Sitting date: 14 Oct 2025
Part 1 Amendments to Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011: general

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): Members, we come now to Part 1. This is debate on clauses 3 to 11, "Amendments to Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011: general", and the Schedule. The question is that Part 1 stand part.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB (Labour—Christchurch Central): Kia ora, Mr Chair. Having just talked about the preamble to this bill, we can now talk about the preamble to the main legislation. I see clause 4 amends the preamble.

Look, it's a relatively simple point but I'm a bit perplexed as to why there's a sense that we've got to have this massive, long preamble in respect of all of the Court of Appeal's decisions on it. Whilst an historian might be interested in the fact that there was a Court of Appeal decision, it's actually really verbose to have in the preamble to the main Act a recitation of the Court of Appeal's decisions which were, in fact, overruled by the Supreme Court. In fact, I'm not sure that the preamble needs amendment at all—and, in fact, I'm pretty sure there's an excellent tabled amendment on the Table, in respect of clause 4. If we're going to give a genuine historical account of why we've got here, we should probably recognise that it's really part of the Government's approach to Māori and Māori interests, which is, basically, to roll back the progress that we've made over the past, I don't know, 150 years or so. So, in terms of the references to the Court of Appeal case, it's entirely unnecessary because they're gone, they've been overruled, and the Supreme Court case itself is the one which prevails.

It may well be that to recite the Supreme Court case and to say we had concerns but the Supreme Court said those concerns around what "continuous use and occupation without substantial interruption" means, in fact, were vindicated and there's actually not that much to worry about any more, but we're going to continue with this piece of legislation which makes it harder again to establish a coastal and customary marine title—is probably what it should actually say.

So, in terms of the new preamble, I'm just perplexed. I see that there is a preamble in the original bill; why you'd want to confuse it is just a little bit beyond me. So if the Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations could talk about the preamble and why he wants to change it, and, in particular, why he wants to put into the preamble—it just seems very poor drafting—a narrative about a court decision which doesn't stand any more, I'd be interested to hear that. Thank you.

Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH (Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations): Well, I would remind the Committee, of course, when the first reading of this bill occurred, when the legislation was designed to overturn the Court of Appeal decision, in particular, the impact of the Court of Appeal decision, which, in effect, took "exclusive" out of the second test. Because the second test is that "exclusive use and occupation of the [coastal] area … without substantial interruption", and the effect of the Court of Appeal decision was, effectively, not to read out that word "exclusive". When we were doing this, the opponents said that this was terrible and appalling; then, lo and behold, the Supreme Court agreed that it was a misreading. So what we're doing here is dealing with issues that relate to the Supreme Court decision, and, in particular—I just want to run through them—one is on the Supreme Court interpretation required extensive use of a space and an intention in some capacity to control the area since 1840 as far as the law permits. The bill is not too different, but subtly different to that, requiring the intention and ability to control the area to the exclusion of others since 1840.

Then, the question of to what extent can decision makers rely on inferences. The Supreme Court interpretation permitted inferences around continuity of use and occupation as part of determining substantiality of any interruptions but reinforces the need for evidence to establish practical expressions of the applicant's mana or control over the seascape. That pointed in the direction of tikanga. But, of course, tikanga is covered in the first leg, and if it was to be a big part of the second leg, then that's not what we understood the intention was, so the legislation focuses on influences on the extent and continuity and exclusivity of use and occupation must be based on the evidence of physical use and not only spiritual or cultural association. So that's a second point of difference.

The third point of difference is around the burden of proof, and the Supreme Court test was that applicants only need to demonstrate use in occupations since 1840 and that they currently hold the area in accordance with tikanga. Exclusivity and absence of substantial interruption can be inferred unless contested by a third party—that is, a third party, somehow, has to prove that it wasn't held exclusively. The approach of the bill is to say that applicants must prove all the elements of the section 58 test now. So that is that's why we're carrying on with this legislation, and that's what we're setting out to do. Thank you very much.

STEVE ABEL (Green): Thank you very much, Mr Chair. To the Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations's last point, one of the key questions around this is: on whom is the burden of proof that exclusivity is maintained or is not maintained or has been broken? Is it the Minister's opinion that the original intent of the legislation was to place the burden of proof not on iwi Māori but on those who wished to disprove that iwi Māori had exclusive use and therefore a right of customary title?

I note in the Supreme Court's finding from December a reference to the Ngāti Apa case—which was the beginning of this whole question in terms of how it engaged with the Government—that "After analysing the [case] on customary rights recognition in New Zealand law during the colonial period, Elias … in Ngāti Apa rejected the reasoning of Ninety Mile Beach as wrong, even in 1963. She concluded that the transfer of sovereignty gave the Crown radical title to the land but did not affect prior customary rights."—which I believe is one of the points Tākuta Ferris was making earlier. "Instead, the common law preserved those rights until they were lawfully extinguished. Keith and Anderson JJ emphasised that the Crown bore the onus of proving extinguishment:".

Is it the Minister's view that that is correct—that the Crown bears the onus of proving extinguishment, rather than iwi bear the onus of proving customary use?

ARENA WILLIAMS (Labour—Manurewa): Thank you, Mr Chair. I'll take the Minister to page 3 of the amendment bill. I'm asking him about his clause 5 that amends section 9 of the Act. I want to ask him whether there should be a definition of "physical use" in this section, because that is a concept which he has been talking about as an important part of this bill, and yet I have some questions around how that meaning should be interpreted. There is already a definition of exclusive use and occupation, because that was the relevant part of the history of British law that this was hinged on. But now if we are hinging it on physical use, that's a concept of British law which comes from Norman feudal law and is centuries old. So the Minister needs to tell us what he means.

Hundreds of years of British law have developed this idea of who owns land, and land ownership can hinge on ideas like adverse possession, which I think he was alluding to earlier, where you might have an exclusive use to the exclusion of others, and that might be the important part of the law. But physical use goes back even further than that. That's a system where you're looking at how feudal Lords might occupy a particular piece of land, that's how peasants or serfs might use and physically use part of law, part of the land which they might give them a bundle of rights that exist alongside the ownership recognised through different mechanisms.

So the Minister needs to help us to explain here what on earth we mean by "physical use" because we don't mean that in our landlord now. We don't expect Mr Andy Foster to get out every day and patrol the border of his house and dig something in the lawn out every six months to prove that he is physically using his lawn, do we? We don't expect Te Whakatōhea to patrol their borders, get out and swim in the moana and erect the jetty to show physical use. We don't expect those things. Their rights arise in different ways. They're actually hinged on concepts in British law. They are nothing to do with tikanga Māori, although this path for establishing rights was intended to do so. On top of that, many iwi have asked the Government through the last 150 years to recognise their customary marine title that are not given effect to by this law.

For instance, the rights of Ngāi Tahu and Rakiura Māori in the Tītī Islands was recognised through a pathway of negotiation with the ground to recognise those special rights and have nothing to do with these concepts around physical use or adverse position. That is an arrangement between the Crown which hinged on the use of that land, the physical use for the gathering of kai, for mahinga kai, and those are a different sort of rights that have been enshrined in that law.

I genuinely do not know which concept in British law we are looking for when the Minister is asking us to interpret the meaning of "physical use". Because this idea, how far does it extend to? If I am physically using my lawn, do I have any physical use rights in the property that is 200 metres from my boundary? No. And so physical use is a very limited sort of a right. And that sort of does go to the way that it was established in our law hundreds of years ago, that it would be for people who were either farming or using that land for the gathering of food and other cultural practices. Is that what is intended here? If so, we should say that because that is a different sort of limitation than the one that most people thought was being applied here. We should be clear about the way that that is intended to be given effect to, so it should be a new definition with a new empowering section in this amendment. It's not. So I would suggest that the best way to deal with that problem is then to take out this reference to "physical use", because physical use in our law is not a concept that is well understood or one that we are using here to interpret what sort of rights—and none of us disagree that there are rights that are given effect to by this legislation, it's just what the test is for. What sort of rights we mean when we have this debate is the right question to ask at this point.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB (Labour—Christchurch Central): I'll actually be quite short, because I just want to pick up on a point that Steve Abel raised, and I want to just take it a step further. The point was around onus, and I'm loath to say that the member as elegant as Steve Abel didn't quite capture, I think, what he perhaps intended, because there are two concepts: one is establishing marine title, and then another is to say that it's been extinguished.

I think the onus for both of those questions may be different. If you've had marine title, you can show that it existed in 1840, and you can show all of the other things that go to establishing marine title, but then the other party—perhaps the Crown—says, "No, it's been extinguished by some lawful Act.", then the question I have is this. Yes, the onus might be on the hapū or iwi to establish all of those things that go to establish marine title generally, but if the other party is relying on an extinguishment, whether it be by legislation or by some other lawful Act—some administrative Act, for example, or some appropriation of adjoining land or building a bridge across it by the Transport Agency, or something like that—is the onus on the other party, and not on the hapū or iwi, to establish extinguishment?

I think that's actually a really important question. I think it's quite separate from the question of establishing the coastal and marine title kind of prima facie, because it's essentially a defence to say that, yes, all that's true but there's been an extinguishment through these series of events, because if the onus lies the other way, and the hapū or iwi have to prove on the balance of probabilities—and I'm assuming that that didn't occur—that would seem entirely unfair.

That's really a short point. It's all I really wanted to raise.

Hon GINNY ANDERSEN (Labour): Oh, thank you very much, Mr Chair. So we're on Part 1 and on the preamble of Part 1. When I read through this second preamble—because we've got a preamble and then we've got a Part 1 preamble—it reads, essentially, like a timeline. It recounts each of the court decisions and basically paves the way for explaining why the Government took the action it did.

But I would like to ask the Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations that there appears to be one glaring error or a missing piece of information from that timeline in the preamble. That key date that is missing from those series of events is the Cabinet decision on 28 November 2023, and that is clearly before the decisions of Whakatōhea Kotahitanga Waka (Edwards) v Te Kāhui Takutai Moana o Ngā Whānau me Ngā Hāpū o Te Whakatōhea.

What occurs on 28 November 2023 is that Cabinet endorses the coalition agreement between the parties as the basis on which the coalition Government will operate. The Cabinet circular provided an instruction to chief executives and their respective officers that they were to have processes in place to implement that. In that Cabinet circular in the National - New Zealand First coalition agreement, it includes a commitment to quote, "amend section 58 of the marine and coastal area Act to make clear Parliament's original intent in light of the judgment of the Court of Appeal in Whakatōhea Kotahitanga Waka (Edwards) & Ors v Te Kāhui and Whakatōhea Māori Trust Board & Ors."

So I think it's right that if that is a key point that this coalition agreement agreed upon and that is a fundamental reason that predates, actually, the court rulings that we are now legislating over, I would like the Minister's views on why that key piece of information—which is an agreement between National and New Zealand First that is included in the coalition agreement and is fundamental, potentially, to the very legislation that we are debating now, why that glaring omission is not included in the preamble to Part 1.

HŪHANA LYNDON (Green): I'm wanting to speak to my tabled amendment to clause 8(1), to be found on page 8 of the Minister's Amendment Paper 380. My proposed amendment is to seek to delete clause 8(1).

That clause, if we look at it, requires the claimant group to provide evidence based on physical activity or use of natural resources in the area of claim, and that spiritual or cultural association to that area is not relevant unless it is manifested in physical activity or use of natural resources. My colleagues in the Opposition have spoken to the fact that there are many ways to express your connection to the takutai moana in your tribal rohe. We have to remember also that for centuries, there has been disruption for tangata whenua of connection, physically, to occupy the land abutting the takutai moana where you have your whakapapa, where your mahinga mātaitai are, where you have harvested, where you have paddled waka, where you have had

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So the proposal in this amendment is to delete this section, because it's unfair. It is unfair on tangata whenua to have to show that somehow we've got a physical manifestation of connection to that space, when we may not own by Western law the whenua abutting that part of the takutai moana.

I raise that as an issue in my kāinga, Whangārei-terenga-parāoa, where the claimants stood in hearings and are waiting for a judgment right now, knowing that very few parcels of land around Whangārei-terenga-parāoa remain within Māori hands. In fact, the harbour board and councils have been great beneficiaries of the land abutting the takutai moana in Whangārei because of public works taking, and yet our people continue to go and our people continue to utilise those customary resources available within Whangārei-terenga-parāoa as good kaitiaki. They continue to exercise their spiritual and cultural connection to that part of the takutai moana, as we see when they're a tohorā that might beach themselves at Ruakākā and other parts of Whangārei-terenga-parāoa. It is the hapū that mobilise to demonstrate those cultural practices of connection to that place. They may not own the land abutting where that tohorā washed up, but they continue to go there and they practise those cultural traditions of hauhake tohorā that have been handed down through the generations.

So the expectation that somehow we have to reach this new threshold of demonstrating the physical manifestation of activity or use of natural resources is challenging for many tangata whenua—not only those who have already been through the hearings process and who have already had the decisions of the court handed down and those that are waiting but also those claimants who still prepare themselves for hearings.

Further, in light of this proposed amendment and the fact that we are saying, "Hey, let's acknowledge the many ways with which tangata whenua connect.", by deleting this clause, it opens up a pathway for us to look at—as we've discussed previously—a structural framework whereby, as tangata whenua, we can participate in this process in a scheme to ensure that the protection and legitimate interests of all New Zealanders in the marine and coastal area of New Zealand is maintained but also a recognition that mana tuku iho for tangata whenua exists and continues to exist. I want to ask a question of the Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations: can he tell us at what point did our customary connection and rights to the takutai moana become extinguished, and how did we lose our customary rights to the takutai moana?

Now there's a whole new threshold. Now we're expected to jump through a whole lot of new hoops. How were our rights as tangata whenua extinguished by the Crown and when did that occur? It would be great to hear from the Minister.

Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH (Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations): The only thing I'd say in relation to that member's speech, of course, is that nothing in this legislation impacts on the ability of Māori or non-Māori to go and collect shellfish and have a connection with a piece of coastline that continues, and there's all sorts of arrangements in place in relation to customary fishing rights and shellfish-gathering rights and tītī gathering rights. All these things are not affected by this legislation, and they carry on. All New Zealanders—and so has been the practice for 150 years now—all New Zealanders, Māori and non-Māori, have used the coastal area and enjoyed it, collected fish and shellfish and had a great time, and nothing is being changed in relation to that.

Where the rubber meets the road in relation to this legislation, though, is the valuable rights that come with the recognition of customary marine title as outlined in this legislation, which, as we've heard, was an agreement between the Māori Party and the National Party back in 2011, which sought to balance the rights of New Zealanders alongside the desire to be able to assert customary marine title by particular groups, whānau or iwi. In relation to that, included in that bundle of rights, is, for example, the ability to effectively grant or not grant resource consent for a range of activities, which—and the previous member talked about a port—can have real consequences for the operations of things going on in our marine space, which are important to how we operate as a country.

So that is why. With those valuable rights, part of the balancing act that was achieved by this legislation was a high threshold, which is what we're trying to establish through this legislation.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB (Labour—Christchurch Central): Thank you, Mr Chair. Again, my point is a relatively short one, I think, and it's about new section 9B, in particular, subclause (3)(b), which says that "This section prevails over—(b) section 7"—of the principle Act—"(Treaty of Waitangi (te Tiriti o Waitangi));". And section 7 of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, essentially, sets out that "In order to take account of the Treaty of Waitangi (te Tiriti o Waitangi), this Act recognises, and promotes the exercise of, customary interests of Māori in the common marine and coastal area by providing,—", and it goes on to talk about the Act.

What it's really doing, in section 7, is saying that this Act is part of the Crown's discharge of its obligations under the Treaty. Obviously, the Treaty is relevant to any of these issues, but that is very much a parliamentary finger pointing to Te Tiriti o Waitangi, saying, "and the courts should recognise that this Act is to be interpreted in a way which is consistent with both the words and the principles of the Treaty". So my question is—and I desperately hope it's a no—does the overriding effect clause here mean that this Act overrides the Crown's obligation under Te Tiriti o Waitangi? Because if it does, it's both a surprise and a deeply concerning matter, because section 7 is essentially saying that this legislation is seeking to ensure that we are recognising coastal and marine rights consistently with all of the principles and statements in the Treaty of Waitangi, including the statement that says—in English—that Māori will be able to keep their rights—their property rights, "their lands, forests, and fisheries", which are the English words, if I remember them rightly—and yet, here, this seems to be saying "but not fisheries", because—

Hon Paul Goldsmith: It has nothing to do with the fisheries.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB: Well, you can scoff, Minister, but that's what the words of the Treaty of Waitangi say. Yet you're saying here that this piece of legislation will override the Treaty of Waitangi. That's exactly what this says.

Now, my reo is not good enough to understand properly the reo version of the Treaty, but my understanding is that it goes further and talks not just about fisheries but about all of those taonga, which are precious, including wider rights of navigation, of kai collection, and the spiritual things which this explicitly overrides. So can the Minister assure us—and this is important when the courts come to apply this—that adherence with the Crown's obligations under the Treaty is still expected? Because that's, alarmingly, not what this appears to say. It says that—"overriding effect" is a strong phrase to use as a title—"this section prevails", that is to say it overrides, is dominant over, section 7 of Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

Is the Minister going to stand up and preside over legislation which explicitly breaches the Crown's Treaty obligations, or can he assure me that I've, in some way, read that wrong and he can stand up and say, on the record, for judges to understand parliamentary intent, that it is his intention that the Crown uphold, adhere to, and honour the Treaty of Waitangi.

ARENA WILLIAMS (Labour—Manurewa): Thank you, Mr Chair. Following on from an answer that the Minister gave, I want to ask him about what he meant about these rights that are in the coastal and marine area arising under the agreement reached by the National Party and the Māori Party in 2011. Because my colleague, the Hon Duncan Webb, has hit on another one of these issues, which is that the Crown's obligations under Te Tiriti o Waitangi are not a creature of statute. So to purport to have an overriding effect over them gets us into some trouble. We need the Minister to clarify that, because obviously you cannot have—the effect of that is what is intended, that Te Tiriti o Waitangi would not apply to the customary marine title (CMT) amendments. That is part of the constitutional framework that we're operating within, not that we are amending today.

The question that I'm asking the Minister is the same sort of question, because the constitutional framework in which we are operating within, and the customary rights that exist before that, are different things. The customary rights that were to be tested in 2004/05, the purpose of that testing through the court was because they arose outside of any legislation. They were rights that had been in place before the signing of Te Tiriti o Waitangi in 1840. So they were a bundle of rights that were associated with the legal system that was the law in New Zealand prior to that, which was tikanga Māori.

So purporting to say that these rights had arisen in the agreement reached by the National Party and the Māori Party in 2011 and were then enshrined in that legislation is wrong and is an interpretation of the law which doesn't recognise that those rights were something that existed, that there were a bundle of property rights held by people in accordance with the legal system which was operative. So those were rights that had arisen, and the question that we were being asked, as a Parliament at the time and as the New Zealand public engaged in this public debate, was how should those crystallise? How should the courts recognise those rights that exist? Because those rights do in fact exist, so how should we give effect to them? That is something that all New Zealanders have an interest in and that is why it's right for Parliament to have that out, have that debate.

That is why we are still debating what was intended, but we are certainly not having an argument about whether they did exist, because if those rights hadn't existed then we wouldn't be having this debate about whether they crystallised and what is associated with them; like, whether you can have any sort of say in the consultative process of a local council in relation to a resource consent, not whether those rights are just in the first place, because they did. So my question for him is about—it's on page 4 at the bottom, clause 9B(2), this phrase: "A decision maker (including the Court) must interpret the CMT amendments in a way that promotes their purposes and application (as stated in section 9A)." I want to ask him about how a decision maker is meant to interpret that when those rights already existed. But also, I want him to explain what that means. Because this is not the usual way that you would set out a sort of duty for a decision maker or a duty for the court.

Can we expect that it would be this Government's approach to insert preambles which are essentially a political narrative of the Government's policy and then clauses in other legislation which would require judges, require decision makers to comply with the interpretation of the policy of the Government in the way that is essentially being suggested here, they now have a duty to do. Inserting a preamble into a document is usually used in the context of Treaty settlements. This is not a Treaty settlement. These rights exist. These are not rights which arose in negotiation between two parties represented by counsel over many years where there is a process for that New Zealand. These are rights which existed before that, so to suggest that a decision maker then needs to interpret those rights—which are part of the common law of New Zealand—in a way which is, in effect, promoting their purposes and application, which are set out in what is a political narrative plonked on the top of something which purports to be legislation is a bizarre way to make law.

Can we expect a National Government to now insert a preamble into every other piece of legislation for which they don't like decisions from the courts, like setting out perhaps their political campaign documents in the Crimes Act and asking judges to comply with that, or else!

Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH (Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations): Well, the last part of that member's comments were irrelevant to this discussion. I just wanted to clarify because the previous member was suggesting that through this legislation we were going to override the Treaty of Waitangi. As he well knows, what the section refers to is that it prevails over section 7 of the legislation, which has the title "Treaty of Waitangi"; it's not the Treaty of Waitangi itself. It is simply overriding section 7. We're replacing the specific comments in the legislation over the broad comments in section 7, but we are not seeking to override the Treaty of Waitangi, or Te Tiriti o Waitangi. We are simply referring to section 7 of the legislation.

STEVE ABEL (Green): Thank you very much, Mr Chair. I would like to speak to Amendment Paper 380 and clause 8, "Section 58, amended (Customary marine title)". My colleague has put up an amendment to delete that clause. I have an alternative, my tabled amendment No. 2. Now, for clarity, this amendment is the specific point at which the legislation articulates that "exclusivity of a group's use and occupation of a specified area [must be] based on evidence of a physical activity, or of a use, related to natural and physical resources (within the meaning of section 2(1)". That's new section 58(1A)(a) in clause 8, but new section 58(1A)(b) is that it "is not based on a spiritual or cultural association"—it explicitly articulates that it must not be based on that.

Now, to the point that my colleague Arena Williams made so eloquently—speaking of eloquence, not as eloquently as Mr Duncan Webb clarified my question on where the onus falls. Generous of you to say I was eloquent on that, and it's still an unanswered question. The onus of proving extinguishment—we still haven't had an answer on that, but you out-eloquented me on that, Mr Webb, so I appreciate it.

But to the point that Arena Williams was making about the gathering of shellfish in her own family history, it is a problem for this complex history we have here for the courts to have clarity as to the character of customary use in customary marine title. Narrowing the things that the court can consider is particularly unhelpful for that court, because that very particular story that a member of this House was able to tell, that showed the relationship of her father's iwi to the marine coastal environment would be exceedingly useful and informative for a court. But under this Amendment Paper from the Minister, that sort of articulation would not be able to be considered.

So, in my amendment, I propose that in determining whether an applicant group has exclusively used and occupied a specified area, the court may consider the following types of evidence—and the purpose of this is to recognise the value of physical evidence. The following types of evidence: (a) physical activities and uses related to natural and physical resources—let that be one of the considerations—but also spiritual and cultural associations that are manifested through ongoing kaitiakitanga practices. Oral histories, whakapapa and traditional knowledge, recognition by other iwi and hapū of the applicant group's authority over the area—surely, a very useful test for a court—the exercise of mana and tikanga over the area, and any other evidence the court considers relevant and that gives due weight to Māori knowledge systems and customary practices.

Surely, Minister, giving our courts that breadth of consideration to take into account all of these useful sources of information and evidence in order to give absolute confidence of the proof of customary marine title would be beneficial in upholding the principle of customary marine title and, indeed, Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Thank you.

Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH (Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations): Just in terms of the burden of proof question that's been raised by a number of people, the 2011 Act says, in section 106, "Burden of proof", in subsection (3), that "In the case of every application for a recognition order, it is presumed, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that a customary interest has not been extinguished", and the bill does not change that. So the question of extinguishment is not covered by what we're talking about when it's in relation to the burden of proof. That relates to the applicants proving elements of the section 58 test, which is in relation to—that they hold the area "in accordance with tikanga;" and with exclusivity in the absence of "substantial interruption".

TĀKUTA FERRIS (Te Pāti Māori—Te Tai Tonga): Tēnā tātou.

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CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): If you can just hold, the Minister needs to get a translation device.

TĀKUTA FERRIS:

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CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): Mr Ferris, I can appreciate the broad nature of your speech at the moment, but we need to come back to this part of the bill at some stage as well.

TĀKUTA FERRIS: Tēnā koe, Mr Chair.

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CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): Mr Ferris, you are able to seek the call for another five minutes.

TĀKUTA FERRIS:

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CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): The honourable Minister. Just before I call him, Mr Ferris, you have been indulged by the Chair. Please respect that in any further contributions to this committee.

Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH (Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations): Thank you, Mr Chair. Look, I think the essence of the previous speech was to ask who I am to bring in such a bill. In answer to the member, I can say, well, I don't want to distract the committee in a long sort of family history, but the first of my family, Charles Goldsmith, arrived in this country in 1840-odd—180 years ago. We've heard of his exploits—elements of it—in the history of the House. He did a whole lot of stuff and entangled himself with Te Kooti, very sadly in many respects. So that is the first of the many people.

Now, the member's genealogy extends maybe four or five times longer than my 180 years in this country, but that makes me no less of a New Zealander than he or any other New Zealander is. So my history goes back 180 years, and there are plenty of other places, and they have been enjoying the coastal area of this country for a very, very long period of time.

Secondly, who am I? I am a Minister of the Crown, elected by the people of New Zealand in the modern democracy in which we live. We as a Government are setting out to try and do our best to find a way through the debates and discussions that we have as a country to recognise our history, recognise customary rights, recognise the role of the Treaty, and try and figure out how to do that in 2025 and in the context of a modern democracy where people have general expectations about what it is.

We are blessed to live in one of the few countries in the world where we have accountable Government, where the people of New Zealand regularly get the chance to throw out Governments that they don't like. They've done that recently and they won't be doing it for a long time to come, I imagine, but you never know, they might, and that is the system that we have, and we're accountable for that.

What we're trying to do, as elected members here, is to find a balance between a point of view that's put out that the entire coastal area of this country—this land is girt by sea, as the Australians are as well—is still owned or held in customary title by the original inhabitants, and we're also trying to recognise that other people have an interest in it. That is why this legislation that we're debating today sought to balance those rights back in 2011 by finding a pathway through for people to recognise customary marine title while also setting a high threshold. We're having a debate about where that threshold should be. So that is who I am, and I hope you're interested.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): Now, the Chair has handed out more indulgences than a 12th century Pope today. We have a balance. We're going to maintain that balance. We're now going to be back on the bill.

ARENA WILLIAMS (Labour—Manurewa): Thank you, Mr Chair. I'll bring the Minister to page 7 of the bill. It is new section 58(1A)(b) in clause 8 that I want to discuss with him, and it does relate to the contribution of the previous speaker Tākuta Ferris, because I think all of us can find what he was saying there around whose history and how do we establish what history is relevant to this paragraph (b). This is a prohibition on decision makers to not make an inference which is "based on a spiritual or cultural association with all or part of the area". I raise this point again because it is important that we understand exactly what we are agreeing to here, and I don't think it is something which many members in this House quite appreciate just how far-reaching that is.

In the situation where evidence is presented in this kind of case, that evidence is treated as expert evidence. You might have in this sort of proceeding a kaumātua, or a person who has a long and in-depth knowledge of not only the history of a particular area but the genealogy of those people who claim whakapapa to that area, present to a court, or even to the tribunal, their evidence of associations, and the reason that they will often begin with the spiritual and cultural associations to that place is because they see that as the most important evidence.

The reason I raise this and step the committee through it is that it is the most relevant and important evidence, because that is how associations are recorded in the way that they are engaging not only with what they are presenting in the law now but what the law is in accordance with tikanga Māori. They are, essentially, presenting evidence of, say, the stories that Ngāi Tahu have of the children of Hine-nui-te-pō—the ankle-biting sandflies in the fiords—and the stories of how they are kaitiaki of those places. It is important to appreciate their cultural lineage and their genealogy and the spiritual associations that people have with those sandflies, not because they are presented as spiritual evidence, but because they are presented as evidence of occupation, evidence of use, and evidence of association with land.

It's important that we appreciate that in paragraph (b), what is being extinguished here is the ability of that evidence to make a difference to these decisions; in fact, it's a prohibition on someone hearing the evidence on which they would draw inferences about that. So it's not just saying that "We think you"—the courts—"should take into account different sorts of evidence, including spiritual evidence and physical use." It's also not saying that "There is a hierarchy of the type of evidence that we want you to take into account, and that spiritual evidence should come after actual-use evidence." It's actually saying that "Evidence that you hear, probably first, from the expert of genealogy and spiritual connection to a place, the evidence that they think is most important to their case—that is evidence that you must not make inferences about.", and that changes the way that these proceedings will have effect. It changes the way, ultimately, that Māori will see the court system and their ability to participate in this process, and it ultimately devalues the way that this history has been preserved in our oral culture, because it is one thing to require someone to set out their physical use of an area while written records exist.

My father was a historian for the Waitangi Tribunal in the 1990s. He compiled much of the evidence in Tauranga Moana, for example, by interviewing orally and then writing down the evidence that was presented around physical use of those lands. That is useful, and now it is evidence that can be gone back to because it exists. That was not a service that existed in the decades leading up to the 1990s, because the Waitangi Tribunal did not operate. It is not evidence that is available.

The evidence that is available to establish use up to the year of 1840 is that waiata that Tākuta Ferris used. It is the karakia that establishes the use of the land and of the trees, and that use of the land where those sandflies that bite at the ankles of te uri o Ngāi Tahu, ngā uri o Te Wai Pounamu, are plagued by. Those are useful stories that tell us the existing history, and so to take out the ability of someone to make an inference about that use changes the system entirely.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB (Labour—Christchurch Central): Kia ora, Mr Chair. As someone who has spent plenty of time in Fiordland, I'm not sure Arena Williams fully appreciates the fierceness of the sandflies. I would curse them rather than see them as a—

Arena Williams: I can tell you their whakapapa.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB: Ha, ha—yeah! Look, I actually wanted to go to the Schedule, which Part 1 incorporates. It's, actually, a really important part of the bill because it's got all the transitional provisions in it. I'll talk about those at another point. The one I really want to talk about is new clause 6 in the Schedule, "No entitlement to compensation". Now, there are two reasons why I want to talk about this. The first one is one of principle. That is, if the Minister accepts—because it seems to be his view that the law before the bill was passed at the moment is more generous in the recognition of customary rights than it will be afterwards—we have a good number of iwi who have embarked upon the recognition process and who are either through the ministerial process or the court process, a significant way through, that would strike me as, to take the words out of another piece of legislation before this House, "a significant impairment of their property rights".

My question is really about whether the Minister is happy to stand up and do what he will be expected to do under the Regulatory Standards Bill when it's passed and explain why he is not compensating, under this legislation, owners of property rights whose property rights are being significantly impaired by this. That's the first point about compensation.

The second point itself has two legs, and that is about the work that has been put into these claims. It's not cheap. Much of the work is done, as Arena Williams has sort of alluded to, by oral history and voluntary work.

Hūhana Lyndon: Volunteers.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB: That's right—"volunteers" is absolutely right, but also there are a few people who get paid along the way, as well. That can really add up, so my question is: why is there no compensation for the significant lost value where people have spent years both in cash and time in pursuing these claims?

Hūhana Lyndon: Sacrificed.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB: It's my call at the moment, so just—ha, ha! But the second leg of that is this: if the litigants in the court cases, in particular, go to the courts—because in these cases, at least in some instances, they'll be like, "Well, what's the point? You've changed the rules under us. We can now look at it, and we've got legal advice that says we'll now be unsuccessful.", but the costs issue is still extant. If a litigant goes to the court and says, "Well, the other side changed the rules of the game whilst we're halfway through.", but this court has a discretion to award costs on any basis it thinks fair and just and fit, does new clause 6 limit the right of the court to award costs against the Government?

It strikes me that if you go to court, it doesn't matter. Even if you discontinue, the court has a discretion to say, "In all of the circumstances, the litigation was properly brought, and the behaviour of the other side led to it being discontinued.", and in those cases, the court can award costs, in my example, against the Government. Does new clause 6 mean that courts cannot award costs against the Government in marine and coastal area claims?

Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH (Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations): I think the member knows the answer to that question, which is, no, it doesn't. It's in relation to claims about property rights and compensation, and our view, of course, is that this bill is reasserting what Parliament intended in the original bill.

In terms of costs, we do recognise the very big frustrations that many people associated with this process would be feeling about having to rehear seven cases, potentially—four that have been decided since 2024; not the original Whakatōhea case, which is being left to enjoy the fruits of their litigation, but the four customary marine title awards made since 25 July 2024, and three are pending. The Government has set aside $15 million towards the extra cost. So it is not a desirable situation, and it's not something we've done with great pleasure or excitement. It is not something that we wanted to do at all, but we felt that it was required, given the significant change to the threshold that first came through the Court of Appeal decision, and it has continued, in elements, through the Supreme Court decisions. So we do recognise that it will be very trying for particularly those seven cases that have gone to hearing. We do note that there are many, many, many more cases still to come, and that's why we believe, as a Government, that it's important to get that threshold correct.

In terms of the cost, the cost has been huge. I don't have the exact figure, but more than $65 million has been spent by the people of New Zealand in support of claims that have been taken so far over the—what is it?—nearly 14 years since the legislation has passed, in support of claimants. Much money has been spent and the predictions are that we have another 20 or 30 years of litigation, and so there are many elements of this legislation that need further work. That still has to be dealt with outside this legislation. But in terms of the court costs, we have set aside a sum of money for that purpose.

STEVE ABEL (Green): Thank you very much, Mr Chair, I appreciate it. I'm speaking to clause 8 on Amendment Paper 380. I believe that the contribution of Tākuta Ferris was exceedingly eloquent and practical and demonstrative of—

Carl Bates: Watch out, New Zealand, you're getting the Greens, Te Pāti Māori, and Labour.

STEVE ABEL: —the challenge that we face here. It enhanced the mana of the House—Mr Bates—for us to hear firsthand a pātere, a chant, that shows exactly how a cultural form elucidates the physical interactions of an iwi with a particular area.

My question for the Minister is this. Given that such an articulation of the relationship of an iwi to an area articulates physical boundaries and physical activities with the marine coastal environment, in new section 58(1A) in clause 8, where it is articulated that "a group's use and occupation of a specified area in a period … is based on evidence of a physical activity, or of a use, related to natural and physical resources", does the Minister regard the likes of a chant articulating that as evidence? Is that evidence, and—to the point—if it is evidence, then new section 58(1A)(b), which goes on to say, "is not based on a spiritual or cultural association"—does paragraph (b) rule not out the possibility of such a piece of evidence being accepted?

My final point, to clarify the question, is that you just gave us an oral testimony of your own family history here in Aotearoa New Zealand, and we accepted that testimony.

Arena Williams: Enjoyed it.

STEVE ABEL: We enjoyed it. We took your words in good faith, and you bought no physical evidence. This whole House relies on testimony—oral testimonies—that we may question or test, but why would you deny something as powerful as the likes of the articulation of the relationship in a physical sense that an iwi produces on a regular basis in interaction, in telling their history with the land and the water? Why would it, potentially, be denied?

Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH (Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations): In response to that, all evidence has been and will continue to be relevant to the decision maker. The change is that cultural or spiritual evidence needs supporting evidence of physical use, but tikanga and oral evidence remain important.

ARENA WILLIAMS (Labour—Manurewa): Thank you, Mr Chair, for my call—which I'm very grateful for, and I hope that my colleagues are able to participate in the debate further. I want to ask the Minister this: why will he not exclude the case of Ruapuke Island from the further customary marine title amendments?

In his preamble, he seeks out an arrangement with Ngāti Porou, which is a legislative arrangement which recognises their postal and marine title and how this Act is intended to interact with the existing arrangement. That's good, that is fair for Ngāti Porou. Ngāi Tahu have suffered at the hands of colonisation and have been dispossessed of their lands in Te Waipounamu for many generations, and Ruapuke Island is no exception. It is incredibly important to the history of Ngāi Tahu and the uses of its people. The Ruapuke Island decision is probably at the top of the list of one where this is a use of taxpayer money which is not necessary.

I doubt that the Minister ever intended to extinguish the rights which have been crystallised and recognised at the High Court - level in the case of Ruapuke Island. I want to underscore this point to you: that decision found from the expert evidence that the applicant group had held this specified area in accordance with tikanga and that they had whakapapa connections to that area, but they also had exercise control in that area through mahinga kai, through kaitiakitanga, through rāhui that they exercised, and through protection of biodiversity—regular use, physical use, use in a customary sense, use of land rights, and the use of British land rights, and that is something which meets all of the tests which the Minister has talked about today. Everything in this committee stage points to that decision still standing, and it should stand.

It has been a long time coming that the whānau of Ruapuke Island have not had their rights and interests recognised in the marine and coastal area of the island, despite the Crown coming to arrangements with the owners of the Tītī Islands and their tradition in taking those islands in a different way. So it is time. Why, Minister, won't you carve out that action which recognised the coastal and marine area of those whānau who whakapapa to Te Waipounamu?

Why won't you preserve the rights that exist now when the High Court has recognised them under the old test but will clearly meet your new test? Why must they go back—using taxpayers' money, the $15 million, or a portion of that—to be reheard? Why must they now comply with the new evidence requirements and the duties on decision makers as you have set them out in these amendments, when it is clear to almost everyone in this House that that is the case, which should still stand; that the rights that exist there are rights which most New Zealanders would want to recognise: that Ruapuki Island is important historically, it is important culturally—not only to those people who are landholders there and landowners, not only to Ngāi Tahu, but all New Zealanders. In a history that we can be proud of in the South, of a history of colonial intermarriage and a history of mahinga kai, which is unique in the world. In a history that should be celebrated and that whānau can now move on, because they have done the work since 2017 in lodging that application where they had to compile the evidence, where they had to take it through a forum where it was rigorous and it was tested and it was won.

Why isn't now the time that we can finally say to the whānau of Ruapuke that "You have done what you needed to do, you have met the high bar, you can now move on to telling your story of occupation of Ruapuke—of the history there, of the colonial intermarriage, and something that all New Zealanders can be proud of."

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB (Labour—Christchurch Central): Thank you, Mr Chair. My friend and colleague Arena Williams just went through a particular claim that has been decided but will have to be relitigated, which raises the transitional provisions. I must say, I've seen some transitional provisions in my time—this is in new Schedule 1AA, inserted by clause 11—but these ones take the cake. They probably take the cake because they're trying to do something extremely complicated.

Look, I get the basic rule, which is that if, before the Government's announcement, you had sorted out your claim and it had been finally decided, then that's all well and good. That's going to be a very small number of claims. But from there, it takes another kind of two pages to explain the complexities about how it's all going to work from there.

There is the basic principle, which is—because this breaches the rule against retrospectivity, because there's one band of cases—and I think this is the one Arena Williams was referring to, where the Government made a policy announcement but hasn't passed the law; the judicial process ground on and decisions were made, and so those rights have crystallised, they've been recognised by law, and these transitional provisions, if I've got it made, this is for clause 4 in new Schedule 1AA, "Certain CMT decisions made in interim period, and related agreements and orders made, have no legal effect and never have had legal effect"—I love that one because it's actually saying the Earth is flat, essentially; that the world is such that that decision never happened, when in fact it did. Now, that is very much against the principle of retrospectivity.

Given that there are a limited number of cases that fall in here, what is the massive policy objection to saying "Well, you got in under the law as it was", which is how it works, we generally like to think that this is the concept of the rule of law; the Minister may not be familiar with it, but the idea is that you apply the law as it stands and you don't pull the legal rug from under people and change legal history, but that seems to be exactly what's going on here. So can he please explain, in a principled way, why he can't adhere to the principle that we don't legislative retrospectively?

The other thing I'd like him to explain is—because I just can't quite get it—if you've got legislation in train and you've gone through various steps, you've had questions about procedure, you've had questions about evidence, you've had setting-down hearings, and so on, what happens to all of those steps? Do those people have to go all the way back to square one and, essentially, file a new claim under the new regime, or can they use all of the work that's been done to date? That's quite an important one. I see he's taking some advice; it's quite an important question.

Perhaps the other adviser can listen to this one, because then the third question is this: if you fall into the sad category of someone who's got across the finish line and then got told "Go back to the start.", what is the status of the proceedings in the interim? Because, other than the judge looking at the evidence and applying the law, it looks like all the work has been done, the hearing's been had, and whilst the legal decision-making framework might be changed, you might need some legal decisions, surely you don't have to adduce all the evidence all over again, because that work's been done. That doesn't fit neatly within a transitional provision, but neither does saying that—what was it?—the cases that have been decided never had any legal effect.

So there are a whole lot of questions. Why are we being retrospective? What are we doing about interim decisions and interlocutory decisions? And what happens to all the legal work that's been done in the cases which have been finalised?

Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH (Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations): There are a number of questions there, but in terms of where the date of taking effect came from—and this is in relation to the date that we had in June last year—I mean, in essence, the goal was to ensure that we had as much consistency with the rest of the vast majority of cases that haven't yet come forward, to have a consistent test, but to recognise that those that had been concluded and granted before the date, we didn't want to unscramble. So that was the logic there.

In terms of having to go back to the start, no, it's not our expectation that the cases that have been heard have to go right back to day one and start the whole process again, merely that they would presumably need to reconsider or hear any extra evidence that's required in relation to the amended test or the clarified test. So it's not going right back to the start.

Hon GINNY ANDERSEN (Labour): Part 1 of the bill holds the real meatiness around what the meaning of "exclusive use and occupation" is, as well as the meaning of "substantial interruption", and that's included in new sections 57A and 57B, inserted by clause 7.

My question to the Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations is that he directed that the amendment bill initially needed to be drafted at the end of 2024, which is before we had court decisions. I'm interested to understand the nature and the depth of the analysis that was undertaken for the substantive changes—the meaning of "exclusive use and occupation" and the meaning of "substantial interruption". I would like to understand a little bit more around the timing and the depth of that analysis, given the fact that this bill was directed by him to be enacted by the end of 2024, which is before those decisions were taken by the court.

The development of policy, the drafting of legislation to give effect to that policy—it's noted quite clearly in the regulatory statement that there were some pretty significant constraints put upon it, with tight time frames required to meet the Government's objective of enacting the amending legislation before the end of 2024.

I'm interested to know why it is now, towards the end of 2025, if he has a view on that, and whether that extended time frame from what he initially intended actually enabled any further analysis or in-depth review of these provisions to occur. The indication in the regulatory impact statement is that the policy advice that Te Arawhiti was able to provide was consistently constrained. In fact, they note in the regulatory impact statement that they sometimes only had days. They specifically state they had days to turn around advice that has led to the parts of this bill, for the development of options, subsequent advice, even the Cabinet papers, and that there were very short consultation periods, sometimes only as short as a couple of weeks.

The concern that I have is that for substantial definitions such as the meaning of "exclusive use and occupation", it appears, from looking through the regulatory impact statement, that the ability for substantive analysis was completely restrained. In fact, they note—and it may be that he has a reason for this, which I'd like to know—that the development of a regulatory impact analysis before Cabinet decisions on the broad policy intent was not able to be done.

Cabinet made policy decisions without a regulatory impact analysis actually being provided to them, and I would like to understand why that happened. The supplementary analysis came after Cabinet had actually taken the decision to proceed. The financial forecasting was not undertaken before Cabinet policy decisions on the cost of re-hearings for the six live High Court cases that my colleagues, both Duncan Webb and Arena Williams, have referred to. There was no forecasting of the financial implications, I understand, when that Cabinet decision was taken, or the costs associated with the anticipated litigation, so what's that case?

Also the analysis of compliance with international obligations and the potential inconsistency with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples—that was raised by claimants in the urgent Waitangi Tribunal hearing inquiry. Finally, the point: the wide stakeholder or public consultation to understand the scale or the significance of the issue and the extent to which the Court of Appeal decision might cause problems in practice. So all of those things were not taken into account when Cabinet made the decision.

The point I'd like to make is that what this is all pointing towards—and I'd love to hear the Minister's views—is that when significant decisions in Part 1 have been taken about the meaning of "exclusive use and occupation", can he reassure New Zealanders that there was actually adequate analysis that took place? Because it's looking like all arrows are pointing towards this being simply a provision within the coalition agreement that was enacted without proper due analysis. Even in the regulatory impact statement, it actually specifically states the Minister's understanding of Parliament's original intent—not the original intent, but the Minister's understanding of original intent was that the decision—and, Mr Chair, I intend to have another minute to finish off. I seek a second call, if that's possible.

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): You can ask.

Hon GINNY ANDERSEN: Mr Chair, can I have a second call to complete my—

CHAIRPERSON (Greg O'Connor): The time has come for me to leave the Chair for the meal break, and the member may want to finish the question when she comes back, so the Minister is not under time pressure to answer. The House will resume at 7.30.

Sitting suspended from 5.59 p.m. to 7.30 p.m.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Good evening, members. The committee is resumed.

Carl Bates: Madam Chair?

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Just a minute! When we broke for the dinner break, we were debating Part 1 and that is the debate on clauses 3 to 11, "Amendments to Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011". The question still is that Part 1 stand part, but before I give the call, can I please just ask, for my own preference, that you refer to the clause that you're referring to as you do your presentation or ask your question. Thank you.

Hon PEENI HENARE (Labour): Thank you, Madam Chair. Thank you for this opportunity and also the engagement from the Minister. I want to acknowledge that. Some of these questions can get a little bit tricky—we are talking lore and law. In this instance, my question to the Minister, because I haven't heard it yet, is whether or not the Minister has made it clear to the House, at this point in time, whether or not he intends on supporting a number of the amendments that have been made? And I want to speak to this particular one, the Amendment Paper under the name of my colleague Arena Williams, which looks towards the deletion of the words "and occupation", and it is in there, clause 10(2)(b), "had exclusive use and occupation of the specified area from the start to the end of the applicable period".

The first question is whether or not the Minister will support the Amendment Paper tabled by my colleague, which I think is a reasonable one. I did mention earlier in our proceedings that the word "occupation" is going to come up quite a number of times, as it looks towards lifting the threshold that we've continued to debate this evening. That's the first question to the Minister.

The second one is slightly more tikanga nuanced, if you will. We know that in a number of those settings, in and around the Takutai Moana, a number of activities have happened and continue to happen there that are undertaken by iwi. I'm speaking to, in particular, the burial of bones, tupuna bones, sites of significance, many of which are already classified through either the Department of Conservation or through Treaty settlements with the Government, whether or not that actually meets the threshold of "occupation", if you will, and in particular, undisturbed for those iwi or hapū or whānau during that time. There are many places I can think of, in particular, in Te Tai Tokerau.

Another point I want to ask the Minister is—he went to lengths earlier to clarify the Queen's Chain; he spoke to that earlier, and he also makes reference to the desire around aquaculture and resource consents, etc.—I wonder if the Minister understands or if he's got a view on the way that toheroa spat works? I'm not too sure if the Minister knows this—how toheroa spat works—but you might find the toheroa on the beach or closer to the waterline, but actually, the spat finds itself in the sand dunes. And I just wondered if, despite the Minister's reference to and explanation of the Queen's Chain, whether or not what we're talking about here, with reference to the Minister's words towards permits and resource consent but also aquaculture, whether or not that could include that particular harvesting and the aquaculture of the toheroa.

Those are just my questions for now for the Minister. Once again, that's Part 1, clause 10, around the Amendment Paper table by my colleague Arena Williams, around the "and occupation" and the deletion of that, and then the matters that I've raised with respect to the use of the land, as well as aquaculture.

Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH (Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations): Thank you. Just in relation to the question, I'm not of a mind to support the Amendment Paper that the member refers to. I do thank the member for his advice on the matter of toheroa spat which was indeed new to me.

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB (Labour—Christchurch Central): Thank you, Madam Chair. I'm going to talk about substantial interruption and the changed test.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Which clause is that, please?

Hon Dr DUNCAN WEBB: Sorry, it's in clause 7, new section 57B(c). So this is the question of the interruption of the exclusive use and occupation. I'm particularly interested in the Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations' explanation where the customary right is, perhaps, a seasonal or even an occasional customary right. So seasonal harvesting would be one, but others would be, for example, the use of the area for navigation by a waka for ceremonial purposes once a year or for tangi or for something like. The definition, particularly in new paragraph (c), talks about any activity, including fishing or navigation, "carried out,—(i) wholly or partly in that area; and (ii) by a person, or persons, who did not belong to the group; and (iii) with … authorisation by or under legislation or otherwise lawfully:".

Now, I guess, my question is: does that activity have to be kind of inconsistent with the customary right? If we have navigation in this coastal area that is also used for, perhaps, you might call it "ceremonial navigation", then it would seem to be a lawful use which is non-exclusive, right? So if you have, I don't know, dragon boats going up and down for a dragon boat festival; entirely unrelated to tikanga but it is wholly or partly in the area, by a person or persons who don't belong to the group, and it is a lawful activity.

My question, therefore, is: is that the kind of thing which is supposed to show there is a substantial interruption of this customary right? It's quite conceivable that there are customary rights which occur only once every few months or only once a year or conceivably once a generation, or even longer than that, but that doesn't make them any less customary rights. To say that they're interrupted by what, in some ways, would be considered kind of noise, activities of other locals going about their business in a way which isn't actually inconsistent with the customary right, but, at the same time, uses the same area, wholly or partly, that don't belong to the group, and it's entirely lawful—so I guess I'm trying to ask: what do we mean by a "substantial interruption" when we've got other activities which are consistent with but use the same resources as the customary right? Thank you.

STEVE ABEL (Green): Thank you very much. I'm speaking to the exact same section, so that's timely, isn't it?

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Or repetitive.

STEVE ABEL: Pardon me?

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Or repetitive.

STEVE ABEL: It won't be repetitive, I can assure you, because one of the key challenges of substantial interruption—and it has been acknowledged in Canada and Australia, as well as here—is that one of the causes of substantial interruption, or the most likely cause in recent years, is, of course, acts of colonisation; the effect that iwi Māori haven't been able to express their customary rights, because they haven't got access to the portion of the seabed that is theirs.

In regard to that problem, I have a proposed amendment, my tabled amendment No. 8, which proposes that, in clause 7 on page 7 that my colleague was just speaking to, we replace the new section 57B in a manner that takes into account that the Crown would not want to be disadvantaging a claim to customary marine title based on interruptions that were clearly a consequence of colonisation. So the wording I'm proposing is that in this Act, "substantial interruption" means "an interruption to the applicant group's use and occupation of an area that was of such a nature, extent, and duration that it effectively severed the group's connection with the area and that was caused by factors within the group's control or by the group's voluntary abandonment of the area".

But it does not mean interruptions caused by confiscation of adjacent land by the Crown; it does not mean legislation, including the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004; it does not mean the Crown's policies that prevented or restricted Māori access; it does not mean interruptions caused by the establishment of ports, harbours, or other infrastructure without the group's consent; and it does not mean commercial activities licensed by the Crown. None of those things should be able to extinguish on the grounds of substantial interruption. That is the amendment I'm putting.

To an earlier point the Minister made about the mischief that he is trying to contend with, or the interference—the likes of a marine farm was the example he gave. A marine farm should not be a thing that interrupts customary title. It is a commercial activity that may be permitted and may be consistent with it so long as it is by the consent of the iwi, but it is not an interruption. I wonder if the Minister could respond to that proposed amendment, which simply has the effect of making very clear that those interruptions I listed would not be grounds for substantial interruption.

HŪHANA LYNDON (Green): Speaking in support of the tabled amendment by my colleague Steve Abel, I tautoko the interruptions that he's listed and refer back to my previous examples of Whangarei-te-rerenga-parāoa in the harbour and the lack of our Māori landowners that exist around the harbour, now, because of takings through the Public Works Act, Harbour Board takings—

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Can you just refer to the clause you're speaking to?

HŪHANA LYNDON: The clause is clause 7, and the proposed amendment by Steve Abel is new section 5(7)(b). He just read out the types of interruptions that Māori could actually suffer, which do happen and have happened, and we've experienced it. We can see the lack of Māori footprint around some of these places, but it does not mean that we don't retain our ongoing connection—cultural, spiritual, and practical—to a place.

I used, previously, in my examples,

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the ability to place rāhui in places of significance, particularly around the harbour, when things go bang in the night or something happens in the harbour.

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Those are all demonstrations of both spiritual and also practical connections that we retain despite not having our lands within our hands as iwi Māori because of the impacts of colonisation and loss of the foreshore and seabed, the land abutting.

I do have an amendment that I would also like to speak to, which is—I was getting so excited; thank you, Steve, for that great amendment that you proposed—No. 4, and I want to invite everyone to join me on page 6. It's in relation to clause 6. There was a new section in the amendment, which was 9B(3)(b), and 9B(3)(b) is a sentence around Te Tiriti o Waitangi. What we have in this provision, in my amendment, is specifically about deleting that new section. My tabled amendment paper, No. 4, proposes, in clause 6, to delete this new section specific to Te Tiriti o Waitangi, because we already have it in the marine and coastal area (MACA) legislation of 2011, section 7, on page 10. That is a better representation of how you can honour Te Tiriti o Waitangi in legislation.

The proposal to insert this new section really is quite unprecedented in terms of the way with which there's a relegation of Te Tiriti o Waitangi within this amendment, this legislation, because previously, in other bills, you see are Te Tiriti o Waitangi section. We have that within the 2011 legislation on page 10, section 7, which clearly articulates how the MACA takutai moana legislation in 2011 honours Te Tiriti o Waitangi and demonstrates how the Crown will uphold its legislative obligations to tangata whenua and Te Tiriti. It is my proposal that we should delete this new section 9B(3)(b), in clause 6, on page 6, because we should uphold and maintain the existing wording that we have in section 7, page 10, of the original legislation

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Te Tiriti o Waitangi.

The Waitangi Tribunal, in their report back on this issue, clearly articulated that there are breaches of Te Tiriti within this amendment and with what is happening here. It is taking us too far back, and we've come too far along in this journey of honouring Te Tiriti that Parliament cannot just legislate away its obligations to Te Tiriti, as the matua relationship between te iwi Māori and the Kāwanatanga underpinned by He Whakaputanga 1835.

My amendment seeks to delete that new section and honour the original intention, which is in section 7 within the legislation, page 10. It's a beautiful piece of work. It really shows how the Government can and could, at their will, honour Te Tiriti. Kia ora.

Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH (Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations): Just briefly, in relation to Mr Steve Abel's amendment, which says that interruptions caused by the establishment of ports and other infrastructure without the group's consent, however that would be gained, wouldn't be into stopping customary marine title being granted. I'd just invite people to imagine that if you have customary marine title in a spot where a port is and the ability to pass resource consents or not, then I think most New Zealanders could understand the difficulties that could pose for actually operating ports in this country, and so I won't be supporting that.

TOM RUTHERFORD (National—Bay of Plenty): I move, That debate on this question now close.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): I think we are not quite there but I am alerting members, please, to come up with some original material. Thank you.

Hon PEENI HENARE (Labour): Madam Chair, thank you very much for the opportunity to take another call. The Amendment Paper—and I mentioned the use of occupation amendment, there's another Amendment Paper in my colleague Arena Williams' name which refers directly to Part 1, clause 7, and it looks towards the removal of, under Part 1, clause 7 new 57B: replace every instance of "and occupation" with "stewardship". I wondered if the Minister had given any thought to that word "stewardship". We've spoken about occupation, but I'd like to hear from the Minister on whether or not stewardship isn't something that he could consider with respect to making sure that this bill does work.

The Minister spoke to the use and the ability to have ports, etc. I wonder if I can take the Minister to another place with respect to that, and that is around the substantial interruption. I want to take him to the Far North and there is a place up there called Waimahana, which is private land all the way down to the beach. It is a secluded bay and it is opened up by the locals because it is the safest place for people to put their boat into the water. They do that as a bit of a public good; they say, "Well, everybody can use that particular private land, come across the private land down onto the beach to cast their boat into the water, because every other bay around it faces directly out to the open ocean, which makes it unsafe to cast their boat."

I wonder if in this particular part, clause 7, new section 57B(c), where it says: "can be caused (without limiting paragraph (a)) by use and occupation carried out, or an activity (including, without limitation, an activity that is or includes fishing or navigation) carried out,". It's a question for the Minister; I know it's rather unique—well, it's not unique actually. There are lots of places around the country where you can do this, but this is specific because the land that leads up to that particular bay is private land, and I know that because my whānau are part-owners in that particular space. So I want to just make sure that, in the good, kind-hearted nature of the locals that opened the opportunity for people to cast their boats—Maōri, Pākehā, anyone actually, mostly people from outside—whether in doing so they now, under this legislation, have hindered their opportunity to show the meaning of a substantial interruption moving forward.

Like I say, I know it's a rather unique case in terms of this particular place, but I know it's not unique around the country. That's my question to the Minister.

ARENA WILLIAMS (Labour—Manurewa): Thank you, Madam Chair. Taking your guidance, I want to quickly bring the Minister to a number of questions that I have had in this part, which relate to his amendments in his proposed Amendment Paper 380. I'm on page 14, and they're about the new Schedule 1AA and the transitional provisions that apply to cases that were—I'm going to ask him about the cases that have been heard and will need to be reheard since consideration of these changes began.

The Minister knows, because we were discussing this before dinner, that I'm particularly interested in Ruapuke Island. That is, I think, the case that will be top of his list of cases where there is some clarity around that still meeting the test of a higher test. What we're considering there is, you know, what does the process look like for a case where it will probably meet the new test?

I want to ask him first in respect of his change to the interim period, which at new clause 4 in new Schedule 1AA says, "Certain CMT [customary marine title] decisions made in interim period,"—so say, Ruapuke—"and related agreements and orders made, have no legal effect and never have had legal effect"; what does that mean for the cases where other decisions have been made in reliance upon them, and has the Minister had advice about what decisions may have been made in reliance upon them? For example, customary marine area rights give rise to the ability for those people who are said to have those rights to participate in consultative processes that councils run around resource consent. That's one sort of set of rights that you're enabled to have. Those already exist in these cases, so I'm asking the Minister whether that phrase "as if they had no legal effect" in fact means that none of the decisions have legal effect and didn't happen. Can councils rely on the consultations that they have used, or do they have to act as if any records that were created, any evidence that was created, in fact do not exist? Is that what the Minister is trying to create there?

I also want to ask in respect of things like taonga tūturu which are discovered in these areas. For example, in Treaty settlements, it is well understood the process for how taonga that are discovered in an area will then be notified to, and then a process worked through with, the Ministry for Culture and Heritage—those people who have rights in those areas to determine, in fact, what iwi or hapū has a relationship to that taonga because of their occupation of the land. Under a customary marine title finding of rights, these also exist. We're talking here about the foreshore and seabed, and so for many of these areas, they are traditional burial sites. It is common for sand dunes and other coastal areas like caves to be used for the storage of not only taonga but also of koiwi.

And so, I'm asking the Minister here: if those rights that have been recognised through a CMT process that now purport to be extinguished by his amendment on page 16—are the arrangements that have been entered into by the Crown to give effect to those rights in the arrangements to do with taonga tūturu or koiwi? What is the effect of those? Do consultations, do evidence-gathering exercises, do exercises in good faith, negotiations between landowners or council, do they have to sort of be struck out? Is that the intention of the words "never have had legal effect"? What are we trying to get to?

I guess the question is: what is the mischief here? Is it the intention that once these have been retried, that those consultative processes and other arrangements that existed, if they are retried and we have, once again, the recognition that they are retried and we have once again the recognition of the rights of the whānau of Ruapuke in the coastal marine area at Ruapuke Island, is it then that those other legal arrangements that were entered into from the date of the court finding to now once again have effect? Because if those rights are reconfirmed as existing—is what he said to me before the dinner break: that they wouldn't go back to the beginning, but they would have to be reheard—does he mean, then, that those can be re-established quickly? Or is it that the rights that existed between the court's decision and now will never have existed? And how far does that go? Does that go to evidence? Does that go to consultative processes? Does it go to relationship agreements? Does it go to memorandums of understanding? How far is he intending to cast the net of "no legal effect"?

Hon PAUL GOLDSMITH (Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations): Just in relation to that question, when this policy to overturn the Court of Appeal decision was announced originally in July 2024, the Government signalled, of course, right at that point that we would seek to have the legislation take effect from that point. So any arrangements that have been entered into would have been done in the knowledge that there was a risk that this legislation would pass and that the legislation would require those examples to be heard again under the new test, so I think everybody would have gone into it with eyes wide open.

Dr VANESSA WEENINK (National—Banks Peninsula): I move, That debate on this question now close.

Hon Members: Madam Chair?

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): I think we're very close. It doesn't matter how loud you shout at me; I can still hear there are people wanting calls. But I am, even in the short time I've been here, hearing repetition.

STEVE ABEL (Green): Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I hear your advice against repetition, and I assure you that this is not a repetitive point. I'm on page 10 of the amendment document, clause 10, "Section 106 amended (Burden of proof)". The Minister made a point in his earlier responses that section 106(3) states that unless there is evidence to the contrary, non-extinguishment of customary interests will be assumed. But when comparing the current section 106 with the amendment, it is evident that while legally non-extinguishment remains assumed, the practical effect of the amendment does, in fact, shift the burden of proof onto Māori applicants.

It stipulates that applicants must prove that they have had exclusive use and occupation over the land since the application period without substantial interruption, right, since "substantial interruption" can include an extinguishment of title. So the new section 106(2), in effect, mandates that the applicants prove that their customary interests have never been extinguished, as to amount to a substantial interruption; therefore, the practical effect of this amendment is that non-extinguishment is no longer presumed and is something applicants must now prove. If it is genuinely the intent of the Minister to ensure that unless there is evidence to the contrary, non-extinguishment of customary interests will be assumed, then this current wording doesn't achieve that intention.

I have a proposed amendment. My tabled amendment paper No. 9, that in Clause 10 we replace the new section 106(2) with new wording, that "in meeting the burden of proof, applicant groups may rely on any of the following: oral histories; pūrākau and traditional narrative; whakapapa and genealogical evidence; evidence of tikanga and customary practices; expert evidence from kaumātua, cultural practitioners, and historians; archaeological, environmental, and anthropological evidence; historical records, including Crown records, even where incomplete or created without Māori input; evidence of the group's continuous identity in connection with the area; any other evidence the court considers probative. The court cannot do any of the following: require a higher standard of proof than would apply to equivalent common law property claims, discount evidence solely because it is oral rather than written, or discount evidence because it does not conform to traditional common law concepts of property or occupation, nor require proof of continuous physical occupation where such occupation was impractical, inconsistent with tikanga, or prevented by the Crown's actions, nor place the burden on applicants to disprove every possible interruption. The court must account for the following: the historical context of Crown colonisation and its impacts on Māori use of marine—"

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Excuse me, can I just point out to the member that this amendment has been tabled? You do not need to read the entire script.

STEVE ABEL: Sure. No, that's a fair point. I won't read any further. But I simply want to put to the Minister that for the clarification of the burden of proof requirements, this amendment would, if it is genuinely the intent of the Government, ensure the default is non-extinguishment of customary interests, make that vastly clearer and put the burden of proof on the Crown to prove extinguishment rather than on iwi to prove customary title. Kia ora.

CARL BATES (National—Whanganui): I move, That debate on this question now close.

A party vote was called for on the question, That debate on this question now close.

Ayes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Motion agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Hūhana Lyndon's tabled amendment to Amendment Paper 380 to clause 6, replacing new section 9B(3) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment to the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment to the amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Steve Abel's tabled amendment to Amendment Paper 380 to clause 6, deleting new section 9B(3)(a) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment to the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment to the amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Hūhana Lyndon's tabled amendment to Amendment Paper 380 to clause 6, deleting new section 9B(3)(b) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment to the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment to the amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Steve Abel's tabled amendment to Amendment Paper 380 to clause 6, inserting new section 9BA is out of order as being inconsistent with the principles and objects of the bill.

The question is that Hūhana Lyndon's tabled amendment to Amendment Paper 380 to clause 7, replacing new section 57A, be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment to the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment to the amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Steve Abel's tabled amendment to Amendment Paper 380 to clause 7, inserting new section 57AA, be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment to the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment to the amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Hūhana Lyndon's tabled amendment to Amendment Paper 380 to delete clause 8(1) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment to the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment to the amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Steve Abel's tabled amendment to Amendment Paper 380 to clause 8, replacing new subsection (1A) of section 58, be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment to the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment to the amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Steve Abel's tabled amendment to Amendment Paper 380 inserting new clause 9A, new section 59A, be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment to the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment to the amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Steve Abel's tabled amendment to Amendment Paper 380 to clause 10, replacing new section 106(2), be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment to the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment to the amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that the Minister's amendments to Part 1 set out on Amendment Paper 380 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendments be agreed to.

Ayes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Amendments agreed to.

Hon PEENI HENARE (Labour): Point of order, Madam Chairperson. Just seeking clarification from the Chair. We've just voted on Amendment Paper 380 in the Minister's name, and in the closure motion was a closure motion to close the question on the debate on Part 1—is that right? Because in this Amendment Paper where there's still a Part 2 that's yet to be—I'm just wondering if it's all closed now and whether or not—

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): No, no, no—only the parts that apply to Part 1—

Hon Peeni Henare: OK—perfect. Thank you, Madam Chair.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): —and can I just ask members that when you are casting your vote, can you just please say whether you are in favour or opposed. Thank you.

The Hon Dr Duncan Webb's tabled amendment to clause 4(2), recital (5), is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

Tākuta Ferris' tabled amendment to clause 4(2), after recital (5), is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

Arena Williams' tabled amendment to clause 4(2) is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

Arena Williams' tabled amendment to clause 4(2), new subsection (5), deleting the words after "recognition of customary marine title" is out of order as being the same in substance as a previous decision of the committee.

Arena Williams' tabled amendment to clause 4(2), new subsection (5), deleting the words "of those provisions changed the effect that Parliament intends them to have, and" is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

Arena Williams' tabled amendment to clause 4(2), new subsection (5), replacing "Parliament" with "Hobson's Pledge" is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

Arena Williams' tabled amendment to clause 4(2), new subsection (5), replacing "Parliament" with "this National Government" is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

Arena Williams' two tabled amendments to clause 5, new definition of "CMT Amendment Act" are out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

Arena Williams' tabled amendment to clause 5, new definition of "CMT amendments" is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

Tākuta Ferris' tabled amendment to clause 5, inserting a definition of "tikanga Māori", is out of order as being outside the scope of the bill.

Arena Williams' tabled amendment to clause 6, new section 9A(1)(a), inserting words after "substantial interruption" is out of order as being merely an attempt to criticise the bill.

The Hon Dr Duncan Webb's tabled amendment to clause 6 replacing new section 9A(1) is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

The question is that Arena Williams' tabled amendment to clause 6, new section 9A(2) replacing "specified" with "may be those noted" be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tākuta Ferris' tabled amendment to clause 6, section 9A to insert new subsection (3) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Tākuta Ferris' tabled amendment to clause 6 deleting new section 9A(3), (4), and (5) is out of order as not being in the correct form of legislation.

The question is that Arena Williams' tabled amendment to clause 6, new section 9B(2) replacing the words after "promotes", be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The Hon Dr Duncan Webb's tabled amendment to clause 6 replacing new section 9B(3) is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

Tākuta Ferris' tabled amendment to clause 6 replacing new section 9B(3) is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

The question is that Tākuta Ferris' tabled amendment to clause 6 inserting new section 9D be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that the Hon Dr Duncan Webb's tabled amendment to clause 7 replacing new section 57A be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Tākuta Ferris' tabled amendment to clause 7, replacing new section 57A(3), is out of order as being inconsistent with the principles and objects of the bill.

The question is that Arena Williams' tabled amendment to clause 7, new section 57B, replacing every instance of "and occupation" with "and stewardship" be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Arena Williams' tabled amendment to clause 7, new section 57B, deleting every instance of "and occupation" be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Steve Abel's tabled amendment to clause 7, replacing new section 57B, is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

The Hon Dr Duncan Webb's tabled amendment to clause 7 replacing new section 57B is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

Tākuta Ferris' tabled amendment to replace clause 8 is out of order as being inconsistent with a previous decision of the committee.

The question is that Arena Williams' tabled amendment to clause 8 new subsection (1A) of section 58 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Tākuta Ferris' tabled amendment to clause 8, new subsection (1A) of section 58 be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Arena Williams' tabled amendment to clause 8 to delete new subsection (5)(b) be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): The question is that Arena Williams' tabled amendment to clause 10, new section 106(2), to delete the words "and occupation", be agreed to.

A party vote was called for on the question, That the amendment be agreed to.

Ayes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Noes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Amendment not agreed to.

CHAIRPERSON (Maureen Pugh): Tākuta Ferris' tabled amendment to clause 10, inserting new section 106(2A), is out of order as being inconsistent with the principles and objects of the bill.

A party vote was called for on the question, That Part 1 as amended be agreed to.

Ayes 68

New Zealand National 49; ACT New Zealand 11; New Zealand First 8.

Noes 55

New Zealand Labour 34; Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand 15; Te Pāti Māori 6.

Part 1 as amended agreed to.

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