South Korea on Verge of Launching Satellite

South Korea on Verge of Launching Satellite

Jane’s Intelligence Review Investigates

LONDON (19th August 2009) – IHS Jane’s reports that South Korea is on the threshold of launching a satellite using its first domestically constructed launch vehicle.

The development of South Korea's space programme has largely been shaped by the inter-Korean security dilemma and United States constraints on missile technology.

Although development so far has been encouraged by competitive rivalry with North Korea, budget constraints are likely to limit any future 'space race' dynamics.

The launch follows delays that have hindered the project from the outset. On 2 June 2009, after four years of setbacks, South Korea's National Space Committee approved the launch proposal submitted by the Korea Aerospace Research Institute (KARI) for 30 July. Technical problems forced the launch to be postponed and re-scheduled for 19 August 2009.

Jane’s Intelligence Review Editor, Christian LeMiere explained, “There is also a military or national security aspect to South Korea's space programme, particularly in the realm of intelligence collection. South Korea depends on the US for a considerable amount of intelligence data, which makes many South Koreans uncomfortable.

“In the case of North Korea's nuclear tests and ballistic missile exercises, the inability to collect real-time intelligence from satellites has concerned a number of South Korean officials.”

The two-stage Naro-1 is planned to place the Science and Technology Satellite-2 (STSAT-2 or Kwahakkisulwisong-2), into low earth orbit. If successful, the launch will mark a milestone in South Korea's space programme, making it the 10th country to possess an independent satellite launch capability.

IHS Jane’s History of the Korean Space Programme

In the mid-1980s, North Korea's then-leader Kim Il-sung initiated the planning for the country's space programme and formed a national Committee of Space Technology that has overall executive direction of the programme to this day.

North Korea's Space Launch Vehicles (SLV) are based on modifying three tactical missiles: the Russian SCUD; its successor, the North Korean scaled-up SCUD called the Nodong; and the Russian SS-N-6 (R-27) which was copied and reverse-engineered from the 1980s to the early 2000s. Three launches of the SLVs have taken place: the Paektusan-1/Taepodong-1 in 1998; the Paektusan-2/probable Unha-2 in 2006; and Unha-2 in 2009. A follow-on SLV larger than the Unha-2 is probably under development.

These SLVs carried one of two variants of Kwangmyongsong satellites, both of which were primarily propaganda missions to glorify Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il, and demonstrate to their citizens that the country is in the forefront of space activity. North Korea claimed both the 1998 and 2009 SLV launches were successful and the satellites were transmitting revolutionary songs, although this was denied by NORAD Russia.

Jane’s Intelligence Review Forecast

North and South Korea have pursued parallel space programmes, with their origins in ballistic missile programmes. However, their paths to an indigenously launched satellite have been different. While South Korea has been hindered by its bilateral MoU with the US, it has benefited from external assistance and co-operation, developing satellites and finally a launch complex and SLV. By contrast, North Korea has progressed from externally supplied missiles without significant outside help but equally without any legal hindrance. Pyongyang has therefore been able to concentrate on the delivery vehicles rather than the satellites, albeit with little success.

The motivations for these space programmes are both strategic and political. South Korea, for example, is inspired by several factors in developing its space programme, including national prestige, scientific nationalism and the expectation of external benefits from space development. Moreover, its National Space Committee includes ministers with prominent cabinet portfolios, so in some respects the space programme can be seen as a political issue with perceived benefits for various ministries. As the cabinet expects to capture benefits from the space programme and the National Assembly must pass budgets to support it, public support for the space programme is critical.

For Pyongyang, developing an indigenous satellite capability could have potential military benefits, although the rudimentary nature of its current satellites suggest this is a secondary motivation. Rather, the national pride to be gained from developing an indigenous satellite capability of any form is more likely a driving force behind the programme.

This was made apparent by official statements through the state-run media. Immediately after the April 2009 launch, KCNA called the satellite payload a "shining product of self-reliance". To be able to develop this capability before its rival, South Korea, would be a significant fillip to the Kim Jong-il regime, particularly at a time of uncertainty over the country's political succession. In addition, the possibility that North Korea could use its SLV capabilities as an international launch centre for other states, with concomitant commercial benefits, is likely to further motivate Pyongyang's programme.

Such factors suggest a 'space race' has been ongoing between North and South Korea since the 1980s, with both competing to become the first to launch a satellite. The South Korean media and some politicians often compare the status of the two programmes. North Korea's advantage in long-range missile and SLV development is commonly mentioned as undesirable and something to be surmounted.

However, any future competition is likely to be limited. Seoul denies space race dynamics with Pyongyang are a motivating factor in its space programme, with various other commercial, military and domestic political benefits of a space programme encouraging the satellite and SLV development. In addition, South Korea's pursuit of international co-operation and commitment to exploring outer space peacefully combined with budget constraints will preclude Seoul from embarking on large-scale and accelerated SLV development. South Korea's next generation KSLV-2 programme will proceed, but is likely to take several years before reaching fruition.

LeMiere conclude, “In the meantime, North Korea will also continue its space programme, but problems over SLV reliability will ensure that South Korea will be able to demonstrate its superiority over its neighbour's space capabilities. The inter-Korean space race therefore appears to be between an eager tortoise and a disinclined hare.”

IHS Jane’s is an IHS (NYSE: IHS) company.

ENDS

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