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Georgia/Diebold Voting Machine Investigation IVs

The Georgia/Diebold Voting Machines Interviews

By Bev Harris
This page also appears HERE

In early February, 2003, programmers for Diebold Election Systems admitted that they had been parking highly sensitive company files (See also Scoop Mirror) on an unprotected web site, a serious security mistake by anyone's reckoning.

The very next week officials from the state of Georgia admitted that a program "patch" (See also Scoop Mirror) was administered to over 22,000 unauditable touch-screen voting machines in Georgia. This took place shortly before the November 2002 election.

This page contains transcripts of the interviews conducted in the course of this investigation.


CONTENTS - Interviews on this page:

Dr. Brit Williams
Michael Barnes
R. Doug Lewis
Guy Lancaster
Josh Gardner
James Rellinger
Kerry Martin
Sandy Baxter
Paul Miller
Kathryn Ferguson, Sequoia
David Elliott
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Interview with Dr. Brit Williams

Dr. Williams, says Michael Barnes (Georgia Secretary of State's Office, his interview also appears on this page) is the man who certifies voting machines for the state of Georgia. ph # 770-423-6422 Feb 12 2003 Professor Emeritus - CSIS Dept, Kennesaw State College - Kennesaw, Georgia

Harris: "I have questions regarding your certification of the machines used in Georgia during the last election."

Dr. Williams: "For the state of Georgia - I don't do certification. The law gives the Secretary of State the authority to say what systems are certified and what are not. What I do is an evaluation of the system. The FEC publishes standards for voting systems. We have national labs that examine for compliance with FEC and if they are in compliance, certification is issued by NASED. Once that's done it's brought into the state and I evaluate them as to whether or not they comply with any state laws. Then we look at ease of installation and operation. Then I prepare a report to the Secretary of State, essentially stating whether or not the system is in compliance with Georgia rules and regulations. Then the Secretary of State takes that report, in combination with the others, and certifies it."

Harris: "What was your involvement in certifying the program patch that was put on? Did you actually certify the patch, or did you determine that it was not necessary?"

Dr. Williams: "Part of our testing program is when these machines are delivered we look at the machines and see that they comply. And in the process of doing that - representatives of Kennesaw University did this - we found about 4-5% of the machines were rejected, not all because of screen freezes but that was one of the problems."

Harris: "It was the screen freezes that caused them to issue a program patch?"

Dr. Williams: "Yes. The vendor created a patch addressing the screen freezing. It made it better but didn't completely alleviate the problem."

Harris: "Did you do a line by line examination of the original source code?"

Dr. Williams: "For the original - no. We don't look at the source code anyway, that's something done by the federal ITAs."

Harris: "Did you do a line by line examination of the patch?"

Dr. Williams: "The patch was to the operating system, not to the program per se."

Harris: "It only changed Windows files? Do you know that it didn't change anything in the other program, did you examine that?"

Dr. Williams: "We were assured by the vendor that the patch did not impact any of the things that we had previously tested on the machine."

Harris: "Did anyone look at what was contained in the replacement files?"

Dr. Williams: "We don't look at source code on the operating system anyway. On our level we don't look at the source code, that's the federal certification labs that do that."

Harris: "Did you issue a written report to the Secretary of State indicating that it was not necessary to look at the patch?"

Dr. Williams: "It was informal - not a report - we were in the heat of trying to get an election off the ground. A lot was done by e-mails."

Harris: "What month did you install that program patch?"

Dr. Williams: "When we took delivery we were seeing that the patch was on there."

Harris: "I have a memo from the Secretary of State's office that is dated in August, and it says that due to a problem with the screens freezing, a patch was going to be put on all the machines in Georgia. It references a Rebecca Mercuri report - "

Dr. Williams: "Rebecca Mercuri is a professor who has done a lot of writing on these things - "

Harris: "Well, I know, and I don't have the memo she apparently wrote which he referenced, all I have is the response from the Secretary of State's office, so let's just deal with that. Apparently, someone had already taken delivery on these machines and they had already been shipped out around the state before the patch was applied, is that right?"

Dr. Williams: "The patches were done while we were doing acceptance testing. One of the things we looked for during acceptance testing was to make sure the patch was put in."

Harris: "But as I understand it, a team of people went around the state putting these patches on."

Dr. Williams: "By the time they put the patches in, the majority of the machines had been delivered."

"Actually, it was going on at the same time. When they started putting the patches in around the state, we tested the machines where they did that [put the patches in] at the factory.

Harris: "When I spoke with Michael Barnes, he said that you tested all the machines, or a random sampling of the machines, after the patch was put on."

Dr. Williams: "We had five or six teams of people with a test script that they ran on each machine - "

Harris: "The test script did what?"

Dr. Williams: "The test script was generic. It was in two parts. One part tested the functionality of the machine. It was a hardware diagnostic, it primarily tested that the printer worked, that the serial port worked, that the card reader worked, tested the date and time in the machine, and to an extent checked calibration of the machine. Then if it passed all of those, it tested the election. We loaded a small sample election in, the same as the one used during certification testing, and we ran a pattern of votes on there."

Harris: "You mean a logic and accuracy test?"

Dr. Williams: "Yes. A little miniature election. If the machine passed, we wrote it up and sent the report back to the office. If it failed -- if it froze up or there were other failures, and there were some of those, like the card reader was broken or the case was broken, then we didn't pass it."

Harris: "Can you tell me about the digital signature?"

Dr. Williams: "That's part of the test that involves looking at the software -- putting the patch on wouldn't change the digital signature."

Harris: "But if you put in a program patch, wouldn't that show that a change has been made?"

Dr. Williams: "No, because the patch was only in the Windows portion - there was no digital signature check on the operating system."

Harris: "Was the digital signature put on by Diebold during development, or by the lab, or who?"

Dr. Williams: "No, that's not how it works. It's inherent in the system - it exists in the system like your fingerprint. They write the source code and the source code is submitted to the federal lab. When it passes the lab they freeze the source code, at that point it's archived. Any change after that is subject to retesting.

Harris: "What was the security around the creation of the cards used to implement the patch?"

Dr. Williams: "That's a real good question. Like I say, we were in the heat of the election. Some of the things we did, we probably compromised security a little bit -- Let me emphasize we've gone back since the election and done extensive testing on all this."

Harris: "Based on your knowledge of what that patch did, would it have been needed for all the machines of same make, model and program? Including machines sold to Maryland and Kansas that were built and shipped around the same time?"

Dr. Williams: "Yeah, but now the key phrase is with the 'same system.' Maryland ran a similar version with a different version of Windows and did not have this problem."

Harris: "So the program was certified by the federal labs even when it ran on different versions of the operating system?"

Dr. Williams: "Yes, they don't go into the operating system."

Harris: "There was an unprotected FTP site which contained software and hardware specifications, some source code, and lots of files. One file on that site was called "rob-georgia" and this file contained files with instructions to "replace GEMS files with these" and "replace Windows files with these and run program." Does this concern you?"

Dr. Williams: "I'm not familiar with that FTP site."

Harris: "Is there a utility which reports the signature? Who checks this, and how close to election day?"

Dr. Williams "We do that when we do acceptance testing. That would be before election testing."

Harris: "What way would there be to make sure nothing had changed between the time that you took delivery and the election?"

Dr. Williams: "Well there wouldn't - there's no way that you can be absolutely sure that nothing has changed."

Harris: "Wouldn't it help to check that digital signature, or checksum, or whatever, right before the election?"

Dr. Williams: "Well that is outside of the scope of what some of the people there can do. I can't think of any way anyone could come in and replace those files before the election - "

Harris: "Since no one at the state level looks at the source code, if the federal lab doesn't examine the source code line by line, we have a problem, wouldn't you agree?"

Dr. Williams: "Yes. - But wait a minute - I feel you are going to write a conspiracy article."

Harris: "What I'm looking at is the security of the system itself, specifically, what procedures are in place to make sure an insider cannot insert malicious code into the system."

Dr. Williams: "There are external procedures involved that prevent that."

Harris: "This is exactly what I want to know. If you know what procedures would prevent that, could you explain them to me?"

********* INSERT *********

Talking Point: "It's a conspiracy theory."

This is scrutiny, not conspiracy.

As this story reaches critical mass, that I expect that a PR tactic used by those who want less scrutiny will be to use the "conspiracy" Talking Point as much as possible. Like the other Talking Points, it distracts everyone from the real issue.

"You're a conspiracy nut."

"This is scrutiny, it's healthy, calling it conspiracy theory is inappropriate. Now the issue, once again, is that..."

More rebuttals: Tampering with elections has been part of every election system for at least 2,000 years. Surely we don't think people quit doing it just because we are in the electronic age?!?!

More rebuttals: Doesn't a conspiracy take more than one person? If no one examines the source code and we're running around the country slapping willy-nilly patches on voting machines just one hacker could tamper.

********* INSERT ENDS*********

Dr. Williams "We have the source code. How can they prevent us from reviewing it? I have copies of source code that I've certified."

Harris: "But you said you do not examine the source code."

Dr. Williams: "Yes, but the ITA did it. The ITA, when they finish certifying the system, I get it from the ITA - someone would have to tamper with the source code before it goes to the ITA and the ITA would have to not catch it."

Harris: "And if someone inside the company tampered with the source code, and the ITA does not do a line by line examination of the source code, this would not be secure, isn't that right?"

Dr. Williams: "Well, but I don't believe that. Have you spoken with the testing labs to verify that?"

Harris: "I have spoken with Wyle, who tells me they stopped certifying voting machine software in 1996. I have spoken with the founder of a voting machine testing lab, who told me the companies refused to allow him to do a detailed examination of the source code - "

Dr. Williams: "How is that possible?"

Harris: "I'm just telling you what he told me."

Dr. Williams: "Which lab was this?"

Harris: "It will be in my article."

Dr. Williams "Well I don't believe that the labs don't examine the source code."

Harris: "I have seen a testing report from one of the labs [Ciber] that certifies these things, and it indicates that operational tests were done, but it did not indicate that a line by line testing of the source code was done."

Dr. Williams: "I think you are basing your story on incorrect information and if you're going to report some kind of a conspiracy theory - "

Harris: "I take issue with that characterization. Not a conspiracy at all. What I am examining is security. I am looking into whether it is possible, assuming you buy a programmer or two, or find a programmer who is a zealot, if it is possible to tamper with the results these machines give out. We do know that, for instance, with the lever machines in New York, people manipulated election results by buying the technicians."

Dr. Williams: "Well you'd have to have access."

Harris: "Yes. What I'm asking you is, if the lab does not do a line by line testing of the source code itself, do we have a problem?"

Dr. Williams: "Yes, but I'm sure they do that."


Interview with Michael Barnes - 404-656-2871

Georgia Secretary of State Elections Division

Harris: "I want to ask you about the program update that was done on all the machines shortly before the election."

Barnes: "All right."

Harris: "Was that patch certified?"

Barnes: "Yes."

Harris: "By whom?"

Barnes: "Before we put anything on our equipment we run through state certification labs and then in addition to that we forwarded the patch to Wyle labs in Huntsville --"

Harris: "They don't test software, though"

Barnes: "They test firmware."

Harris: "Oh, that's right."

Barnes: "Wyle said it did not affect the certification elements. So it did not need to be certified."

Harris: "Where's the written report from Wyle on that? Can I have a copy?"

Barnes: "I'd have to look for it I don't know if there was ever a written report by Wyle. It might have been by phone."

Barnes: "Also, in Georgia we test independently at Kennesaw University -- a state university."

Harris: "Can I see that report?"

Barnes: "You'd have to talk to Dr. Williams, and he's out of town. He's in Lincoln. Dr. Williams is on the NASED certification and I think he's also at Kennesaw University. He does the certification for the State of Georgia."

Harris: "Was this new patch tested with a Logic and Accuracy test or was it tested by looking at the code line by line?"

Barnes: "Logic and Accuracy and also they verify that our version [of the program] is identical and also any software is tested through Ciber and Wyle."

Harris: "But Wyle decided not to test the patch, you say. Was this patch put on all the machines or just some of the machines?"

Barnes: "All the machines."

Harris: "So every machine in Georgia got this program update."

Barnes: "Yes, every one of the machines used in election day in November. If it had been sent out to counties prior already, Diebold and their technicians went out and manually touched every machine. Some of the machines were still at the manufacturer, they did the patches on those."

Harris: "How long did it take to do patches on, what was it, around 22,000 machines?"

Barnes: "It took about a month to go back out and touch the systems."

Harris: "Can you tell me about the procedure used to install the patches?"

Barnes: "The actual installation was a matter of putting in a new memory card. It took about one and a half minutes to boot up. At the beginning, they put the memory card in a slot on the side of the machine. There are two slots.

"Usually you use a PCMCIA card that contains all the election information. There was no election material in the units when we started the procedure. They take the PCMCIA card, install it, and in the booting up process the upgrade is installed."

Harris: "Where did the actual cards come from?"

Barnes: "Diebold gave a physical card -- one card that activates each machine. There were about 20 teams of technicians. They line the machines up, install the card, turn on, boot up, take that card out move on, then test the machine."

Harris: "Were people driving around the state putting the patches on the machines?"

Barnes: "Yes."

Harris: "What comment do you have on the unprotected FTP site?"

Barnes: "That FTP site did not affect us in any way shape or form because we did not do any file transferring from it. None of the servers ever connected so no one could have transferred files from it. No files were transferred relating to state elections."

Harris: "How do you know that no one pulled files from the FTP site?"

Barnes: "One voting machine calls the servers and uploads the info. We don't allow the counties to hook up their servers to a network line."

Harris: "I notice that one of the things the network builder put on the machines was a modem."

Barnes: "The only time you use the modem is on election night. That is the only time the unit was used, was election night when they plug it into the phone. Also, I know where all the databases were built. All the database building is controlled by Diebold."

Harris: "How does that work?"

Barnes: "The database is built on the GEMS program -- when completed you transfer from GEMS to the TS unit [TouchScreen unit] via a single memory card. When the TS unit is turned on it checks to see that the memory card is the properly registered card."

Harris: "Having the screens freeze up is pretty severe error -- how did five percent of the machines get out of the factory with that? How did they get through Wyle testing labs?"

Barnes: "All I know is that the machines were repaired."

Harris: "How do you know how do you know that the software in the machines is what was certified at the labs?"

Barnes: "There is a build date and a version number that you can verify. Kennesaw University did an extensive audit of the signature feature -- Dr. Williams and his team went out and tested every machine afterwards to make sure nothing was installed on them that shouldn't have been."

Harris: "They tested every one of 22,000 machines?"

Barnes: "They did a random sampling."


Interview with R. Doug Lewis, of The Election Center

I am not the only one Mr. Lewis hung up on. Another of my sources called Mr. Lewis to inquire about specific certification procedures, and Lewis hung up on him too. Although Mr. Lewis claims that the certification labs review line by line, here is a quote I found in the Los Angeles Times from Mr. Lewis:

Los Angeles Times December 11, 2000 - "The first vendor to sign up for testing complained about Election Technology Laboratories, says R. Doug Lewis, executive director of the Houston-based Election Center, which helps administer the program. Among the vendor's concerns was the lab's desire to examine its actual lines of computer programming code. Administrators sided with the vendor, saying they had not intended such a deep level of examination.

Lewis plays a key role in the security, integrity and scrutiny of our national election process.

The Electon Center: 281-293-0101 R. Doug Lewis cell phone: 713-516-2875 Interview Feb 12, 2003

Assistant: Doug Lewis is gone for the day - his cell phone is 713-516-2875. And he is the only one to talk with.

Harris: "Mr. Lewis, I understand that your organization is the one that, basically, certifies the certifiers of the voting machines, is that correct?"

Lewis: "Yes."

Harris: "Do you have anything in writing that shows that a line by line examination of source code was performed by either Ciber or Wyle?"

Lewis: "No. But that's what they do. They go line by line. They're not trying to rewrite it."

Harris: "Where can I get something in writing that says they look at the code line by line?"

Lewis: "I don't know where you'd find that."

Harris: "Do you have that?"

Lewis: "I don't know that we do. What we follow is the FEC standards and as long as the vendor meets those standards we don't ascertain how they write their code, or even if it is particularly well written."

Lewis: "Let me be more precise. Are you saying that Wyle and Ciber do a line by line check on the code, and the way it interacts with the system, to make sure that no one could have put any malicious code into the voting machine software?"

Lewis: "Oh. That's what you're talking about. I don't know if they do a line by line check to see if there's a problem."

Harris: "Who can I speak with at Ciber and Wyle?"

Lewis: "I don't think anyone there could answer your questions."

Harris: "Who do you speak with at those labs?"

Lewis: (muttered.)"Shawn S/,.,/,., at Wyle."

Harris: "Okay, who at Ciber?"

Lewis: "No, Shawn S/.,,.//,. is at Ciber. And the person at Systest would be Carolyn Coggins --"

Harris: "Who should I ask for at Wyle?"

Lewis: "Wyle tests the hardware."

Harris: "But they also test the firmware, don't they?"

Lewis: "Jim Dearman at Wyle."

Harris: "I couldn't quite catch the name of the person at Ciber. Did you say Shawn S.... what was that last name?"

Lewis: (muttered.)"Shawn Sou//.,/,/.."

Harris: "I'm sorry, I couldn't understand you. What is that name again?"

Lewis: (muttered.)"Shawn South.,/,/."

Harris: "How do you spell that?"

Lewis: (muttered very fast)"Southw/,/. "

Harris: "I'm sorry, you'll have to slow down. How do you spell that?"

Lewis: (quietly.)"S--o--u--t--h--w--[ard?]" [I never was able to understand him. I ended up looking him up on the web. The correct spelling of the name is Shawn Southworth]

Harris: "I have one more question: Prior to taking over the Election Center, you owned a business that sold used computer parts, which ended up going out of business. Shortly after that you took over The Election Center. Did you have any other experience at all that qualified you to handle issues like the security of national elections?"

Lewis: "Oh no no no. I'm not going to go there with you."

Harris: "I have newspaper articles published shortly after your computer reselling company went out of business, that refer to you as an expert in election systems. What else did you do that qualified you to take over your current position?"

Lewis: "My background is that I owned a computer hardware and software business. I've never claimed to be an expert. That's the reason we have laboratories, nationally recognized laboratories."

Harris: "And you're saying that they test the code line by line but they don't look for any way that malicious code could be embedded?"

Lewis: "You can't prove a negative."

Harris: "The statement that 'you can't prove a negative' is a Talking Point, not an answer. Of course this is an issue that must be specifically addressed. If you sell a slot machine, for example, or an ATM machine -- something you know someone will try to tamper with, when you sell that machine you are expected to address exactly what has been done to prevent tampering, and you have to answer that for every kind of tampering they can think of."

Lewis: "Your theory suggests that one person can do so undetected."

Harris: "One person or a few people. So if you have a programmer who is compromised, we have a problem, wouldn't you agree, unless the testing lab specifically looks to see what each line of code does, and how it interacts with other things."

Lewis: "At the current level of testing while that may be theoretically possible it would be highly unlikely if people are doing what they are supposed to do. They test these things over and over, at the national labs and and the state level."

Harris: "But only Wyle or Ciber or Systest do line by line code checks, if they even do that. At the state level, as I understand it, they do not do this --)"

Mr. Lewis hung up on me.

[I don't know why Mr. Lewis did not own up to any other qualifications for his position, because I have been able to document that he had some elections experience around 24 years ago. His used computer reselling business was called Micro Trade Mart, and I have located documents of Mr. Lewis's ownership of this company from 1986 through June, 1993. I pulled the corporate documents for The Election Center, a Virginia corporation started in 1994 and located a news article showing that Lewis was Executive Director of The Election Center in 1995.

Information about Mr. Lewis's background is hard to come by, but we recently located an impressive resume for Mr. Lewis that says that he was an Assistant to the President at the White House (I have not been able to verify this position, but if his resume is correct my guess would be Lyndon Johnson or Nixon, both of whom had ties with with John Connally).

The resume says that R. Doug Lewis managed campaigns for the presidency [this would be John Connally, who made an unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 1980] and has more than 15 years of business experience in fields such as management consulting for the petrochemical, refining, and chemical processing industry. It also says that he managed campaigns for Congress, U.S. Senate, governor, and served as Executive Director of the Democratic party in Kansas and Texas, worked as Regional Political Director in the DNC, and managed the political affairs for former Texas Governor John Connally. His resume says he established the Joint Elections Officials Liaison committee (JEOLC), the National Association of State Election Directors (NASED), the National Association of County Recorders, elections officials, and Clerks (NACRC), the International Association of Clerks, Recorders, Election Officials, and Treasurers (IACREOT), and the International Institute of Municipal Clerks (IIMC), the National Postal Task Force, the National Task Force on Voting Accessibility, and the National Elections Reform Task Force.]

I am working on verifying each of the above statements on his resume.


Attempt to interview Ciber, Inc. Voting Machine Software Testing Lab

But first, a rule made up by The Election Center (See R. Doug Lewis, above) - You will find this on their web site:

"The ITAs DO NOT and WILL NOT respond to outside inquiries about the testing process for voting systems, nor will they answer questions related to a specific manufacturer or a specific voting system. They have neither the staff nor the time to explain the process to the public, the news media or jurisdictions. All such inquiries are to be directed to The Election Center on behalf of NASED."

CIBER Huntsville Office 7501 S. Memorial Parkway Suite 107 Huntsville, Alabama 35802 phone - 256-882-6900 fax - 256-882-9905 Diane Gray is the person who screens phone calls.

According to The Election Center, Shawn Southworth is the one to talk to about voting machine certification.

I also tried bypassing the system by entering extension numbers at random: ext 2301 Shane Hammond (left message) Ext 2308 Shane Hammond

Spoke with Diane Gray (spelling?) and she said they are instructed to refer questions like this to The Election Center. I told her that R. Doug Lewis, of the Election Center, told me that Shawn would be the person to talk with. She started to give me his cell phone number and then said "No, I'll have him call you back."

He did not call me back.

[After Wyle Labs quit testing voting machine software in 1996, the testing went to Nichols Research, then to PSINet, then to Metamore, and then to Ciber. Documents indicate that Shawn Southworth has been involved with voting machine software testing for Nichols Research, PSINet, Metamore and Ciber.]


Interview with Guy Lancaster 2/4/2003:

Harris: "What would be the reason for having final election results posted on your FTP site?"

Lancaster: "I fail to understand the question."

Harris: "I see on your web site that you have a computer consulting firm and you set up the Global Election Systems FTP site and I was wondering if you are still working for the company, now that Global Elections System has been acquired by Diebold"

Lancaster: "I'm on another project there now."

Harris: "You now work for Diebold"

Lancaster: "I am on a project for them, yes."

Harris: "I have some questions about the FTP site you use to exchange files with your technicians or whatever."

Lancaster: "FTP site for technicians...silence...I'm not sure what you're talking about."

Harris: "You have a site with a lot of files on it that lets anyone go in, there's a link on a web site that goes to it."

Lancaster: "I think the FTP site has been disabled."

Harris: "When was that?"

Lancaster: "About a month ago."

Harris: "It was up during the 2002 election?"

Lancaster: "I think so."

Harris: "In fact people were on that site last week. It says on your web site you supervise it. Are you the person supervising it?"

Lancaster: "About a year and a half ago they brought in a dedicated person to handle that system."

Harris: "How long has it been up?"

Lancaster: "It has been up quite some years. It started when it was Global."

Harris: "What are you doing with your FTP site? It seems to have a lot of sensitive files on it."

Lancaster: "Sometimes our customers use the FTP site to transfer their own files."

Harris: "What do you mean 'customers?' Do you mean the election officials, the states, your technicians, what?"

Lancaster: "Counties, cities, sometimes there is stuff there for state certification boards, federal certification, a lot of test material gets passed around."

Harris: "So all these people can get on your ftp site as anonymous users. What do you do to protect the system, since anyone can get on -- how do you keep someone from just uploading malicious code or tampering with election result files, for example?"

Lancaster: "We'd have to talk about specific files and I'd have to go and talk to the people involved. The site is just a means for transferring stuff between people."

Harris: "But anyone can just go there and download and upload files?"

Lancaster: "Our policy is that everything up there should be password encrypted."

Harris: "But I'm getting e-mails from whistleblowers, who are concerned. And they tell me they find a lot of files with no passwords at all."

Lancaster: "Then somebody isn't doing their job."

Harris: "Who posts these files, and what would prevent them from exchanging one file with another?"

Lancaster: "It wouldn't matter if it was overwritten. These aren't official results. It would be purely for some kind of testing or something like that. We like to get people's real result for testing purposes."

Harris: "One of my sources tells me there are election files that say things like "Cobb County General Election" and then "Cobb County - Fixed." What would that mean?"

Lancaster: "The file must mean that they've finished adjusting the ballot."

Harris: "One example they gave me is like, "unofficial prince george's general election," then "Prince George Final," then "Prince Georges - Fixed" and then "Final Locked Prince Georges." How would you prevent someone from overwriting one file with another and just putting it on the server for technicians and election officials to use?"

Lancaster: "You couldn't put anything without authorization."

Harris: "I have an e-mail about one of these files, or folders that says "replace the files with these." How would you prevent overwriting a program patch with one that contains malicious code?""

Lancaster: "First of all you couldn't put something that anybody's gonna take for a program patch -- all of such official patches have a password."

Harris: "Do you know if your FTP site has ever had a security breach?"

Lancaster: "I'm trying to think, for a security breach, I think it got shut down by someone."

Harris: "Was this recently?"

Lancaster: "Recently someone shut it down."

Harris: "Have there been any other problems? Would you know about it if someone came to your ftp, or replaced files at your ftp?"

Lancaster: "Well, we have recently just discontinued what's considered anonymous access, so people could before, yes, but now we use a different means."

Harris: "Until when, specifically, could just anyone get in?"

Lancaster: "I don't know what the actual date is, I'm not the person to ask."

Harris: "Who would be the person to ask?"

Lancaster: Tab Iredale. 604-261-6313. And the other person is Josh Gardner, also at that same office number.

Harris: "Do you have a technician named Rob who works anywhere?"

Lancaster: "There is a Rob doing some kind of West Coast sales."

Harris: "Do the salespeople have access to this FTP site too?"

Lancaster: "Yes, the salespeople have access to it. A lot of it the purpose is to keep them up to date."

Harris: "So technicians, and salespeople, and counties, cities and states and election workers and all of the staff for Diebold…"

Lancaster: "As needed."

Harris: "Do you have someone named Kerry Martin?"

Lancaster: "Kerry Martin, he's based in McKinney."

Harris: "What is his position?"

Lancaster: "I'll log in and look him up. He is an Election Support Specialist."

Harris: "What does an Election Support Specialist do?"

Lancaster: "Election support is mostly helping with software."

Harris: "Was Kerry Martin in Florida last fall?"

Lancaster: "I don't know. You'll have to ask someone else about this now."

Interview with Josh Gardner 2/4/2002


[Called for Tab or Josh: They work in Vancouver. Phone was answered by a woman, "Diebold Election Systems."]

Harris: "Tab Iredale please."

Woman who answered phone: "Tab just stepped out."

Harris: "Oh, could I speak to Josh please."

Gardner: "How did you know who I am?"

Harris: "Guy Lancaster told me you would be the person to talk to."

Gardner: "Could I put you on hold for a second?" [disconnected me]

[called back, put on hold, then Josh picked up.]

Harris: "Hi, I guess we got cut off."

Gardner: "I can't answer those questions and I have to go. Goodbye."


Interview with James Rellinger [an independent contractor] 2/4/2003

Harris: "I understand that you worked for Diebold Election Systems in Georgia. Can you tell me what you did?"

Rellinger: "Sure, I'll give you a quick overview of how they did this -- the stuff is already engineered by some higher level programmers and engineers. Then they contracted us here in Georgia to basically follow a recipe book and we ran down and built these things."

Harris: "By 'build these things' -- I think of build like a hammer and a screwdriver. What do you mean by build, what were you building?"

Rellinger: "Oh, that's a good point. There were 159 of these servers that went out. [159, one for each county] All we did was run through a series of tests to make sure they could log on and communicate and make sure everything jived with the touch screen.

"When you say build they were actually just a Dell server and we added some hardware to it for instance CD burners, a tape came in them already, but we'd add things to make them modem capable.

"When you say build a server it's not physically assembling a hardware. We added a component or two to make it do what we needed to do, modems, we load the Windows 2000, put the software in then we test it against their touch-screen machines."

Harris: "How does this all work, how do the servers relate to the touch-screen machines exactly?"

Rellinger: "There is one server per county, 159 counties, 159 servers deployed. Each county got an allotment of touch-screen machines statewide, it was something like 22,000.

Rellinger: "The machines are not actually live connected during the voting process, these machines have a memory card inserted into them. The card would have a serial number, 'This is precinct such and such,' as far as reporting to the database the card has a security ID."

Harris: "--Do you know if it is hard-wired into the card, or is the serial number part of the software or what?"

Rellinger: "Oh, that's what their software does, I'm not involved in that part. But it's all certified and tested and tested again."

Harris: "Okay, back to how the system works…"

Rellinger: "Afterwards they seal the cards, then they take the cards to the precinct and they open them and insert them and turn the machines on. At the the end of the day all the cards are collected and report back to the server and it matches up to the database. It's a flash memory all we had to do is make sure they could talk.

Harris: "I'm not a technician, so could you break this down for me, how exactly do the cards get read by the network you built?"

Rellinger: "Suppose you have seven voting machines. At the end of the day they'll close it down take 6 cards and accumulate into the seventh. The seventh machine adds all the other six to its totals. Then you attach a modem and it dials into the server and downloads the tabulation."

Harris: "You explain this very well."

Rellinger: "Part of what we did was also supply support for the election people."

Harris: "What happens after it gets to the counties?"

Rellinger: "Then they can have the counties dial it in for an unofficial state total."

Harris: "You sound like you did a great job for them."

Rellinger: "It was a lot of fun. We built a great team, did about a year's worth of work in five months."

Harris: "How secure do you think these things are?"

Rellinger: "We were not part of a team that tested that aspect of the election system, that would be Diebold, their in-house group, hardware and then all their software people.

Harris: "Okay, how did the FTP site fit in, what was its function? I saw files with your name on them, so I assume you used it sometimes."

Rellinger: "FTP -- that's all developmental stuff. That FTP server is part of the company. It's part of the interoffice transfer of files as they are being worked on. None of the election has to do with the FTP site...That FTP server is more like a garage or workbench."

Harris: "I noticed that there were some file like, "El Paso Election" and "Alameda Election," how would those be used?"

Rellinger: "Files about elections would have been likely something they were using for an example, you know, 'I have these results for this, you can run your software tests using this data.' It would have already been public data."

Harris: "Were any election results from November 2002 -- Are they still doing a lot of work on these things, so they would have the new election results on the ftp site?"

Rellinger: "I wouldn't know, I wasn't there then."

[Rellinger reports on his web site that his contract with Diebold Election Systems expired November 2, 2002. The elections were held November 5, 2002]


Interview with Kerry Martin 2/4/2002

I was interested in Kerry Martin because of the following article (I found at least two different articles when he did interviews with the press):

"- In a predominantly black Miami neighborhood, voting at one precinct didn't begin until 11:45 a.m., nearly five hours after polls were supposed to open. Officials said 500 people left without voting. At a nearby precinct, the touchscreen machines stopped working at 11:50 a.m. and were shut down for nearly five hours, causing more than 100 would-be voters to be turned away, election worker Kerry Martin said." [The touchscreens this article refers to were made by ES&S, a competitor of Diebold Election Systems)

I asked Kerry Martin if he was a technician or a programmer, and he told me no, he was in sales. Then I told him I found files on the FTP site that had his name on them, and they weren't just sales stuff. He then said he is also does technical support.

Harris: "Don't all the programs used in these machines need to be certified? It seems that people are uploading and downloading files at this FTP site and using them in elections."

Martin: "Certain hardware things and certain software things, most of them, you only are allowed to use the certified version."

Harris: "Why, then, would you have files that say 'replace the files with these?'"

Martin "Replace all the files with these -- normally that could be a Windows thing."

Harris: " guys have a file on your FTP that says "Replace the GEMS files with these.""

Martin: "Replace the GEMS files ... I don't know what that would be."

Harris: "Was there a guy named Rob working in Georgia?"

Martin: "No that would be Keith Long, he's the guy who worked in Georgia."

Harris: "Can you tell me more about how the FTP site was used?"

Martin: "You would have to talk to our I.T. guys about the FTP site."

Harris: "Who are they?"

Martin: "Robert McDonald or Josh Gardner"

Harris: "Is that Robert, Rob, Bob...McDonald spelled M-A-C?"

Martin: "No. MC-Donald." Robert McDonald."

Harris: "Were you in Florida last September?"

Martin: "No I was in Norfolk."

Harris: "Thanks."


I called the switchboard and asked if there is a Rob or Robert. Her name was Stacy. She said, "Yes, Robert McDonald." I got his voicemail. He answered it with "Robert."

I called the switchboard again and asked if Robert McDonald ever goes by the name Rob. She said, "Robert. Rob is okay."

I wasn't sure what she meant. I asked for CEO Bob Urosevich, a few times. Finally I got his assistant who said "he is right in the other room." She told me that he had my message and if he wanted to talk to me he'd call me back.


Interview with Sandy Baxter

Election Supervisor of San Juan County, she's located in Friday Harbor System: Accuvote optical scan

Harris: "Do they ever e-mail you a program patch?"

Baxter: "No. We might get an e-mail that says how to do something, or to be on the lookout for something. For updates what we normally get is, they give it to us on a CD ROM"

Harris: "Does everyone get the updates at the same time? Or do some people get them and some not?"

Baxter: "That's kind of a sore point because it turns out that we were like five updates behind, but they're improving on that greatly since Diebold took over. They sent updates to all the counties in WA awhile back, bringing us up to date."

Harris: "Have you ever needed tech support? How is that handled, since they don't take the boat out to Friday Harbor?"

Baxter: "I had to call a tech when I first became Election Supervisor before we had the Windows system. At that time it was a total Unix system. I would have to call a tech in Vancouver BC to talk me through it on the phone. Like they'd say, okay, go to this menu, try this."

Harris: "How did the switch from Unix to Windows go?"

Baxter: "To switch from Unix to Windows, they still have Unix base, I think, but they put a Windows platform on top. All the counties that had the old system, we went to the Windows based training in Wenatchee. I think it was about 1999 we bought a new server. They gave us recommendations for servers, like Dell. They had Dell ship them to McKinney, Texas and they loaded the systems on and various modems, digiboards and stuff and they had their field rep bring all the systems to Wenatchee we all received about a week's training on them, then we took them home and installed them."

Harris: "Tell me about your interactions with technicians"

Baxter: "Well, it's little things, like I called a tech and asked, 'How do we do it if we have a split precinct or whatever.' Then we got a new manual that was much better than the old one given to us at the training. That one was not very good, and the training was frankly a little shaky. Since then we all call each other and ask each other, like 'Did you figure out how to do this or that -- I'll call xxxxx in Chelan and the lady in Klickitat elections person.'

"We had another training session in King County when we went through some of the hardware maintenance, and King County has their own staff that does different things with the boxes.

"We talked to Diebold at the time to tell them what we want, like, let us know of any upgrades because before we wouldn't always get them. I can say that since Diebold has had them they are much better focused on customer service than before. Diebold will send us questions, like 'What elections do you have, who's the best person to contact' -- they still are using the Texas people, the old Global people."

Harris: "Do you get anything by e-mail?"

Baxter: "They may have sent me an e-mail saying 'try doing this and that if you're having a problem with headings.' Actually they sent us new ROMS a long time ago for the actual Accuvote system. There is always a physical item, like a CD or this ROM looked like a little chip, it's a little electronic device with little feet, it's a read only memory they had another version of the ROM and they sent us the chip. That was like in 1997 or 1996."

Harris: "When you have Windows, they sometimes automatically notify you of upgrades and it's all done online, you just upgrade each time your computer detects you need it. Is there anything like that with the GEMS system?"

Baxter: "GEMS doesn't have a live connection to a web site to update the system, with Windows either. But I have Norton as the virus detector on the server and it updates, but it's separate and GEMS doesn't connect to it. The GEMS is on the same server. The server can handle multiple PCs, but I only have one at this time, so my PC is also my server."

Harris: "Help me visualize how the GEMS is on the computer that is hooked up to the Internet but isn't connected to the Internet."

Baxter: "I have two modems. I have a modem that is for going out and it is not connected to the GEMS system. So I can go to the web. I have what's called a digiboard on my server that allows multiple modem connections. I have a second modem on the GEMS system but its only for the AccuVote systems. My precincts modem me the results on that. The second modem is the only one that goes to my GEMS system. I have to activate it and then I have to double activate it.

"It doesn't have the capability to go in and out. I just plug it in when I use it. There are two external modems. One is very slow, 14.4, the votes come in on the slow one."

Harris: "Do you have a special ballot or card that performs a function?) "Ender card, yes. What I do is, on the global system…(she changes subjects. But the manual says that the ender card locks the election. The manual also says there is another card that launches a program to start the election"

Baxter: "The fellow you talked to [I was introduced to her by a campaign manager for a candidate] I'll bet he thinks that you can e-mail something directly into the election system. We don't get updates on that. We get them all on CD.

"The Global system is set up so it won't work if it's connected. The systems have to be certified by the state and a lot of them have to get NASED certification and that's one of the things that they look for, they look for all the things you can do to violate the integrity of the system. I am supposed to notify the Secretary of State when I get a program update."

Harris: "Does the update come with a notification card or something, or is that just something your training tells you to do?"

Baxter: "No, we don't get anything like that with the updates. In fact the last one, they didn't even send any instructions with it. But I'm on the phone with them (secretary of state office) once or twice a week."

Harris: "How does the notification of the update go?"

Baxter: "I'll say, 'Oh by the way, we got an update on our Global system' and they say 'What does it do?' and I'll say it does such and such a thing, like it adds more spaces to the form or something."

Harris: "How do you know what the update does?"

Baxter: "Well, just what they tell me it does. I tell that to the Secretary of State. And then they say, okay, that sounds alright."

Harris: "Suppose you were some bad guy, like a city boss that was corrupt, and you wanted to send everyone an update disk that was something you made yourself. Is there any way your computer knows that the update comes from the manufacturer?"

Baxter: "I don't know how the computer would know if the update comes from GEMS. It always asks for a password. It has a triple password, one for the server, one for GEMS and one if, for example, I need to call up a special election."

Harris: "When is the last time you installed an update?"

Baxter: "I can't remember when I put that disk in, it was I think 2000 or 2001. But this time they sent me the CD with no instructions on it. What it involved, most of it is like adding more spaces to reports I think.

"One thing, with Global, you do the programming yourself. ES&S you send those off and they send you back a memory card."

Harris: "You mean programming the ballot?"

Baxter: "Yes. I do the ballot and then I download the information onto a memory card that looks like a credit card and the memory card has the ballot info on it, has the voting block info and the programming to reject under or overvotes."

Harris: "Since you talk to the other elections people, do you know if they get upgrades at the same time you do, or the same ones you do?"

Baxter: "I don't know what everyone else gets. My last one didn't even have instructions."


Interview with Paul Miller

State of Washington Secretary of State's Office Dave Elliott and Paul Miller would be the ones that know about certification dates for upgrades. I spoke with Paul Miller 360-664-3442

Harris: "I'm wanting to know, how can I find out the dates that program updates for the AccuVote system were certified by the state?"

Miller: "It depends upon if its an upgrade to the actual tabulation equipment. If it's a minor modification on how they run the reports that is not an issue that necessarily requires recertification."

Harris: "If they put a CD in the machine and run "setup" and it installs an update program, how would you know what it does? Do you just ask the manufacturer what it does, or what?"

Miller: "Well, replacing a Rom chip on the device itself, something like that, usually they will let us know what's been modified and we'll make the decision as to whether to test it."

Harris: "If elections officials are mailed a CD to overwrite the program with an updated one, when and how do you certify that?"

Miller: "That is not an issue."

Harris: "I don't understand."

Miller: "The part that we certify is the tabulation equipment, the system that reads the ballot and stores the results."

Harris: "So, if the optical scan machines read results, and as I understand it the results are stored on a memory card, and then the results are either transferred to a central server by modem and read there, or they can be taken out of the machine and brought to a central location…how does that work?"

Miller: "The results are stored in the Rom chips and are transferred to the memory card."

Harris: "So what is it that you test, when there is an upgrade?"

Miller: "We look at the device at the polling site and the central tabulating -- these are essentially the same device as at the polling place. For Global it's fitted with the central counting at the polling place itself."

Harris: "For example, I was just talking to the Elections Supervisor on the San Juan Islands, and the polling places are on different islands, and each one has an optical scanner machine, as I understand it. So isn't there a program involved, which tabulates the results when they are modemed in to the server?"

Miller: "You're talking about polling place votes. Also there are absentee and those are what I refer to as central counting. The process when they are modeming in numbers, you've got independent numbers at polling places you're modeming in from, and those independent devices can be checked as part of canvassing. The central counting I'm referring to is the absentee ballots, which aren't counted at the polling place, they're counted at the elections office. Those are run through the machines like those at the polling place."

Harris: "My question remains, how do you certify program upgrades? Who tells you there is an upgrade? Because when an Elections Supervisor tells me, 'I get a CD in the mail and it doesn't have instructions, and then I run it,' what I want to know is, what is the control system for that?"

Miller: "The first step on any process and the thing that we primarily rely on is that they are required to run the equipment through the ITA (Independent Testing) labs. What we're looking for when we certify is primarily that it meet the Washington State standards and the ability to do rotations and so forth as the law requires."

Harris: "So you don't really look at the software, or certify any updates that come in on CDs?"

Miller: "But the CD -- it depends on what kind of upgrade we're talking about--"

Harris: "Would you look at the CD if the change was substantive?"

Miller: "You're talking about the lines of code?"

Harris: "I just want to know what the procedure is to safeguard the integrity of the system when an elections official replaces one version of the program with an update, such as a new CD that comes in the mail."

Miller: "What you need to understand is that we set up and run Logic and Accuracy tests before every election that are designed to be checked, specific to each election. The purpose of that is that people can make mistakes so the Logic and Accuracy tests catch that, but it also catches that the system counts the votes accurately."

Harris: "Would you ever look at the CD?"

Miller: "That's when we rely on the labs to do that and the rigorous testing they do."

Harris: "When the manufacturer provides an upgrade by CD or by replacing a ROM or whatever, do you need to get it recertified?"

Miller: "Sometimes."

Harris: "Who tracks that?"

Miller: "I don't understand."

Harris: "The lady I talked to got a CD and then ran it to upgrade her GEMS program. How does anybody know what's on that program? Even if an independent testing lab examines the updated CD, who tracks that at your office to make sure the CD these Election Supervisors are installing has been certified by an ITA?"

Miller: "You have to talk to somebody else. Somebody needs to track the rewriting."

Harris: "Who does that?"

Miller: "We rely on the lab."

Harris: "Who makes sure the new CDs sent out to elections officials are tested and certified by the lab?"

Miller: "Well that brings us to, we do the L and A test. That's the primary way we do it. It happens every election."

Harris: "So you're relying on only the L and A for upgrades?"

Miller: "Depending on the significance of the upgrade."

Harris: "How do you know what the significance is, when it's a program on a CD that you haven't seen?"

Miller: "The manufacturer is supposed to notify us when they make upgrades."

Harris: "Am I understanding this correctly, that the manufacturer is supposed to notify you of the upgrade, and based on what they say the upgrades do, you decide whether anyone needs to certify the new CD software?"

Miller: "Correct."

Harris: "In Washington State, there is a spot check of the hand count against the machines, isn't there?"

Miller: "The political parties have the right to request hand count of three precincts in any county on election night."

Harris: "Do they have to pay for that?"

Miller: "No."

Harris: "That seems like a good policy to have. What about the Sequoia touch screen machines you have in Snohomish County? How can a candidate request a hand count of three precincts?"

Miller: "On the touch screen -- we do have the hand recounts of close races too."

Harris: "On a machine with no voter-verified paper trail?"

Miller: "Well, there's no way to do a hand recount on a DRE."

Harris: "How do you do an L and A on a DRE? It seems like if you try to simulate the voting situation and push a whole bunch of votes, your finger would get tired."

Miller: "The test is set up to ensure -- you don't necessarily need to do hundreds of votes. You set up a, you ensure that you cover every contest on the ballot."

Harris: "How many ballots did they run on the L and A for those touch screen machines? Was it 10, 100, 1000?"

Miller: "Again what you want to do is check each and every race and you set up a pattern one for the first race, two for the second, you vote that pattern and run reports and ensure the numbers come up right."

Harris: "Who makes up the pattern?"

"We make up the pattern."

Harris: "If a machine miscounts after higher numbers of votes were cast, how would you know?"

Miller: "What's the scenario, what's the way that would happen?"

Harris: "Well, for example, let's say a programmer set it up that way."

Miller: "What you're implying is that there is a way for a programmer to know where a candidate will be on the ballot to give that candidate a benefit. That's impossible."

Harris: "Regardless of who sets up the ballot, the ballot does identify who is a Republican and who is a Democrat. So there would be a way for the program to know that. Why couldn't a programmer, for example, set the machine to wait for a couple hundred votes and then put, say, one out of every 10 Democrat votes into the Republican bin?"

Miller: "It's not the programmer that programs the machine."

Harris: "But whoever does it identifies, for example, who is a Democrat and who is a Republican, so regardless of who inputs that, the machine would be able to read and identify that too."

Miller: "I'm not going to talk about proving a negative."

Harris: "But the positive, which can be proved, is that every election system that's ever been used in the USA has, at one time or another, been tampered with. And what we do know is that $800 million has gone toward contributions to candidates. So certainly we can predict that someone will try to tamper with a programmer. And therefore, what I'm asking, is what safeguards do we have in place to make sure that, if someone tampers with a program or a CD update --"

Miller: "I think we've gone as far as we can go."


Interview with Kathryn Ferguson of Sequoia Systems, on the Dave Ross Show

Ross: "And I also have the, I'm going to see if I can get the staff to call up Sequoia Systems, see what they have to say about this.

Harris; "That'd be great!"


Ross: "We're going to talk in a moment, I believe, to Kathryn Ferguson of Sequoia Systems, one of the systems that you say has been in trouble before..."


Ross: "Okay now I'm just getting a message from Tina that Kathy hung up. Are you going to call her back, was it a disconnection or what? You're calling her back, okay."


Ross: "We're still going to try and get Kathy Ferguson on but Tina's telling me she's....not answering. So we've left a message."



Interview with David Elliott

Ross: "We've been talking with Bev Harris about her concerns over electronic voting. We have on the line now David Elliott, who is Assistant Director of Elections for the state. David good morning, thank you for calling in today."

Elliott: "Good morning. Secretary Reed asked me to give you a call and make sure that you had access to our information."

Ross: "I appreciate that. So what's your comment on this."

Elliott: W"ell, I would say we've got 39 counties in Washington State and all of them are using software from one of three or four companies which have been talked about by your show today, and they're companies that have been around a long time, the systems are certified for use in the state. I just, it bothered me a little bit to hear the companies being so badly portrayed.[his characterization] I'm no defender of these companies, they're private, but I don't want people to walk away with the feeling that there's a real problem here."

Ross: "So you have ways of verifying the accuracy of these programs."

Elliott: "Well the state law provides for all kinds of things related to -- first off, what we call Logic and Accuracy testing of the system. There are also opportunities for people to come in and ask for hand counts of precincts, that's in the state law. I believe also your caller, or your guest was talking about how it would be nice to be able to come in and do a hand recount for pay, where the person paid for it, we actually have provisions like that in state law. Anybody who wants to come in and request a recount can pay to have it done and they can confine it to a single precinct or they can pay for the whole county if they want, so we do have many of those safeguards in place already."

Elliott: "Then how does a voter know, when he's voting on a touch screen, for example, that the computer has entered the vote accurately?"

Elliott: "Well, you enter into an area where privacy is very important as you've pointed out in your earlier comment, and one of the issues that's in the national debate right now is 'well, we'll just have a receipt printed out,' and the problem with a receipt is it's also your best ticket for selling your vote, you can say, look, I can prove I voted for your candidate. So receipting is not necessarily a good idea for other reasons. So the security has to be front loaded on these machines."

Ross: "I hadn't thought about that. So your concern with having a receipt is that you really don't want there to be any evidence of how a person voted."

Elliott: "Well, simply because that evidence could be misused or could be used for coercion or that sort of thing, and so the point of it is that the security on this, has to be front loaded, the machines have to be tested thoroughly before they are used and to the satisfaction of the voters and, like I say, we do a Logic and Accuracy test for every election and frankly David we don't have a lot of people turning out to see those tests, and I guess that's a good sign, it means people are generally accepting that things are working well, but those are public, and you know the parties attend those, and --"

Ross: "Well there wouldn't have been anybody showing up for a test in Florida either, unless somebody got in and noticed there were irregularities, right? I mean unless is somebody to wave the red flag, everybody indeed will assume that the voting is accurate. But what Bev is saying is, if you don't have a paper trail, then how do know that something's gone wrong, you know? Where's the impetus for the double check?"

Elliott: "Right. What I'm saying is that we, because we don't, we do have a paper trail in all systems except direct recording electronic, I mean, you understand that those ballots are the paper trail. So we're just talking about DRE, which are the new touch-screen systems. And what you have to do is front-load the check, and that means have a thorough test of the Logic and Accuracy prior to the first ballot being recorded."

Ross: "And are you the only people who have access to that software? If somebody from the company wanted somehow get into the software and revise it, could they do that without your knowledge? Or do you have the key to the encryption, do you have the passwords, do you have the administrative passwords, etc?"

Elliott: "Well, if, the answer to that is complicated, if you have time I'll give it to you."

Ross: "I will, but we have to take a break first."

Ross: "David I was asking you when it comes to this computerized voting where there is deliberately no paper record given to the voter so he can't go out and tell somebody, you successfully bought my vote, or something like that, what is the, where is the security, you say they are checked out, but is there somebody besides the Secretary of State's office who has the password that would allow you to get into the software?"

Elliott: "Yeah, and before I make the comment that we welcome the examination and the scrutiny of these systems at all times, and I'm not upset with Bev at all, I mean, we, we're glad to have people paying attention to this process. So I don't want anybody to get me wrong there. What we've got is a national and state certification process."

"The Federal Elections Commission and the National Association of State Elections Directors together work with Laboratories in Denver Colorado and Huntsville Alabama, to examine these systems, both software and hardware. They put them through all kinds of tests, looking for what they call trap doors in the software, to make sure..." (tape ran out). NOTE:[Actually, it's Huntsville and Huntsville. Wyle is headquartered in California, but their voting certification takes place in Huntsville. Ciber is headquartered in Colorado, but its voting certification takes place in Huntsville.]

******** ENDS *******

- Bev Harris, author of Black Box Voting: Ballot-Tampering in the 21st Century. This article is copyright by Bev Harris, but permission is granted for reprint in print, email, or web media so long as this credit is attached.

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