Cablegate: Turkish Mfa Requests U.S. Action at Un, U.S. Help
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 002360
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2014
TAGS: CY GR PREL TU
SUBJECT: TURKISH MFA REQUESTS U.S. ACTION AT UN, U.S. HELP
FOR TURKISH CYPRIOTS
(U) Classified by DCM Robert Deutsch, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: In an April 27 meeting with DCM, Turkish
MFA Deputy U/S Ilkin requested that the U.S. push the UNSC
for a Presidential Statement placing blame on the Greek
Cypriots for failure to reach a Cyprus settlement. He also
asked that the U.S. make concrete gestures toward Turkish
Cypriots. End Summary.
April 28 UN SYG Briefing
2. (C) Ilkin noted that the SYG will brief the UNSC April
28, although it is not clear whether there will be a UNSC
debate. Ilkin pointed out that after Cyprus negotiations in
Copenhagen and the Hague, the UNSC issued Presidential
Statements blaming the Turkish Cypriot side. This time,
Turkey wants the UNSC to show "evenhandedness" and issue the
same type of statement directed at the Greek Cypriots. The
Turks want the U.S. to work in the UNSC to get a statement
including the "realities" of what happened and the same kind
of assessment of blame as previous statements. Turkey also
hoped there might be an informal UNSC discussion which would
provide an opportunity for the GOT to express its view.
3. (C) Ilkin, stressed that the Turks want to get something
tangible on the record blaming the Greek Cypriots or their
leadership while the memories of the referendum and events
leading up to it are still fresh. Ilkin worries that
memories will be short and the window for getting this on the
record will close.
4. (C) In a follow-up conversation, Cyprus Department Head
Bilman hoped a statement would include the fact that Turkish
Cypriots said yes to the UN plan, while the Greek Cypriots
said no; and a declaration that there is now a new situation
on the island and the Turkish Cypriots' isolation should end.
5. (C) Ilkin said the Turks hope to use the statement to
garner EU support for lifting the embargo on the "TRNC" and
taking other measures to support Turkish Cypriots.
U.S. Gesture to Turkish Cypriots
6. (C) Ilkin requested that the U.S. make "even a small
gesture" toward Turkish Cypriots. The Turks think this will
encourage other countries to follow. Ilkin said that this
would also "influence our modalities" of dealing with the
Greek Cypriots. (Bilman later explained this means
improvements in the lot of Turkish Cypriots might enable the
Turks to reach out to Greek Cypriots.) Ilkin added that he
is not seeking recognition for the "TRNC", but rather a
symbolic but concrete gesture toward Turkish Cypriots, e.g.,
in the area of transportation. Ilkin said that the EU's new
regulation on the Green Line would be the first indication of
the EU attitude toward Turkish Cypriots after the referendum.
7. (C) DCM responded that the U.S. is actively considering
and discussing ways to ameliorate the Turkish Cypriots'
situation. However, many of the issues involved are
technical and require careful consideration. The U.S. is
also engaged with the EU in this effort, including a
just-concluded visit by PDAS Ries to Brussels. At the UN,
the U.S. is already working to have the SYG's report reflect
settlement efforts by Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. DCM told
Ilkin that the real prize for Turkey is getting a date to
begin accession negotiations in December, and it needs to
keep its strategy focused on that objective.