Cablegate: Health Cooperation-No Agreement to Launch

VZCZCXRO1132
RR RUEHCHI RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHJA #0182/01 0420925
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 110925Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4462
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0010
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS COLL
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 3124
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6032
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 3711
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 5445
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/DOD WASHDC
RHHMUNA/USPACOM HONOLULU HI

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 JAKARTA 000182

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, STAS, OES/STC, S/ECC, OES/EGC, AND
R/ECA
DEPT PASS TO OSTP Jason Rao
NSC for Pradeep Ramamurthy
BANGKOK FOR RDM/A

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV TSPL TBIO EAID KGHG ID
SUBJECT: Health Cooperation-No Agreement to Launch
U.S.-Indonesia Joint Program

REF: A) Jakarta 175
B) EAP/MTS-Embassy Jakarta email 02/03/10

1. (U) This message is Sensitive But Unclassified.
Please handle accordingly.

2. (SBU) SUMMARY: After three days of intense
discussions, U.S. and Indonesian negotiators could not
reach agreement on the creation of the Indonesia-
United States Center for Biomedical and Public Health
Research (IUC). The USG accommodated GOI concerns
regarding civilian control of the IUC and showed
considerable flexibility on a range of other issues.
However, GOI negotiators operated under instructions
that precluded agreement in a number of key areas,
including control of USG resources and personnel,
privileges and immunities, the scope of the IUC's work,
intellectual property rights and related issues.
While we have requested ministerial level calls in an
effort to break the impasse, we must begin preliminary
steps to shut down the existing U.S. Navy laboratory
in Jakarta. This step is a significant setback for
our health cooperation and could harm other elements
of our Comprehensive Partnership. However, we will
work to minimize the damage, especially in light of
the President's upcoming visit. END SUMMARY.

DIPLOMATIC FULL COURT PRESS

3. (SBU) An interagency USG team visited Jakarta
February 8-10 for negotiations aimed at establishing
the Indonesia-United States Center for Biomedical and
Public Health Research (IUC). The IUC would replace
an existing U.S. Navy research laboratory (NAMRU-2)
that had become the subject of considerable domestic
controversy. Former Health Minister Siti Fadillah
Supari-long an opponent of NAMRU-2-agreed in September
2009 to pursue the IUC as a possible new mechanism for
our bilateral health cooperation. Our efforts took on
added urgency when the GOI agreed to extend the visas
of current NAMRU-2 personnel until March 15 but made
clear that it could offer no further extensions.

4. (SBU) We have engaged the GOI at all levels in an
effort to make the IUC a reality. Ambassador Hume has
pressed the matter in meetings with several key
Cabinet officials. On the last day of the recent
negotiating round, visiting PACOM Commander Admiral
Willard raised the subject with President Yudhoyono.
At every turn, we underscored to the Indonesian side
that continued U.S. Navy presence was critical to the
IUC's success because no other USG agency had the
resources and personnel to replace the Navy
contribution. We also made clear our willingness to
make every possible accommodation in order to assuage
Indonesian political sensitivities.

FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT VISIONS

5. (SBU) Using the USG draft Memorandum of
Understanding (Ref B), USG negotiators worked with an
interagency GOI team in an effort to narrow our
differences. Initial discussions focused on the need
to provide the GOI with political cover for the
continued presence of U.S. Navy personnel. The USG
agreed to a civilian-led structure that provided for
joint decision making on all IUC research activities.
We also accepted Indonesian proposals to remove any
text that suggested that the IUC was a continuation of
NAMRU-2 under a new name.

6. (SBU) As negotiations proceeded, however, it
became clear that the Indonesian side held a
fundamentally different vision of the IUC from the USG.

JAKARTA 00000182 002 OF 003

We had proposed a collaborative framework where each
government contributed personnel and resources to work
on joint projects of mutual benefit. Indonesian
officials envisioned the IUC as an institution with a
distinct legal personality and which would control
personnel and resources provided by both governments.

7. (SBU) Successive Indonesian counter drafts of the
IUC MOU continued to include language that the USG
could not accept. At the conclusion of three days of
negotiations, we remained far apart on several red
line issues:

--Control of Resources and Personnel: GOI negotiators
insisted on a management structure that gave IUC
leadership, including a proposed Indonesian-national
director, control over USG resources. The Indonesians
also insisted on prohibiting U.S. Military personnel
from participating in the IUC.

--Privileges and Immunities: The Indonesian side
refused to grant USG personnel participating in the
IUC privileges and immunities equivalent to
Administrative and Technical Staff under the Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

--Scope of the IUC's Work: Indonesian officials had
urged that the U.S. Centers for Disease Control be the
lead agency on the USG side. However, they sought to
restrict the IUC's activities in such a way that
excluded most of the CDC's core activities. This
included proscribing surveillance, applied
epidemiology and other public health activities. GOI
negotiators explained that some Indonesians,
especially in the legislature, would view such
activities as a violation of Indonesian sovereignty.

--Intellectual Property Rights and Related Issues:
The Indonesian side insisted on the inclusion of an
annex covering the protection of genetic resources and
traditional knowledge that the USG could not accept.
They also pressed for language that would have
implications for ongoing multilateral negotiations on
intellectual property rights and sample sharing. We
accepted language pledging to adhere to Indonesian
laws on these matters as well as international
agreements to which both countries were parties.
However, we could not accept the GOI's other
provisions.

--Adherence to Indonesian Government Policies:
Indonesian negotiators insisted on language that
obligated U.S. participants in the IUC to follow
Indonesian government policies. While the USG
accepted the need to follow Indonesian laws and
regulations, the concept of policies remained too
vague, and too easily changed, to accept. In addition,
the GOI could not accept our requirement that the
agreement explicitly state that applicable U.S. laws
and regulations must be followed.

WHERE WE GO FROM HERE

8. (SBU) We have requested that Secretary Clinton
call Foreign Minister Natalegawa and that Secretary
Sebelius call Health Minister Endang in an effort to
break the impasse (Ref A). The Charge has also
discussed USG redline issues with the President's key
foreign affairs advisor. The Department of Foreign
Affairs (DEPLU) has informed us via diplomatic note
that NAMRU-2 must be closed by March 15. Given that
fact, we must begin the final shutdown of the
laboratory's operations. We have already moved high-
value equipment from the current NAMRU-2 facility

JAKARTA 00000182 003 OF 003

(located on a Ministry of Health compound) to the
Embassy warehouse. We are also beginning to move
other equipment from NAMRU-2 and will terminate NAMRU
FSN employees consistent with Indonesian labor laws.
Per the expired 1970 MOU on NAMRU, all fixed equipment
and biological specimens will remain GOI property.

9. (SBU) Failure to reach agreement on the IUC is a
significant setback for our health cooperation with
Indonesia. Additionally, GOI positions during the IUC
negotiations may pose problems for other areas of
cooperation, such as the Science and Technology
Agreement. While we will work to close NAMRU-2 as
quietly as possible, some negative publicity may occur.
Mission recommends that USG agencies currently engaged
in health cooperation with Indonesia maintain their
ongoing programs. This will help minimize the impact
of the IUC impasse on other areas of our health
relationship. We will continue to look for additional
ways to minimize the damage this matter causes for
other bilateral issues, especially in light of the
President's upcoming visit. Mission has transmitted
proposed press guidance on this matter to the
Department via email.

OSIUS

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