Cablegate: Iaea/Bog/Iran: Statements Call On Iran To

VZCZCXYZ0009
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0500/01 1670929
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 160929Z JUN 06
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5113

UNCLAS UNVIE VIENNA 000500

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC IAEA IR KNNP
SUBJECT: IAEA/BOG/IRAN: STATEMENTS CALL ON IRAN TO
COOPERATE, RESTORE CONFIDENCE, AND NEGOTIATE

REF: UNVIE 475

------------------------
Summary and Introduction
------------------------

1. (SBU) At the June BOG, mission, per reftel, accomplished
its objectives of underscoring the absence of confidence in
the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, stressing
Iran's need to halt enrichment-related activities, and
re-dividing the NAM. Iran was dealt with under agenda item 8
(g) "Report by the Director General on the implementation of
NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran."
The session consisted of a DG introductory statement, 33
country statements (28 Board members, 4 Rule 50 speakers, and
Iran), and a Chairman's summary. The statements began in the
morning on June 15 and the Chair provided his summary at 1245
hours.

2. (SBU) The "like-minded" countries, including France (on
behalf of the EU3) and Austria (on behalf of the EU),
provided statements that were generally more muted in tone
than previous ones. EU members did not provide individual
statements, despite our recommendation during consultations.
Reflecting extensive prior coordination, these statements all
noted the lack of cooperation cited in the DG's report,
called on Iran to implement confidence building measures
(CBMs), and to resume negotiations on the basis of the P5
plus one package. Japan, Australia, Canada, Norway, and the
US (full text below) echoed these themes, as did Russia,
China, and most of the NAM.

3. (SBU) Malaysia (representing the NAM), read the May 30
Ministerial Statement verbatim and hit on all of the
well-known themes. Nevertheless, 12 NAM countries delivered
tough national statements calling on Iran to cooperate with
the Agency and respond positively to the P5 plus one offer.
Eight NAM members explicitly called on Iran to implement
previous Board resolutions and CBMs to restore confidence in
the nature of its program. End Summary.

-----------------------------------------
DG's Opening Remarks: Not "Much Progress"
-----------------------------------------

4. (SBU) DG ElBaradei's opening statement on June 12 flagged
Iran's lack of cooperation with the Agency, noting "the
report makes clear that the Agency has not made much progress
in resolving outstanding verification issues." (Note: these
remarks, as well as his last two reports on Iran, seemed to
provide cover for most of the NAM to make tougher statements
on Iran. End note.). Without specifically mentioning the P5
plus one initiative, he also lauded the recent efforts that
aim to reach a comprehensive agreement that would
simultaneously address the international community's need to
establish confidence in the peaceful nature of Iran's
program, while addressing Iran's security, technology, and
energy needs.

-----------------------------------------
Chairman Amano Calls the Meeting to Order
-----------------------------------------

5. (SBU) Board Chairman Amano, noting the April 28 and June 8
DG reports, convened the meeting to discuss the
implementation of safeguards in Iran on June 15 at 1015
hours. Country statements immediately ensued.

-------------------------------
NAM Reads Ministerial Statement
-------------------------------

6. (SBU) The Malaysian Ambassador, representing the NAM,
provided a verbatim reading of the May 30 NAM Ministerial
Statement, which regurgitated all of the well known NAM
themes: states' rights to peaceful nuclear cooperation in
conformity with their legal obligations; voluntary
confidence-building measures should not be construed as legal
obligations; the IAEA is the sole competent authority for
safeguards verification; support for a Middle East nuclear
weapon free zone; cited Israel's need to join the NPT;
decried threats of attacks against nuclear facilities devoted
to peaceful purposes; and proclaimed support for negotiations
without preconditions. The statement welcomed Iran's
cooperation with the Agency, seeming to completely ignore the
DG's reports and comments to the Board demonstrating Iran's
lack of cooperation with the Agency. It also did not call on
Iran to take steps that would enable the P5 plus one
initiative to succeed.

------------------------------

Tougher NAM Country Statements
------------------------------

7. (SBU) Many NAM counties associated themselves with the NAM
statement, 12 countries-including Venezuela-called on Iran to
cooperate with the Agency and respond positively to the P5
plus one offer. India, Singapore, South Africa, Ghana,
Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Egypt, Algeria, Libya, Brazil,
Colombia, and Ecuador echoed these themes, suggesting these
statements had been closely coordinated to distance
themselves from the official NAM gibberish and demonstrate
growing international concern over Iran's actions. Eight NAM
members explicitly called on Iran to implement previous Board
resolutions and CBMs to restore confidence in the nature of
its program. Many also lauded the U.S. willingness to engage
in direct negotiations with Iran. (Note: Many NAM countries,
during private consultations with various delegation members
yesterday, had initially expressed reluctance to deliver
individual statements, but apparently responded positively to
our entreaties to send Iran a unified message. End note.).

8. (SBU) Syria and Cuba were Iran's only defenders at this
Board meeting, with both decrying the Board's February
decision to refer Iran to the UNSC. Neither criticized Iran
for the lack of cooperation cited in the DG's recent reports
or called on Iran to implement CBMs. Cuba, noting the
"setbacks" in the Agency's progress to resolve outstanding
issues, blamed this turn of events the UNSC referral,
claiming this action never should have happened. Cuba
mentioned "recent events" by countries that raise the
prospects for a negotiated settlement, but did not call on
Iran to take actions that would enable such talks. Belarus
was equivocal, noting the ongoing diplomatic initiative but
not calling on Iran to respond positively or take steps to
create the conditions for its success. Yemen was the only
NAM country on the Board that did not provide a statement,
citing the absence of a sufficiently senior Yemeni
representative in Vienna.

-----------------------------
Austria Delivers EU Statement
-----------------------------

9. (SBU) Austria, representing 37 EU countries, expressed
concern at the lack of progress in resolving the outstanding
issues, which is required to restore the international
community's confidence in the nature of Iran's nuclear
program. It called on Iran to cooperate with the Agency,
implement CBMs (without specifically saying "suspension"),
and respond positively to the P5 plus one package. There was
no reference to the UNSC or possible future sticks that the
EU could deploy.

------------------------------------
EU3 and "Like-minded" Echo EU Themes
------------------------------------

10. (SBU) France (speaking for the EU3) endorsed the EU
statement, noted that Iran's cooperation with the Agency had
"dwindled to almost nothing," and provided a short recitation
of the P5 plus one-related developments over the previous
several weeks. The U.S., Japan, Korea, Canada, Australia,
Norway, and Argentina hit on similar themes, reflecting close
coordination over the past two weeks. On balance, these
statements were calibrated to highlight Iran's lack of
cooperation and need to implement CBMs, while seeking to
avoid an Iranian overreaction that could undermine ongoing
diplomatic efforts. The EU3, Australia, Canada, Norway, and
U.S. all specifically mentioned the UNSC, while Japan, ROK,
and Argentina did not (but called on Iran to implement BOG
resolutions and implement CBMs).

----------------------------
Russia and China Follow Suit
----------------------------

11. (SBU) Russia said that Iran's cooperation is necessary to
dispel the international community's concerns about the
nature of Iran's program, while calling on Iran to respond
positively to this "serious" proposal. It did not mention
the UNSC. China, however, said Iran needs to respond to Board
resolutions and the UNSC Presidential Statement. China lauded
the U.S. decision to engage Iran, noting that the P5 plus one
had reached "consensus" on a far reaching proposal to Iran.

-----------------------------
Others Chime In Under Rule 50
-----------------------------

12. (SBU) Under Rule 50, which allows non-Board members to
speak, New Zealand, Chile, Pakistan, and Panama all echoed
the themes that Iran must increase its cooperation with the

Agency and respond positively to the P5 plus 1 offer.
Pakistan used this opportunity to trumpet Islamabad's efforts
to shut down the A.Q. Khan network, emphasizing that people
from about 30 countries had been involved, and imploring
states to take steps to curtail development of other
proliferation networks.

-------------------------------------
Iran: Ready To Negotiate On Its Terms
-------------------------------------

13. (SBU) Iranian Ambassador Soltanieh, noting the May 30
Ministerial Statement, thanked the NAM for their support,
which he claimed reflected the views of 116 countries. He
then delivered, at least for him, a rather low-keyed speech
that played up Iran's cooperation with the Agency, citing the
litany of over 2000 man days of inspections, implementation
of the Additional Protocol prior to its ratification (even
though they are no longer implementing the AP), over 20
complementary accesses with short notice, and at least 13
samplings conducted at military sites. He also noted that
the DG had found no evidence of diversion of declared
materials. He claimed that referral of the Iran file-not
done because of verification issues but because Iran halted
CBMs-was a "historical mistake" and noted the file should be
returned to the IAEA.

14. (SBU) Regarding the P5 plus one offer, it was notable
that Soltanieh specifically mentioned the other five partners
but omitted the U.S. Repeating the official Iranian line, he
proclaimed Iran's willingness to negotiate, but without
preconditions and said the package has some positive elements
but there are many (unspecified) ambiguities. Iran will
respond to the offer in "due course." He then requested that
the Board remove Iran from the agenda of subsequent Board
meetings, something that many delegations, including UNVIE,
will not support.

-----------------------------
Chairman's Summary Inadequate
-----------------------------

15. (SBU) Chairman Amano, at 1245 hours, promptly delivered a
summary that did not accurately capture the debate in the
Board room. He noted that some countries expressed concern
about Iran's diminishing cooperation with the Agency, cited
Iran's need to implement CBMs and the Additional Protocol as
called for by the Board, and encouraged Iran to react
positively to the P5 plus one diplomatic initiative.

16 (SBU) However, he then noted "other country" concerns, and
then regurgitated themes from the official NAM statement-with
out reflecting the widespread calls in the individual country
statements for Iran to increase its cooperation with the
Agency, implement CBMs, and respond positively to the P5 plus
one initiative. (Note: Ambassador Schulte will issue a strong
demarche over the Chairman's misleading portrayal of the
debate. End note.).

------------------------------------
U.S. Statement, As Delivered June 15
------------------------------------

17. (U) Mr. Chairman,

Last September, the IAEA made two important findings:
first, that Iran had violated its safeguards obligations
under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty; and second, that
Iran had lost international confidence that its nuclear
program is exclusively peaceful.

The IAEA and the UN Security Council have called on Iran to
cooperate, fully and proactively, in resolving troubling
questions about its nuclear program.

The IAEA and the UN Security Council have also called on Iran
to refrain from activities to enrich uranium and produce
plutonium. Iran failed to heed these calls. Instead of
suspending uranium enrichment-related activity, Iran is
conducting small-scale operations and has announced ambitious
plans to proceed with larger-scale operations. Instead of
halting work on a heavy water reactor that will produce
plutonium, Iran is forging ahead with construction. Instead
of granting IAEA requests for greater access, Iran has
limited the number and location of visits by inspectors and
refused Agency requests to upgrade monitoring capabilities.
Instead of answering IAEA questions, Iran has: declined to
satisfy IAEA concerns about ties to the A.Q. Khan network, an
illicit market for nuclear weapons technology and assistance;
declined to meet the IAEA' s request to turn over a document
from the A.Q. Khan network on fabricating components for
nuclear weapons; declined to answer IAEA questions about

advanced and potentially undeclared centrifuge programs;
declined to explain apparent connections between an
undeclared uranium conversion program and the design of a
missile warhead.

Last week's report by the Director General is sparing in
words but clear in content: Iran continues to withhold
cooperation with the IAEA on almost every outstanding issue.
Iran is not implementing any of the confidence-building
measures requested by the Board and backed by the Security
Council.

Mr. Chairman,

No one disputes the right of Iran to a peaceful nuclear
program in conformity with its NPT obligations. But Iran's
program makes no sense from a civil perspective. Iran's
leaders say they need the heavy water research reactor at
Arak to produce medical isotopes. But why this large
investment when an existing research reactor in Tehran
remains underutilized? Iran's leaders claim they need
enriched uranium for nuclear power plants. But Iran has no
nuclear power plants. The one under construction at Bushehr
will receive fuel from Russia. Iran's leaders claim they
need the capability to enrich uranium to be self-sufficient.
But Iran's known reserves of natural uranium are only
sufficient to power a single reactor for under seven years.
Even adding speculative reserves, Iran would run out of
uranium soon after completing construction of just seven
reactors. Compare Iran to the examples of South Korea and
Sweden. South Korea has twenty nuclear power plants. Sweden
gets 40 percent of its electricity from nuclear power. Both
are advanced countries. Neither enriches uranium.

The programs and actions of Iran's leaders are not consistent
with a peaceful program.

Mr. Chairman,

Our goal is to secure a diplomatic solution, one in which the
leaders in Tehran provide tangible assurances that they do
not seek to acquire atomic weapons. With that goal in mind,
we have worked with Europe, Russia, China, and other
like-minded countries to present Iran's leaders with a clear
choice. The negative choice is for Iran's leaders to
maintain their present course, ignoring international
concerns and international obligations. If Iran's leadership
makes this choice, the Islamic Republic will only incur great
costs and lost opportunities. The positive choice, the
constructive choice, the choice that would most benefit the
Iranian people, is for Iran's leaders to alter their present
course and to cooperate in resolving the nuclear issue.

This must start by Iran meeting IAEA and Security Council
requests to suspend all activities related to uranium
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing, including research and
development. These activities, once pursued covertly, and
now pursued in contradiction of IAEA resolutions, are not
necessary for Iran to enjoy the benefits of civil nuclear
power. But they are a necessary step in mastering the
technology and acquiring the material and know-how to produce
weapons-grade material. Hence our concern. And hence the
requirement by the Security Council, the Board, and the six
Ministers to suspend these activities.

Suspending these activities will allow the Security Council
to suspend its action. And suspending these activities will
allow the EU3 countries, joined by the United States and
others, to open negotiations for a long-term agreement. Such
an agreement would both reaffirm and advance Iran's right to
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including access to
nuclear fuel and civil nuclear technology. Such an agreement
would also open the prospect for increasing political
dialogue and economic cooperation with the rest of the world.
This choice will lead to the real benefit and long-term
security of the Iranian people.

Mr. Chairman,

When the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, the United
Kingdom, Russia, China, and the United States met here in
Vienna two weeks ago, the substance of the message could not
have been more clear -- a choice of two paths for the Iranian
government: one offering considerable benefits, including
peaceful nuclear technology and civil nuclear power; the
second bringing to bear the weight of the Security Council.

And the delivery of the message could not be more clear: Six
Ministers representing Europe, Russia, China, and the United
States standing side-by-side, in complete solidarity. We
hope that Iran's leaders will think carefully about the
proposal from the six Foreign Ministers.

We hope that Iran's leaders will think about what is best for
the economic prosperity and long-term security of the Iranian
people. And we hope that other countries, including all
represented here today, will encourage Iran's leaders to make
the right choice: a choice for cooperation and negotiation;
and a choice to grasp the diplomatic opportunities now being
offered.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

SCHULTE

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