Cablegate: Strategic Concept: Group of Experts Met With
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 USNATO 000384
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: NATO PREL MARR MOPS PK UK XG RS
SUBJECT: STRATEGIC CONCEPT: GROUP OF EXPERTS MET WITH
PERMREPS ON SEPTEMBER 7
USNATO 00000384 001.2 OF 006
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: In the September 7 first meeting of the
Group of
Experts (GoE) with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on the
NATO new Strategic Concept (SC) review, both the Secretary
General (SYG) and former Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright, the GoE's chairperson, stressed the importance of
a transparent, inclusive, and consultative process. In
interventions given by 24 out of the 28 Allies, some broad
themes and general consensus emerged: the new SC should be
concise and clear policy document, Article 5 of the
Washington Treaty remains the core of NATO, territorial
defense and out-of-area operations are not contradictory,
the relationship with Russia needs to be an area of focus,
Comprehensive Approach and dealing with international
actors are key to operational success, and relations with
other
international actors are an integral part of NATO.
Luxembourg and Slovenia announced during the NAC that they
will host the first and second NATO-sponsored SC seminars in
October and November,
respectively. END SUMMARY
2. (SBU) In the first NAC meeting with the Group of Experts
(GoE) for the new Strategic Concept (SC), Secretary General
Rasmussen said he intended to fully respect and fulfill the
mandate given to him at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit of
developing the new SC. He introduced each member of the
GoE and said their objective was to present to him by May
1, 2010, their analysis and recommendations for the SC,
based upon the results of the GoE's external consultations
and internal reflections. This will be preceded by an
interim progress report to be done in time for the December
2009 foreign ministerial. He stressed the GoE's
independence, noting that each member had been appointed in
their personal capacities. As such, they should contribute
freely, unconstrained by national positions. The SYG said
the process will play a key role in the quality of the
final product, it should be guided by principles of
inclusiveness, transparency, and it should be participatory
) he intends to keep the Council involved.
3. (SBU) Regarding the reflection phase, the SYG said he
wanted to involve the strategic community in Allied nations
in the consideration of the challenges NATO faces, adding
that he expected the NAC to both actively contribute at HQ
and ensure capital participation. The experts should also
participate in consultation by visiting capitals in groups
or individually, in addition to consultations on the
margins of the NATO-sponsored seminars. The GoE will
inform the Council both in December and April; the group's
internal and capital consultations are to remain strictly
confidential.
4. (SBU) Former Secretary Madeleine Albright, the GoE's
chair, assured Allies that the group would look at all the
various issues confronting NATO and would establish issues
of focus and working methodologies. She voiced her
commitment that the experts' work would be independent, but
transparent.
5. (SBU) Denmark, the first of 24 nations to speak, raised
seven points, which the UK, Germany, and many others later
endorsed and referred to:
USNATO 00000384 002.2 OF 006
- Denmark favored a concise and policy oriented SC rather
than a comprehensive political document;
- The SC should focus on the areas where NATO can add
value;
- The SC will need to be clear on what NATO's focus should
be and should set out priorities, with the prioritization
of tasks and the carrying-out of operations based on an
equitable sharing of resources;
- The Alliance should be preserved as the primary forum for
trans-Atlantic dialogue and provider of security;
- Denmark said the activation of a more deployable force
structure was crucial; at the same time, it saw no
contradiction between territorial defense and out-of-area
operations;
- The Comprehensive Approach needs to be made an integral
part of NATO; and
- Focus needed to be given to developing NATO-EU
relationships.
Denmark further urged that the SYG and the GoE to be bold,
challenging, and innovative in approach and methodology.
6. (SBU) Luxembourg announced it would host the first
seminar in mid-October. It stressed that all Allied
governments should be involved in the SC process given the
new challenges, new threats, and new areas of deployment
they share. It expressed confidence that the Alliance
would live up to this charge.
7. (SBU) Romania threw its full support behind the GoE,
stressing that the GoE was the Alliance's group, not just
the SYG's group. It noted that process plays an important
role in strengthening Alliance cohesion. Romania welcomed
visits by the GoE. It did not object to a visit to Russia,
but thought it should be balanced with visits to potential
aspirant countries.
8. (SBU) Norway was pleased to see the GoE's openness since
Norway,s candidate was not chosen, and Norway expected the
Council to be actively involved in the next stage. Norway
also favored a concise and compact SC that was shorter and
more precise than the previous ones. On substance, Norway
focused on the following points:
- The SC should have clear references to what NATO faces on
its own territory and at its periphery. It also needed to
have language on Article 5, Alliance solidarity, and
indivisibility of security;
- The SC should contain carefully calibrated language on
arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation; and
- The SC needs to find formulations for other international
actors, noting the important with relations with the UN and
the EU.
9. (SBU) Spain emphasized that the SC should reaffirm the
values of the Washington Treaty and the principle of the
indivisibility of security. Spain also said that the
seminars should have participation from civil society,
noting the importance of public opinion. Spain wanted to
consolidate the principles of Comprehensive Approach in the
new SC and joined Norway,s position on disarmament. It
also placed importance on partnerships to the east and the
south, making the connection that--given the operations in
Afghanistan and Kosovo--NATO has the greatest part of its
USNATO 00000384 003.2 OF 006
operations are in Muslim countries. It added that NATO's
partnership structures for the Mediterranean and the
broader Middle East--the Mediterranean Dialogue and
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative--are closely scrutinized by
the Muslim world. To the east, Spain said NATO needed to
find a way to effectively cooperate with Russia, arguing
that Russia was not the former Soviet Union.
10. (SBU) Turkey recognized that the GoE's independent
analysis would be important, but pointed out ultimately it
was the Allies, responsibility to make the hard
decisions. Turkey said that on form and structure the SC
needed to reflect a balance between length and utility ) it
should be relatively short, but detailed enough to provide
clear guidance. Turkey said that many would look at the SC
to examine NATO's new vision. Further, the SC should
contain the following elements:
- Underline the role of consultation and consensus
building, the importance of cohesion, solidarity, and
indivisibility in the trans-Atlantic link;
- Consider threats new and old;
- Counter terrorism;
- The desire to work with partners ) Russia is an
indispensible actor NATO needs to work with, and this can
be done in a mutually respectful manner;
- Working with international actors, such as the UN and the
EU; and
- The clear need to enhance the Strategic Framework with
the EU.
Turkey also argued that that many elements in the current
Strategic Concept were still relevant. It added that while
new issues do need to be addressed, the Alliance should not
try to reinvent the wheel.
11. (SBU) Poland echoed Turkey's point that many elements
in the 1999 SC were still valid. It said that collective
defense was the core of NATO and must remain valid. Poland
stressed that Article 5 was no less relevant today and
should still be a part of our everyday business. Poland
raised as areas of focus: enlargement, realistic threat
assessments, and EU-NATO strategic partnership.
12. (SBU) Slovenia announced it would host the second
seminar some time in November. It deemed both the process
and the substance important and supported a dialogue with
partners and international actors. It underscored that
both old and new Allies needed to be able to identify with
the new SC, The SC needed to balance between NATO's
founding purpose and out of area operations, preserve the
trans-Atlantic link, form a strategic partnership with
Russia, address Comprehensive Approach, defense
transformation, and strategic communication.
13. (SBU) Estonia expressed high hopes for the work ahead
and echoed Turkey's point that though some elements of the
1999 SC are outdated, many points remain valid and should
not be renegotiated unless nations wanted to open up old
debates. On the point of territorial defense, Estonia
warned that we must accept that conventional war in Europe
was still a possibility. Referencing the 2007 cyber
attack, Estonia said, however, that it does not believe in
diluting Article 5 and that every new threat should be
USNATO 00000384 004.2 OF 006
linked to it. Instead, Article 5 should be kept as a last
resort. Germany later reinforced this point.
14. (SBU) The UK came in and subscribed to the Danish
intervention in its entirety, adding an additional three
points:
- A great deal in the 1999 SC remains valid, but the
graphic demonstration of 9/11 showed that security in the
territory cannot be seen in isolation from elsewhere, and
the out-of-area/expeditionary capability notion needed to
find its way into the new SC;
- A constructive and substantive partnership with Russia
will need to be a part of the new SC; and
- The notion of a forward looking and ambitious reform
agenda was needed to underpin the new SC.
15. (SBU) Hungary said it was reassured by statements of
the Secretary General and Albright that all opinions would
be heard, but underscored that in the end the SC was a
document that needed to be fully endorsed and signed on by
all 28 Allies. It said that this would require compromise,
flexibility, transparency, and close contact. Hungary also
said it wanted a clear and concise new SC that builds on
the 1999 SC. It should address Article 5, setting out in
clear and unambiguous terms that NATO is ready, willing,
and able to defend its members.
16. (SBU) Italy said the Declaration on Alliance Security
agreed in April 2009 stated where the Alliance is at
present and it expected from the GoE additional thinking to
look into the future. Italy said it expected the Alliance
to look at Afghanistan, while stressing that the
Strategic Concept must also look beyond Afghanistan.
Further, Italy expected in the new SC to include:
- A balancing between traditional threat and new
asymmetrical threats;
- A balancing of Article 5 and Articles 4 and 10;
- Transparency in the process both internally and
externally, as the rest of the world will want to know what
NATO is doing;
- Treatment of NATO-EU relations, arms control, and
Comprehensive approach.
Italy also favored a short and clear document, saying that
"short is beautiful, clarity is beautiful. The general
public must understand it and others can see what NATO is
up to."
17. (SBU) The Czech Republic offered three points for
consideration:
- The temptation to go into an exhaustive list of threats
should be avoided. The Alliance should keep to areas where
NATO has a say and occupies a leading role;
- The SC should define what the Alliance does and will do
outside of the Alliance area; and
- In order to reach 100 percent consensus, frequent and
constant interaction between the GoE and capitals will be
necessary.
18. (SBU) Canada noted that the SYG and the GoE have a
strong remit from the Heads of State and Government and put
USNATO 00000384 005.2 OF 006
forward its desire for a jargon-free, concise and short new
SC that is both forward looking and well informed by
current operations. It pointed to the Washington Treaty as
a good starting point, highlighting the "Canadian" Article
2 as a place to reaffirm the original NATO values in a very
different world. Characterizing it as a "fascinating and a
complex task," Canada emphasized that at the end of the
day, this process needs to achieve a substantive outcome
with clear political guidance.
19.(SBU) The U.S. pointed out that the GoE, which
represents not 12 countries (Note: a reference to the
number of experts in the Group, each from a different
country) but the entire Alliance, enjoys an independence
that allows it to ask hard questions and expose differences
which the Allied members in their national capacities are
less able to do. The experts can not only expose the
points of contention and controversy, but also offer a way
ahead and strategic guidance. The U.S. endorsed, like many
others, a short and concise document that was visionary.
It shared Canada's view that the Washington Treaty offers a
good starting point. In an era of globalization, it was
important that we explain this Alliance in way that makes
its roles and purposes understandable to the average
person.
20. (SBU) Bulgaria noted several priorities: preserving
NATO as a place for consultation; Article 5; the
Euro-Atlantic link; a commitment to further develop partner
nations; the articulation and securing of a vision of
Europe, who le and free; and Russia.
21. (SBU) Greece placed its priorities on: preserving NATO
as a political-military alliance; collective defense and
the trans-Atlantic link; keeping up with new challenges,
risks and threats; updating of Alliance capacities; and
promoting cooperation and dialogue with partners.
22. (SBU) Later interventions, as much of what had been
said elicited broad agreement, were kept brief. France
intervened to note the importance of the process and
inclusiveness, adding that it should lead to concrete
measures in order to adapt the Alliance to the new security
environment. Germany endorsed in full the Danish remarks,
aligned itself with Norway's position on arms control, and
cited Estonia's comment that not every threat should be
related to Article 5 but that a balance should be struck
between Article 5 and other issues. Iceland added climate
change and economic security to the list of areas to
examine while adding that collective defense was the
backbone of the Alliance and the trans-Atlantic link is
indispensible. Belgium mentioned many of the priorities
already cited by others: Comprehensive approach )
relations with the EU and the UN; disarmament and
arms-control; relations with Russia; and dialogue with the
neighbors of the Alliance. The Netherlands, Croatia, and
Lithuania all expressed general agreement with everything
said before.
23. (SBU) In response, Albright said that she listened
carefully to each statement and took them to heart. She
assured Allies that she will stay in close touch, give
interim updates, and reach out generally, including to
non-NATO members. In doing so, she will take "lessons
USNATO 00000384 006.2 OF 006
learned" into account. She concluded by saying that she
will not shrink from looking at the difficult questions as
"you need to break eggs to make an omelet."
24. (SBU) While noting that it was too early to comment on
substance, Rasmussen said that on procedure, process, and
form, the purpose of the new SC should be to create
consensus on what NATO's core tasks are in the current and
future security environment, thereby serving as a guiding
instrument for political and military bodies. The new SC
should be less wordy and should be written in
understandable language. It should address a broader group
and public, including reaching out to the female audience.
In answering a question from the UK on how to channel the
vast interest on the part of think tanks in the new SC, the
SYG encouraged everyone to participate in as many SC
related events as possible as it is a common responsibility
to contribute to this process.
DAALDER