Written Statement to Human Rights Sub-Committee, Canberra Au

A Written Statement to the Human Rights Sub-Committee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade, House Representatives of Australia Canberra, 28 February 2012

Papua Update by Budi Hernawan OFM and Yusuf Sawaki on behalf of Indonesian Solidarity

Key issues:

1. Dialogue “Jakarta-Papua [1].” On 9 November 2011, President Yudhoyono signaled a green light by publicly using the term ‘dialogue’ to convey his willingness to talk to Papuans on three conditions: (1) the dialogue will not undermine the territorial integrity of Indonesia, (2) it will discuss the failure of the implementation of the Special Autonomy, and (3) it will discuss developmentrelated issues. This signal opens a new space for negotiations with Jakarta. For example, meetings with the Papuan Church leaders have been held twice in the last two months. During the second meeting, President Yudhoyono gave an order to Vice President Boediono to prepare the negotiations in collaboration with Papua Peace Network led by Father Neles Tebay, a Catholic priest and theologian.

However, this preliminary engagement remains fragile. Papuan leadership remains divided because any processes to build Papuan leadership has confronted both internal disputes among Papuans and repression from the Indonesian government almost at every stage. The latest example is the arbitrary arrest and detention of Mr Forkorus Yaboisembut c.s. who is now on trial charged with treason.

Also, the national government institutions differ in their interpretations of what dialogue might mean. One approach is that dialogue should be about Papua not between Jakarta and Papua. Others argue that dialogue should include anything but the territorial integrity of Indonesia. Others propose an Aceh-like model of bipartisan dialogue mediated by an international party. Others simply try to co-opt the whole initiative altogether.

2. Continuing violence. In the last six months, we observe that some hot spots e.g. the highlands (Puncak Jaya and Paniai) and the area around Freeport mine, the world’s largest cold and copper mine in Timika, remains unresolved. The violence stems from the continuing fight between Papuan Freedom Fighters and the Indonesian security forces and police. In Timika in particular, the rivalry between different units in the Indonesian army and the police has contributed to the increase of random shootings in the last three months. To date, the police are not able to explain why these shootings occurred randomly and took lives of innocent people.

3. Militarisation of Papua. Since the incorporation of Papua into Indonesia, Papua has been militarised. Militarisation is not limited to the physical presence of the Indonesian security forces and its infrastructure, which are already excessive (see the appendix), but perhaps more importantly, its influence on our daily life, Papuan mentality, politics, culture and society. The latest research by Imparsial (2011) [2], a Jakarta-based NGO, suggests that there is a direct link between the excessive presence of the Indonesian military and the infringement of human rights of Papuans. Drawing on the literature on the impact of militarisation of a society for a long period of time (e.g. Northern Ireland, South Africa etc), militarisation has contributed to the increased level of violence and crimes at the communal level. One explanation is that people tend to take for granted violence as part of their daily life. This phenomenon can be observed in Papua, particularly in areas where the presence of the Indonesian security forces is excessive. Moreover, the influence of the army on the local government remains significant. Let alone in the judicial system when it comes to political cases. The latest example is the show of force exhibited by the Indonesian police and army during the court proceedings for the case of treason against Mr Yaboisembut cs3. The principle of fair trials and the independence of judiciary have been significantly undermined not only by the excessive presence but also by public comments of the Papuan Chief of Police and the Commander of the Army in Papua that have already preempted the impartial and objective hearings of the court.

4. Questions of welfare. Despite the dramatic increase of the provincial budget under the Special Autonomy scheme, Papua with a population of 3,5 million4 remains the second lowest in term welfare of the people out of 33 provinces in Indonesia. Papua is ahead only of Western Nusa Tenggara province which has a 3 population of 4,5 million5 and much lesser natural resources and local income. The Human Development Index published by UNDP records that Papuan remains the lowest in terms of household income, years of schooling and live expectancy. These three issues are exactly among the top priority of the Special Autonomy. Internally, Papua continues to suffer from growing inequality between a small Papuan elite who have access to all benefits and public services and the vast majority or ordinary people who live under the poverty line. Similarly, the widening gap between the economic migrants (2.2 million or 60% of Papuan population) and the indigenous Papuans (1.4 million or 40% of Papuan population) remains unresolved. The low welfare standard, continuing violence, the excessive presence of the security forces, and the hope for dialogue have converged in Papuan aspirations for independence. The growing Papuan expectations pose a serious question as who can manage them. In this context, dialogue would be the best option to pave the way for feasible solutions.

Key recommendations for the Committee: 1. Support the political will of the SBY administration in its willingness to start dialogue with Papuans 2. Invite major power in Asia (e.g. India, Japan, China) and the Pacific (Pacific Island Forum) to express their support for this process publicly 3. Call for Indonesia to open up the isolation of Papua from international engagement to comply with Indonesia’s international obligations (e.g. donors, international NGOs, UN bodies) 4. Call for Indonesia to release Papuan political prisoners and to respect the independence of judiciary by preventing the police and the army intervening in the court proceedings of the case of Mr Yaboisembut c.s.

[1] In this statement we use the term “Papua” to refer to the Western half of New Guinea Island. Under the current government administration, this area consists of two provinces: West Papua and Papua provinces.

[2 ]ARAF, A., ALIABBAS, A., MANTO, A., REZA, B. I., SATRIYA, C., MAHRURI, G., NURHASYA, J., SIMUN, J., SAFA'AT, M. A. & INDARTI, P. 2011. Sekuritisasi Papua: Implikasi Pendekatan Keamanan terhadap Kondisi HAM di Papua, Jakarta, Imparsial. This constitutes the first critical assessment of measuring the impact of the physical presence of the Indonesian military on human rights of Papuans. The presence of the Indonesian military in Papua is classified into two categories: regular troops and non-regular troops. The regulars are those who are permanently stationed in Papua and the non-regulars are those who are rotated across Indonesia. The latter category includes Kopassus, the Indonesian army special forces, and four infantry battalions stationed along the border with Papua New Guinea. The research estimates that the regular troops comprise 8.045 army, 1.272 navy, 570 air force troops (p. 354-5).

[3] Mr Forkorus Yaboisembut is among five Papuans who have been charged with treason following the declaration of the independent state of the West Melanesia as the conclusion of the Third Papuan Congress on 19 October 2011. The four others include Mr Edison Waromi, Mr Selpius Bobii, Mr Dominikus Sorabut and Mr August Kraar.

[4] See Indonesian Bureau of Statistics http://www.bps.go.id/tab_sub/view.php?tabel=1&daftar=1&id_subyek=12¬ab=1 accessed on 25 February 2012

ENDS

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