organisers, gifts and payments from fans and from bookmakers and gamblers. The corruptors have exploited this relaxed regime and players and umpires through ignorance or avarice have received gifts and money which may have led to corruption.
90. The spectre of a more sinister regime of fear and coercion has been raised to explain some aspects of cricket corruption. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) in India, has an investigation underway into the links between organised crime and cricket. My unit has met people who have made allegations about threats to their life as a result of exposing cricket corruption and I have met a number of people who were, in my opinion, genuinely frightened of the consequences if it became known they were cooperating with the Anti Corruption Unit.
91. It is too early to make definitive statements about the involvement of criminals or organised crime but it is alleged from a number of separate sources that a major criminal had access to an individual team and wielded undue influence over team selection and performance. It is also alleged that a murder in South Africa was a contract killing as a result of a dispute between rival corruptors from other countries. The proceeds of corruption in cricket are sufficiently large to attract the attention of organised crime and corruption provides an opportunity for easy profit and simple money laundering.
Particularly Vulnerable Matches
92. The allegations made to the Anti Corruption Unit suggest that the corruptors are more likely to target some matches rather than others and although I have described these separately elsewhere in the report I will draw them together again to emphasise the ongoing vulnerability of certain matches:
Where little is at stake, other than pride. Typically the last match in a series which has already been won convincingly by a team and substantial odds are being offered against them being beaten by the weaker side
One Day Internationals in tournaments where one of the sides playing has either already qualified for the next stage of the tournament or already been eliminated. Hansie Cronjè called these matches 'soft matches' and others have called them by the bridge term 'dead rubber' matches. Again betting against form provides attractive odds and if the match is fixed guarantees a handsome return for the corruptors.
One Day International tournaments on neutral territory. We have received reports of some players treating these events with indifference and the opportunity to maximise the receipt of gifts or indulge in under- performance for betting purposes.
93. An important question in assessing the extent of corruption in international cricket is whether it mirrors malpractice in the domestic leagues and tournaments within the individual countries. My primary focus and my terms of reference relate to international cricket but I have sought to understand the potential risk to domestic cricket. A case can be made that if international players are prepared to sacrifice national pride and reputation by under- performing for corrupt reasons, at international level, they will be even more likely to carry out similar activities at club level. However, the most important factor would appear to be whether there is a betting market to place bets on fixed matches and occurrences within matches. From the work undertaken by my unit there is overwhelming evidence of a significant unlawful market place for betting on all international matches, wherever they are played in the world. The evidence in relation to an unlawful betting market place for club, county, state or other matches is patchy, anecdotal and not compelling. There is no room for complacency but international cricket remains the main arena for cricket corruption.
The Scale of the Problem and the Countries Involved
94. At appendix B, I have summarised the inquiries and investigations into cricket corruption and elsewhere in the report I have suggested that these episodic inquiries have only revealed the tip of the iceberg. At appendix C, I have set out matches mentioned in some of these official inquiries.
95. The scale of the problem has justifiably undermined confidence in the integrity of the game and challenged the legitimacy and ability of those who run the game nationally and internationally. Because of the often secretive nature of the corrupt arrangement we will never know the full extent of corruption in cricket. However, we do now have a much clearer idea of how, when and where much of it took place and this gives me the confidence to make a series of recommendations for reform.
96. The challenge to combat cricket corruption is a world wide challenge. The Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) and the Indian Government have courageously acknowledged the role which the unlawful betting industry in India has played. In many ways the Indian betting industry has been the engine room which has powered and driven cricket corruption. The work of my unit has shown that it would be wrong to leave the analysis at this statement for we are or will be carrying out investigations which embrace most of the full member countries of the International Cricket Council. The blame for the spread of cricket corruption is a shared responsibility and must not be unfairly laid upon the Indian sub-continent.
Corruption is Still Taking Place
97. Despite the publicity given to the ban on Hansie Cronjè, the sentences handed out to players from Pakistan and India and the formation of the Anti Corruption Unit, there are indications that some players and others are still acting dishonestly and to the orders of bookmakers. Allegations have been made to my unit in relation to matches played in the ICC knockout tournament in Nairobi in October 2000 and more recently in relation to the New Zealand v Pakistan series in 2001. These allegations are being reviewed and full investigations will take place, if justified.
98. I believe the blatant cases and excesses of cricket corruption have been stopped. I know from the work of the ACU that most of the preliminary approaches to players, umpires, groundsmen and others, to sound out their willingness to be drawn into corruption, have stopped. What is left is a small core of players and others who continue to manipulate the results of matches or occurrences within matches for betting purposes. They may be doing so out of greed, arrogance or because they are not being allowed to cease. Some may fear their previous corruption will be exposed if they try to stop and some may fear threats of violence if they stop. It will take some time before those who have developed a corrupt lifestyle within cricket have sufficient fear of exposure and punishment to stop.
The Role of the International Cricket Council and the National Cricket Boards
99. I have set out above some of the factors which help to explain why corruption developed in cricket. To conclude this section I will comment on the role of the International Cricket Council and the National Cricket Boards.
100. With the benefit of knowledge now in the public domain, a compelling case is made that the ICC and the individual cricket boards could and should have done more to deal with the problem of corruption at an earlier stage. It is important to understand why those who have run cricket nationally and internationally failed to get to grips with the problem.
101. Until the most recent contracts linked to the TV rights for the ICC tournaments, including the 2003 and 2007 World Cups, the ICC did not have the financial security or the collective will from the constituent boards to provide an adequate infrastructure of administration and control. Consequently, the ICC has not had and still does not have the staff or systems in place to enable the proper governance, leadership or supervision of world cricket.
102. For almost half of its history the ICC was a loose and fragile alliance with a small central administration based at Lords, in London with limited budgets and limited powers. Naivety and no clear mandate to deal with corruption exacerbated the problem. Also the ICC staff at Lords missed opportunities to encourage more robust action to deal with the challenge. Although the Executive Board of the ICC has proposals for developing the ICC administration it does not yet provide an infrastructure to meet the financial and governance requirements of the modern game.
103. The current President of the ICC has encouraged change and given strong support to the Anti Corruption Unit which has been fully operational since September 2000. It is disappointing but not surprising that until very recently the ICC, at the centre, was in very poor shape to respond to the disparate strands of corruption as they emerged around the world.
104. The individual cricket boards and member countries of the ICC responded to the emerging problem of corruption with a patchwork of criminal, judicial, disciplinary and informal measures. The history of these investigations is set out at appendix B. No single inquiry had the jurisdiction to investigate beyond its own country, players and officials. Nevertheless, a disturbing picture gradually emerged of the extent of corruption and opportunities were missed to share information and concerns.
105. Firm action has been taken in some cases. However, the resolute action by some has been diluted by others who have procrastinated and missed opportunities to deal with the problem. National pride and embarrassment have certainly hindered a more collaborative and coordinated approach to dealing with the problem. In some cases the perception is given that allegedly corrupt players have been tolerated because of their importance to national sides. This ambivalence to facing up to the challenge of corruption remains a real threat to the integrity of the effort to clean up the game.
106. Earlier in this report, I described the history of corruption in cricket and the reasons why it has flourished. I also reported that I believe occurrence and match fixing are still taking place. In this section of the report I set out a number of interlinked recommendations which, if implemented, will give the ICC and the national cricket boards a much stronger ability to deal with the challenge which still has the potential to undermine confidence in world cricket. In putting forward these recommendations I have drawn on the work of the ACU and on the findings and recommendations of the inquiries set out in appendix B.
Education and Awareness
107. Ignorance of the risk and actuality of corruption in cricket have enabled malpractice to spread and flourish. I have spoken to mature and worldly wise players, umpires and administrators who were genuinely unaware of the corrupt practices until the revelations in recent years. There is a compelling case and acceptance for a programme of education and awareness training.
108. The ICC should develop and implement a comprehensive training and awareness programme designed to raise awareness of the risks of corruption in cricket and the methods used to entice players and others into malpractice. It should also emphasise the resolve of the ICC to deal with the problem and to punish wrongdoers.
RECOMMENDATION NO 2
109. An education programme will only be effective if it is professional, embraces all member countries and is ongoing. Whilst respecting national, cultural and religious differences, the ICC should produce training material that can be utilised in all the member countries with a consistent and enduring series of messages.
RECOMMENDATION NO 3
110. Best practice in major sports in the United States of America has shown the value of a professionally made video being at the core of a training programme to deter corruption. American football, basketball, baseball and the ice hockey authorities use a video commissioned by them. The ICC should commission a professionally made video for use in cricket. Such a video would be strengthened by the inclusion of disgraced cricketers relaying their experiences to deter others.
RECOMMENDATION NO 4
111. As well as raising awareness of the problem, the programme should encourage the reporting of improper approaches and engender confidence that the ICC does want to confront the problem. The video should be reinforced and supported by posters and other literature.
RECOMMENDATION NO 5
112. The training and awareness programme should target all international players, umpires and other relevant people in cricket. It should include all representative national teams from the youngest age group upwards. Beyond that consideration should be given to making sensible links with cricket academies and the domestic game within the individual countries.
Security and Control
113. Corruptors have gained access to players and others with consummate ease. The absence of even the most basic regime of accreditation on tours has allowed undesirable people to mix freely with players and has provided the breeding ground for improper approaches and corruption. A balance must be struck between the needs for privacy, a social life and the ambassadorial role of players on the one hand and on the other the need to create a viable regime of security and control. Consultation should take place and notice taken of the good practice which is being developed in some countries. I have set out below a package of measures designed to incorporate best practice and promote a sensible regime of security and control.
114. Each full member country of the ICC should appoint a full time Security Manager. They should be recruited locally and employed by the National Boards but work to a broadly similar job description. If necessary, they should be funded centrally by the ICC. Their job description will include:
Providing advice and action in relation to the security of players, officials and venues
Preventing and detecting improper approaches to players on tour
Collating intelligence about improper approaches and liaising with the Anti Corruption Unit.
115. The Security Managers could be drawn from a variety
of backgrounds including police, military, security and
RECOMMENDATION NO 7
116. After consultation within cricket, a sensible regime which controls access to players on tour should become part of best practice. This should be formalised through accreditation systems. The mischief which must be stopped is the unrestricted access of potential corruptors to dressing rooms, hotels, training grounds and other venues in person or by telephone. If these practices are allowed to continue the efforts to control malpractice will deserve to be ridiculed.
117. Similarly, after a brief period of consultation, a sensible regime should be introduced to manage and restrict the use of mobile telephones during international matches by players and others with insider information to avoid the perception or reality of improper release of information for betting purposes.
RECOMMENDATION NO 9
118. If commercial imperatives continue to take international matches to neutral venues such as Sharjah, Canada, Singapore or elsewhere the ICC must recognize that the relaxed carnival atmosphere and the blurred regimes for payments and gifts provide an ideal venue for improper approaches. Extra vigilance and security will be necessary if these neutral venues continue to be used or expanded.
Player Conditions, Involvement and Obligations
119. Significant variations in player conditions, remuneration, representation and contractual obligations, whilst understandable, may have contributed to temptation and malpractice. It is argued that jealousy, insecurity and a potentially short international career have all added to the temptation to be drawn into corruption. The cultural and commercial differences within the member countries mitigate against a comprehensive single response to this challenge. Nevertheless, a number of improvements can and should be made.
RECOMMENDATION NO 10
120. The players are not sufficiently involved in the administration of the game and ownership of the problems. There is limited recognition of players representative bodies nationally and internationally. Even after taking account of recent developments such as the captains' meeting in Melbourne and the representation made by the embryo organisation representing players internationally, there is considerable scope for drawing players into a more productive relationship with the ICC. Consideration should be given to enhancing the role of the players and their representative bodies.
RECOMMENDATION NO 11
121. There should be a more consistent approach to players contracts. Ideally there would be a single common form of contract with common features including an obligation to comply with the latest Code of Conduct of the ICC which was published in November 2000. In the meantime the cricket boards who do not have a contractual relationship with their players should give written notice to the ICC that their players are aware of and bound by the Code of Conduct published in November 2000.
RECOMMENDATION NO 12
122. The first round of self declaration forms, which gave the players and others the opportunity to retrospectively report improper approaches and behaviour, was well motivated but not worth the logistical effort and outcome. The players obligations should be reflected in their contracts, briefings and the work of the new Security Managers. The self declaration process should not be repeated.
123. The current situation with part time umpires, paid different rates of remuneration, is recognised by the ICC as untenable longer term. The ICC also has proposals for a Manager of umpires.
RECOMMENDATION NO 13
124. The ICC has already announced plans for an elite panel of full time professional umpires, a Manager of umpires and proposals to develop other umpires to new levels of expertise and professionalism. These proposals should be implemented as soon as possible.
Prevention and Investigation of Corruption
125. The Anti Corruption Unit has been operational for seven months and its work has confirmed the long history of corrupt practices within cricket. These corrupt practices are now deeply ingrained in the operating culture of cricket and in some cases may be linked to major criminals. It will take a significant and long term effort to keep malpractice under control and to reduce it to a minimal level. The Anti Corruption Unit, with its current terms of reference, has made an important contribution in scoping the scale of the problem, establishing a database and supporting criminal investigations, judicial investigations and special investigations. However, it requires further change to build on these foundations. The ICC should also review its policies on drug abuse within cricket.
126. The ICC must accept that anti corruption and security measures are a necessary and long term requirement to be funded by the ICC.
RECOMMENDATION NO 15
127. The Anti Corruption Unit should be called the Anti Corruption and Security Unit or just the Security Unit. This will reflect its support for the new Security Manager posts. It will also utilise the considerable experience within the unit in relation to security issues generally. This will enable the unit to build on the vital anti corruption work which will remain at the core of its activities.
RECOMMENDATION NO 16
128. The ICC should review its awareness and policies in relation to unlawful use by players of performance enhancing drugs or other unlawful use of drugs and issue guidelines and advice.
129. It was important to have a high profile Director to inaugurate the work of the unit and I reaffirm my commitment to this task until the completion of the 2003 World Cup. However, the key issue for the ICC is that the work of this unit should be at the core of an integrated process to combat malpractice. The Anti Corruption and Security Unit should remain a small unit located in the same country as the new Chief Executive of the ICC and with much stronger links to the new Chief Executive on matters of strategy, budgets and personnel. Strong links should also be established with the new Security Managers (see recommendation no 6). Longer term the integrity of cricket will be best served by processes enshrined in the running and administration of the game. Less reliance should be placed on a succession of outsiders brought in to deal with the problem as if it is an ephemeral issue. As in comparative business organisations, the Chief Executive and the Executive Board of the ICC should be held accountable for their performance in combating malpractice.
RECOMMENDATION NO 18
130. Even though security and prevention of corruption should be an important concern for the Chief Executive and Executive Board, the operational independence of the Anti Corruption and Security Unit should be preserved by it continuing to report to the Chairman of the Code of Conduct Commission of the ICC on specific investigations.
RECOMMENDATION NO 19
131. The terms of reference of the unit should be reviewed and redrafted to take account of the recommendations in this report and to enable the unit to take on a more proactive role to prevent and detect corruption.
The Future of the ICC
132. Large sums of money are now generated by the commercial activities of the individual boards and the ICC centrally. As a result, a strong case is made for a more coordinated and regulatory approach by the ICC. There is also a need to develop the corporate governance of the ICC to match the significant sums of money now available to develop world cricket. The ICC will be in a stronger position if it continues to evolve from its origins as a loose and fragile alliance into a modern regulatory body whose role is clarified and whose transactions are more transparent and accountable. The recommendations I have set out below will enhance the reputation of the ICC and strengthen its moral and actual authority to deal with corruption in world cricket.
RECOMMENDATION NO 20
133. The understandable and legitimate aspiration to minimise tax obligations and the need to preserve commercial confidentiality in business transactions should not be allowed to reach the point where the ICC can be portrayed as a secretive and opaque organisation. The ICC must become more open, transparent and accountable. Consideration should be given to the publication of an annual report by the President and Chief Executive. It should review the past year and signpost future activity. Without breaching commercial confidentiality it should detail how the ICC is using its considerable financial resources to develop world cricket.
RECOMMENDATION NO 21
134. The large sums of money generated by the TV rights contracts and the distribution of this money require commensurate auditing processes. To avoid the perception or reality of misappropriation the ICC should develop an internal audit function which matches the new scale and risk of the commercial operations of the ICC.
RECOMMENDATION NO 22
135. The ICC has tried to address 'conflict of interest' issues for those who serve on the Executive Board of the ICC. The matter has not been resolved satisfactorily and needs to be revisited. It is very much in the interest of world cricket to attract experienced businessmen to serve on the Executive Board. However, the ICC must face up to the role ambiguity of having people with business interests linked to television serving on committees who award contracts for the TV rights. It must also face up to the perceptions involved in combining senior positions in cricket administration with personal business interests in betting and gaming. The ICC should review its policies and issue clear guidelines on 'conflict of interest' issues.
RECOMMENDATION NO 23
136. The ICC has an Ambassador programme designed to help develop cricket in countries where the game is not a major sport. The ICC should review the list of cricket ambassadors and remove from the list any names which no longer seem compatible with the fight against corruption.
Implementation of Recommendations
137. The ICC is at a critical point of evolution. I encourage it to build on recent developments and implement the programme of change set out in the recommendations in this report.
138. The new Chief Executive should be given the authority and responsibility to lead an implementation programme designed to put all of the approved recommendations into full effect before the World Cup in South Africa in the early part of 2003.
SIR PAUL CONDON
INDEX OF APPENDICES
Appendix A -
Copy of Self Declaration Form 56
Appendix B - History of Investigations and Inquiries 58
Appendix C - Matches Mentioned in Official Inquiries 77
TO BE WRITTEN ON THE HEADED NOTEPAPER OF THE BOARD OF EACH MEMBER COUNTRY
Form of Declaration
This form applies to every international player, to whom the ICC Code of Conduct applies, involved in the playing of the game of cricket and is to be treated as a supplement to any contract with your Board.
This form requires you to declare in the interest of protecting the good name of cricket, whether you have been approached to be involved in cricket corruption in any form.
1. Have you
taken part in, or been approached to take part in, any
arrangement with any other person involved in the playing or
administration of the game of cricket which might involve
corruption in any form?
2. Have you for
personal reward or for some other person's benefit agreed,
or been approached, in advance of or during a match to act
in deliberate breach of the Laws of Cricket, the ICC
Standard Playing Conditions, the ICC Code of Conduct or
contrary to the spirit of the game of cricket
3. Have you for personal reward or for some other
person's benefit agreed, or been approached, to give
information concerning the weather, the ground, Team
selection, the toss or the outcome of any match or any event
in the course of a match other than to a newspaper or
broadcaster and disclosed in advance to your Board?
4. Have you ever for personal reward or for some other person's benefit, deliberately played, or agreed to play or been approached to play, below your normal standard, or encouraged any other person to play below his normal standard, in order to contrive an event during the course of a match? YES/NO
5. Have you for personal reward
or for some other person's benefit been involved, or
approached, in any attempt to pervert the normal outcome of
Where an answer of yes is given full details should be provided to Head of the Anti-Corruption Unit of ICC.
I hereby declare that I will not be involved in the future in any of the conduct described above and I will immediately inform the Chief Executive of my Board either directly or though the Team Manager and/or the Head of the Anti-Corruption Unit of ICC if I receive any approach to be involved in any such conduct.
NOTE - IF YOU KNOWINGLY ANSWER ANY OF THESE QUESTIONS INCORRECTLY OR IF YOU FAIL TO TELL THE HEAD OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION UNIT OF ICC OF ANY CHANGE TO YOUR ANSWERS, YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO BE DISCIPLINED BY YOUR BOARD AND HEAVY PENALTIES MAY APPLY
I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THE ANSWERS I HAVE GIVEN TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS ARE TRUE AND NOT MISLEADING
Name of player: (in CAPITALS)
HISTORY OF INVESTIGATIONS AND INQUIRIES
In this Appendix to the report I have summarised the chronology and outcome of investigations into match fixing and related issues.
England 1994 - Don Topley
Between 23rd and 26th August 1991 a match between Essex and Lancashire resulted in a victory for Essex who subsequently won the County Championship. On 25th August 1991 the match was interrupted when the same teams met in the Sunday league contest, which resulted in Lancashire winning and advancing within the competition.
In 1994 Don Topley, who played for Essex in both the above matches, alleged in a British newspaper that the outcome of both matches had been pre-determined by the teams to ensure that both benefited from the outcome. An Inquiry at the time by Lancashire, Essex and the Test and County Cricket Board resulted in no action being taken against any person or team.
In 2000 the England and Wales Cricket Board (ECB) passed the Topley papers to the Greater Manchester Police. They concluded that no police action was warranted. Subsequently the ECB announced that there was insufficient evidence against any individual falling under the Boards jurisdiction to bring a case before a discipline panel.
Sri Lanka 1994 – Board of Control for Cricket in
Early in 1994, following a tour in India, the Board of Control for Cricket in Sri Lanka ordered an Inquiry into the national team's poor performance. The tour had resulted in all three Tests being lost by an innings. The report concluded, "There is evidence that a bookmaker of Indian origin has attempted to make his presence felt in the national cricket scene".
Australia 1995 – Australian
In September 1994, during the Singer Cup in Sri Lanka, Mark Waugh and Shane Warne accepted $4,000 and $5,000 respectively from 'John', an Indian bookmaker, to provide him with weather and pitch information in games involving Australia.
Waugh declined to provide details concerning team tactics or selection of players but provided information to 'John' on approximately ten occasions over a five month period. This included games in Pakistan, Australia during the 1994/95 Ashes tour, in New Zealand in February 1995 and finally in the West Indies during the tour in 1995. the full scope of Waugh's telephone calls were not fully appreciated until further examination during the O'Regan Inquiry.
John gave Warne, who had been introduced to Waugh, an envelope containing $5,000 as a token of his appreciation for meeting him. Warne was subsequently phoned by John on three occasions during the Ashes series in Australia 1994/95 and he responded in quite general terms to queries about the composition of the team and the likely state of the pitch for certain matches.
These arrangements came to an end when a journalist contacted Ian McDonald, the Australian Team Manager. Waugh and Warne provided McDonald with handwritten, but unsigned statements (dated 20 February 1995) concerning the acceptance of money from 'John'. After a further interview with ACB officials, when both men again made admissions, Waugh was fined $AUS 10,000 and Warne $AUS 8,000.
Other than a reference to the incident in the Minutes of the ACB meeting of 28 February 1995, no mention of this incident was made public until 1998. This would accord with the then feelings of the ICC that, in the best interests of cricket, such matters should not be released into the public domain. This incident is referred to in the O'Regan Report.
Pakistan 1995 –
Justice (Retd) Fakhruddin G Ibrahim
In 1995 the Pakistan Cricket Board (PCB) initiated an Inquiry, under the chairmanship of Justice Fakhruddin G Ibrahim, a former judge of the Pakistan Supreme Court, to look into allegations made by Australian players surrounding the First Test between Pakistan and Australia in Karachi in 1994 and the ODI in Rawalpindi
Some months after the game a newspaper carried an article alleging that Salim Malik had offered three Australian players (Shane Warne, Mark Waugh and Tim May) $200,000 to manipulate the result during the last day of the fixture. Waugh also alleged that Malik offered him $200,000 for four or five Australian players to under- perform in the next days ODI in Rawalpindi.
The Inquiry was frustrated as the Australian players did not travel to Pakistan to give evidence, and thus the Inquiry had to rely on their statements together with the cross examination of Malik.
In February 1995 the International Cricket Council urged the Pakistan Cricket Board to be discreet "always bearing in mind the damage to the image of cricket if allegations were made public in any way".
In October 1995 Judge Ibrahim concluded the proceedings by saying "The allegations against Saleem (sic) Malik are not worthy of any credence and must be rejected as unfounded".
These allegations were re-examined during the O'Regan and Qayyum Inquiries.
India 1997 – Chandrachund Inquiry
In 1997, following revelations in 'Outlook' magazine, the Honourable Shri Justice Y. V. Chandrachud was appointed as a One Man Committee (Chandrachud Committee) by the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) to hold an Inquiry into the alleged charges of betting and match fixing by Indian cricketers and/or by the management.
The article alleged that Manoj Prabhakar had been offered Rs. 25 lakhs (approx $53,000 at current Indian Rupee/US dollar rate) by an Indian team member to under- perform during the 1994 Singer Cup match between India and Pakistan so as to favour Pakistan.
In November 1997 Justice Chandrachud, concluded his investigation. Whilst he accepted that large scale betting occurred in India he was unwilling to accept, upon the information provided to him, that there was proof that any Indian player, official or journalist had ever involved themselves in such a form of activity. This internal Inquiry was not to become public for some two and a half years.
Australia 1998 – O'Regan Inquiry
In 1998 after the 1994/95 Waugh and Warne allegations were revealed by the media, the Australian Cricket Board (ACB) faced criticism of the handling of the affair. It responded by appointing Rob O'Regan AM QC to conduct a full investigation covering the period January 1992 to December 1998. His brief was to:
Investigate whether any of its contracted players had engaged in certain conduct relating to betting, bribery, match-fixing, the unauthorised receipt of moneys or other benefits and related matters, and to investigate also disciplinary processes available for consideration of such conduct.
As his was a private ACB Inquiry, O'Regan did not have the powers conferred by statute to compel witnesses to give evidence on oath or affirmation, nor could he even require them to give evidence at all. The Inquiry did not enjoy the protection of absolute privilege, such as would provide a complete defence against an action in defamation.
O'Regan concentrated his examination on the events surrounding Australian players in respect of:
approach to Dean Jones during 1992 in Sri Lanka.
Allegation that the second match of the 1992 World XI v Indian XI was fixed.
Allegations that Allan Border was approached to fix the final Test of the 1993 Australian tour of England.
The acceptance of $4,000 and $5,000 by Mark Waugh and Shane Warne during the 1994 Sri Lanka/Pakistan Tour
Alleged approach to Ricky Ponting for match information during 1997
Alleged approach to Mark Taylor regarding weather and pitch information during the 1998 Pakistan tour.
After a thorough investigation O'Regan formed the opinion that there was no basis for recommending disciplinary action against any Australian player, Waugh and Warne having previously been fined in 1995. However he did criticise the ACB for its handling of the Waugh/Warne case believing that they should have been suspended.
He recommended that the ACB review the way in which it dealt with serious disciplinary proceedings, publicity of such proceedings, penalties to be imposed and player counselling in relation to untoward contact with those with gambling interests.
Some of the events mentioned in the O'Regan report were later to be corroborated by the Indian bookmaker MK Gupta, when he was interviewed by the Indian Central Bureau of Investigation in 2000 during the Hansie Cronjé affair. However the evidence of Gupta made a new allegation of corruption against one Australian player. This allegation is currently the subject of an investigation by the Special Investigator appointed by the ACB, with assistance from the ICC ACU.
Pakistan 1998 – Qayyum Inquiry
In 1998, under the terms of the Commission of Inquiry Act 1956, Pakistan set up a one man Judicial Commission to probe allegations that members of the National team had been involved in betting and match fixing. Mr. Justice Malik Muhammad Qayyum was appointed to the Commission.
This was to follow the Inquiry undertaken by Justice (Retd.) Fakhruddin G. Ibrahim and a Probe Committee Inquiry chaired by Justice Ejaz Yousef (Yousef Inquiry). The Yousef Inquiry, which did not have the powers of a Judge to compel witnesses to give evidence, was undertaken ex-parte and no opportunity was given to the accused to be represented or cross-examine witnesses. Whilst the Yousef Inquiry was abandoned, as it was felt that the process was flawed, it had tentatively suggested that certain players be suspended from playing cricket.
Justice Qayyum decided that rules of natural justice such as hearing and right of cross-examination must be applied.
The Commission's mandate was:
To probe into the allegations regarding betting and match fixing against the members of the Pakistan Cricket Team.
To determine and identify the persons including members of the team responsible for betting and match fixing.
To recommend such actions as may be appropriate; and
To suggest measures to avoid any future incidence.
The term 'match-fixing' was defined as:
Deciding the outcome of a match before it is played and then playing oneself or having others play below one's/their ability to influence the outcome to be in accordance with the pre-decided outcome. Match fixing was undertaken primarily for pecuniary gain.
As Justice Qayyum considered that the appropriate punishments for match-fixing was a ban he required the burden of proof to lie between that applied to the criminal and normal civil standard, i.e. a higher standard of proof than the balance of probabilities.
Two offences were considered:
Bringing the name of the team into disrepute (match-fixing related)
The Commission examined cricketers from Pakistan and Australia, Sports Journalists and miscellaneous other witnesses, and heard evidence containing fact and conjecture relating to incidents of alleged betting and match fixing. Whilst many events were related, it soon became apparent that Salim Malik was the focal point of many of the allegations.
Amongst those who appeared to give evidence were Mark Waugh and Mark Taylor. They gave evidence of an approach by Malik shortly before the Wills Triangular Series ODI in Rawalpindi on 22 October 1994 when Malik sought out Waugh to enquire if he could influence the Australian team in throwing the match.
However, whilst not specifically asked about it, they did not mention the undisclosed ACB 1995 finding that Waugh and Warne had accepted money from an Indian bookmaker, a fact to which Taylor had also been privy. This was revealed in December 1998, after they had given evidence before Justice Qayyum. As a direct result of this disclosure the Qayyum Inquiry travelled to Australia, where a special hearing having been convened under Pakistan law, they heard from Waugh and Warne.
Although completed many months earlier, and submitted to the PCB, Justice Qayyums report was not published until after the publicity surrounding the revelations about Cronjè.
In the report he concluded "The allegation that the Pakistan team as a whole is involved in match-fixing is just based on allegation, conjectures and surmises without there being positive proof. As a whole, the players of the Pakistan Cricket team are innocent".
However he found that the evidence in the case of Salim Malik was such that he should be banned from cricket for life and that there should be an inquiry into his assets. He further recommended that Ata-ur-Rehman should be similarly banned for life. Additionally Wasim Akram, Mushtaq Ahmed, Waqar Younis, Inzamam-ul-Haq, Akram Raza, Basit Ali and Saeed Anwar were subject of various penalties including being warned, censured, further investigated or kept under observation. He also recommended that the captaincy of the Pakistan Cricket team be removed from Wasim Akram.
He also imposed fines of varying amounts as follows: Salim Malik Rs. 10 lac Wasim Akram Rs. 3 lac Mushtaq Ahmad Rs. 3 lac Ata-ur-Rehman Rs. 1 lac Waqar Younis Rs. 1 lac Inzamam-ul-Haq Rs. 1 lac Akram Raza Rs. 1 lac Saeed Anwar Rs. 1 lac
At the current Rupee/US Dollar exchange rate, one 1 Lac (100,000 Pakistan Rupees) equates to approximately $ 1,640.
Justice Qayyum considered that the PCB should enforce declarations of assets by all its players and, if necessary, initiate a probe into their accounts. A watchdog Review Committee should be formed to deal with any future allegations.
A series of recommendations were made to prevent match fixing in the future. They can be summarised as covering areas surrounding,
The character of the team Manager and Captain
Independent team ombudsman of foreign tours
A new code of conduct
Increase in players pay and conditions
Education of players concerning entrapment by bookmakers
Enforcement of strict discipline with a zero tolerance approach
Review of match venues
Players' relations with the press and match day restrictions
England 1999 – Metropolitan Police investigation
In late July 1999 Stephen Fleming, the New Zealand Captain, was approached in his hotel in Leicester, UK by two Indian nationals who allegedly propositioned him to 'fix' the 3rd Test between England and New Zealand due to take place at Old Trafford, Manchester on 5th August. He rejected the proposition and reported the matter to his Team Manager.
A day or so later Chris Lewis, the former England international, was similarly approached by two Indian nationals with a view to him arranging to 'fix' the 3rd Test or alternatively future matches involving the England team. He rejected the offer and the incident was reported to the England and Wales Cricket Board and the Metropolitan Police, London. A criminal investigation was initiated and police interviewed various people alleged to be involved in the corrupt approach. During the course of enquiries the Metropolitan Police have liaised with the New Delhi Police, CBI and the King Commission in developing links between the various allegations of corruption.
The result of the investigation has been passed to the UK judicial authorities for consideration.
India 2000 – New Delhi Police
In April 2000, whilst investigating an unrelated matter, New Delhi Police were monitoring the telephone calls of an Indian national. They overheard a telephone conversation in which Hansie Cronjé was mentioned, and subsequently listened to him discussing match fixing.
The New Delhi Police launched an investigation centred on the association between Cronjé (and South African players), London based businessman Sanjay Chawla and two Indian bookmakers. In May 2000 the New Delhi Police charged Cronjé, Strydom, Gibbs and Bojé, in their absence, with cheating, fraud and criminal conspiracy.
India 2000 – CBI
Following the investigation by the New Delhi Police, which revealed that Cronjé had taken money from Indian bookmakers the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) instigated an inquiry.
Unlike previous inquiries, the CBI
(whose investigations commenced in May 2000) actively sought
out evidence, in contrast to hearing witnesses in a formal
enquiry. They also utilised itemised telephone billing to
prove associations. The CBI decided that first of all a
broad enquiry was to be made to ascertain whether match
fixing and other malpractices connected with the game of
cricket existed. Accordingly, the following were fixed as
The CBI focused on the following:
Identification of the betting syndicates operating in India and examine their activities.
Unraveling of the linkages of cricket players or their intermediaries with these syndicates and their roles in the alleged malpractices; and
Examination of the role and functions of Board of Control for Cricket in India so as to evaluate whether it could have prevented the alleged malpractices.
The CBI, like Qayyum, provided a definition of match fixing, which they interpreted as:
Instances where an individual player or group of players
received money individually/collectively to under-perform;
Instances where a player placed bets in matches in which he played that would naturally undermine his performance;
Instances where players passed on information to a betting syndicate about team composition, probable result, pitch condition, weather, etc.,
Instances where grounds men were given money to prepare a pitch in a way which suited the betting syndicate; and
Instances of current and ex-players being used by bookies to gain access to Indian and foreign players to influence their performance for a monetary consideration.
The revelations about Cronjé, which will be referred to within the section relating to the King Commission, ultimately led to Mukesh Kumar Gupta (also known as MK and John), an Indian bookmaker. Gupta, who was one of many bookmakers and gamblers interviewed by the CBI, was the only one to admit to corrupting cricket players of various countries. He alleged he had paid players significant amounts of money for under-performing and match information
The investigation found that MK Gupta had become involved in illegal betting in the 1980's and in 1988 paid Ajay Sharma 2,000 rupees, having watched him play, as a token of his appreciation. Subsequently through Sharma, and later Manoj Prabhakar, Gupta alleged that he met many Indian and foreign international players. He gave evidence of large-scale corruption involving, amongst others, Azharuddin and Cronjé. He also named several non Indian players and alleged that they had been involved in cricket malpractice. The CBI did not have the jurisdiction to investigate the non- Indian players and although they named them in their report they did not carry out any investigation into these allegations.
After collecting evidence from players, officials, bookmakers, gamblers and others, the CBI commented that " At the very outset that the cricketing fraternity, generally speaking, maintained a 'conspiracy of silence' and were rarely forthcoming with any specific information relevant to the enquiry. Not a single player/ex-player/official etc., other than those who had made vague and general allegations in the media, volunteered any information to the CBI".
The CBI Report, published in November 2000, implicated Indian players, and officials, and non-Indian players. It also criticised the BCCI. The Solicitor General of India was in broad agreement with the findings of the CBI that no criminal charges could be filed against anyone.
The CBI criticised the Board of Control for Cricket in India for being negligent in response to allegations of match fixing and also criticised its structure and accountability. The Board has challenged these criticisms.
Following publication of the CBI Report the BCCI appointed Mr K. Madhaven to review the finding of the report and conduct inquiries on behalf of the BCCI with regard to Indian players and officials. On 5 December 2000, after Mr Madhaven had submitted his findings, the BCCI banned Mohammad Azharuddin and Ajay Sharma for life from playing any cricket matches conducted or authorised by the ICC/BCCI or affiliated association. Manoj Prabhakar, Ajay Jadeja and Dr Ali Irani were banned for 5 years in similar terms.
The CBI Report concluded that whilst small scale betting on cricket matches had been taking place in India for a long time, the advent of live television broadcasts led to an upswing in large scale betting. This coincided with India's victory in the 1983 World Cup. The CBI linked the current sophisticated nature and monetary scale of betting in India to organised crime with clear signals of 'Mafia' underworld involvement.
South Africa 2000 – King
Following the Cronjé revelations, and his subsequent confession to officials of the United Cricket Board of South Africa (UCB), the authorities set up an Inquiry chaired by Judge Edwin King.
The Commission was established by the President of South Africa in terms of Section 84(2)(f) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, (Act No 108 of 1996) as a Commission of Inquiry into Cricket Match Fixing and Related Matters (commonly referred to as the King Commission).
The Terms of Reference for the preliminary investigation were:
A.1. The disclosures made by the former South African cricket captain, Hansie Cronjé, that during the Triangular Tournament between South Africa, England and Zimbabwe in January and February 2000, he received payment of approximately $10,000-00 from a bookmaker.
A.2. Whether during the period 1 November 1999 – 17 April 2000, and excluding the matters referred to in paragraph 1, any member of the South African cricket team or team official received or was promised payment of any amount of money or other benefit (excluding salary, emoluments, sponsorship and other payments or benefits lawfully connected therewith) in relation to his or her functions as a member of the South African cricket team or as a team official.
A.3. Whether a proposal was made to the South African cricket team during its tour to India in 1996 that it forfeit or otherwise influence the result of a cricket match.
The Commission heard that on 7th April 2000 the UCB first became aware of allegations that Hansie Cronjé had been involved in match fixing, although it did not define its interpretation of match fixing. After initial denials to the UCB, Cronjé confessed to accepting money from bookmaker Sanjay Chawla for involvement in cricket malpractice involving the South African Team. Cronjè had been introduced to Chawla by South African based bookmaker Hamid Cassim.
The evidence revealed that Cronjé had approached several South African players in an apparently light hearted and jocular manner suggesting that money could be made by fixing the results of games. This was his way of sounding out his colleagues. In the main this was laughed off, but Herschelle Gibbs and Henry Williams were later to be embroiled in Cronjé's corruption.
During the CBI investigation Azharuddin had admitted that in December 1996 he had introduced Cronjé to the bookmaker M K Gupta during the South African tour to India. Gupta immediately propositioned Cronjé, who accepted $30,000 to ensure that South Africa lost the Third Test commencing the following day. Cronjé stated that he had subsequently done nothing to influence the outcome of this match, which India won.
About the same time Gupta made an offer to Cronjé for South Africa to lose a One Day International, initially being played for the benefit of Mohinder Amarnath, but subsequently converted into an official international match.
Cronjé approached several members of the South African Team and mentioned that he had received the offer that was dependant on the team playing badly in the ODI. The offer was reportedly in the region of $200,000 – $250,000 and Cronjé was later to indicate that the offer had been raised by $100,000. Following meetings, involving senior members and the team as a whole, the offer was rejected.
Their relationship ended in November 1997 after Cronjé rejected Gupta's corrupt proposals during the quadrangular series.
With Gupta off the scene it is alleged that in January 2000 Cronjé influenced the result of the 5th Test against England at Centurion Park. After the first days play, when South Africa was 155 for 6 at the close of play, days two, three and four had been affected by the weather. On the evening of the penultimate day's play Cronjé spoke to Marlon Aronstam, who was well versed in sports betting, who urged him to 'make a game of it'. On the last day it was agreed that South Africa would declare and leave England with a 'run race', a feat that they achieved. Aronstam had reportedly agreed to make a donation of R200,000 to a charity of Cronjé's choice (although Cronjé recalls the figure to be R500,000) if he could ensure a positive result for the fixture. At the current Rand/US Dollar exchange rate, R200,000 equates to approximately $24,000 and R500,000 to approximately $ 60,000.
Aronstam also testified that he had paid Cronjé R50,000 as an advance for future cooperation in relation to pitch reports.
The UCB subsequently banned Cronjé for life. On 28 August 2000 Gibbs and Williams were banned from international cricket for six months (ending 1 January 2001) and fined R60,000 and R10,000 respectively for accepting a $15,000 bribe offered by Cronjé to under-perform in an ODI at Nagpur earlier that year. However Gibbs and Williams were permitted to continue playing domestic cricket.
The First Interim Report of the Commission detailing the evidence of Cronjé was published in August 2000.
One of the Commission's duties was to make recommendations concerning the various matters falling within its mandate.
On 14 December 2000, although his work continued, Judge King completed his second Interim Report with his recommendations. These fell under the broad headings of:
Education and Training
Punishment and Sanctions
United Arab Emirates 2001
Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates had been mentioned during various Inquiries as a venue where match fixing occurred. In January 2001 the Emirates Cricket Board commissioned a private Inquiry, under the chairmanship of the George W Staple CB QC, to examine allegations that directly impinged upon Sharjah as a venue. The Commission of Inquiry, which also included the former West Indian Captain Clive Lloyd and Brigadier Mohammed K Al Mualla, submitted its confidential interim report to the Emirates Cricket Board in April 2001.
ACCESS TO REPORTS
This document, whilst giving the reader a flavour of the various Inquiries and Reports, does not pretend to encompass all matters that were subject of inquiry or investigation. Full copies of the Reports may be found at the following web site addresses:
Qayyum Inquiry Report
King Commission Report – 1st Interim
King Commission Report – 2nd Interim
The table at Appendix 'C' provides details of matches mentioned by players, administrators, team officials, journalists or bookmakers during the CBI, Qayyum (Q) and King (K) inquiries in India, Pakistan and South Africa.
Whilst the above information has been compiled from a variety of sources, assistance and copyright material provided by Wisden Cricketers' Almanack and CricInfo is gratefully acknowledged.
MATCHES MENTIONED IN OFFICIAL INQUIRIES
The following matches were mentioned by players, administrators, team officials, journalists or bookmakers during the CBI, Qayyum (Q) and King (K) inquiries in India, Pakistan and South Africa. Inclusion on this list does not necessarily indicate that a match was fixed.
Season Match Venue Type
See Wisden Inquiry
1979-80 India v Pakistan Calcutta Test 1981 p. 1012 CBI, Q
1987-88 *Australia v Pakistan Lahore one-day 1988 p. 283 Q
1990-91 Delhi v Bombay Delhi Ranji 1992 p. 1160 CBI
1991-92 Wills XI v Habib Bank Delhi one-day CBI
Two India games in B&H World
Series in Australia CBI
1992 England v Pakistan Nottingham one-day 1993 p. 303 Q
1992-93 India v England Calcutta Test 1994 p. 972 CBI
India v England Bangalore one-day 1994 p. 978 CBI
India v England Gwalior one-day 1994 p. 980 CBI
India v England Gwalior one-day 1994 p. 981 CBI
1993-94 India v Sri Lanka Lucknow Test 1995 p. 1091 CBI
New Zealand v Pakistan Christchurch Test 1995 p. 1107 Q
New Zealand v Pakistan Christchurch one-day 1995 p. 1112 Q
India v Pakistan Sharjah one-day 1995 p. 1172 Q
1994-95 Australia v Pakistan Colombo one-day 1996 p. 1138 CBI, Q
Sri Lanka v India Colombo one-day 1996 p. 1141 CBI
Pakistan v Australia Karachi Test 1996 p. 1030 Q
Pakistan v Australia Rawalpindi one-day 1996 p. 1147 Q
India v West Indies Kanpur one-day 1996 p. 1152 CBI
South Africa v Pakistan Cape Town one-day 1996 p. 1177 K, Q
South Africa v Pakistan Johannesburg one-day 1996 p. 1178 K, Q
1995-96 *India v Pakistan Bangalore one-day 1997 p. 1043 Q
Pakistan v Sri Lanka Singapore one-day 1997 p. 1175 Q
1996-97 India v Australia Delhi Test 1998 p. 1037 CBI
India v South Africa Rajkot one-day 1998 p. 1156 CBI
India v South Africa Mumbai one-day 1998 p. 1158 CBI
India v South Africa Ahmedabad Test 1998 p. 1049 CBI
India v South Africa Calcutta Test 1998 p. 1050 CBI
India v South Africa Mumbai one-day 1998 p. 1054 CBI, K
South Africa v India Durban Test 1998 p. 1081 K
South Africa v India Cape Town Test 1998 p. 1082 K
South Africa v India Johannesburg Test 1998 p. 1084 CBI, K
West Indies v India Barbados Test 1998 p. 1118 CBI
1997-98 Sri Lanka v Pakistan Colombo one-day 1999 p. 1171 CBI, Q
Sahara Cup Toronto one-day 1999 p. 1176 CBI, Q
Pakistan v India Karachi one-day 1999 p. 1182 Q
Pakistan v South Africa Faisalabad Test 1999 p. 1083 Q
Pakistan v Sri Lanka Lahore one-day 1999 p. 1194 Q
England v Pakistan Sharjah one-day 1999 p. 1212 Q
India v New Zealand Sharjah one-day 1999 p. 1240 CBI
1998 England v South Africa Leeds Test 1999 p. 411 K
1998-99 India v Pakistan Jaipur one-day 2000 p. 1281 CBI
England v Pakistan Sharjah one-day 2000 p. 1289 Q
1999 *India v Zimbabwe Leicester one-day 2000 p. 445 CBI
*Bangladesh v Pakistan Northampton one-day 2000 p. 471 K, Q
*India v Pakistan Manchester one-day 2000 p. 478 K, Q
1999-2000 Challenger Series between India, India A and India B CBI
India v New Zealand Ahmedabad Test 2001 p. 1113 CBI
South Africa v England Centurion Test 2001 p. 1077 K
One-day series between South Africa, England and Zimbabwe K
India v South Africa Mumbai Test 2001 p. 1196 K
India v South Africa Bangalore Test 2001 p. 1198 K
India v South Africa Nagpur one-day 2001 p. 1202 K
* World Cup match.
Reproduced from Wisden Cricketers' Almanack 2001 by kind permission of John Wisden & Co Ltd.
© ICC 2001