Cablegate: Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (Ctbt): On-Site


DE RUEHUNV #0415/01 2460648
R 030648Z SEP 09





E.O. 12958: N/A
Inspection (OSI) Discussions at Working Group B (WGB)-33

REF: STATE 85155 (PCG-235)

1. This cable reports discussions of On-Site Inspection (OSI)
issues that took place during the first half of the thirty-third
session of Working Group B (WGB-33), August 17 - 25. International
Monitoring System (IMS) and International Data Centre (IDC) and OSI
discussions taking place during the second half of the Working Group
B meeting will be reported septel. The U.S. delegation executed
guidance (ref A, paragraphs 16-22).

12 - 16
28 - 40
70 - 84


3. In discussions of the seven non-papers covering proposed changes
to the OSI Operational Manual Model Text, circulated by the OSI
Operational Manual Task Leader, the U.S. delegation drew upon the
U.S. proposed revisions (line-in/line-out) to the text provided in
each of the Task Leader Issue Papers. Most U.S. proposals were
accepted, and those that were not will be discussed at subsequent
sessions of WGB. Contingent upon funding and approval of the annual
program of work by the Policy Making Organizations, WGB-33 will
endorse the OSI Action Plan provided that the timelines contained in
the Action Plan are viewed as target date, not deadlines. The WGB
OSI Milestones will be further revised based upon discussions during


4. The On-Site Inspection (OSI) Operational Manual Task Leader (TL)
Malcom Coxhead opened the plenary and briefly reviewed the agenda
and schedule for the session. The schedule called for OSI and OSI
Operational Manual issues to be discussed during the first week. He
suggested that any delegation wishing to make an opening plenary
statement should save their statement for the next plenary session
that would occur on Monday, 24 August 2009. The agenda was adopted
without comment and Coxhead then turned the floor over to the OSI
Task Leader, Vitaliy Shchukin.

5. Shchukin briefly reviewed his plan for the session, highlighting
the various topics on the agenda. He also indicated that the first
OSI task meeting on Wednesday morning would begin with a video
presentation on the 2008 Integrated Field Exercise (IFE 08).

6. OSI Operational Manual Task Leader returned to the schedule for
the review of the Model Text of the Operational Manual and indicated
there would be 8 sessions through the course of WGB-33that were
focused primarily on the various theme papers that he had developed

and that were posted to the Experts Communication System (ECS) and
subsequently circulated by the Provisional Technical Secretariat

7. The U.S. delegation then read a brief statement from guidance
(ref A, para 16). The plenary was closed without further comment.


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8. The Argentine delegation made the first intervention in the WGB
Task Group and explained that their experts would not arrive until
week 2 of WGB and asked to have an opportunity to make inputs into
the Model Text at that time.

9. The Chinese delegation echoed Argentina's comments and explained
that their experts were having trouble obtaining visas for WGB-33.
Coxhead assumed both delegations that they would have the
opportunity to make inputs but also highlighted the fact that there
would not be an opportunity to completely re-address all the issues
that had been discussed earlier in the session.

10. The Iranian delegation then criticized the methodology that the
OSI Operational Manual Task Leader had proposed. The Iranian
position was that nothing was final until it was approved by the
Conference of States Parties, so until then, these issues could be
reviewed as needed.

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11. A representative of the PTS began the discussion of the first
theme paper, Theme 15: Ad Hoc IFE Lessons (ECS-DIS-WGB-TL-18-IP_15).
He explained that the August-September 2008 Integrated Field
Exercise (IFE 08) highlighted the need to carefully identify and
mark the inspection area (IA) boundaries. The theme paper was an
effort to better define those procedures in the Model Text.

12. WGB worked on line-in/line-out changes to the relevant
paragraphs in the Model Text (CTBT/WGB/TL-18/40). This process
resulted in discussions on several different themes. Several
delegations offered suggestions to increase the specificity
regarding position-finding. Both the Iranian and Russian
delegations wanted to identify in the model text specific types of
position-finding equipment and procedures to be used. In addition,
the Croatian delegation asked about procedures for boundary marking
and whether that should have been included in the Model Text.

13. The Chinese delegation opined that setting boundaries under the
CTBT regime was similar to the process used by CWC and in any case
was a difficult and contentious task. The Task Leader cautioned
that the group should avoid such comparisons and explained that CTBT
and CWC were very different regimes.

14. The UK delegation and the Task Leader both highlighted the need
to ensure that inspectors have the greatest flexibility possible and
explained that including such specifics would limit what flexibility
they had.

15. The Iranian delegation next raised an issue regarding the need
for the Inspection Team (IT) and the Inspected State Party (ISP) to
agree before any boundary markings were made. The U.S. delegation
countered that safety considerations or specific inspection
techniques presented situations where either side would want to
unilaterally mark boundaries. In those cases there simply was not
time to reach agreement over where to mark boundaries. A compromise
was put forward that changed the language. The new text identified
the need for consultation on boundary marking.

16. The Task Leader noted that the text required some cleaning up
and promised that he would present some revised text later in the


17. TL Coxhead explained that the purpose of Theme 7 Paper
(ECS-DIS-WGB-TL-18-IP_7) was to modify paragraphs 6.5.12 to 6.5.17
of the Model Text and to better describe OSI procedures regarding
the conduct of passive seismic techniques.

Iran's Eight Points
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18. The Iranian delegation stated that although passive seismic
techniques were an important component of the OSI regime, the Model
Text would need to address eight points that were not adequately
covered in the Theme 7 Paper:

-- Point 1: IT procedures on how to establish a network of
seismology stations.

-- Point 2: IT guidelines on how to determine the number of
seismology stations that would be required.

-- Point 3: IT equipment descriptions (technical specifications,
capabilities, and limitations).

-- Point 4: IT decision making guidance (when, where, and how to
deploy passive seismic techniques).

-- Point 5: IT site selection guidance (how to select a section of
the IA to deploy passive seismic techniques).

-- Point 6: IT topographical guidance (how to use different
seismology techniques in different areas).

-- Point 7: Manual of seismic observables (to guide the IT on which
equipment to use).

-- Point 8: Seismic station network detection (IT procedures on how
to determine event magnitude -- including a sufficient definition of
the term "Expected Detection Thresholds" that is cited in the
proposed draft text).

19. The TL stated that many of the issues addressed in the eight
points were already addressed in the Model Text, and requested the
Iranian delegation provide the PTS with a written statement on the
eight points to facilitate additional discussion during WGB. The
Iranians replied that they had a draft statement prepared, however,
it was not ready to be presented to the PTS. Despite this, the
Iranian delegation stated its belief that WGB had enough information
to respond to their concerns. The OSI Operational Manual Task
Leader left it to the Iranian delegation to work with the PTS on how
best to move forward during this session.

Deployment of Passive Seismic Sensors
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20. The U.S. delegation proposed a change to paragraph 6.5.16 of
the Model Text that clarified when focused deployment of passive
seismic sensors was to be used. The U.S.-proposed text was adopted
with non-substantive changes.

Passive Seismic Techniques During the Continuation Period
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21. The Japanese delegation expressed interest in creating specific
guidelines for the use of passive seismic techniques. They believed
that the use of passive seismic techniques during the continuation
period should only be done on a case-by-case basis. The Egyptian
delegation added that passive seismic techniques should only be
conducted during the initial period and not during the continuation

22. The TL indicated that the use of passive seismic techniques
during the continuation period was permitted under the Treaty and,
as such, was a strategic versus a legal issue. He added that
extending an OSI into the continuation period simply meant that the
IT was making progress in fulfilling its mandate but had not been
able to complete all of its planned activities during the initial
period and needed additional inspection time. He reasoned that
decisions about the use of passive seismic techniques during the
continuation period should be left to the IT Leader (ITL) and not
micromanaged in the Model Text.

Distance of Separation Between Adjacent Seismic Stations

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23. The Japanese and Iranian delegations asked why the PTS was
proposing to change the distance of separation between adjacent
seismic stations from a range of 3-6 km to a range of 3-5 km. The
Japanese delegation also questioned whether this change was
consistent with other text in the Theme 7 Paper that stated
seismometers should be deployed within a few kilometers of the
source. The Japanese stated that guidance needed to be inserted in
the Model Text that provided the IT with specifics regarding
location of the seismic stations. The Task Leader stated that this
issue would need to be studied further.

24. The U.S. delegation voiced concern about making changes in the
Model Text that were too detailed and tied the hands of the IT
regarding use of passive seismic techniques. The U.S. reasoned that
at some point you needed to trust the expertise of the IT. The UK
delegation agreed that the Model Text should be practical and
provide the IT with a large degree of flexibility. The Iranian
delegation replied that while it would be up to the IT to decide how
best to use these techniques, the Model Text needed to provide
specific guidelines for making such decisions. The Task Leader
agreed with the U.S. position that flexibility should be given to
the ITL.

25. A PTS representative stated there was always a threshold that
you would want the stations to detect in order to perform an
analysis. He remarked that Table A1.3-1 in the Model Text provided
estimates on the necessary separation distance that allowed the IT
to determine the number of needed seismic stations. In addition,
demonstrations and field testing of PTS equipment had shown that the
3-5 km distance was preferable. If the stations were placed beyond
the 6 km range, detection capabilities were severely affected and
limited the utility of the passive seismic techniques.

Analysis of Data from Adjacent Seismic Stations
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26. The Iranian delegation raised concern with the proposal in the
Theme 7 Paper that each [seismic] station should monitor its
immediate vicinity for at least two to three days. Iranian experts
felt this was too long because they believed it took at least 10
days to analyze data obtained from such stations. Given the limited
time available to detect evidence of seismic aftershocks, and the 10
day period to analyze the data, Iran questioned whether use of data
from such stations was viable. The PTS representative replied that
the results of IFE08 showed that it took less than 10 days to
process the data. In fact, the entire analysis process took only
4-5 days to complete.

To Grid or Not to Grid?
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27. The U.S. delegation asked the PTS representative whether he
believed that seismometers would be deployed in a pattern other than
a grid to detect seismic aftershocks. The PTS representative
replied that it was envisioned that a grid pattern would be used.
The U.S. asked the question because of concern that the draft text
had too much specificity regarding the use of passive seismic
techniques. The PTS representative replied that although the PTS
shared similar concerns, he did not believe the current (and
proposed) Model Text was too detailed. In line with its concerns,
the U.S. proposed alternative text for paragraph 6.5.12 of the Model
Text to provide greater flexibility for the IT.

28. Begin U.S.-Proposed Text:) A systematic survey may be
conducted using a network of stations based on on-site specific
considerations, topography, noise sources, and other issues that
will affect the configuration. The station separation should be
based on these considerations. Each station should monitor as long
as the Team Leader directs. (End Text.)

29. The Iranian delegation stated that the last sentence of the
U.S.-proposed text required further clarification. The Task Leader
interjected that the U.S.-proposed text and all of the other
proposed changes to the Theme 7 Paper needed to be studied further
by States Signatories and the PTS and would be discussed further at
the next WGB session.



30. TL Coxhead proposed to focus first on issue 13b (Inspected
State Party Roles and Responsibilities) from the Theme 13 Paper
(ECS-DIS-WGB-TL-18_13). With respect to issue 13b, the PTS saw a
need to have provisions in the Model Text that broadly outlined ISP
obligations based on experiences obtained during IFE08 in which the
"ISP" was not aware of key Treaty obligations and responsibilities.
The U.S. delegation noted that the paragraph contained a mixture of
rights and obligations in addition to practical proposals for
fulfilling such rights and obligations. The U.S. delegation
proposed the chapeau for the proposed paragraph 2.1.xx clarify that
the ISP had a right and obligation to enable the IT to fulfill its
inspection mandate, and proposed to list several activities
consistent with ISP Treaty rights and obligations.

31. The Chinese delegation countered that the U.S. proposal
complicated matters since most of the ISP rights and obligations
listed in the paragraph were logistical in nature. The Iranian
delegation supported the Chinese position.

32. The UK delegation added that although it supported the U.S.
proposal, it believed that the text should be inserted into Chapter
4 of the Model Text (In-Field Coordination and Support) instead of
Chapter 2 (General Provisions). The UK articulated its view that
ISP adherence to its Treaty rights and obligations required both a
political and a logistical commitment. As a result, the Model Text
should not tell the ISP what to do. Without a logistical commitment
to back it up, the underlying political commitment would become an
empty promise. The German delegation stated its support for the UK
position to have the text inserted into Chapter 4.

33. The U.S. delegation highlighted the fact that the chapeau of
paragraph 2.1.xx mixed ISP Treaty obligations with practical
assistance the ISP could provide to the IT. Following that thought,
the Russian and UK delegations proposed that the draft text list ISP
obligations separately from other types of assistance. The Russians
stressed the importance of ensuring that the ISP roles and
responsibilities listed in the paragraph were accurate and
inclusive. The Chinese and Iranian delegations countered that any
list of ISP roles and responsibilities needed to be stated broadly.

34. The U.S. delegation proposed a new subparagraph to be added to
the list of ISP roles and responsibilities that specified the ISP
should limit activities in or near the IA to prevent interference
with IT activities and measurements. The Iranian delegation
countered that this was contrary to provisions of the Protocol that
required the inspection team to arrange its activities in a way that
provided for the least possible inconvenience to the ISP and
disturbance to the inspection area.

35. The U.S. noted that the Treaty required the ISP to make every
reasonable effort to demonstrate its compliance with the Treaty and
to enable the IT to fulfill its mandate.

36. The U.S. delegation proposed an additional modification to the
list of roles and responsibilities to ensure the ISP facilitated
entry and exit of the IT and its equipment into and out of the IA,
in addition to ISP territory. The Iranian delegation objected to
this proposal because this text potentially would require inspection
equipment to be moved within ISP territory on a continuous basis.
The U.S. replied that the proposed text was consistent with ISP
obligations as defined by the Treaty and its Protocol. The Russian
delegation indicated concerns over how the U.S.-proposed changes
would be interpreted by States Parties in terms of complying with
ISP domestic laws and regulations and the possibility that the draft
text contradicted the Treaty and Protocol.

37. The TL opened by informing the participants that the Issue
Papers to be reviewed were modifications to the Operational Manual
Model Text which included text he had prepared based on Lessons
Learned from IFE08 and States' contributions. The IFE08 Lesson
Learned stated that "States Parties should be aware of the
logistical support that they may be required to provide to the IT
during an OSI. An indicative list of requirements may be included
in any standing arrangements that the TS [Technical Secretariat]
will enter into with States. Such a list should also be readily
available for viewing by States. It could be published online."

38. There was general agreement that Roles and Responsibilities

(R&R) involve many important considerations. The Iranian delegation
stated that they would like to see an equitable balance between the
R&Rs for the IT and the ISP. There was considerable discussion of
the 8 items listed as "steps the ISP should take." It was stated
that this is a mix of obligations and voluntary actions. It was
suggested that a Reference to Paragraphs 60 and 61 be added to the
introductory paragraph.

39. Regarding the item addressing the transportation of the IT and
its equipment into and out of the ISP territory and within the
Inspection Area (IA), the discussion became quite involved over the
issue of access to sites within the IA. Access is covered in other
areas of the Treaty and can be negotiated. The discussion shifted
to the issue of Managed Access. There was some question about where
managed access should be addressed within the Model Text and the
consistency of language. The TL stated that managed access should be
included in section 2.1. Because further consideration of these
issues is warranted, bracketed text remains.

40. The next major discussion involved the preparation of and
support for a base of operations for the IT. The Slovakian
delegation expressed concern that the language is too vague and
could be interpreted as a minimum effort (identify an area) or a
maximum effort (construction of a facility). The term "reasonable
effort" is not defined in either the Treaty and its Protocol or in
the Model Text. TL decided to take the issue off line to resolve
later. The TL's concluding statement made the point that this
suggested list of logistical items was intended to remind the ISP
that there are a number of considerations for the ISP.

41. For the second paragraph, it was agreed that there should be
some type of framework that the TS and the ISP can use to negotiate
what the ISP provides. These provisions may take the form of
standing arrangements. There were concerns about the language. The
Russian delegation stated that the word "guidance" is too much of a
directive and that "recommendations" would be better. The TL
concluded by saying the tone of the entire section will be adjusted
to indicate that negotiations will be involved and directives will
be avoided.

42. The U.S. proposal regarding the ISP limiting its activities in
or near the IA to prevent interference with IT activities was
promoted from the list in paragraph 2 to become a separate


43. In contrast to the initial morning session, the later part of
the morning involved a relatively uncontentious discussion of the
U.S.-proposed text addressing procedures for "Changes to the
Operational Manual" after entry into force of the Treaty. There was
some discussion of what constitutes "substantive" changes as opposed
to "administrative" changes. "Substantive" was defined as technical
and "administrative" was defined as editorial. These definitions
were generally accepted, with the understanding that the Executive
Council would decide the nature of a proposed change to the
Operational Manual. The U.S. delegation-proposed provision of
accelerated notifications to the IT of changes involving safety
issues was agreed. The Iranian delegation stated that substantive
changes to the manual agreed to by the Executive Council would only
become effective for a State Party if that State Party gave its
affirmation during a period of time following the decision of the
Executive Council. The U.S. delegation countered this requirement
for affirmation of changes could result in different OSI procedures
for different States Parties. Bracketed text was added to the
effect that formal approval is required by each State of a
substantive change before the change is effective for that State.
This text will be resolved later.


44. Discussions continued on the Iranian paper CTBT/WGB-32/NAT.2
which identified issues that were left out of the model text as it
migrated from the Interim Draft Rolling Text to the Model Text. TL
Coxhead began with proposal 7 and gave a brief introduction. The
Iranian delegation emphasized that the paper was trying to raise

issues not faithfully reflected in the Model Text. They stressed
not to focus on the words, which could be changed, but the concepts.
They asked the TL to put the concepts into bracketed text
somewhere, or as a Task Leader Note, so they wouldn't be lost. The
Iranians stated they wanted to have results from their paper which
they could report back to capital. The TL stated that the Iranians
would be best served if they themselves drafted the text.

45. Iran was very concerned about how OSI equipment would be
procured by the CTBT Organization and evaluated by the States
Parties if it was specialized equipment, not commercially available
off-the-shelf equipment. The UK delegation suggested that the OPCW
equipment familiarization model was placed in the Model Text at
paragraph 3.3.2 to allow for States Parties to evaluate the
equipment. This issue came up again concerning the transparency of
the equipment acquisition process and a list of all the equipment.
The U.S. delegation stated that before the (P)TS is allowed to
purchase equipment for use during an OSI, the States (Parties) have
to approve it, and, as part of this approval process, States will be
afforded the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the
functionality of the equipment. Russia stated that, at some point,
the task group would need to have a real discussion about real

46. The next discussion was the Iranian proposal to define the
Treaty provision requiring the IT to leave the ISP "as soon as
possible" within a fixed time, advocating 72 hours. The UK
delegation stated that it took six days during IFE08 to leave
Kazakhstan. The U.S. delegation pointed out that such a restriction
would leave the ISP with the same time period in which to undertake
and conclude all ISP post-inspection activities. Paragraph 12.6.1
was bracketed to reflect the issue.

47. The Iranian delegation wanted to introduce the concept that the
Requesting State Party (the State or States requesting the OSI) was
responsible for the observer and his/her actions with regard to
issues of confidentiality once the OSI was completed. It was
pointed out that paragraph 4.8.4 of the Model Text addressed the
issue. The TL, however, questioned the legality of either

48. A key discussion took place on the meaning of paragraph 37 of
Part II of the Protocol, "The on-site inspection request shall be
based on information collected by the International Monitoring
System, on any relevant technical information obtained by national
technical means [NTM] of verification in a manner consistent with
generally recognized principles of international law, or on a
combination thereof." The Iranian delegation expressed the view
that this meant that the NTM data should be put to a consensus vote
within the Executive Council on the relevance of such data and the
means by which it was obtained prior to the Executive Council voting
on whether to consider such data during its deliberations to
authorize an inspection. The NTM data would not be allowed if there
was no consensus. The U.S. delegation pointed out that such a
decision was within the purview of the individual States and not
within the purview of the Executive Council as a whole and that the
Iranian proposal was not only outside the bounds of the Treaty but
also had no place in the Operational Manual.

49. The Iranian delegation also introduced a concept that did not
allow for inspectors and inspection assistants to leave the ISP and
return at a later date during the conduct of an OSI. The U.S.
delegation pointed out that the Treaty required inspectors to be
granted multi-entry visas and Iran pulled its suggestion.

50. The Iranian delegation introduced the concept that the ISP
could go to the Director General with the claim of a frivolous or
abusive inspection as a direct means to stop an inspection, as well
as direct the Executive Council to punish the Requesting State
Party. The UK delegation responded that the Iranian proposal was
revolutionary. It went around paragraph 67 of Article IV of the
Treaty and the Executive Council's ability to terminate the
inspection. Iran stated it felt the OSI Operational Manual relates
to all parts of the Treaty and Protocol and so feels that the Manual
can address the issue. The U.S. delegation stated that the starting
and termination of the inspection was in the manual as well as the
ability of the Executive Council to address frivolous and abusive
inspections. Germany supported the U.S. and UK position and stated
they would never support the Iranian text.

51. The Iranian delegation wanted to add language to the Model Text

requiring an agreement between the ITL and the ISP on the number of
IT personnel that would be permitted in the ISP and the IA during
the drilling phase of an OSI. The TL stated that the Treaty was
very clear in not specifying a limit on the number because of the
unknowns involved. The TL recalled that the increased number of
personnel would be known to the ISP by means of a revised inspection
mandate and the subsequent notification of the ISP regarding arrival
at the ISP point of entry of additional IT personnel. Iran wanted
to consult with other delegations on this issue.


52. TL Coxhead presented Theme 2: IT Health and Safety
(ECS-DIS-WGB-TL-18-IP_2) for consideration. This paper addresses in
part issues identified in Annex B of TL-18/42 on security of the
inspection team.

Security of IT, Samples, Data, and Facilities
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53. The U.S. delegation asked for clarification on the distinction
between "safety" and "security," as well as definitions of "IT
premises" and "joint" as in "joint storage." The TL confirmed that
"IT premises" is the location where the IT is housed and has its
offices, as defined in Part II, paragraph 27(b) of the Protocol.

54. The TL indicated that "safety" and "security" are understood
using the traditional dictionary definitions. The Russian
delegation offered the following definitions, which were generally
accepted: "safety" is protection from natural phenomena; "security"
is protection from illegal acts, e.g. "by restless natives."

IT vs. ISP Responsibility
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55. The Iranian delegation expressed concerns with the balance
between ISP and IT responsibilities and expectations. The German
delegation indicated that during IFE08 safety within the base of
operations seemed to be overlooked by the IT. The Croatian
delegation cited the "Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Rights" but
stated that the TS and the IT need to take some responsibility.

56. The U.S. delegation offered text changes to the theme paper,
which it understood would be inserted into Chapter 4 of the Model
Text. Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the US-revised text were adopted with

no substantial changes.

57. On paragraph 3, Iran questioned whether the Director General
can be responsible for safety or security when DG is in Vienna and
not on-site.

58. The UK delegation pointed out that the U.S. proposal is based
on para 102 of the Protocol. The PTS questioned whether ISP can
provide for safety and security within IT premises, which should be
off-limits to ISP when IT is not present.

59. The U.S. delegation stated that the security of IT equipment,
data, and samples should be the responsibility of the IT unless the
IT is not present. The UK delegation offered that the IT is
responsible for its own operational security, but that overall
security and protection from harm is the responsibility of the ISP.
The Russian delegation expressed concern with ISP having
responsibility for samples, because these will be under seal and
should be protected by IT against tampering.

60. The TL suspended discussion on paragraph 3, requesting
suggestions for alternative text.

61. On paragraph 4, the Iranian delegation, with concurrence by the
Russian delegation, indicated that "coordination" with ISP is
insufficient for TS to provide additional support to ensure the
security of the IT. Further, this paragraph may be contradictory to
ISP obligations.

62. After discussion of exactly what kind of support the TS can
provide to the IT in the field, other than requesting additional
support from the ISP, the provision enabling TS support was deleted.
The TL set aside the remainder of Theme 2 for later discussion.


63. TL Coxhead presented CTBT/WGB/TL-18/42, Planning for the Third
Round of Elaboration of the Draft OSI Operational Manual. This
paper provides clarity on WGB plans and allows for input from States
Signatories and the PTS.

64. Table 1 in Annex A, "a living document" according to TL,
presents a plan for addressing various parts of the Model Text over
the next 8 sessions of WGB. No specific timelines are provided,
although with 8 WGB sessions at 2 per year, review of the current
Model Text, without identifying or discussion further issues, would
not be completed until 2013.

65. The Japanese delegation fully endorsed the TL plan, especially
with the issues identified in the Annexes, and requested flexibility
in later sessions to amend the plan as needed. The UK delegation
indicated that active seismic and multispectral technologies are
missing from the Table. The UK also suggested using workshops to
draft text for the OSI manual, which could then be considered by
WGB. The U.S. delegation noted that WGB was trying to write
operational manual text for concepts on which there is no

66. The German delegation recommended against using workshops or
the ECS to draft text, recommending instead holding extra sessions
of WGB. France concurred with holding extra WGB sessions and
expressed support for the plan.

67. The Iranian delegation rejected the concept of any artificial
deadlines for development of the OSI manual. Iran also indicated
that the following issues were missing from the TL-proposed plan:
compensation to the ISP, abusive/frivolous OSI requests, managed
access, phenomenology, confidentiality, and general provisions.
Iran supports using workshops to discuss technical issues but not to
draft text for the manual. Iran supports using the ECS to make
intersessional progress on draft text.

68. Iran ultimately rejected the TL paper and will not agree to it
being referenced in the report of WGB-33. The Task Leader indicated
that the text is his and thus not up for acceptance by WGB.
However, the Annexes can be separated for future reference.

Now what?
- - - - -

69. The U.S. Delegation requested that the task group define and
present what was meant by the States Signatories in the expression
"intensify our efforts" in the report of WGB-32 with respect to the
development of the OSI Operational Manual Model Text. The U.S.
delegation indicated the need for additional intersessional work,
extra sessions of WGB, and workshops to address areas where
conceptual agreement is lacking.

70. The Iranian delegation again expressed its view that making
textual changes to the Model Text at workshops is unacceptable.
Iran also reiterated that WGB should not set timelines for
development of such a text. WGB needs time to address lessons
learned and incorporate future changes based on activities occurring
before the first Conference of State Parties (CSP) which will
approve the OSI Operational Manual currently under development.
States have a right to introduce issues until the manual is

71. The UK delegation indicated that nothing in the Treaty prevents
finishing the manual before the first CSP. Furthermore, the TL plan
calls for a target of 8 WGB sessions to finish the 3rd round of
elaboration and "targets are not deadlines." The TL indicated that
he would draft text for agreement on the OSI Model Text plan later
in the week.

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72. TL Coxhead opened discussion of Theme Paper 10
(ECS-DIS-WGB-TL-18-IP_10) by reminding the task group that the
non-paper incorporates lessons from IFE08. The TL opened up the

floor for proposed text changes on the subject paper. He also
reiterated that an executive summary would possibly be required on
the preliminary findings report.

73. The U.S. delegation requested clarification on the introduction
to paragraph 11.1.1. of the Model Text, which designates various
mandatory communications between the IT and the Director General as
"reports." The U.S. delegation pointed out that some of the items
identified in this paragraph are not reports according to the Treaty
and the Protocol. By identifying these mandatory communications as
"reports" and requiring a single template be used for all reports,
the Model Text conveys rights of the ISP and obligations on the part
of the IT that are not conveyed by the Treaty.

74. The TL responded that the U.S. observation was noted; however,
WGB would need further discussion about how to address this issue at
a later date.

75. The Iranian delegation raised a fundamental problem with the
word "executive" when discussing the need for a TL-proposed
"executive summary," namely, that it implies that there will be some
further actions required. The TL responded that the executive
summary does not imply any further action and exists in a document
purely to act as a high-level summary.

76. When addressing paragraph 11.6.3, printed vs. electronic copy
of the preliminary findings report, the UK delegation noted that
during the Integrated Field Exercise, the Base of Operations was
being dismantled around the teams while the report was still being
reviewed. The UK felt that having an electronic copy to review
would facilitate better organization for both the Inspected State
Party and the Inspection Team.

77. A PTS representative disagreed and emphasized the need to have
signed and countersigned copies of the preliminary findings report
to ensure confidence in the authenticity of the final document.

78. The Chinese delegation echoed the PTS' comments on the need for
a hardcopy report and further elaborated that, in the Chemical
Weapons Convention, the final report is a signed and countersigned
hard copy because of the concern with potential manipulation of the
electronic copies. The Chinese also noted that the hardcopy should
take precedence over the electronic copy and that if there is an
electronic copy it should not be regarded as official.

79. The TL moved the review on to paragraph 11.6.4 regarding
attachments to the preliminary findings report. The TL counseled
that the word "list" would be replaced with "materials".

80. The U.S. delegation raised an issue about radionuclide sample
analysis. Any analysis performed outside of the inspection area at
designated laboratories would be provided directly to the Director
General, and it was unclear how the Inspection Team would gain
access to this information to include it in the inspection report.

81. The UK delegation offered an explanation: the assumption here
is that results would be from the Inspection Team's on-site
analysis. It was proposed to add the word "available" to make clear
that only 'immediately available' radionuclide sample analyses would
be attached to the report.

82. The Iranian delegation agreed with the UK's clarification and
also raised concerns regarding subparagraph (q). They argued that
WGB cannot ensure highly protected information would not be attached
to the report. The German delegation agreed and argued that highly
protected information should be handled separately. The TL proposed
that a small group should be formed to address the issue of handling
highly protected information.

83. The Chinese delegation agreed with the TL's suggestion of a
small group but also brought up a point for clarification regarding
the legal status of attachments to the report. They were concerned
that it was not clear if the attachments themselves were also to be
signed. The TL recognized the Chinese delegation's concerns and
recommended that the concerns be forwarded to the PTS legal body for

84. The Iranian delegation also raised an issue regarding the
ability at the ISP to provide comments to the preliminary inspection
report. Iran was unsure if the ISP should submit comments through
the ITL or if comments should be submitted directly to the Director

General. The UK argued that this point is inconsequential, because
the ISP would make their case in the Executive Council whether or
not they insert formal comments at the time of delivery of the
inspection report. Iran further suggested that there should be some
sort of mediation period in the Executive Council when the
preliminary inspection report is submitted.

85. France offered that, due to the short timeline of the progress
report review, the ISP should send comments directly to the Director
General to relieve the ITL of any additional burden. The TL took
all remaining comments and closed the floor due to the late hour.
He further commented that this document would be revisited at a
future Working Group B.


86. TL Coxhead opened the floor for discussion of the Theme 5
Paper, Inspection Equipment (ECS-DIS-WGB-TL-18_5). The Iranian
delegation requested clarification on the meaning of "approved
equipment." The UK delegation, a member of which was asked by the
Task Leader to chair the session due to his expertise and
familiarity with the proposed text, provided that, any time the text
refers to approved equipment, it is referring to equipment approved
by the Conference of States Parties. However, the Russian
delegation requested that it be made clear exactly what equipment is
being addressed. As Russian pointed out, there is equipment
approved by the Conference of States Parties, as well as the
approved equipment that is included in the inspection mandate, and
equipment that is approved for use during an OSI by the ISP.

87. The U.S. delegation sought clarification from the TL and from
the floor on what exactly the Technical Secretariat is being asked
to confirm during "certification" of equipment intended for use
during an OSI. In the U.S. view, according to the Protocol, the
Technical Secretariat is certifying that the OSI inspection
equipment has been properly calibrated, maintained, and protected
and nothing more.

88. The Russian delegation disagreed with the U.S. delegation's
characterization of the scope of TS certification, and in a confused
presentation further argued that certification is different than
calibration. The inspection equipment can have more than one
function and the text needs more detail on what equipment serves
which purpose. The Russian delegation argued that because of
differing concepts of the scope of TS certification, the WGB needed
to develop common standards for equipment.

89. The U.S. delegation offered that the intent of the word
"certification" in the Protocol is to confirm that the equipment
meets the requirements of the Treaty. The ISP needs to verify that
the TS has done its job correctly, and as such, must check to make
sure that all equipment has been certified. However, the Russian
delegation would not agree with any of the proposed changes to the
Model Text to reflect the discussion. The TL offered that, based on
time constraints, the issue should be addressed in the next OSI
manual session. All agreed.

90. The U.S. delegation provided revisions for the text in the
theme paper. The task group adopted the U.S. changes as the basis
for discussions. Nearly all of the U.S. changes were adopted, while
some were modified by the discussions but leaving the substance
intact. Different delegations indicated concerns about the specific
paragraphs or general equipment concerns. The Iranian delegation
indicated that the ISP should check all IT equipment at the POE.
The Chinese delegation was concerned about the amount of time to
check. The Italian delegation questioned what "data" would be
loaded onto IT equipment upon its arrival at the point of entry of
the ISP. The Russian delegation insisted that source code for all
software be available for the ISP. PTS suggested that the software
could be validated with a checksum test at familiarization and
compared to the results obtained at the POE.


91. TL Coxhead reviewed his proposed text for the WGB-33 report,
summarizing the deliberations by WGB-33 on the TL Theme Papers and
the future work of WGB on elaborating the Model Text of the OSI

Operational Manual. There was very little objection over the text
until the Iranian delegation objected to the idea of workshops
preparing text for the Operational Manual and for the recognition
that WGB needs addition sessions to address OSI. The Iranian
delegation proposed text that aimed to prevent additional meetings.
The UK delegation suggested that the word "meeting" be dropped so as
to emphasize the need for more time, without prejudice to the
decision on more WGB sessions. The Japanese delegation asked that
the phrase "accelerate consideration by WGB" be inserted in the
draft text of the report. The U.S. delegation pointed out that the
Preparatory Commission is the approving authority for the annual
schedule of WGB meetings and proposed wording that got the Iran
delegation to drop their wording request.

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92. A small group of experts from the U.S. delegation attended a
series of sidebar meetings with the Task Leader Coxhead, members of
the PTS OSI Division and experts from selected delegations
(primarily delegates from the P-5) on the Field Information
Management System (FIMS) being developed by the PTS for OSI. The TL
Coxhead wanted to address the rights of the IT, ISP rights to
observe, and duplication of the data for the ISP, along with an
overview of the FIMS concept of operations. Jean Michelle Millon,
PTS OSI Division project officer, provided a presentation of the
system and answered questions from the U.S. concerning how the FIMS
would work with non-binary data. U.S. experts noted that more
discussion is needed on this issue. John Walker of the UK stated a
concern over the reliance of FIMS on forms at each of Jean
Michelle's concept of operations steps. He stated that unless the
inspectors were thoroughly trained in the FIMS it would cause

93. In its presentation of the FIMS, the PTS acknowledged that the
Seismic Aftershock Monitoring System (SAMS) processed data outside
of FIMS. Russian experts challenged the premise being built into
FIMS. This is a data receiving and classification area that then
sends data into the correct bin. Russian experts did not believe
this would work. U.S. experts discussed the fact that some data
needs to be processed outside of FIMS in order to determine
sensitivity and, therefore, could not be loaded directly into FIMS,
which serves in part as a management tool after a
sensitivity/classification decision. It was also possible for
inadvertent recording of data that is not even recognized by the
team. This data would be relevant to the inspection, processed in
the "green," but subsequently be recognized as classified by the

94. Experts were asked to provide at a subsequent meeting scenarios
for the processing of data collected during the OSI that would be
loaded into FIMS. The Task Leader wanted to run these scenarios
through the FIMS model and generate discussions before the PTS
invested too much time and resources. Italian, French, Chinese, UK
and U.S. experts attended the meeting. Russian experts were absent.
The PTS brought the OSI Division SAMS expert to the meeting to show
how SAMS interfaced with FIMS. He showed that SAMS really does not
interface with FIMS. Experts felt this processing of data outside
of FIMS would be a common occurrence with the data collected with
Continuation Period Technologies. The small group went through a
number of scenarios that demonstrated that it was possible for
higher classification data (defined by the current Operations
Manual) to get into the general data system unless it was "screened"
beforehand. However, the UK expert stated that they had written a
paper (Background Paper for OSI Workshop 13: Clandestine Underground
Nuclear Tests and Confidentiality) on this issue and had concluded
that the amount of higher level data would be only a few percent of
the data collected during an OSI. U.S. and UK experts agree to
produce additional scenarios for further consideration by the


95. The U.S. delegation met with the OSI Operational Manual Task
Leader Coxhead to continue discussions on U.S. perceptions of OSI

Manual Chapter 10 on Confidentiality, discuss answers previously
provided by the Task Leader to a series of questions posed by the
delegation, and listen to what support the Task Leader might need
from the U.S. The U.S. delegation expressed concerns about the use
of three separate levels of confidentiality and the accompanying
"need to know" requirement that would limit access to data, which in
turn could limit OSI IT effectiveness. The Task Leader understood
the arguments and stated that WGB spent a lot of time and capital on
putting together the current Chapter 10. The U.S. delegation voiced
concern about the ability to abuse the levels of confidentiality.
The group discussed reporting templates and how they evolved to
reflect the Preliminary Findings Document template, the fact that
there is no other template specified in the Treaty or its Protocol,
and the concern that without specifying templates in the Operational
Manual, the ISP could object to any other report format.
Additionally, the U.S. delegation expressed concern about the
equipment checking at the point of entry (POE) and the need for a
familiarization process by the State Parties to speed the POE
activities. The Task Leader expressed interest in help in all
aspects of the OSI Operational Manual but singled out review and
revision of text dealing with radionuclides, in particular Noble Gas
sampling strategies, subsurface and aerial for serious consideration
by the U.S.


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96. Task Leader Vitaliy Shchukin opened the first of the three
sessions by showing a training video prepared by the PTS using
footage from IFE08. The video was an illustrated overview of the
entire OSI process that emphasizes major elements of OSI
implementation. Copies of the video were made available to

97. PTS Executive Secretary Tibor Toth attended this session and
summarized the IFE08 as a "defining moment" for the PTS. The
exercise was "... of a scale 1-2 orders of magnitude ..." greater
than any field exercise previously done under any arms control or
nonproliferation treaty or agreement. The exercise involved three
years of preparation with a concentrated involvement of about one
third of the PTS staff over a period of six months. The exercise
has been evaluated by various groups, internal and external to the
PTS, and by several workshops. Toth said that the evaluation review
of the exercise represented a backward look, while the current OSI
Division Action Plan (discussed later) represented a forward look
based on the lessons learned from the exercise. The implementation
of the Action Plan is the next important step in the development of
OSI capability. He pointed out that serious attention will have to
be paid to resources in determining how to support such large events
as IFE08 in the future in light of a "flat" organization (zero real
growth and no increase in staff).

98. Brazil asked if there was a particular benefit from having
IFE08 take place at a former nuclear test site. Kvok indicated that
this was a primary consideration (and benefit) in light of the
observable and detectable signatures that such a site presents.


99. Kvok presented the new OSI Action Plan (CTBT/PTS/INF.1020)
developed by the OSI Division that provides the strategic framework
for the OSI regime over 2009-2013, leading to operational readiness
at entry into force of the Treaty. The Action Plan takes into
account the Evaluation Report on IFE08. Key elements of the Action
Plan are five main areas of OSI development with many detailed
sub-elements and sub-projects. The plan calls for a series of
annual directed exercises leading up to another large scale exercise
in 2013 that will be a major test of OSI readiness. This
presentation provoked considerable discussion among the delegates.

100. TL Shchukin, in reference to the Action Plan, pointed out
three requirements for its implementation: availability of
resources and expertise; importance of reaching agreement on a
definition of OSI readiness; and testing OSI readiness with a large
scale field exercise.

101. General support for the Action Plan was expressed by the UK,
Australia, Israel, Croatia, France, and the U.S. South Africa and
Brazil stated that they were not yet in a position to support the
Action Plan. Several states expressed concern over issues such as
links to (or lack of) a definition of OSI readiness, lack of
priorities for development of Action Plan elements, and the lack of
budget and other resource information. China highlighted technical
issues needing focus and the need for assessments of technical
effectiveness. The U.S. delegation followed guidance (ref A,
paragraph 19) and noted that the Policy Making Organizations (PMO)
have a responsibility to provide guidance and resources to help the
PTS develop the OSI regime.

102. In further discussion on the OSI Action Plan, Iran expressed
the view that the plan should take into account (1) prospects of
entry into force (EIF) of the treaty, (2) availability of resources
to execute the plan, and (3) the sustainability of techniques and
equipment required to carry out an OSI. A major theme in subsequent
comments by Iran was relaxing the time frame for the conclusion of
the Action Plan to allow for unforeseen circumstances. Iran
presented many comments on the report either requesting
clarification or changes. Iran again expressed procedural concerns
about using OSI workshop reports to modify text in OSI Operational
Manual. Surprisingly, Shchukin interpreted Iran's comments as a
general acceptance of Action Plan and Iran did not counter.
Director Kvok further expressed that the document is living (subject
to change) as a strategic vision based on IFE08 about how to reach
readiness by EIF. He made additional comments about evaluating
untested OSI technologies and training of inspectors for OSI. In
response to Iran's concern regarding deadlines, the UK delegation
expressed that the Action Plan is not couched in deadlines but
rather target dates.

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103. Silvia Alamo (Chief, PTS Evaluation Section) gave a
presentation that addressed how OSI techniques, methods, and
components are validated. The approach is to embed quality control
in all project phases using a project-management-based approach,
define quality requirements, and apply quality reviews during
project implementation. She emphasized the need for "ownership" of
evaluations and use of external evaluators. The UK delegation
expressed strong support for the ownership comments. The Iranian
delegation expressed the need to do enough preparation to carry out
proper evaluation. The U.S. delegation supported the UK's comments
and asked if the PTS Evaluation Section becomes involved on exercise
design. Alamo stated that this is not always done well and that it
needs to start earlier in the design process. Japan concurred with
the report and emphasized that independence is a key factor to
successful evaluation.


104. Wang Jun (Chief, Documentation Section, OSI Division) gave a
presentation on OSI Workshop 16 focusing on IFE 08 lessons learned.
Main points of discussion were radionuclide and noble gas sampling
and analysis, visual observation, multispectral and Infra-Red
imaging methods, active seismic methods, and recognition of the
importance of signatures. Wang stated that the technical areas have
been covered at different levels of understanding and detail during
the course of past and current workshops. He observed that there
was a clear drop in intensity and coverage of these OSI technical
areas in 2000 when major players (i.e., the United States) left the
program. Topics (e.g., identification of essential inspection
techniques and equipment, concepts of application of key techniques,
identify key R&D projects, etc.) were listed for upcoming workshops.
Other events proposed for 2010 include further elaboration on draft
text for the operational manual and underground nuclear explosion
phenomenology (signatures).

105. The U.S. delegation asked the planned location and time for
the next workshop, learning that no venue or date have been set,
although it may be near Vienna. The UK delegation expressed that
future topics should include drilling. The Iranian delegation
expressed procedural concern that workshop recommendations should
not be directly used in OSI-related text development without first

being considered by WGB. The Brazilian delegation also stated that
it could not support endorsements of workshop recommendations,
although it will take note of reports but not rubber stamp
endorsements from a workshop. In support of adopting workshop
recommendations, the U.S. noted that there are two types of
workshops (those sponsored by a State Signatory and those sponsored
by WGB) and that OSI Workshop-16 was a WGB workshop. Italy agreed
with U.S. position. TL Shchukin acknowledged that consensus could
not be obtained for WGB endorsement of the recommendations of OSI


106. TL Shchukin stated that WGB is to produce a revision of its
milestones covering the next several years. Regarding Shchukin's
paper on the revised milestones (CTBT/WGB/TL-4/37), Iran questioned
whether there was a clear picture of the readiness level of the CTBT
OSI regime at EIF. Further discussion by UK, U.S., Iran and Japan
ensued on readiness at EIF. Iran made the suggestion, supported by
Germany and Australia, to add information to the OSI milestones on
the anticipated state of readiness as of the last day of the
Conference of States Parties. The U.S. delegation expressed the
concern that more detailed information was needed to describe
readiness levels, the timing and interrelationships of the various
steps comprising the basic elements of the OSI development program,
and that the WGB Milestones also should reflect elements for which
WGB is responsible, not just the tasks for which the PTS is
responsible. Brazil suggested streamlining documents and combining
them where possible. France supported the U.S. view on the
structure of the OSI Milestones and for the redesign of the table in
the document.


107. The PTS briefed WGB on paper CTBT/PTS/INF 1018 OSI Equipment
Conceptual Idea; Refinement of specifications for testing and
training. This led to a confused conversation because the equipment
did not appear to be thought of in the context of operations for an
OSI. Most of the equipment was shallow electromagnetic and did not
reflect field results and experiences of the states parties. The
Israeli delegation suggested a workshop on equipment. The Egyptian
delegation queried whether the equipment was for use in the initial
vs. continuation phase. It appeared to be continuation phase
technologies but the PTS was using it in the initial phase. The
Iranian delegation wanted more details on the uses of the equipment
at a non technical discussion level.


108. The PTS then briefed WGB on the 2nd OSI Training Cycle. This
will increase the number of surrogate inspectors from 50 to 100
prior to the 2013 large scale exercise. The plan was generally
accepted, but delegations asked specific questions. The U.S.
delegation asked how the inspectors were evaluated, since trainees
were volunteers. Italy asked if the PTS had the resources to carry
out the plan. The PTS responded that they were using consultants
for the advanced courses. The UK delegation queried about how the
refresher training of the first 50 would be done. Brazil queried
what the qualification for visual observation was. Iran requested
the P5 train inspectors on visual observation and phenomenology. It
also became clear in the discussions that each country expected to
nominate at least one inspector to fill the 50 new inspectors.
Nearly all nominees have no experience in nuclear matters or on-site
inspection. PTS was putting together a new note verbale to better
specify the inspectors' qualifications.


109. TL Shchukin indicated he saw general acceptance by WGB of the
PTS presentations and encouraged them to move forward. Iran
indicated it was nervous about which options the PTS would choose as
it moved forward. PTS showed the OSI budget for next year. The
overall PTS budget is flat but OSI is going to have a 23 percent

increase. The Task Leader then showed the subjects to be addressed
in next Working Group B. The UK delegation led a discussion on
whether the WGB Radionuclide Experts Group could be tasked to
address OSI questions. The Task Leader was going to put together a
tasking and discuss with other task leader.


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