Review reinforces Government action on weathertigh
Hon Maurice Williamson
Minister for Building &
Construction
22 December 2009
Review reinforces Government action on weathertightness
A PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) report released today on the size and cost of the weathertightness problem reinforces the Government’s work towards assisting affected homeowners, Building and Construction Minister Maurice Williamson said today.
“I commissioned this report because we needed to know the magnitude of the problem so we could respond appropriately,” Mr Williamson said. “The PwC report shows the damage is much larger than anyone had previously wanted to acknowledge.
“The review estimates that between 22,000 and 89,000 homes are affected. The Government accepts PwC’s consensus forecast that around 42,000 dwellings built between 1992 and 2008 could have been affected.
“The report says it is likely that only a minority of these leaky homes – around 3500 - have had repairs done to date, and around 9000 failures had now gone beyond the 10-year legal liability limit period.
“This leaves thousands of New Zealanders in a terrible position: they may not be able to borrow the money to repair their homes, or to sell them, so their single most important asset is decaying in front of their eyes.”
Based on 42,000 failures, the report estimates the total economic costs of fixing the affected homes at $11.3 billion in 2008 dollars.
“Issues can be laid at the doorstep of a lot of people and organisations, but the blame game has been played for too long – now it’s time to act. That’s why the Government is bringing together a package as a priority to help affected homeowners repair their homes and move on.”
Copies of the report : http://www.dbh.govt.nz/2009-news-index
Summary Fact Sheet of the PricewaterhouseCoopers Report into the scale and scope of Leaky Homes
The Department of Building and Housing commissioned PricewaterhouseCoopers to carry out research to re-estimate the size and cost of the weathertightness problem in New Zealand. The key findings are as follows:
Failure
Rates
• The total number of affected dwellings is
estimated to fall within the range of 22,000-89,000. The
consensus forecast is for an estimated 42,000 failures;
• Under current policy settings and resolution
mechanisms, approximately 3,500 dwellings have undergone
some form of repair to date;
• It is estimated that
approximately 9,000 of the failures have occurred beyond the
10 year limitation period for legal liability;
• Failure rates since 2006 appear to be much lower
than in previous years, suggesting changes in the regulatory
requirements and building practices have addressed the major
problems identified in the past and reduced the incidence of
weathertightness failures.
Failure Costs
• For the consensus forecast of 42,000 failures,
the total economic cost (i.e. repair and transaction costs)
of remediation of the affected dwellings is estimated as
$11.3 billion (in 2008 dollars);
• These costs are
estimated to be distributed, under the current policy, as
follows:
o 69 % to the owner;
o 25 % to councils;
o 4 % to third parties (e.g. builders); and
o 2 % to
the government (the cost of administering the WHRS etc)
• Owners carry the largest share as:
o they carry
their own transaction costs;
o failures occurring after
the 10-year liability limit are the owner’s
responsibility;
o many failures have gone unrecognised
and will, therefore, remain the owner’s responsibility;
o some owners are responsible for the building work
(they are the developer) or have failed to mitigate damage
when recognized (contributory negligence).
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
1. Why
was the PricewaterhouseCooopers report prepared?
A. The Department of Building and
Housing carried out a review of the approach to the
weathertightness problem in 2009. The first part of the
review was to identify the scope of the issue.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was contracted by the
Department to carry out research, analysis and modelling to
provide a re-estimate of the size and cost of the leaky
homes problem. Homes are defined as both houses and
apartments. This was the first comprehensive research
carried out on the scale and cost of the problem.
The
research had the objective of estimating:
• The number
of dwellings, built between 1992 (when the Building Act 1991
came into force) and July 2008, at risk of being leaky
buildings;
• The number of leaky dwellings that have
been repaired to date;
• Who is bearing what costs,
under current policy. Costs included: repair costs (e.g.
labour, materials, professional fees), legal costs,
transaction (e.g. council consent fees) and other costs.
2. What data did PwC
research?
A. A mix of quantitative
and qualitative data and information was used to develop the
re-estimate.
Quantitative data
included:
• Council building consent data: 10
Territorial Authorities collected information about
individual buildings from a random sample of their building
consent files from 1992 – 2008;
• Weathertight Homes
Resolution Service (WHRS) claims data;
• Statistics New
Zealand building population data;
• BRANZ building
materials survey data;
• Weathertight Homes Tribunal
adjudication decisions and Court decisions;
• Survey
of WHRS claimants and other
parties.
Qualitative information
A
number of interviews and workshops were held with a range of
experts in the building sector, including architects,
building surveyors, the Registered Master Builders
Federation, the Certified Builders Association, council
staff and WHRS assessors. The experts were asked for their
views on both the size and cost of the leaky homes problem.
The qualitative information was used to test the
quantitative data.
3. Which Territorial
Authorities provided you with
information?
A. Rodney District,
North Shore City, Waitakere City, Auckland City, Manukau
City, Tauranga City, Wellington City, Christchurch City,
Upper Hutt City and Dunedin City all supplied samples of
their building consent data. Their contributions ensured a
greater availability of data than previous
years.
4. How many homes are affected?
A. The PricewaterhouseCoopers
report shows there is a wide range of the possible number of
homes affected, from a low of 22,000 to a high of 89,000.
The report estimates that it is most likely approximately
42,000 homes (called the ‘consensus forecast’) built
between 1992 and 2008 have been affected. The evidence
suggests that only a minority have been repaired to
date.
Of the leaky homes covered by the re-estimate
approximately:
• 3,500 have already been
repaired;
• 9,000 are likely to be outside the 10 year
limitation period for legal liability.
Using the
‘consensus forecast’, it is therefore likely up to
around 30,000 dwellings have already failed, but not been
repaired, or will fail in the future (within the 10 year
limitation period).
5. What is the total
economic cost of the leaky homes
problem?
A. To remediate all of the
42,000 affected dwellings in the ‘consensus forecast’
would incur a total economic cost of an estimated $11.3
billion. Some of this cost has already been incurred in the
past for dwellings that have already been repaired. But the
future total economic cost of remediation is likely to be
around $6.3 billion.
6. What are the other
key findings in the PwC report?
A.
The review confirms what we have known – that there is no
single cause of the weathertightness problem. The causes
include:
• Poor design – such as buildings without
eaves;
• Poor workmanship, reflecting a low skill base
in the sector;
• Introduction of new materials and
products, without good knowledge about how to use
them;
• Weak inspection processes by councils.
7. Who is currently bearing the costs of the problem?
A. The cost of the weathertightness
problem is currently being borne mainly by owners: 69%.
Territorial authorities are meeting approximately 25% of the
cost and other parties (e.g: builders and developers) just
4% of the total cost. This is mainly because repairs on
most homes are paid for solely by owners, who usually do not
pursue legal remedies or obtain contributions from other
liable parties.
8. Are design or
architecture fees, legal fees and alternative accommodation
costs included in the total $11.3 billion
figure?
A. Yes, such costs are
included in the figure.
9. What about the
cost of repairs that have already been
undertaken?
A. The total cost of
the leaky homes problem includes repairs and costs which
have already been undertaken and paid for.
10. Are there regional variations?
A. Yes, there are regional
variations. In major metropolitan areas the single unit
dwellings (houses) built are typically larger and more
complex and multi-unit dwellings (apartments) that include
decks, flat roofs and a lack of eaves are also more frequent
in these areas. The style and fashion of dwellings with
greater use of monolithic cladding and higher risk design
features occur more often in the major metropolitan areas.
Building practices in these metro areas are also different
to the rest of the country and likely to have contributed to
the higher rate of failure - around 95 per cent of eligible
WHRS claims so far come from these areas.
The level of
skill and supervision for some large developments in these
areas may have been lower than elsewhere, particularly for
multi-unit dwellings where large numbers of labour-only
contractors were hired.
However, there are exceptions. In
Christchurch, there is a higher proportion of brick veneer
homes with low risk design trends as is more common in the
South Island. On the other hand, some dwellings built in
Queenstown and Wanaka are similar to those in the metro
areas with many sizeable and complex single unit
homes.
11. According to the report, are
multi-unit or single-unit dwellings more likely to face
weathertightness problems?
A.
Multi-unit dwellings show a much higher risk profile
according to the research and are therefore more likely to
experience weathertightness problems. However, the high risk
dwellings built more recently have used different building
practices that provide greater capacity for drainage and
drying. Therefore, the risk profile of more recently built
multi-units does not equate to the same rate of failure for
those built before 2005.
12. Why
was the original estimate for weathertightness so
inaccurate?
A. Previous estimates
were based on very limited data and knowledge about the
causes and effects of weathertightness failure. Since an
initial analysis by PwC in 2005, the passage of time has
allowed a longer claims history to emerge in the WHRS and
the courts; there has been an improved performance by
building assessors in the estimation of repair costs; and
the inclusion of a more detailed description of likely
damage in costings. In addition to this, a greater volume of
other information, in the form of evidence, anecdote and
opinion as to the prevalent and likely rate of nature of the
weathertightness failures in New Zealand’s housing has
emerged.
13. Are the figures accurate?
A.
The Government is satisfied the process was robust and the
data used was reliable and the best available. It is highly
unlikely a different process would have come up with a
significantly different result. Even so, the report
acknowledges there is a high degree of uncertainty about the
numbers, but whichever way you look at it, the problem is
big, the exact numbers don’t make any difference to that
fact.
14. What is the 10-year
limit?
A. The WHRS Act gives homeowners 10
years to lodge a claim with the WHRS from the time the
dwelling was built or altered. This is in line with the 10
year longstop period under the Building Act for commencing
proceedings relating to building work. The PwC report
concludes that the vast majority of leaky homes will show
evidence of latent failure within the 10-year
period.
15. Why has it taken so long for
the Government to release the PwC report?
A.
The Government was mindful of the impact on homeowners and
worked as quickly as possible, taking account of all the
information that had been collected as part of the review.
The report was released as soon as was reasonably
practicable in the circumstances.
16. Is the
Government directly liable for any of the leaky building
problems?
A. The Government has no legal liability for leaky homes.
ENDS