U.S. State Dept Daily Press Briefing: 30 July 2007

Tom Casey, Deputy Spokesman
Washington, DC
July 30, 2007
12:35 p.m. EDT

U.S. State Dept Daily Press Briefing: 30 July 2007

INDEX:

Middle East

Determining Quantity & Cost of Equipment, Systems and Supplies to the Middle East
Preliminary Consultations with Congress on Military Aid
Khalilzad Comments / Saudi Aid and Support in Combating Terrorism
Number One Issue: Stability and Security in Iraq
Long History of U.S. Commitment to Security of Friends and Allies

Pakistan

123 Agreement / U.S. Relationship with Pakistan

India

Presentation of Formal 123 Agreement to Congress for Review and Approval

Tunisia

Release of Activist Lawyer Abu

Russia

Missile Defense Meetings / Sergei Kislyak to Represent Russia

Afghanistan

Taliban Should Release Hostages / Support for Afghanistan and South Korea’s Governments

North Korea

Envoy Level 6 Party Talks in August

Iraq

O’Hanlon and Pollack Assessment of Political Process in Iraq
Political Leadership Must Act to Resolve Issues / September Assessment

Japan

Japanese Elections

Serbia

U.S. Supports Serbia Ascension to the EU, but there Remain Some Obstacles
U.S. Dedication to the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo

TRANSCRIPT:

MR. CASEY: Okay. Well, good afternoon, everybody. I know that many of your colleagues are out and about on their way on the road with the Secretary. I don't have anything to start you off with, so Matt.

QUESTION: Yeah. Tom, on the Secretary's statement from this morning and then Under Secretary Burns' comments, I'm confused as to -- or puzzled as to why you guys can not come up with a -- if, in fact, there is a notional list of weaponry that is to be sold to the Saudis and the other Gulf countries, why it is that you can't say what -- you know, how much money we're talking about here at the moment. It is because you plan to refine that notional list that Under Secretary Burns talked about or because you expect the Congress to do it for you?

MR. CASEY: Well, it's a couple of things, Matt. First of all, I think as Nick said this morning, clearly, this'll be a package that ultimately will be in the billions of dollars, but there are two other factors involved here. One is, while we got a preliminary idea and a preliminary list of equipment and supplies and other kinds of systems that the countries would want to buy, part of it is determining the quantities involved. Part of it also, as Nick said, is that once we actually begin these formal consultations, there may be other -- they may decide -- some of the countries involved may decide that their needs actually are in a somewhat different direction. So it's pretty hard to really even offer you an estimate of that.

I think if you look, for example, at some of the things that have been done in the past -- in the 1990s, there was a $9 billion package of sales to Saudi Arabia for F-15s there. I believe the AWACS sales, when they occurred, were 3 or 4 billion dollars at the time. So I think you can get a sense of magnitude from some of the things that have gone on in the past, but I think we're just reluctant to try and put a range on that price tag just because until we've had these consultations in the next few weeks, it's very hard to really come up, even, with a ballpark figure.

QUESTION: Well, is the notional list that you have, is it greater than 9 billion or 3 or 4 billion or -- and if that's just for the -- if that was just for the Saudis, then, you know, we're talking about countries like Kuwait, which is -- you know, compared to Saudi, relatively microscopic in size and probably doesn't need the same.

MR. CASEY: Well, exactly, and again, I'm using that example -- that sale as an example of some of the things that we've done in the past. And frankly, this process and what we've announced here today has far more continuity to it than it does novelty in terms of our support for the defensive needs of some of these countries. But look, you know, whether you're buying 10 of one kind of aircraft or a hundred of one kind of aircraft makes a pretty huge difference in the amounts involved. And again, until we get a chance to sit down with these countries and talk to them about it, I think it's pretty hard to really come up with a number that, in any honest way, answers that question.

The other thing, in terms of Congress' role in this, we have consulted preliminarily with Congress on this. We did before making this announcement here, but obviously, the congressional role in any of these kinds of military sales, again, as it has been in the past, is very important. And as we move forward with these consultations, we'll then be talking to Congress both informally as we move through that discussion, as well as formally when we get to the point of actually having a package to be able to notify them about.

QUESTION: All right. Well, am I wrong in thinking that if there is a notional list, there is a notional price tag attached to that list?

MR. CASEY: Not as far as the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, who will be conducting those consultations, knows.

Yeah.

QUESTION: There's been a lot of talk about -- that Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, particularly the UAE, have been undermining the process in Iraq, perhaps even fueling the insurgency; the Sunni insurgency. Yesterday, Ambassador Khalilzad spoke out about this; said Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states are being most unhelpful in undermining the Iraqi Government. Is this the right time to be rewarding them for this kind of behavior?

MR. MCCORMACK: Well, Elise, I think you heard Nick talk about this again a little bit this morning. We view these actions today as very much in keeping with our longstanding commitments to our friends and partners in the region, and very much an opportunity to demonstrate that the United States intends to work with those countries that are forces for moderation that have that longstanding security and military relationships with us, to help them be able to deal with the potential threats that are out there, including the threats posed by Iran and Syria and their alliance and their continuing support for terrorist organizations.

I'd also just want to remind people, too, that in addition to what we're talking about for the Gulf states and for Egypt, we're also talking about a $30 billion package for the state of Israel, as well, to make sure that Israel maintains its qualitative military edge and is able to answer all of its defensive requirements as well. So this is really a comprehensive package, and it's designed to support our broader security interests in the region.

Now, in terms of Saudi Arabia and Saudi Arabia's relationship with Iraq, we certainly want the Saudi Government and we want the Gulf Cooperation Council governments -- we want all the states in the region to support the Maliki government to help it advance its efforts to build peace and security in a stable country there.

And you do ask more of your friends. And I suspect that, as you've heard from others in the Administration over the last few days, that we will be talking to the Saudis and to others about what they can do to meet some of the commitments they've already made in terms of providing aid and support; in terms of, for example, establishing diplomatic contacts and formal relations there, as well as what we can all do to help combat the problems of terrorism in Iraq, and that includes what we can do to cut off the pipeline of fighters through Syria as well as the support that Iran is providing to militia groups there.

But I think if you look at what the Saudi Government's done, I saw General Petraeus this morning speak to this question, has said that the Saudis have been very effective in patrolling what is a long and porous desert border and that they're certainly making efforts to try and prevent people from going to Iraq to join in with terrorist activities there.

QUESTION: Well --

MR. CASEY: Of course, you do have a problem, however, where you have a pipeline in a series of networks that we are trying to combat and trying to work on together, but one that's aided and abetted by the Syrian Government.

QUESTION: Well, there seems to be a little inconsistency, then, with what Ambassador Khalilzad was saying. I mean, he wasn't just saying that they were looking the other way or not doing enough to crack down on the pipeline. He was suggesting that they were deliberately undermining the process by supporting the Sunni insurgency and not acting as a force for moderation. So when you consider this particular arms package, obviously, I know, as you say, it's for your own defensive interest, but are you placing or do you intend to place any conditions on this package that Saudi Arabia or any other Gulf states don't take steps to undermine the process deliberately?

MR. CASEY: Well, I didn't actually see Zal's comments, though I know they were on a very important show on a very important network.

QUESTION: They were. The most.

MR. CASEY: But -- absolutely. But of course, you know, Ryan Crocker, our current Ambassador in Baghdad, has spoken to this issue. I know Zal has in the past and others have as well. Look, we all want to see everyone do what they can to help the Iraqi Government move forward. But at the same time, I think it's important that for all the states in the region, that they understand that the United States has a longstanding commitment to their security and to our national security interests in the region. And what this package is about, just like previous military assistance that's been provided to these countries, is advancing those broader security concerns.

One thing that's clear, it's certainly not going to help the cause of peace and security in Iraq or peace and security in the Broader Middle East to not have the defensive needs of these countries met at a time when those standing on the other side of the issue, specifically Iran and Syria and the terrorist groups they support, are actively trying to expand their influence.

QUESTION: Yeah, I understand, but just one more. I mean --

MR. CASEY: Sure.

QUESTION: How -- I understand about their defensive needs on Iran and other issues, but it sounds like by undermining the process in Iraq, they're going against your defensive needs.

MR. CASEY: Well, again, and you heard Nick say this this morning, the -- issue number-one for us is always going to be trying to promote security and stability in Iraq. And we have had cooperation from the Saudis and from other countries on that specific issue. Do we want them to do more? Yes. We want everyone to do more because until we're in a position where we are able to establish a secure and peaceful Iraq, then we want everyone to redouble their efforts and make what kinds of actions they can to help move this process forward.

But again, I'm sure this will be part and will be a very important part of the consultations that the Secretary and Secretary Gates have during the trip that they're just about to begin today. But what's important is that we continue to understand and work with the governments of the Gulf, whether that's Saudi Arabia or Kuwait or the UAE or others, as exactly what they are, which is allies with us and friends who have a common objective in Iraq and a common objective for the region and then one that stands very much in contrast with the countries who are actively undermining the process in Iraq, such as Iran and Syria.

Nina.

QUESTION: Following up on this, some would say that this initiative will spark some kind of regional arms race. What would you say to those critics?

MR. CASEY: Well, as I mentioned to Matt earlier, there's a long history that goes back to the early 1980s of the United States providing major arms sales to the countries of the region. That began in the early '80s with the AWACS sales to Saudi Arabia. As I mentioned, in the last decade or so, we've done substantial multi-billion dollar defensive sales for Saudi Arabia and for other countries. So it's hard to see how what is, frankly, the continuation of a multi-decade policy, is somehow changing the military balance in the region or is somehow sparking something new. This is more, again, about continuity than it is about any new or different approach to regional security.

But what it does do at this particular moment is send a very clear signal, again, to Iran and to Syria and to those who are seeking to destabilize the region, who are seeking to expand their influence at the expense of forces of moderation in the region, that the United States is committed to the security of our friends and allies, and that we're going to make sure that they have what they need to be able to defend themselves against these threats.

QUESTION: Are you not concerned that this move will antagonize Iran even further and perhaps will bolster internal support for its president?

MR. CASEY: Well, look, I think it's pretty clear to us that the Iranian President doesn't particularly care about what anyone thinks, and certainly doesn't care what his own people think, because if he cared about what his own people think, he'd actually be trying to engage the international community. He'd be trying to engage with us in dealing with Iran's nuclear program. He'd be trying to engage with us in resolving some of the issues in Iraq, rather than subverting the government and trying to actively undermine it by supporting extremist militia groups.

In terms of how this will be viewed -- we will be viewed in the region, we hope what it will be viewed in the region as is a strong statement, again, that the United States is standing with its friends and allies. I think, internally in Iran -- again, I don't think the Iranian people want to be isolated. They certainly are very proud of their country, very proud of their culture and heritage. They want to be engaged with the result of the world.

And I think it's pretty clear to us, and I hope it's clear to them, that the actions that their government is taking are driving them further into isolation and driving them further away from a time when they can have the kind of relationship with the rest of the world that they'd want to.

Yeah.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. CASEY: Sure.

QUESTION: Tom, arms race in a different part of the globe in South Asia: Pakistan has again challenged the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Deal by test-firing another missile capable of carrying nuclear weapons. Where do we stand as far as -- because they are saying they have not gotten the deal, India is getting the deal, so they will continue to test.

MR. CASEY: I seem to be repeating Nick Burns all day today, but let me try it again. As you heard from Nick on Friday, with relation to the formalization and the agreement on the so-called 123 agreement, the critical piece required under our law to implement the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Accord, we believe that we have a relationship with India that's important and we have a relationship with Pakistan that's important.

In the case of India, we’ve moved forward with this arrangement because, as the President said and as you heard from Nick on Friday, India has been a responsible actor. It's been outside the nonproliferation regimes, but it's actually behaved responsibly. It hasn't proliferated weapons technology. It hasn't done anything to undermine international assurances.

And we want to be able to bring India into the mainstream here and what we've done with this agreement overall, as well as with the specific step of the 123 agreement, is take us one more step closer towards bringing the vast majority of India's nuclear capabilities, specifically, their civilian nuclear side, into the nonproliferation mainstream. And we believe that's something that strengthens nonproliferation regimes throughout the world. It’s something that Dr. ElBaradei from the IAEA believes so as well. And so we're going to continue with this agreement and continue with it based on those very rationale and logic behind it.

In terms of our relationship with Pakistan, again, as Nick said on Friday, we have a very important relationship with Pakistan. We particularly have it with respect to what is our number-one national priority, which is working around the world to combat the threat of terrorism posed by al-Qaida and other extremist groups. And we're going to continue with that. We also want to see that there be dialogue between India and Pakistan, dialogue that has expanded and has grown under the leadership of President Musharraf and others. So, you know, this is not something that should be viewed as somehow, something -- an action that we take with India that somehow requires a similar action in the case of Pakistan.

And I think we've also been very clear that because of the issues with proliferation from Pakistan, that it's a very different situation between those two countries. And the fact that we have this agreement with India now is a clear recognition that there is a real difference.

QUESTION: Just quick follow-up. What Secretary feels about this latest missile test? And also, you think this agreement will go through before Congress leaves for vacation?

MR. CASEY: Well, in terms of the missile test, I think Sean spoke to that on Friday and I'll leave it there. What she thinks about it, I'm sure your colleagues may take the opportunity to ask her while she's on travel here.

As far as the congressional schedule for this agreement, as Nick said, before this can be presented to Congress, two other things have to happen. First of all, India has to finalize its safeguards agreement with the IAEA and then secondly, we have to work with our partners in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to develop an exception for India to be able to move forward with that. Once those two steps are done, we'll be able to present the formal 123 Agreement with all these accompanying steps to Congress for their review and approval. And I think we're looking at doing that sometime in the fall, but obviously, that's contingent on these other two steps moving forward.

QUESTION: But Tom, one more quick -- I'm sorry.

MR. CASEY: You've had enough chances.

QUESTION: Can she sign the agreement before even Congress follows 123 Agreement finalized during her --

MR. CASEY: Well, again, we need to have -- the agreement itself has now been finalized between the two countries. We need these two additional steps before we send it to Congress in terms of signing dates or other things. I have to leave it to the lawyers on that one. But the important point is, is that we're moving forward with this. We do need to get these other two pieces in place before presenting it to Congress and then we look forward to having an opportunity to discuss it with the members on the Hill and hopefully to see them approve what we believe is a deal that's in the best interests of the United States and the best interests of India.

Samir.

QUESTION: Do you have any comment on the release from prison of Tunisian activist lawyer Mohamed Abbou last week?

MR. CASEY: Just for you, Samir, we do.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. CASEY: I do want to -- I did -- and thank you for giving that to us a little earlier. We did look into this. And I do want to tell you that the United States welcomes the release of activist lawyer Mohamed Abbou by the Tunisian Government on July 24th and his release marks the end of his imprisonment for more than two years. This is an important step forward, we believe, for the cause of human rights and freedom of expression in Tunisia. And we welcome this development again and would urge the Tunisian Government to continue to take steps that are consistent with its own declared intentions to pursue democratic reform. And certainly, allowing greater freedom of expression is one of the hallmarks of that.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. CASEY: Yeah.

Sir.

QUESTION: There's a delegation here from Russia to discuss the missile defense issue. Can you tell me who is on the -- who are they meeting on the U.S. side and do you have any idea -- Sergei Kislyak, who's leading the delegation -- who else would be participating in it and how they're going to be structured, how it's envisioned?

MR. CASEY: All good questions and all ones I'll pretty much have to get you answers on. I understand that Ambassador Kislyak is here representing the Russian side. I know he'll be talking with Dan Fried and some of his other counterparts in the European Affairs Bureau. In terms of a readout of the conversations, they did just get underway today. And I will try and get you a readout on them this afternoon, but I really don’t have anything going in right now.

Yeah.

QUESTION: Thank you, Tom. Regarding the South Korean missionary (inaudible) in South Africa -- Afghanistan --

MR. CASEY: Yeah.

QUESTION: Yes. Secretary Rice and South Korean Foreign Minister Song Min-soon had a conversation last weekend regarding that situation. Could you tell us what is the content of the conversation?

MR. CASEY: Well, I know -- I think the last conversation I have recorded between them was back on Wednesday of last week, so I don't believe they had a conversation over the weekend, unless my list is not up to date here. But look, I think, again, we want to be very careful in discussing this issue. This is obviously a difficult time for the families of the hostages and for the Government of South Korea and the Government of Afghanistan as well.

Our main point that we have stressed in all our conversations, including, I'm sure, in discussions of this issue that the Secretary might have had, is to simply show our -- ask our support, show our support for the Government of South Korea and the Government of Afghanistan and their efforts to resolve this issue. And just to reiterate again what we've said repeatedly, which is that these individuals should be released unharmed, should be allowed to go back home to their families. And that's certainly the conclusion we want to see.

QUESTION: What does the Secretary Rice feels about -- to save their lives in Afghanistan?

MR. CASEY: Sorry, I'd -- say -- could you say that again?

QUESTION: Save their lives, I mean, the missionaries' lives.

MR. CASEY: Well, certainly, we want to see these people be able to be returned home. They certainly have not done anything that would warrant them -- no one has done anything that would warrant them being kidnapped or being taken hostage. And it's absolutely, unfortunately, part of the hallmark of the Taliban that they will engage in these kinds of activities and will engage in all kinds of other vicious attacks, both on foreigners in that country trying to help the citizens there, as well as on Afghanis themselves.

I know I've heard President Karzai speak to this issue and say this is a cowardly act. I know that there are religious scholars and a religious council in Afghanistan that's condemned the taking of hostages and particularly the taking of female hostages, so -- as being contrary to Islam. So certainly, I think there is widespread rejection of this. And everyone believes that these people are innocent and need to be able to get home.

Mio.

QUESTION: On the six-party talks, any update on the working groups and when they're going to be meeting and where yet?

MR. CASEY: No, I don't believe anything's been scheduled. I'm sure there are a number of people that are looking at when and where we can do that, but I think as Chris said, you can look forward to seeing those groups meet in August and then seeing a subsequent meeting at the envoys-level six-party talks.

QUESTION: You don't think they're going (inaudible)?

MR. CASEY: No, not yet. Again, I think we're looking -- or expecting they'll be taking place in August, but at this point, they're still working out logistics on them.

Nina.

QUESTION: On Iraq, please -- you've probably seen the op-eds in the New York Times. One by O'Hanlon's pretty positive. But one criticism he does have is, he says that Iraqi politicians continue to dawdle and maneuver for position against one another. What would -- what's your reaction to that? Would you say it's a fair assessment?

MR. CASEY: Well, I leave it -- you know, these guys, Mr. O'Hanlon and Ken Pollack, spent some time out in the region and spent some time in Iraq. And I do think that what they've written is a fairly positive assessment, albeit a cautious one, of what's happening there.

Look, in terms of the political process in Iraq, again, I think Ambassador Crocker has spoken to this one fairly clearly too -- this is something -- these are difficult existential issues for the Iraqis to deal with and for the Iraqi political system. That doesn't mean that they're getting a pass. They need to act and they have to act. And from the Prime Minister on down, they know they do. But the process of building the kinds of political compromises on these issues is a difficult one and we're going to support them in whatever way we can. We're also going to be urging them, as we have in the past, to make these compromises, to make the kind of fundamental agreements and the difficult compromises that are necessary for Iraq to be a stable and functioning society that serves its own people well.

But this is fundamentally a commitment that they have, not to us, but to their own people, and it's one that they have to fulfill. And we certainly need to see action on a wide number of issues, including the ones that were talked about in the benchmarks report, as well as other kinds of progress, not only at the national-political level, but at the local level. We have seen positive things happen in the regions and in the provinces. We need to see, though, more done at the national level to resolve some of these broader issues that are there and pass some of the legislation that we all know is necessary.

QUESTION: Well, with that (inaudible) --

MR. CASEY: Yeah.

QUESTION: -- what do you make of the parliament deciding to go ahead -- or beginning today, its month-long vacation that you had argued --

QUESTION: Well, it was two months, wasn't it?

MR. CASEY: Well, look, I'll certainly let the Iraqi parliament explain why it's taking its recess and how long it's doing it for. The fact remains there are a lot of issues on the table that the Iraqi parliament needs to take action on, as well as the broader Iraqi political establishment. We certainly hope that during the parliamentary recess, the Prime Minister and other political leaders in the country will be working as hard as they can on developing some of the kinds of proposals that the legislature can then view when it comes back into session. But there's a lot of work to be done in Iraq. I'll leave it to the parliamentary leaders themselves to explain why this might be a good time to take a break.

QUESTION: Well, doesn't it -- do you see any way that the legislation that are included as part of the benchmarks that are supposed to be reviewed again in mid-September -- is there any way that these are going to -- they're going to be able to get these done if they're going to take the next month off?

MR. CASEY: Well, Matt, you know, I'm not going to try and handicap where they come out in September and we'll certainly all have an opportunity when Ambassador Crocker and General Petraeus make their report to Congress to look at where we are and where we're not. What I do know is that in the Iraqi political system, the political leadership, the leaders of the individual parties have a great deal of influence over what actually gets put before the legislature and whether those compromises are ultimately successful.

Whether the parliament is in session or not, I think we expect that all of Iraq's political leadership is going to be continuing to work on those kinds of issues and work out the kinds of compromises so that when the parliament does come back into session, there will be something there for them to vote on and them to act on. But again, this is not just about having the votes. It's about doing the work in advance so that there's actually legislation there that folks can agree on.

QUESTION: Yeah, well -- but in fact, that's not -- that's entirely opposite to what you just said because it is -- the benchmark is a vote and is -- is the passage of this legislation, which -- unless you're suggesting that somehow, they're going to be able to do this while they're not in session, I don't --

MR. CASEY: Well, what I'm suggesting to you is that we fully expect that the leaders of the political parties in Iraq, those who have crafted the legislation that has been passed successfully over the last few months, and I guess there's been about 60 major pieces of legislation, that they have, in fact, gotten through in their last session, though certainly not some of the ones that have been noted in the benchmarks and that are critical towards national reconciliation and critical for the development in Iraq.

What I'm saying is we expect that political leadership to be continuing to work on those issues even if parliament's not in session.

Yeah, let's go back here. I will get to you, Mr. Lambros. I promise. Yeah.

QUESTION: I had a question about the elections in Japan.

MR. CASEY: Yeah.

QUESTION: There's calls for the prime minister to resign and now -- what the State Department's reaction to that is?

MR. CASEY: Well, I'll leave the internal political developments to the Japanese themselves. Certainly, Japan held, yet again and obviously, a very successful election and we congratulate the Japanese people for that, as we would anyone else. In terms of what the political implications of that are, the United States has a strong relationship with Japan that goes back many years. We expect we'll be continuing to work with the prime minister and his government as things move forward. In terms of what this election means or signifies for the Japanese political system, I'll leave that to the politicians and the analysts in Japan.

Mr. Lambros, okay.

QUESTION: Okay. Mr. Casey, anything to say on the last Friday meeting here at the State Department between Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the Serbian Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremic?

MR. CASEY: Well, I wasn't in the meeting myself, Mr. Lambros, but I think as we've made clear, they covered the set of issues that you would expect. That certainly does include both our bilateral relations with Serbia, our desire to see Serbia become fully integrated into the Euro-Atlantic institutions, including the EU, as its own stated desire is. We also pointed out that there were a number of things that stood in the way of that and that certainly includes a resolution of the Kosovo issue and of course, it also includes the final disposition of a number of those war criminals who are still out there from the 1990s. And so, you know, I don't think you would have seen anything surprising in the meeting.

In terms of Kosovo, to anticipate your next question, of course the Secretary reiterated our longstanding view that ultimately, this process that is going forward needs to be resolved with an independent Kosovo based on the Ahtisaari plan. And certainly, we're looking forward to the commencement of an additional 120-day period of discussions between the parties to see how far we can get on that.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) on Kosovo since the position of Belgrade and Washington are totally different?

MR. CASEY: Well, again, I'll leave it to the Serbian Government to describe their positions. I think ours is clear and I'm sure the Secretary made it quite clear as well.

Okay, Goyal. One last one.

QUESTION: Tom, many neighbors in South Asia are worried about the ongoing situation in Pakistan and also, many think that here -- and many Pakistanis I have spoken -- they are also asking question that, how can you have free and fair elections when three major operation leaders are not allowed to contest elections? They're outside of the country. And finally, there -- recently, talks between Benazir Bhutto, the former Prime Minister and General Musharraf that she might return to Pakistan -- is there any -- U.S. playing any role in this action or what --

MR. CASEY: Well, I don't know, Goyal. It sounds like there's a lot of politics going on in Pakistan and I mean that in a good sense. There needs to be accommodations made between the political leadership in Pakistan. Our interest and our goal is seeing that there are free and fair elections that are held and ones in which all legitimate parties can participate.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. CASEY: Thanks, guys.

QUESTION: Thank you.

ENDS

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