Cablegate: Daily Summary of Japanese Press 07/13/06

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 TOKYO 003922

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR E, P, EB, EAP/J, EAP/P, EAP/PD, PA
WHITE HOUSE/NSC/NEC; JUSTICE FOR STU CHEMTOB IN ANTI-TRUST DIVISION;
TREASURY/OASIA/IMI/JAPAN; DEPT PASS USTR/PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICE;
SECDEF FOR JCS-J-5/JAPAN,
DASD/ISA/EAPR/JAPAN; DEPT PASS ELECTRONICALLY TO USDA
FAS/ITP FOR SCHROETER; PACOM HONOLULU FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ADVISOR;
CINCPAC FLT/PA/ COMNAVFORJAPAN/PA.

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OIIP KMDR KPAO PGOV PINR ECON ELAB JA
SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 07/13/06
Part-2
INDEX:
(6) Editorial: No jumping the gun

(7) Enemy strike argument linked to LDP presidential race

(8) Interview with Internal Affairs and Communications Minister
Takenaka on five years of Koizumi reforms: Door opened for economic
recovery

(9) Lost civilian control -- pullout of GSDF troops from Iraq:
Uniformed officers learned a lot from troop dispatch to Iraq

ARTICLES:
(6) Editorial: No jumping the gun

ASAHI (Page 3) (Full)
July 12, 2006

Key cabinet ministers have been sounding as if they want Japan to go
strike and destroy North Korea's missile-launching sites before they
fire missiles. Even more, they are starting to say Japan should also
acquire the capability of striking first in order to do so.

"I wouldn't say we must do nothing until we suffer damage." This
remark came from Foreign Minister Aso when he appeared on a July 9
TV program. "From now on, we will need to deepen our discussions
over whether we should acquire that capability," Chief Cabinet
Secretary Abe said in a July 10 press conference.

SIPDIS

Amid the international community's diplomatic efforts to resolve the
nuclear problem, North Korea fired seven missiles in the name of
"training." This is an extremely irresponsible act of provocation.

Someday, North Korea may fire real warheaded missiles at Japan. Its
recent firing of missiles made people harbor such an intangible
feeling. It is difficult to shoot down all missiles, so it might be
unavoidable to carry out a preemptive strike in order for Japan to
save the lives of its people. They probably wanted to raise such a
problem.

Seemingly, their arguments appear plausible. However, we should
think it over in a cool-headed manner.

There is no knowing where a yet-to-be-fired missile is targeted to
hit. Striking first, though in self-defense, is tantamount to waging
war. The question is how to find out North Korea's aim, but it would
be extremely difficult to do so.

The Rodong, a missile of the intermediate-range type, has Japan
within its range. Rodong missiles are reportedly deployed in
mountain tunnels or elsewhere to be moved out and fired. Tremendous
intelligence capabilities are needed to locate their whereabouts.

If Japan may strike first, North Korea may further try to forestall
Japan's move and attack Japan. There is also such a risk.

In the event of an armed attack on Japan, the Self-Defense Forces
will defend Japan's homeland, and US forces will pound enemy bases.
This has been the basis of Japan's national security or its
defense-only doctrine.

The government has taken the position that Japan may strike first in
a very limited number of cases. In point of fact, however, the SDF,

TOKYO 00003922 002 OF 007

with its role and hardware being restricted, has not been enabled to
strike enemy bases.

Conforming to the ideal of its peace constitution, Japan will never
ever commit aggression against foreign countries, nor will it become
a military threat. This is our national will, which has endorsed
Japan's defense-only principle.

Some may argue that we need to retouch Japan defense-only posture
now that we are in the age of ballistic missiles. However, striking
North Korea's missile site first will undermine Japan's security
policy.

We must not jump the gun as a consequence of becoming oversensitive
to North Korea's provoking tactics.

Altering Japan's defense-only doctrine would inevitably stir up not
only North Korea but also China, South Korea, and other neighbors.

What is most fearful to North Korea is the United States' mighty
military power. What is most reliable for Japan and its national
security is probably the United States' deterrence capabilities.
Premised on this, Japan should seek to settle the problem on the
diplomatic front as its strategy.

(7) Enemy strike argument linked to LDP presidential race

TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 24) (Abridged)
July 12, 2006

Following the test firing of ballistic missiles by North Korea, an
argument calling for enabling Japan to "launch a (preemptive) strike
on an enemy country" has resurfaced in the Liberal Democratic Party
and Minshuto (Democratic Party of Japan). The argument may overturn
the foundation of the nation's exclusively defense-oriented policy.
Behind brave comments seems to be a tug-of-war with North Korea, as
well as such other factors as the LDP presidential election in
September.

Defense Agency Director-General Fukushiro Nukaga, Foreign Minister
Taro Aso, and LDP Secretary General Tsutomu Takebe all called for
allowing Japan to launch a "preemptive strike," that is, to strike
an enemy before being attacked. In reality, a preemptive strike
requires: (1) a confirmed enemy base; (2) insufficient air defense
of an enemy country; and (3) sufficient striking power. Is a
preemptive strike a real possibility for Japan?

Military analyst Motoaki Kamiura thought such was not technically
possible. He argued:

"Taepodong is the only missile that requires building a frame for
fueling. Rodong and other types of missiles are hidden, being
mounted on trailers. The radar systems in spy satellites and
reconnaissance planes Japan and the United States can deploy are
unable to catch their images to determine a target base.

Furthermore, South Korea and US Forces South Korea cannot launch a
preemptive strike, according to Kamiura.

"North Korea has deployed a large amount of chemical and biological

TOKYO 00003922 003 OF 007

weapons along the demilitarized zone. That country produces 4,500
tons of chemical weapons and 1 ton of biological weapons annually.
Japan's preemptive strike would result in the explosion of those
weapons on the Korean Peninsula."

What caused the enemy strike argument to surface? Masaru Sato, an
indicted Foreign Ministry official on leave, noted:

"It's part of the intelligence war. The intelligence war involves
four factors: external, counterespionage, propaganda, and
conspiracy. Japan makes good use of the last two."

According to Sato, the Koizumi diplomacy has "unintentionally"
achieved a successful outcome since the issuance of the Pyongyang
Declaration in September 2002. The declaration is designed to allow
Japan to provide economic assistance to North Korea in return for a
total settlement of the abduction issue and a freeze on the nuclear
and missile development programs. In the past, the North's
intimidation strategy worked, eliciting concessions from Japan.
Today, Japan is on the offensive, repelling all intimidations from
the North.

Sato added:

"North Korea today resembles Japan during the Battle of Okinawa in
the closing days of WWII. With no hope in sight, the North is a step
short of giving in to despair. The enemy strike argument is designed
to further pressure the North. Pyongyang will take it seriously. The
problem is that Japan is not using the theory as part of its
strategy in the intelligence war. In other words, Japan may end up
losing its freedom of action because of this argument."

What does it specifically mean? Former Upper House lawmaker Sadao
Hirano explained:

"The enemy strike argument has the risk of lawmakers uttering
hawkish words in the hope of gaining immediate popularity instead of
discussing how to defend the nation based on a rational perception
of the current situation. And that might fuel emotional arguments in
the country. The current situation is reminiscent of prewar days."

The enemy strike theory reportedly has its roots in the unified
government view released by the Hatoyama cabinet in 1956. Hirano
warned:

"The Hatoyama administration spread the hawkish policy widely in the
postwar period. Between the period back then and today, there are
marked differences in terms of the situation in East Asia and the
performance of weaponry. It is not improper to shed the same light
on the two distinctive periods. The series of hard-line views are
connected with moves supporting Abe, a hardliner toward the North,
for the LDP presidential race."

Childish politics resulting in war underway

Political commentator Minoru Morita warned:

"If Japan declared a preemptive strike policy, other countries would
do the same. Lawmakers must not play with fire that would endanger
the people's lives just for the LDP presidency."

TOKYO 00003922 004 OF 007

Morita also said that the lawmakers' true mission is to maintain
peace and that anyone suggesting the enemy strike theory would have
been beaten up even by hawks a decade ago.

"Simply put, such a move today will result in a war. Self-styled
hawks are keeping silent for fear of emotional public criticism.
Childish politics making light of the people's lives has begun."

(8) Interview with Internal Affairs and Communications Minister
Takenaka on five years of Koizumi reforms: Door opened for economic
recovery

NIHON KEIZAI (Page 4) (Full)
July 11, 2006

The government's Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy finalized on
July 7 its annual economic and fiscal policy guidelines (honebuto
hoshin) for 2006, the last package for the Koizumi administration.
The Nihon Keizai Shimbun asked Heizo Takenaka, who has engaged in
economic policymaking since the inauguration of the Koizumi
administration, for his views about the reform efforts made by Prime
Minister Koizumi over the past five years.

-- What has been brought in through the Koizumi reforms?

The Japanese economy had been in an abnormal state during the dozen
years or so after the bursting of the bubble economy. As economic
pump-priming measures, the government stepped up investments in
public works projects, resulting in piling up the nation's current
account deficit. The economy, though, did not improve, and
uncertainty loomed large over the nation's banking system due to
huge nonperforming loans. Entrusted with economic management under
such a situation, the Koizumi administration pushed for structural
reforms. The reforms over the past five years contributed to stop a
further deterioration of the economy and to open the door for the
economy to improve.

There are two types of reform: reactive and proactive. Reactive
reform is defensive, as represented by measures taken to deal with
the issue of bad loans. In this case, there is no other remedy but
to write off the loan claims.

During the so-called lost decade in Japan, major changes occurred in
the world. With the advance of globalization, the population in the
market economies in the world increased from 3 billion to 6 billion.
In addition, frontier areas, like the digital revolution, have
appeared. To cope with such changes, promoting proactive reform has
also become necessary, and such reform was exactly what Prime
Minister Koizumi pursued, based on the principle that tasks that can
be done by the private sector should be done by the private sector,
and the economy should be improved based on market vitality. As its
symbolic challenge, there is the privatization of postal services.

The Koizumi cabinet opened the door of proactive reform. The next
administration will have to continue to carry out this type of
reform in order to prevent the Japanese economy from deteriorating
again.

-- Making use of the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, which

TOKYO 00003922 005 OF 007

was set up just before the Koizumi administration was launched, you
changed the conventional policymaking method, didn't you?

A number of councils have been set up in government offices, and
policy debates have been conducted in earnest. Despite such efforts,
Japanese policies during the decade since the bubble economy burst
did not score good results. In deliberations at such councils, with
no strong political leadership demonstrated and under bureaucrats'
lead, breakthrough policies cannot be worked out.

In this sense, the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy is quite
different from other deliberation councils. Chaired by the prime
minister, the panel discusses various matters and works out policies
while seeking the prime minister's judgment. The prime minister's
leadership has been displayed through the council in an
unprecedented way. In part thanks to this, reforms made headway. Our
council served as en engine of reform.

The Ministry of International Trade and Industry took charge of
economic policies, while the finance minister was responsible for
fiscal policies. Economic and fiscal affairs are closed linked to
each other. The policy panel took the view of managing economic and
fiscal policies under a single body for the first time. As a result,
it has become possible to bring about moderate economic recovery
while moderately restoring fiscal soundness.

Most key terms, like honebuto hoshin, were coined in meetings of the
Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy. Even so, if a certain
government agency has strong influence over the council, it could
become a "super council." We therefore must be careful about this.

-- The panel made compromises in coordination with the ruling
parties on the financial revitalization program, postal
privatization, and other reform plans, didn't it?

Policies in a democratic society must be adopted through the
democratic process. There naturally are conflicting views. It is
impossible to achieve a perfect score, so points must be gradually
deducted. Even the prime minister cannot carry out policies just as
he hopes.

Cynically speaking, this trend is, in a sense, to prove that
democracy is properly functioning. Some might think that the policy
panel made concessions on the issues of financial revitalization and
postal privatization, but we engaged in a tactful game and achieved
results based on such tactics as setting a high goal and aiming to
achieve something more attainable and giving up on negotiations if
this minimum goal is out of reach. We are amazed at how skilled
government officials are on tactics. Government officials who can
act without being diffident toward their ministries or agencies
helped me. Unless common principles on policymaking are shared among
experts, it will be impossible to deepen policy debate.

(9) Lost civilian control -- pullout of GSDF troops from Iraq:
Uniformed officers learned a lot from troop dispatch to Iraq

TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 1) (Full)
July 12, 2006

By Shigeru Handa

TOKYO 00003922 006 OF 007

Colonel Masahisa Sato, the leader of an assistance unit who is known
for his imposing mustache, temporarily returned home secretly on
April 20, 2004, three months after Japanese troops were deployed to
Iraq. The purpose was to look for ways to get funds for troop
activities in Iraq.

In past overseas activities, Self-Defense Forces (SDF) troops had to
engage themselves in repair works. But in Iraq, the number of SDF
troops to be dispatched to Iraq was limited to no more than 600
personnel; consequently, a facilities unit was decided to be
composed of some 50 troops. Although this figure was insufficient to
do the repair work, if Iraqis were hired to make up for the shortage
of staff, it would become a relief measure for the unemployed locals
and contribute to bringing peace to the region. The troops to be
dispatched to Iraq calculated that doing so could lead to securing
their safety.

On April 7, the GSDF camp in Iraq was attacked by rockets for the
first time. This attack might have stemmed from local discontent
with insufficient job availability. This incident eventually led
Colonel Sato, a responsible officer for public relations, to return
home temporarily.

Why can't the SDF have ample funding for their activities? The
reason is because laws and rules related to the SDF do not assume
overseas SDF activities. In order to hire Iraqis, the SDF disbursed
the employment cost from the remuneration fund, which is used to pay
guest speakers invited to the Japanese camp.

After Sato returned to Iraq, this employment cost was paid from the
equipment procurement budget used to purchase goods, instead of the
remuneration fund. The disbursement expanded 10 times from 10
million yen per month to 100 million yen.

The "uniformed officer's lobby activity," according to a senior GSDF
officer, on the government achieved a tangible result.

In addition, the GSDF had an eye on official development assistance
(ODA), which is under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' (MOFA)
control, as a possible source to fund the cost of GSDF activities.
Particularly, it targeted the grass roots grant fund cooperation
under the ODA.

The upper limit of money paid out from the grass roots grant
cooperation is set at 100 million yen, which is a relatively small
amount. But the merit is there no need to go through clumsy
proceedings, namely, if nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) apply
for financial support for their plans or projects, Japanese
diplomatic missions abroad can make the decision on whether to
finance their plans or projects. In order to use this fund, a
diplomatic establishment is necessary in Samawah. In response to the
GSDF's strong call to establish such a diplomatic establishment,
MOFA established an office in the GSDF camp in Samawah and installed
five MOFA officials there on a regular basis.

Uniformed officers thus made one effort after the other to set the
stage for SDF personnel to be stationed abroad safely. But the
payment of the employment cost for Iraqis from the defense budget is
suspected of stretching the definition of the defense budget. As for

TOKYO 00003922 007 OF 007

ODA, it is neither intended to finance SDF activities nor be
insurance for the protection of the SDF.

Is the SDF dispatch to a battlefield intended to loosen the laws and
the systems that are supposed to be observed tightly?

The troop dispatch to Iraq has brought some changes to the SDF. For
example, a military-civilian cooperation office in charge of
overseas activities is expected to be established in the GSDF's new
readiness group that will be formed in the GSDF's Asaka base in
Tokyo in March 2007. That office will be staffed by senior officers
who were stationed in Iraq.

Major General Koichiro Bansho, who was dispatched to Iraq along with
Colonel Sato and who served as chief of the reconstruction
assistance unit, in looking back on the past years of the deployment
of SDF troops to Iraq, said: "The SDF has moved in the right
direction over the past 50 years since its foundation." The morale
of diligent and well-trained troops did not weaken despite being in
a "burning hell" where the temperature could rise above 50 degrees
centigrade and where there were repeated rocket attacks.

What the SDF lacked in the past may be the experience in actual
combat. Helped by weak civilian control, SDF troops were able to
grope for the best way to do their operations abroad and learn a lot
from the experience.

"If Japan needs to send personnel to dangerous areas, politicians
tend to send SDF personnel to them," a senior GSDF officer remarked.
This, too, has become a valuable lesson ahead of the next troop
dispatch.

SCHIEFFER

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