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Cablegate: 2006-2007 Guinea-Bissau Incsr Part Ii:

VZCZCXRO9031
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHDK #2818/01 3311231
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 271231Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 6958
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 DAKAR 002818

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR INL, AF/RSA, AF/W, EB/ESC/TFS AND INR/AA
JUSTICE FOR AFMLS, OIA AND OPDAT
TREASURY FOR FINCEN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN KCRM KTFN PTER SNAR PU
SUBJECT: 2006-2007 GUINEA-BISSAU INCSR PART II:
FINANCIAL CRIME AND MONEY LAUNDERING

REF: STATE 157136

OVERVIEW
--------
1. This cable is Part Two of the 2006-2007 National
Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Financial
Crimes and Money Laundering report for Guinea-Bissau.
Included is a narrative overview (paras 2-12). Para
13 contains responses keyed to the numbered questions
beginning with Reftel paragraph 17.

2. Despite increased drug trafficking and the specter
of oil production, Guinea-Bissau?s instability and
tiny economy make it an unlikely site for major money
laundering, except as the placement point for proceeds
from drug payoffs, theft of foreign aid and corrupt
diversion of oil and other state resources, headed for
investment abroad.

3. Guinea-Bissau has adopted the uniform AML law and
hopes to have an operational FIU by the end of the
year. Real progress, however, will be hampered if not
entirely stalled by lack of capacity, corruption,
instability, and distrust, particularly of the
judicial sector. As one banker commented, Guinea-
Bissau is small and the judiciary is indiscreet;
accordingly only a blatant transaction would likely
cause the bank to incur the risk of filing a STR.

4. Three banks operate in Guinea-Bissau. Western
Union and MoneyGram are associated with the banks.
The Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO), based
in Dakar, is the Central Bank for the countries in the
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU or
UEMOA): Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d?Ivoire, Guinea-

SIPDIS
Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, all of which
use the French-backed CFA franc currency, which is
linked to the euro. The Commission Bancaire,
responsible for bank inspections, is based in Abidjan.

5. On November 2, 2004, Guinea-Bissau became the
third WAEMU country to enact the WAEMU Uniform Law on
Money Laundering (the Uniform Law). The new
legislation largely meets international standards with
respect to money laundering; it does not comply with
FATF recommendations concerning politically-exposed
persons, and lacks certain compliance provisions for
non-financial institutions. The law does not deal
with terrorist financing.

6. On May 29, 2006, the Minister of Finance
promulgated a decree establishing an FIU, although the
FIU is not yet operational. As of the date of
writing, members had been selected, but not yet
appointed by the President. The FIU is expected to be
in place by the end of the year, headquartered in the
old BCEAO building in Bissau.

7. Official statistics regarding the prosecution of
financial crimes are unavailable. There are no known
prosecutions of money laundering.

8. The penal code of Guinea-Bissau criminalizes
terrorist financing. However, there are no reporting
requirements or attendant regulations. The BCEAO is
working on a directive against Terrorist Financing.
The directive is expected to be presented to the WAEMU
Council of Ministers in December 2006. If adopted,
the member states would be directed to enact a law
against terrorist financing, which most likely would
be presented as a Uniform Law in the same manner as
the AML law. Because, like the AML law, it is a penal
law, each national assembly must then enact the law.
(NOTE: Since the uniform AML law was adopted by WAEMU
in 2002, four of the eight member countries have
enacted it. END NOTE.) In addition, the FATF-style
regional body for the 15-member Economic Community of
Western African States (ECOWAS), African Anti-Money
Laundering Inter-governmental Group (GIABA) has
drafted a uniform law, which it hopes to have enacted
in all of its member states, not just the WAEMU
states. GIABA will present is draft at a conference
November 21-23 in Niamey.

9. The UN 1267 Sanctions Committee consolidated list
is circulated both by the BCEAO to commercial

DAKAR 00002818 002 OF 010


financial institutions and the Ministry of Finance.
To date, no assets relating to terrorist entities have
been identified. The WAEMU Council of Ministers
issued a directive in September 2002 requiring banks
to freeze assets of entities designated by the
Sanctions Committee.

10. Multilateral ECOWAS treaties deal with
extradition and legal assistance. Other bilateral
accords are not known. Under the Uniform Law, once
established, the FIU may share information freely with
other FIUs in WAEMU.

11. Guinea-Bissau is a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention, has signed but not ratified the UN
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and
has not signed or ratified the UN Convention against
Corruption. The status of the 1999 UN International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism and the African Union Convention on
Terrorism Finance is not known.

12. The Government of Guinea-Bissau should continue
to work with its partners in WAEMU and ECOWAS to
establish a comprehensive anti-money laundering and
counter-terrorist financing regime. Guinea-Bissau
should fully install its FIU, and work to improve the
training and capacity of its police and judiciary to
combat financial crimes.

RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC REFTEL QUESTIONS
--------------------------------------
13. The following responses are to specific Reftel
paragraphs/questions:

GENERAL QUESTIONS
-----------------
Question 17: Is the country (or territory or
dependency) considered an important regional financial
center (such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Panama,
Switzerland, etc.)? What is its significance in terms
of money laundering?

-- Guinea-Bissau is neither a regional financial
center, nor is money laundering thought to be
significant. Bissau?s banking sector is governed by
the BCEAO, which issues the euro-pegged CFA franc
(CFAF). Along with the BCEAO, the ?Commission
bancaire? is a supranational supervisory entity, based
in Abidjan, Cote d?Ivoire, created in April 1990 to
control and oversee financial institution operations.
There are three banks in Guinea-Bissau, two of which
(Banco da Uniao and Banco Regionale de Solidariedade)
have begun operations in the last year and have
between 6,000 and 9,000 accounts each. The third
bank, Banco da Africa Ocidental (BAO), began operating
in 1999 as an investment bank and entered the retail
market after the failure of then-other bank in Bissau,
the Banco Internacional da Guine-Bissau, in 2002. As
of 2004, the BAO had approximately 7,000 accounts.

Question 18: To the extent it is known, is money
laundering/terrorist financing primarily related to
narcotics proceeds? (If applicable, specify drug.)
If not, what is the major source(s) of the proceeds?
Also to the extent known, do the criminal proceeds
laundered in the jurisdiction derive primarily from
domestic or foreign criminal activity? Are the money
laundering proceeds controlled by local drug-
trafficking organizations, organized crime, or
terrorist groups?

-- Guinea-Bissau is increasingly being used by drug
traffickers transiting between Latin America and
Europe. There is no evidence that drug proceeds are
laundered in Bissau, however, other than proceeds that
are used to buy off local officials or procure local
cooperation. For example, two reputed-to-be
Columbians were arrested in 2006 with over 600 kilos
of cocaine. The two were later released and
disappeared. It seems likely that drug proceeds were
involved.

Question 19: Is there a significant black market for
smuggled goods in the country? If so, do you believe
it is significantly funded by narcotic proceeds or

DAKAR 00002818 003 OF 010


other illicit proceeds? Does contraband smuggling
generate funds that are laundered through the banking
system?

-- Arms smuggling is believed to be prevalent, and
drug proceeds likely fund arms purchases.

Question 20: Does money laundering/terrorist financing
occur in the banking system, within an offshore
financial center or free trade zone, or in the non-
bank financial system (e.g., exchange houses) or via
alternative remittance systems such as hawala, or all
areas? Is the country experiencing an increase in
financial crimes, not limited to money laundering or
terrorist financing, such as bank fraud and
counterfeit currency? Please explain.

-- The banking sector demonstrated a relatively high
awareness of money laundering risks and all banks
reportedly had compliance programs in place. However,
banking officials believed Bissau to be vulnerable to
laundering, particularly via over- and under-invoicing
of imports. Guinea-Bissau has no known free trade
zones and is not linked to offshore centers. Official
statistics regarding prosecution of financial crimes
are unavailable.

Question 21: To the post?s knowledge, do the country?s
financial institutions engage in currency transactions
involving international narcotics trafficking proceeds
that include significant amounts of United States
currency or currency derived from illegal drug sales
in the United States or that otherwise significantly
affect the United States?

-- Guinea-Bissau appears to be a transit point between
Latin America and Europe and does not significantly
affect the U.S. Bissau?s financial institutions do
not appear to have a significant role in laundering
drug proceeds.

OFFSHORE FINANCIAL CENTERS
--------------------------
Questions 22 to 24: These questions are not
applicable, and are not reproduced, as Bissau has no
offshore banking or other institutions.

FREE TRADE ZONES
----------------
Question 25: Are there free trade zones operating in
the jurisdiction? If so, please give the number and
briefly describe operations, capability and function.

-- Bissau has no known free trade zones.

Questions 26 and 27 pertain to free trade zones and
are not reproduced.

LAWS AND REGULATIONS TO PREVENT MONEY LAUNDERING
--------------------------------------------- ---
Question 28: Is money laundering a criminal offense in
this country?

-- Yes, in 2004, Guinea-Bissau became the third WAEMU
country to pass WAEMU harmonized legislation
establishing a uniform law on money laundering.

Question 28 (continued): Does the law apply only to
drug-related money laundering? Does the country list
specific crimes or take an all serious crimes
approach? Note: In some jurisdictions, anti-money
laundering laws cover ?all serious crimes? which are
defined as crimes that carry a threshold minimum
sentence in the jurisdiction?s penal code. If the
country lists specific crimes, what offenses are
covered? If there is a threshold minimum, what is
that threshold?

-- Under the new legislation, the source of the
proceeds can be any crime.

Question 29: Has the country enacted secrecy laws that
prevent disclosure of client and ownership information
by domestic and offshore financial services companies
to bank supervisors and law enforcement authorities?


DAKAR 00002818 004 OF 010


-- The uniform law on money laundering enables banking
information to be shared with law enforcement
authorities. The law states: ?Notwithstanding all
contrary legal provisions or rules, professional
secrecy may not be invoked . . . to refuse providing
information to the control authorities.?

QUESTION 30: Do current laws provide for the
establishment and funding of a financial intelligence
unit (FIU)?

-- The current law provides for the establishment,
albeit not funding, of an FIU. A directive
establishing an FIU was signed in May 2006, but the
FIU has not yet begun operations.

FINANCIAL SECTOR
----------------
Question 31: Who supervises and examines financial
institutions for compliance with anti-money
laundering/counter-terrorist financing laws and
regulations?

-- The Banking Commission has the responsibility to
supervise financial institution compliance with
AML/CTF laws and regulations. The Commission
reportedly has conducted some AML compliance
examinations; however, due to the fact that half of
the member states have not adopted the uniform law,
its efforts have been limited.

Question 32: Are banks and other financial
institutions required to know, record, and report the
identity of customers engaging in significant
transactions, including the recording of large
currency transaction at thresholds appropriate to the
country?s economic situation? What is the statutory
threshold?

-- National Assembly resolution number four in 2004
deals with money laundering. Article 26 stipulates
that if a bank suspects money laundering it must
obtain a declaration of all properties and assets from
the suspect and notify the Attorney General who is
then required to appoint a judge to investigate.

Question 33: Are banks and other financial
institutions required to maintain for an adequate time
records necessary to reconstruct significant
transactions through financial institutions in order
to be able to respond quickly to information requests
from appropriate government authorities in narcotics-
related or other money laundering or terrorist finance
cases? For how long?

-- The law requires financial institutions to preserve
records for at least ten years.

Question 34: Are the money laundering controls applied
to non-banking financial institutions, such as
exchange houses, stock brokerages, cash couriers,
casinos, insurance companies, etc., and to
intermediaries, such as lawyers, accountants, or
brokers/dealers? Who supervises such entities for
compliance?

-- The law applies to a host of sectors, including all
of those listed above and others. Some entities have
government regulatory authorities; others (such as
attorneys and accountants) have professional
supervisory authorities, while others have no
effective regulator.

Question 35: Do financial institutions report
suspicious transactions? Is such reporting mandatory
or voluntary? Is reporting required for all
suspicious transaction, or is there a threshold amount
below which suspicious transaction reports are not
required? Are non-bank financial institutions
required to report such transactions?

-- The law requires financial institutions to report
suspicious transactions to the FIU; there is no
minimum threshold. Non-bank financial institutions
are also required to report. As yet, however, there
is no FIU.

DAKAR 00002818 005 OF 010

Question 36: Are reporting individuals (bankers and
others) protected by law with respect to their
cooperation with law enforcement entities?

-- Reporting individuals and their supervisors are
accorded full civil and criminal immunity (as well as
protection from professional sanctions) for
information provided to the FIU in good faith.

Question 37: Are there statutory requirements for
limiting or monitoring the international
transportation of currency and monetary instruments?

-- In general, all incoming currency and monetary
instruments must be deposited in a bank, the post
office, or changed at an authorized foreign exchange
bureau within 30 days. There is no limit on the
amount. The entities report receipts monthly to the
BCEAO. Outgoing transfers must be handled by banks,
the post office, or, in the case of cash or travel
checks for travelers, by authorized change bureaus.
Regulations provide a long laundry list of
justifications for transfers; such transfers can be
done by the financial institutions without
authorization as long as the transferor provides
documentation of the purpose of the transfer (and, in
the case of the Post and change bureaus, is within a
certain amount). A notable exception is transfers for
the purpose of foreign investment, which, as with any
other purpose not on the list, must be approved by the
Minister of Finance. Financial institutions report
outgoing transfers monthly to the BCEAO.

Question 38: Please describe cross-border currency
reporting requirements, including those that apply to
cash couriers?

-- On entry, non-residents must declare in writing any
currency from outside the ?zone franc? in the amount
of CFAF one million (approximately USD 2,000) or more,
as well as monetary instruments denominated in cash in
any amount. On exit, non-residents must declare in
writing any non-franc-zone currency above
approximately USD 1,000 as well as all monetary
instruments from foreign entities. Residents are not
required to declare currency on entry; on exit, they
must declare in writing amounts any foreign currency
and any monetary instruments greater than
approximately USD 4,000. These requirements are for
the purpose of currency control and are not well
enforced.

FINANCIAL INTELLIGENCE UNIT/INVESTIGATION
-----------------------------------------
Question 39: Has the country established and
adequately staffed a financial intelligence unit
(FIU)? Where in the Government is it housed; e.g.,
within the finance or national police ministry, as an
independent agency, etc.

-- By law, the FIU will be within the Ministry of
Economy and Finance, although its staff will be drawn
from several ministries. The Minister of Finance
believes that the FIU will be in place by the end of
2006.

Question 40: Describe the authorities and functions of
the FIU. Is it an administrative body that performs
analytical duties or does it also have criminal
investigative responsibilities? Does it have
regulatory responsibilities?

-- According to the law and decree, a senior Ministry
of Finance functionary will administers the FIU. Its
mission, among other things, is to receive and analyze
suspicious activity declarations, and, where
appropriate, to refer files to the Prosecutor General.
It is an administrative-type FIU, but has the
authority to obtain information through
?correspondents? within police entities (as well as
within other government entities). It also has two
senior police inspectors and a customs officer on
staff. Some of its functions could be viewed as
investigative, but it is not clear where the limits of
its investigative authority lie. It does not, at

DAKAR 00002818 006 OF 010


present, have regulatory responsibilities.

Question 41: Does the FIU have access to the records
or databanks of other government entities? Financial
Institutions? Does it have formal mechanisms in place
to share information domestically or with other FIUs?

-- By law, the FIU has the authority to request
information from any government entity through its
?correspondents? as well as from any reporting entity
(i.e., financial and designated non-financial
entities). Under the uniform law, information can be
shared freely among the FIUs in WAEMU; at present,
however, there are only two operational FIU (Senegal
and Niger).

Question 42: How many suspicious transaction reports
(STRs) were received in 2006? How many were the
subject of investigation or resulted in referrals to
law enforcement for investigation?

-- None.

Question 43: Which government bodies are responsible
for investigating financial crimes, including money
laundering and terrorist financing? Are they
adequately staffed and trained to fulfill their
responsibilities?

-- Apart from the FIU, the judicial police and
prosecutors are responsible for investigating money
laundering and terrorist financing. There is a small
unit at the Attorney General?s office charged with
investigating corruption and economic crimes.
Capacity is low; in the words of one judicial police
officer: ?null.? The police cite lack of training and
means, no collaboration with banks, and
institutionalized corruption as impediments to
investigations. Both police and the public
prosecutors office complained of corruption within
Customs hindering the ability to get documents
necessary for investigations.

Question 44: Have there been arrests and/or
prosecutions for money laundering or terrorist
financing since January 1, 2006. How many? Please
report highlights of any major cases not previously
reported.

-- No.

Question 45: Has the jurisdiction criminalized the
financing of terrorism as required by the United
Nations Security Council resolution 1373? If so,
please provide title of act, date of enactment, and
pertinent details. If the jurisdiction has an ?all
serious crimes? anti-money laundering law, please
indicate if terrorism and terrorist financing are
considered ?serious crimes.?

-- Guinea-Bissau has criminalized terrorist financing
since October 13, 1993. See Penal Code, Title VI,
Article 203. The law criminalizes, inter alia, the
financing of terrorist groups or organizations. These
in turn are defined as groups of two or more persons,
acting in concert, with the intent to harm the
integrity or independence of the nation, to impede ?
or subvert the functioning of constitutionally
mandated state institutions, force a public authority
to commit an act, refrain from or tolerate an act, or
to intimidate certain persons, group of persons or the
population generally through a criminal act.

As happened with the uniform law against money
laundering, the BCEAO has taken the lead in drafting a
directive against terrorist financing, which it
expects to present to the WAEMU Ministers? meeting for
consideration in December 2006. The current draft
adopts the definition of terrorism contained in the
1999 UN Convention, and requires financial and non-
financial institutions to report transactions
suspected to be related to terrorist financing to the
FIU. In addition, the draft contains provisions
intended to strengthen the regulation of NGOs. Once
adopted by the Ministers, a Uniform law will be
drafted and be available for adoption by the

DAKAR 00002818 007 OF 010


parliaments of member states. GIABA has a draft
uniform law for all ECOWAS states that will be
discussed at a seminar in Niamey in November 2006.

Question 46: Has the jurisdiction circulated to its
financial institutions the list of individuals and
entities that have been included on the UN 1267
sanctions committee?s consolidated list as being
linked to Usama bin Ladin, members of the Al Qa?ida
organization or the Taliban, or that the USG or the EU
have designated under relevant authorities. If so,
did the jurisdiction identify, freeze, seize, and/or
forfeit related assets in 2005? If so, please provide
dollar amount.

-- The list is circulated both by the BCEAO to
commercial financial institutions. To date no assets
relating to terrorist entities have been identified.

Question 47: Does the jurisdiction acknowledge the
existence and use of indigenous alternative remittance
systems that by-pass, in whole or part, financial
institutions? Describe the steps the jurisdiction has
taken regarding regulating alternative remittance
systems, such as hawala, black market exchanges, money
remitters, trade-based money laundering, cross border
cash smuggling, or the misuse of gold, precious metals
and gems.

-- In theory, unlicensed remitters and exchanges are
illegal. Banks acknowledge the use of over/under
invoicing, but it is not known whether this practice
is related to money laundering or is simply tax fraud.
Authorities cite porous borders and cash smuggling as
problems, in part because of reportedly rampant
corruption in Customs.

Question 48: Discuss the efforts the jurisdiction has
taken to thwart the misuse of charitable and/or non-
profit entities that can be used as conduits for the
financing of terrorism?

-- The current regulation of charities is not known.
The WAEMU uniform AML law covers charitable and non-
profit entities, which are required to file suspicious
transaction reports. The draft terrorist financing
directive includes provisions to strengthen the
supervision of NGOs.

CASH SMUGGLING
--------------
Question 49: Bulk cash smuggling and the use of cash
couriers to move the proceeds of crime and terrorist
funding are of significant concern to the USG. Are
there laws criminalizing smuggling cash into and out
of the country? If so are Customs officials aware of
cash courier problems and capable of dealing with the
issue?

-- See Response to Question 47.

Question 50: Are cash smuggling reports shared between
host government entities (in particular with an
existing FIU)?

-- There is no FIU at present. See Response to
Question 47.

ASSET FORFEITURE AND SEIZURE LEGISLATION
----------------------------------------
Question 51: Has the country enacted laws and
established systems for identifying, tracing,
freezing, seizing, and forfeiting narcotics-related
assets as well as assets derived from or intended for
other serious crimes? If so, please describe the
authority (regulatory or judicial). Are new
legislation or changes in current laws, regulations,
judicial or administrative authorities, being
considered?

-- The uniform AML law provides for the freezing,
seizing, and confiscation of property by judicial
order. In addition, the FIU can order the suspension
of the execution of a financial transaction for 48
hours. The BCEAO can also order the freezing of funds
held by banks. In addition, judicial authorities can

DAKAR 00002818 008 OF 010


order the seizure and confiscation of property used in
crime; in a recent cocaine seizure case, the
authorities seized a truck and several boats.

Question 52: What are the obstacles or disincentives
to enacting such laws, regulations, other authorities?

-- Guinea-Bissau is a civil law country. As such, it
does not have a tradition of civil forfeiture.

Question 53: What are the major provisions in current
and/or proposed legislation? For example, what assets
can be seized? Do they include: instruments of crime
such as conveyances used to transport narcotics, or
farms on which illicit crops are grown or which are
used to support terrorist activity, or intangible
property such as bank accounts? Can substitute assets
be seized or must a relationship to the crime be
proven?

-- The uniform law allows the freezing, seizure and
confiscation of any property, corporal or incorporeal,
on order of the investigating judge as a conservation
measure. Upon conviction for money laundering or
attempted money laundering, the law provides for
obligatory confiscation of property that is the
proceeds of laundering; property into which that
property has been converted, commingled, invested or
transformed; and any proceeds (income) derived from
that property. There is an exception for an owner who
can establish that s/he was unaware of the illegal
source of the property. The court may also order, as
penal sanctions, the confiscation of any property used
or intended to be used in the offense, and the
confiscation of other property of the convicted person
(the latter does not appear to be ?substitute assets?
as that term is understood in the U.S.; the provision
does not relate the amount of licit property subject
to confiscation to the amount laundered or put beyond
the reach of the court).

Question 54: Can legitimate businesses be seized if
used to launder drug money, support terrorist
activity, or are otherwise related to other criminal
proceeds?

-- The AML law provides as stated in the previous
response. Whether the business is involved in the
offense, or subject to the innocent owner defense,
would depend on the facts of the case. A business
that is convicted of laundering can be dissolved or
closed. The law has not been applied in this regard.

Question 55: What government entities are responsible
for tracing, seizing and freezing assets? Is there a
period of time ascribed to the action of freezing,
after which the assets are released? Are frozen
assets confiscated? If yes, by what government
entity? Who receives proceeds from asset seizures and
forfeitures?

-- The FIU can order a 48-hour freeze (in the form of
a delay on the execution of a transaction). Such
action must be converted to a judicial order within 48
hours or the freeze must be lifted. As noted above,
the investigating judge can issue orders freezing or
seizing assets as a conservatory measure. Confiscated
property goes to the public treasury.

Question 56: Does the banking community cooperate with
enforcement efforts to trace funds and seize/freeze
bank accounts?

-- As far as is known, there have been no enforcement
efforts involving banks.

Question 57: Does the law allow for civil as well as
criminal forfeiture?

-- The uniform law allows explicitly for criminal
forfeiture. There is no provision for American-style
civil forfeiture. It is not clear what happens to
property seized if no prosecution results and no owner
is identified.

Question 58: Does the Government enforce existing

DAKAR 00002818 009 OF 010


drug-related asset seizure and forfeiture laws? Does
the jurisdiction have adequate police powers and
resources to trace, seize and freeze assets? If so,
can the jurisdiction freeze assets without undue
delay?

-- As noted above, police in a recent cocaine case had
seized an SUV, several boats and weapons. The
suspects were released and it is not known what
happened to the seized property. The total number of
confiscations is not known.

Question 59: Does the government have an independent
system and mechanism for freezing terrorist assets?

-- National Assembly resolution number four in 2004
deals with money laundering and it is the same
resolution that would be used to respond to terrorist
assets. The government could use that authority to
obtain a declaration of all properties and assets from
the suspect and notify the Attorney General who is
then required to appoint a judge to investigate.

Question 60: What was the dollar amount of non-
terrorist related assets frozen, forfeited and/or
seized in the past year? How does this amount compare
to amounts seized in previous years?

-- Statistics on the value of seized assets are
unavailable.

Question 61: Has the country enacted laws for the
sharing of seized narcotics assets, as well as the
assets from other serious crimes with other
governments?

-- The uniform law provides that the sharing of seized
narcotics assets with other governments can be
negotiated on a case-by-case basis.

Question 62: Is the Government engaged in bilateral or
multilateral negotiations with other governments to
enhance asset tracing freezing and seizure?

-- Guinea-Bissau is required by the uniform law on
money laundering to freely exchange information with
the FIUs of each of the WAEMU countries, although at
present only Senegal and Niger have a functioning FIU.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
-------------------------
Question 63: Has the country adopted laws or
regulations that allows for the exchange of records
with the United States on narcotics and narcotics
related money laundering, as well all-source money
laundering, terrorism and terrorist financing
investigations and proceedings? Has the jurisdiction
reached agreement with the United States authorities
on a mechanism for exchange of records in connection
with such investigations and proceedings? If not, is
the country negotiating in good faith with the United
States to establish such an exchange mechanism? Does
the jurisdiction have similar arrangements with other
jurisdictions?

-- With respect to money laundering, the uniform AML
law provides that the FIU may enter into cooperation
accords with other FIUs. The law also contains
extensive provisions for the exchange of information
on a judicial level. These provisions comport with
international standards.

Question 64: Identify all treaties, agreements, or
other mechanisms for information exchange that host
country has entered into with the USG or other
countries, including agreements between the FIU and
its counterparts, and those with home country
supervisors to facilitate the exchange of supervisory
information regarding banks and trust companies
operating in the host country. Describe the status of
efforts to update such agreements or arrangements.

-- Not known.

Question 65: Has the country cooperated, when
requested, with appropriate law enforcement agencies

DAKAR 00002818 010 OF 010


of the USG and other governments investigating
financial crimes related to narcotics, terrorism,
terrorist financing and other crimes? If the country
has cooperated on important cases with USG agencies,
please describe.

Not known.

Question 66: Please detail any instances of refusals
to cooperate with foreign governments, as well as any
action taken by the USG and any international
organization to address such obstacles, including the
imposition of sanctions or penalties?

-- Mission is unaware of any refusals to cooperate
with foreign governments in routine cases.

Question 67: Is the country a party to the UN
International Convention against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances (Vienna
Convention), the UN Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, and, the UN Convention against
Corruption or other applicable agreements and
conventions? Does it adhere to relevant international
money laundering standards, such as the
recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force,
the policy directive of the EC, and the legislative
guidelines of the OAS and/or other similar
declarations? If so, what steps is it taking to
implement them? If not, what, if any, steps are the
country taking to become a party or implement?

-- Guinea-Bissau is a party to the 1988 UN Drug
Convention, has signed but not ratified the UN
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and
has not signed or ratified the UN Convention against
Corruption. The status of the 1999 UN International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism and the African Union Convention on
Terrorism Finance is not known. The uniform AML law
largely meets the FATF recommendations for money
laundering, and Guinea-Bissau is attempting to
implement them through, inter alia, the installation
of an FIU.

UPDATES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTION FROM 2005 INSCR
--------------------------------------------- -
Question: Does the jurisdiction have the authority to
identify, freeze, seize and/or forfeit terrorist
finance?related assets? If so, please describe the
authority invoked (regulatory, legislative, judicial,
administrative).

-- Pursuant to a September 19, 2002 BCEAO directive,
banks are required to freeze assets of UN-designated
terrorists and terrorist entities. There are no
provisions for seizing and/or forfeiting terrorist
financing-related assets. These provisions are
contained in the draft BCEAO directive.

Jacobs

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