Cablegate: (C/Nf) P5 Heads of Delegation Side-Meeting On Npt
DE RUEHLO #2199/01 2651428
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 221428Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3559
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1205
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2968
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 3504
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0395
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1491
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1268
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 002199
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/22/2019
TAGS: PREL PARM KNNP UK CH FR RS IR EG PK
SUBJECT: (C/NF) P5 HEADS OF DELEGATION SIDE-MEETING ON NPT
AND OTHER ISSUES -- SEPTEMBER 4, 2009
Classified By: Political Counselor Robin Quinville for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C/NF) Summary: On Friday, September 4, in conjunction with the UK-hosted P5 Conference on Confidence Building Measures Towards Nuclear Disarmament, UK Del head, Mariot Leslie, convened a side meeting of the P5 heads of delegation (HOD) to discuss preparations for the UN Security Council Summit on Nonproliferation and Disarmament; P5 objectives and strategy for the 2010 NPT Review Conference; approaches to nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy; approaches to nuclear security; and FMCT. P5 also discussed and endorsed a brief press statement to publicize the meeting. Delegation members are identified in para. 11. End Summary.
UN Security Council Summit --------------------------
2. (C/NF) U.S. HOD, U/S Tauscher described U.S. goals for the Summit, while acknowledging others, concerns that it not preempt the NPT Review Conference or prejudge work of other bodies. Other P5 welcomed the initiative and expressed satisfaction with negotiations in New York on a draft UNSCR. Both Russia and China spoke of the need to find a balance between ambitions and what is achievable. Russia advocated a generic text without reference to specific countries, but said after the summit we would have another tool as a reference point to use with Iran. France urged the Summit to address "real issues" including threats to the regime; this was a matter of political credibility. The UK said that British policy was driven by a sense of crisis. The nonproliferation regime is under threat from breakout in DPRK and we are trying to avert a similar breakout by Iran. It was important to capture these ideas in New York. It also was important that the NAM not see this effort as "the school masters telling them what to do." The UK was approaching the UNSCR as an integral part of the NPT strategy.
2010 NPT Review Conference --------------------------
3. (C/NF) P5 delegates offered overviews of their respective positions, agreeing on the value of P5 coordination and a joint P5 statement to the RevCon, as well as the need to manage expectations. U.S. Special Rep Burk reviewed USG objectives for the RevCon. The U.S. would seek to leverage its disarmament record to make progress on nonproliferation including strengthening verification and enforcement of compliance; addressing abuse of the NPT,s withdrawal provision; and promoting peaceful nuclear uses in a way that does not contribute to proliferation. China urged P5 unity, and all acknowledged the value of a joint P5 statement to the RevCon. Russia noted "new dynamism" in the international security environment, and the need to stress the overall validity of the NPT as the backbone of the global architecture.
Abuse of the NPT Withdrawal Provision -------------------------------------
4. (C/NF) U.S. (Burk) described USG interest in addressing abuse of the NPT withdrawal clause at the RevCon, noting the need to ensure that treaty violators were not absolved of their violations by withdrawing from the treaty. China pushed back on any "amendment of the NPT" or infringement of a party,s right to withdraw from the Treaty while Russia cautioned against impinging on sovereign rights through "intimidation." U.S. made clear that no amendment was contemplated and France agreed that no one wanted to restrict the right of withdrawal. China persisted that this was a legal issue and a matter of noncompliance, not withdrawal, and should not be taken up under the latter heading. U/S Tauscher emphasized that the goal was to ensure that parties did not escape their treaty violations by leaving the treaty. The U.S. was looking to reinforce the equity the parties have in the NPT and this was a way to restore that equity and to communicate that to others.
Strengthening the IAEA ----------------------
5. (C/NF) P5 agreed that universal adherence to the Additional Protocol should be a RevCon deliverable. Opponents would need to be addressed one-by-one because their objections were not uniform. Reps agreed that Brazil and South Africa were particular problems. All agreed that the new DG offered opportunities as well as challenges. Russia said the constrained financial situation would make it difficult to agree on resources for the IAEA. U/S Tauscher said the U.S. had wanted the IAEA budget to be integrated with nuclear security and had called on DG-designate Amano to give us his budget projection as a first step. All agreed that was the proper course and would help us get the priorities right.
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy -------------------------------
6. (C/NF) UK Chair noted that the NNWS, especially those in the NAM, have constructed a narrative that the developed countries are trying to obstruct their access to technology and want assurances that their legitimate aspirations will be met. France emphasized that the sensitivity of enrichment and reprocessing technologies needs to be acknowledged. Russia said it seeks continued work on multilateral fuel cycle proposals with a view to reaching agreement on its own initiative before El Baradei leaves his post at the IAEA. Russia will share its proposal with the P5 and is seeking co-sponsors, needing 18 votes to move forward. Although the Indians are rejecting the proposal, other similar initiatives pose no conflict and are mutually reinforcing. U.S. (Timbie) noted tangible U.S. financial support for an IAEA international fuel bank, and said that Russia,s Angarsk proposal was the most advanced and the US would like to see it move forward. It was important to emphasize to the NAM that this proposal had been modified to take concerns about infringement of rights into account.
Article VI and Disarmament --------------------------
7. (C/NF) UK Chair Leslie framed the discussion: how to get credit for what we are doing under Article VI; can we extract viable substance from the 2000 RevCon,s 13 steps; is there anything to do on negative security assurances (NSAs); and how to maintain P5 solidarity, in particular how to reconcile language on disarmament with China,s modernization. Noting the "inevitable" focus on disarmament at the RevCon, Russia saw commonality in statements by the U.S., UK, France and Russia. France stressed the need to emphasize the importance of maintaining a credible deterrent, and of not crossing red-lines, i.e., anything that would compromise deterrence. All agreed that the 13 steps represented a point in time, but that the P5 needed to take a fresh look at possible steps for 2010, with a view to a possible P5 offer for the RevCon. Russia and China indicated willingness to start a discussion on a universal NSA, with China supporting discussions in the CD on a legally binding instrument ("we can just talk about it; we don,t have to agree to it.") France highlighted its support for nuclear weapon free zones, urged that PSAs be considered, and urged care in managing expectations. U.S. (Burk) reminded participants of the longstanding U.S. NSA, said that U.S. doctrine would be a subject of the nuclear posture review to be completed next year, that the USG was reviewing its position on NWFZs which it considered on a case-by-case basis, and the U.S. would not be prepared to support negotiations on a universal, legally binding NSA.
Middle East and the NPT Review Conference -----------------------------------------
8. (C/NF) All agreed this was a complicated and difficult issue which could mean the success or failure of the RevCon; it was important to use the time available before the RevCon to find a way forward. Russia said it was continuing to develop its ideas for a conference to respond to the 1995 Middle East resolution. France stressed the need to address the Egyptians at the highest level and said the P5 have a role to play. UK noted the need to find a device that allowed Egypt to claim its concerns had been taken into account. U/S Tauscher described her own efforts to engage with Egyptian officials to this end, saying that while we want to find a way forward that satisfies their concerns, we want their cooperation at the RevCon.
9. (C/NF) Citing the breakthrough at the Conference on Disarmament leading to adoption of a robust program of work, U/S Tauscher asked the other P5 for suggestions for breaking the stalemate with Pakistan over FMCT negotiations. Is there something the P5 can do collectively to get the program of work started in January 2010? China said it supported an early start to FMCT negotiations but expressed understanding for Pakistan,s position: "geographically speaking, they have a point. If I were Pakistan, I would take the same position." China said it would be unwise to exert pressure on Pakistan as a group. Russia said it did not have a position on a P5 demarche to Pakistan and would have to think about it. UK wondered if a collective demarche by the six previous CD chairmen could be organized and said that any approach to Pakistan could reflect understanding of its particular security considerations. Participants agreed to U/S Tauscher,s proposal that each demarche the GOP again and then regroup in mid-October. If there had been no progress, they would need to revisit the issue.
Future Meetings ---------------
10. (C/NF) P5 HODs agreed on a press statement reporting on the meeting, but reached no agreement on further meetings on confidence building measures, with China suggesting they be convened on an "as needed basis." U.S. reminded participants of P5 agreement in Geneva to meet regularly to coordinate preparations for the 2010 RevCon, but noted this was separate from the UK initiative. UK Chair Leslie offered to draft a summary of key issues from the session.
11. (SBU) P5 Representatives. U.S.: U/S for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher; Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Amb. Susan Burk; Jim Timbie, T staff, Department of State. UK: Mariot Leslie, DG Defense and Intelligence, FCO (chair); Liane Saunders, Head Counter-Proliferation Department, FCO; Judith Gough, Deputy Head, Security Policy Department, FCO. China: VFM He Yafei, MFA; Wu Haitao, DDG, Arms Control and Disarmament Department, MFA. France: Patrick Maisonnave, Director Strategic Affairs, MFA; Martin Briens, Director for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, MFA; Celine Jurgensen, Deputy Director for Nuclear Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, MFA. Russia: Sergey Ryabkov, Deputy Foreign Minister. Visit London's Classified Website: XXXXXXXXXXXX